The world exists only for the experience of Me. Outside of it, nothing exists, because there is nothing out there to be experienced - it exists only to be known. Without someone to experience it, the world ceases to exist, because it exists only as an object of knowledge.

>>24466653 (OP)
Solipsism OP, it's been done

>>24466653 (OP)
What does that have to do with you specifically?

>>24466727
What truly exists is the I and the Other. The I is the negation of the Other; it is the self‑affirmation of myself. The Other is the negation of the I. The I can only affirm itself, for reality resides in it. The Other, as such, does not exist in itself but only as that which is different, the non‑I.

The I is each person’s individual constitution, their own individuality. From this point of view, the I has total superiority over the Other, for I am I and all I need resides solely in me. The Other, in this sense, exists only as the negation of the I.

>>24466653 (OP)
>>24466735
A classic misreading of Fichte, Jacobi being the main exponent. Fichte was so pissed over it that he devoted all of book 2 of On the Vocation of Man to presenting this solipsistic/nihilistic misreading with his OWN arguments from the Foundation almost word for word and then in part 3 overcoming it with a popular version of genuine idealism - attacking his 'own' philosophy as it was construed by the opponents of idealism. The Fichte-Jacobi feud is very sad. Jacobi was ofc a Christian counterenlightenment figure who thought reason turned into nihilism and that we needed faith even to believe in the external world. Fichte (unlike other so-called Kantians) saw his point, hence in part 3 of the Foundation he talks about 'belief' as the ground of knowing, and in the 1st and 2nd Introductions it's even more explicit. There are letters from Fichte to Jacobi where he says, essentially, 'you're right man, I dig what you're doing. We don't actually disagree at all. Your pistic realism is the same as my transcendental idealism, they're both legitimate viewpoints." This is especially remarkable because Fichte was normally pretty nasty to any variety of dogmatism/realism. But Jacobi never understood the Wissenschaftslehre. Fichte was pretty sure he never even read part 3 of the Foundation. I wish I had my copy of their letters with me.

In response to the OP - suffice it to say that if there was no world outside of you you wouldn't be able to act. The old 'how do you know your representations are actually grounded in something else?' argument has no sting for a transcendental idealist, it's obviously transcendent. (Many people find Kant's Refutation of Idealism unsatisfying because they don't understand this). We have representations of an external world = there is an external world. To respond to the solipsism angle I'd have to go through the Summons arguments, but the tl;dr is that the origin of consciousness can only be explained by a determinate concept of individuality and determinacy necessitates determinability.

>>24466814
I can clarify further - the transcendental idealist can deduce belief in reality (the feeling of necessity), but you have to have belief to enter the system in the first place (specifically belief in your own free will and morality). It's ironic that Fichte is remembered as a radical 'subjectivist' or 'egoist' when his entire goal is to prove the reality of the world, other minds, and the meaningfulness of life.

>>24466735
>The Other, as such, does not exist in itself but only as that which is different, the non‑I.
This actually goes both ways lol keep reading. Nature is 'inert', 'dead', 'passive' in the sense that it has no free will, "the real negation of intuiting" but you couldn't exist apart from it.

"Nothing in the Wissenschaftslehre is more crucial than the interaction of the I and the not-I. The I is intuitable only in reciprocal reaction with the not-I.. It can be thought of apart from this relationship; but then it is not actual, but is a necessary idea. The not-I, on the other hand, cannot even be thought of as existing outside of reason." (This is obviously true. Go on and try to think of it, you will find yourself present as the thinker). "The I is primary; the not-I is secondary, and this is why one is able to think of the I in isolation, but not of the not-I. The pure I is a mere idea, whereas the I obtains actuality, i.e. intuitability or being, only in connection with or in relationship to the not-I. The not-I can certainly be thought of as existing apart from any connection with our individual reason. That is to say, the not-I might exist even if we did not, but then it would not exist *for us*. This is why ordinary common sense has resort to a creator when it considers the creation of the world: *it is unable to imagine the not-I apart from some relationship to a rational being*, i.e. God. To be sure, the creation of the world is explained differently in the Wissenschaftslehre." (1799 Nova Methodo 5)

Transcendentally, the not-I is simply another way of viewing your own activity, and even there it's necessary. Practically, the not-I is as real as you are.

>>24466814
I didn't think anyone would read it. So here's the rest that I didn't publish in the previous post. >>24466735

"The Self is sovereign, for I am the Self; the Other is the non-self—he does not see things as the Self sees them, does not know what I know, does not like what I like. The Self is source; the Other, boundary. The Self affirms; the Other restricts.

The Other is a represented object—that is, a mere object to be known, never a source of knowledge. The Self is Subject, the one who knows, yet never known. The Other is object—never knowing, always known."