Can someone explain what the visitor means in the last two dialogues of his? I think I get them but I'm not sure. This is 244 btw.

>THEAETETUS: What do you mean?

>VISITOR: If he supposes that a thing is different from its name, then surely he's mentioning two things.

>THEAETETUS: Yes.

>VISITOR: And moreover if he supposes that the name is the same as the thing, he'll either be forced to say that the name is the name of nothing, or else, if he says that it's the name of something, then it's the name of nothing other than itself and so will turn out to be only the name of a name and nothing else.

>THEAETETUS: Yes.

>VISITOR: And also the one, being the name of the one, will also be the one of the name.

bump

>>24473117 (OP)
If you insist that the name refers only to itself (a name is a name), then the name no longer points to anything real; it refers to just another name, an endless loop of language detached from reality.

>>24473636
Only fags like you would want to depict Christ with long hair because you're effeminate.

>>24473636
Okay, that was close to what I understood. What about the first part?

>>24473708
>If he supposes that a thing is different from its name, then surely he's mentioning two things.

if you say, "a tree is not the same as the word 'tree'", you are now talking about two things:

The word 'tree' (the sign)

The actual tree (the referent)

acknowledging the difference between a name and the thing it names necessarily means we are speaking of two distinct entities: the name, which is a symbol, and the thing, which exists independently of the name. This distinction preserves the link between language and reality, allowing words to meaningfully refer beyond themselves

>>24473740
No, I meant this

>VISITOR: And moreover if he supposes that the name is the same as the thing, he'll either be forced to say that the name is the name of nothing,

>>24473763
Will I rose with any other name smell different?

Then the word is not the thing and what you call atheism is just a thing and not the thing you are refering to

>>24473117 (OP)
He's spelling out difficulties of the Parmenidean thesis "One is".

1) If they distinguish the word-name "One" from the One itself, then they'd be forced to admit "Many is," insofar as the word-name and the One itself both are.

2) If they don't distinguish the word-name "One" from the One itself, then they're forced to admit that either A) it's the word-name of nothing/no-thing, because they're left with only a word-name, or B) it's the word-name of something/some-thing, but that something amounts to only a word-name for another word-name (because if "One is", all word-names are just word-names of the same One thing).

>>24473117 (OP)
It just means "words mean things". A word that refers to itself is unintelligible, as it is not fulfilling its function and may as well refer to nothing, like the word spoqital.

>>24473787
Great take, emblematic of many painful readings. Here's a question. What if we take the angle that words aren't things? Or that the word refers to One and itself is one insofar as it is one (and not many unintelligible letters)?

>>24473809
>Great take, emblematic of many painful readings. Here's a question. What if we take the angle that words aren't things? Or that the word refers to One and itself is one insofar as it is one (and not many unintelligible letters)?
I would imagine that the objection to the first option would be that it presupposes what it means to be or to be One. I don't think anyone would disagree that words aren't "things"/"beings" the way a tree or animal is, but you'd probably run into something like the positivist verification problem, where "it's wrong/right to say that words have being" would be meaningless, since wrongness and rightness or truth or falsity or whatever don't have the kind of being a tree or animal does either. The second option might run smack dab into the difficulty of taking "One" by different senses, where it can mean "a whole" or "a unit" or "a unity", but only by softening the Parmenidean thesis so that One can be while also Many could be. (It does resemble the second hypothetical deduction in Plato's dialogue Parmenides, but it's not clear how Plato thinks Parmenides takes it.)

>>24473917
>where "it's wrong/right to say that words have being" would be meaningless, since wrongness and rightness or truth or falsity or whatever don't have the kind of being a tree or animal does either
It would be a being of relation, wouldn't it? But I see what you mean because these kinds of meta-arrangements are not like the things that they are supposed to describe. The being of a true statement is ultimately nothing compared to the being of the things it describes (of which a certain matching is what makes it true).
>where it can mean "a whole" or "a unit" or "a unity"
To what extent do these things mean different things? As far as I can tell, a whole or a unit are the same thing, except that a unit has some purpose of measurement, and unity is the abstracted property which describes the fact that any whole or unit is itself (so, it's still tied to those wholes/units/etc. and is tautological).

bump

>>24473117 (OP)
The Stranger is trying to show that “otherness” (and thus a harmless form of “not-being”) is unavoidable. If name and thing are really two different items, then “difference” obviously exists. But suppose a sophist insists they are the very same item; the result is still absurd. For then the word “one” would literally be the number one, which would mean it can name nothing except itself; naming would collapse into a single self-referential object. Either way, we must distinguish the sign from what it signifies, so some real relation of being-other-than must be admitted. This prepares the ground for the Stranger’s later claim that not-being is simply “being different,” which in turn saves the possibility of false statement.

>>24473117 (OP)
>Can someone explain what the visitor means in the last two dialogues of his?
thing- being
name- essence
c.f. cratylus where words have no essence

>>24474967
he needs attention too

>>24473117 (OP)

>>24473117 (OP)
i drew an image

>>24475842
You put more effort but it literally makes less sense than the other explanations

>>24475886
That's a you problem

>>24473772
>>24473787
>>24473809
>>24474967
>>24475842
Thank you anons.
So what I understood is:
1) You can assume the name (N) and the thing (T) are different things.

2) If you assume they're the same, you'll have to admit (i) N is not 'naming' anything as is the function of a name (since it's the same as T) or (ii) if you want to say it is naming something, you'll be forced to say it's just naming itself, N, and so is simply the name of a name.
Correct so far?

>>24476030
Pretty much

Keep this in mind Dostoievsky once said

"When a kid has a concept of something it learns the word inmediatly"

what does this have to do with pointers?

>>24473117 (OP)
Worried you didn't make it to the top of the dog pile and get your initiation op?

>>24477262
??!

>>24477814
I may have been thinking of Phaedrus. Was this where they try to figure out what a sophist is?

>>24478506
Yeah it is but >>24477262 still doesn't make sense

>>24473117 (OP)
>>VISITOR: And moreover if he supposes that the name is the same as the thing, he'll either be forced to say that the name is the name of nothing, or else, if he says that it's the name of something, then it's the name of nothing other than itself and so will turn out to be only the name of a name and nothing else.
>>THEAETETUS: Yes.

>>24478526
My take may not be strictly canonical. Iirc they basically come to a conclusion that a sophist is an imitator of a philosopher. Aristotle was the one who refined this further. At the time they were left with a conjecture that the use of dialectic could indicate one who seeks knowledge or one who is merely avoiding refutation. The former being the philosopher and the latter being the sophist or something to that extent. In Phaedrus there are references to climbing to the top of the dog pile and acquiring initiation. In Sophist they also conjecture that dialectic is means to verify or define without division. Plato's writings would indicate he sided with division but Socrates stuck with dialectic. This makes the process of identification difficult and subject to group consensus and may have little bearing on the outcome. A sophist by that definition could still reach the top and achieve initiation. A sophist by Aristotle's definition could not.

>>24478551
Oh okay. I haven't gone that far yet so didn't get the reference. I thought you were calling Plato pretentious or something.

>>24478551
>that dialectic is means to verify or define without division. Plato's writings would indicate he sided with division but Socrates stuck with dialectic
Can you explain what you mean by verify with division? I assume you mean something about dialectic not being an adequate means for verifying objective truth but I never heard it framed as dialectic vs division.

>>24478574
Is this another challenge? Are we all mere pseudlosophists?

>>24478583
Dialectic can include division but it's mostly arriving at an outcome via opposing viewpoints.