Want to hear about Russia's own "Operation Red Wings" or the Ansariya ambush? Let me tell you about the battle near the village of Kharsenoy. But before I begin, let’s define what GRU Spetsnaz brigades are. Then I’ll explain how GRU Spetsnaz degraded after the fall of the Soviet Union, their performance during both Chechen wars, and their tactical situation. I’ve seen many people — I think even Michael Kofman from CEIP — say that GRU Spetsnaz brigades are basically tier-3 elite infantry (like the 101st Airborne, etc.). While I understand why some folks think that (I’ll touch on it later), it’s not entirely accurate.

>>63905780 (OP)
The peak of their power was during the Soviet-Afghan War, when GRU had 14 special-purpose brigades with personnel exceeding 10,000. It’s worth noting that GRU brigades are roughly analogous to U.S. Army Special Operations Groups. During the conflict, their main objectives were sabotage, ambushes, raids, and adjusting artillery or airstrikes behind enemy lines. All 14 brigades were under the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and executed these missions with high combat effectiveness and readiness. Like all SF units, selection was strict — only young men (under 27) with prior military experience were accepted.

>>63905792
The fall of the Soviet Union was devastating for the entire army, including the special forces. Many SF personnel, unbelievably, were used as free labor in agriculture to plug holes in the collapsing economy. Worse still, all 14 brigades were scattered across the former Soviet republics. For example, the 5th Special Purpose Brigade in Belarus became part of the Belarusian Army; the 15th in Uzbekistan joined the Uzbek Army; the 4th in the Baltic Military District was disbanded, as the Baltic states wanted no part of it. Ukraine’s case is especially interesting.

>>63905798
Three brigades — the 8th, 9th, and 10th — were stationed in Ukraine. They became part of Ukraine’s armed forces and formed the foundation for its modern Special Operations Forces. The 9th Brigade was eventually disbanded, but the 8th became the 8th Separate Special Operations Regiment (Special Operations Center "West").

>>63905801
The 10th Brigade became the 3rd Separate Special Purpose Regiment (Special Operations Center "East"). Both units have played active roles in the Russo-Ukrainian War.

>>63905808
Fun fact: their organizational structure remains quite similar to their Soviet-era configuration (pic related).

>>63905816
As you can see, one brigade was reformed, and five others were absorbed into post-Soviet republics. Still, Russia retained eight brigades — a substantial number. Additionally, the capable 45th VDV Brigade was formed in 1994. However, losing six brigades reduced the number of qualified officers. That wasn’t the only issue: many officers were dismissed or resigned due to the chaos of the post-Soviet period. Many had Afghan experience. As a result, inexperienced individuals filled many SF leadership roles. Training suffered. The 1041st Training Regiment in Pechory, Pskov Oblast trained Spetsnaz sergeants, while the 467th Special Purpose Training Regiment was created to prepare those deploying to Afghanistan. Ideally, all Spetsnaz units should have gone through it. But the 1041st was disbanded, and during both Chechen wars, no similar training center was created.

>>63905818
GRU Special Purpose Brigades were originally meant to operate independently, conducting sabotage, ambushes, raids, and targeting behind enemy lines. However, in Chechnya, the army command was so poor that Spetsnaz were often subordinated to regular commanders and used for a wide range of tasks — many of which were not suitable for special forces (e.g., unsupported assaults on fortified positions). Sound familiar?

>>63905821
Regular army recon units were abysmal. To compensate, Spetsnaz autonomy was curtailed, and SF personnel were assigned to recon units — putting them directly under army commanders. In a well-led military, this might be fine. But this was the 1990s Russian Army. Seeing Spetsnaz in their ranks, commanders believed they could do anything — including suicidal frontal assaults. Over time, the growing competence of army recon units began to encroach on the traditional sabotage role of Spetsnaz. This, in my opinion, is where the myth of Spetsnaz as elite light infantry began.

>>63905825
The Russian Army remained virtually unchanged between the First and Second Chechen Wars — with the same problems affecting GRU Special Forces. They were again used inappropriately, although sabotage and raid missions still occurred. However, even those saw a noticeable drop in quality compared to the Afghan War.

>>63905828
Let’s return to the main topic. The year 2000 was the bloodiest of the Second Chechen Campaign. Though Grozny was captured, many insurgents survived and linked up with stronger units in the mountainous south. The republic was not fully under Russian control. The high command mistakenly believed the insurgency had been crushed. Mechanized units began advancing into the mountains. But vehicles bogged down in mud, weather limited air support (Russia’s 1990s-era air force had no capability for low-visibility ops), and soldiers faced brutal conditions.

>>63905833
On the night of February 15–16, four groups from the consolidated 700th Detachment of the 2nd Separate Special Purpose Brigade (2nd Spetsnaz Brigade) set out from Tangy-Chu to secure the advance of the 752nd Motor Rifle Regiment. On February 19, they were ordered to conduct recon ahead of the 752nd's February 21 advance toward Kharsenoy. The following groups participated: Group 231 (16 men), 232 (17 men), 233 (18 men), and 234 (13 men).

>>63905843
By February 20, Groups 232 and 234 reached elevation 947.0 — near where the battle would occur. Groups 231 and 233 remained at elevation 892.0. That evening, 232 and 234 moved to nearby heights 1029.0 and 1106.0. Group 231 took elevation 947.0, leaving behind 10 frostbitten men with Group 233.

>>63905848
Around February 20, Spetsnaz encountered the Ministry of Justice's "Typhoon" unit. Major Nikolai Evtukh later described meeting sick, frostbitten recon troops sleeping in the snow with only coats and a radio. They were given food. One soldier collapsed from a 1.5-meter fall. Another twisted his ankle. Both were evacuated by helicopter. Evtukh’s unclear account suggests one soldier from Group 234 was injured and stayed behind — 13 deployed, but only 12 fought. Possibly, both a recon man and the Typhoon spotter were evacuated.

>>63905854
On February 21, a six-man element of Group 231 reached elevation 947.0 and spotted a prepared enemy strongpoint and two trucks. They destroyed the trucks with RPG fire — an extremely risky move. Company Commander S.A. Alyoshin ordered reinforcements. By 11:30, Group 234 arrived. 35 men were now on the height, including 8 from motor rifle units (likely spotters and engineers). Groups 233 and part of 231 remained at elevation 892.0.

>>63905857
Staff Sergeant Filippov(pic related), though badly injured, survived and testified. Another wounded soldier survived only by falling down a slope. Propaganda claimed that children executed soldiers, but survivors and 752nd troops reported no such thing — though wounded were indeed finished off with headshots. Around 10:30, 752nd troops began advancing from the Malyy Kharsenoy ravine, still in contact via dying radios. Troops were exhausted after three days through mud and hills. Some were hit by artillery. They didn’t reach the battle in time. Typhoon personnel also heard the gunfire but received no orders and had no situational awareness. Charging uphill would risk friendly fire. At 12:45, Group 231’s commander reported militants occupying trenches 300 meters south of elevation 947.0. He requested artillery fire. At 13:05, a ranging shot was fired. Then the signal was lost. No further artillery support came

>>63905875
Between 13:10–13:30, the 752nd heard heavy gunfire. By 14:30, they reached the scene: 33 dead and 2 wounded. Many weapons were stacked in pyramids; soldiers were drying clothes. The attack was a surprise. Likely, the recon troops spotted militants, called for fire, but were flanked and hit from above. The firefight lasted 15–20 minutes. Infantry arrived too late. Claims that vehicles were heard are likely embellishment — troops were on foot. All sources agree: no unit could have responded in time. The Typhoon unit physically couldn’t reach them. The 752nd infantry arrived first. One infantryman recalled: “We marched for days. Recon led us. We got hit by Grads. At Kharsenoy we collapsed. Then we were ordered uphill. We heard gunfire. The clearing was surrounded by bushes; a road cut through it. Spetsnaz had taken position under trees. Security was set near the edge. There were mattresses — who brought them? A pit had been dug. Looks like they were hit while resting. Two survived. One had bandaged the other. We were ordered to move into Kharsenoy but were repelled. The clearing was later dubbed ‘The Dead Clearing.’”

>>63905875
The recon unit chose a poor position — an open, familiar clearing with minimal security. Many weapons weren’t at hand. One survivor only had grenades. Though 8 machine guns were present, most weren’t manned. Contact with command was lost early. No defensive measures (mines, signal traps) were laid. Artillery couldn’t be used without accurate coordinates. Air support wasn’t viable. The recon troops resisted and didn’t surrender. Militants soon reoccupied the strongpoint. Infantryman's account: “It got dark. We were ordered to link with the only surviving spetsnaz group. The company refused to go at night. Commander threatened court-martial. Then said at 6 AM artillery and air strikes would hit the area. We left before the bombardment. We dragged the dead into the forest. Then saw two militants — they walked toward Group 233. No response on radio or flares. We advanced. The spetsnaz mistook us for enemies. Their sniper shot one in the head, one in the neck. Another hit a tripwire. They had dug in well. Eventually, the sniper realized we were allies and stopped. He guided us through the mines. They were lucky. So were we.” Two more soldiers died in this friendly fire incident. Radios had died the day before. Flares were misunderstood. This shows what could’ve happened had anyone rushed a dug-in spetsnaz position head-on.
In conclusion, it’s hard to estimate militant casualties. But there's a good chance they didn’t even have numerical superiority. This was a one-sided battle — and a tragic one.

>>63905780 (OP)
Is this a bot? Who are you even talking to.

>>63905892
we this is it

>>63905900
maybe I am a bot anon

>>63905900
First storytime thread?
>>63905892
>go on recon mission
>start shooting
You can't fix stupid.

I enjoy autism OP. Have a double weapons dump.
https://www.x.com/wartranslated/status/1938596736261357756

>>63906142
https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1938165674448232873

>>63905900
Lurk for a year before posting, newfag.

good thread

Thanks story-anon

>>63907462
>>63907468
thanks frens

interesting thread, did you also make the thread about the similar story of those russians getting hunted down & captured in the mountains in a botched operation?
it's interesting how incompetent they really are a lot of the time, bit of a waste.

>>63909104
>did you also make the thread about the similar story of those russians getting hunted down & captured in the mountains in a botched operation?
yes it was my thread
>it's interesting how incompetent they really are a lot of the time, bit of a waste.
well their problems started during the soviet union and even through Red army was better led and something like this would led to massive investigation they still had their fair share of problems. The fall of Soviet union only worsen the situation and even 2010s military reforms did not fixed their problems. Main difference between modern and 90s Russia is relatively better economy and Putin's ambitions thats it

did GRU units back then have political commisars like we see in movies where some commisar over rides the captain on ships over little things?

Thank you for telling us about something interesting, Anon.