Cabrera's absolutely right that human beings can't be held responsible for the structural defects of Being (a decidedly Gnostic insight). What they are guilty of, however, is what they become when these constraints are lifted or at least mitigated. You see it all around you now. The state of nature - understood as the most thermodynamically probable existential predicament - is preferable to what we got going on today because 1) it is an incubator of morality even if morality is a palliative and 2) the "moral impediments" it imposes on human society are not as pervasive or global. What human beings become in a condition of surplus reveals a deeper relation between the will and the world that I think both escapes Cabrera and precedes the world itself: terminal wills (loci of perception tilted towards their outside) implicate and are implicated by terminal structures (itself a Buddhist insight - what isn't a Buddhist insight is Cabrera insisting that sexual perversion does not violate his MEA insofar as it is sexual: but that's a story for another day). You are born into the world that will have you. Abolish its frictions, and the vast majority only expose why they were born into it in the first place. It's not that people are amnesiac demiurges. No: we're not complicit with the structure of Being: we're complicit with those parts of us which are implicated within that structure. In Montano's terms (PBUH), we're complicit with our "informational closeness" to becoming.

>>24487735 (OP)
So we should no become? If we are the result of becoming, then 'becoming' is our utmost characteristic of our being, by which we even exist. Existence is expressed by the further becoming of being. Death isn't a choice. For life is constant death, and death is the death of death. Intelligence is the antithesis of death. It is the reproduction and continuation of itself by itself. Death is cheated by intelligence. I think we are but a stage of being where intelligence emerges from our conditions. What is next is unknown for us.

Putting my argument another way: morality is only possible under duress, within a system determined by punitive feedback: its limited phase-space and contingent repression of the terminal: expand that phase space, and evil is revealed as the Carpocratic attractor it was all along. In other words, the Augustinian position was not necessarily wrong, but premature. Cabrera's right, but only within a premodern EROI band.

>>24487931
I think you are right about the duress. I don't understand the other part of your post.
I think morality is an anvil hanging on a very thin hair of unknowing. It is unknowing that makes us capable of living with our actions, for if we knew the causal thread of all our actions millions of causes ahead, then our planning on things would have to change and our actions would even have to become evil in some cases, because some times it is evil that prevents even bigger evil in the future

>>24488046
That's the point. In a world where actions can reverberate globally, most of them resolve into evil. The "Carpocratic attractor." To say nothing of overt local evil. In nature's more restricted possibility space, evil can't get off the ground. Augustine was talking about original sin. He was wrong then, right now. Cabrera argues man isn't evil; he is immoral only because he is forced to adapt to a defective world. He is wrong now, but would have been right in Augustine's time. Which is why I'm saying: Augustine was premature. Humanity needs technology and civilization to actualize its latent sinfulness. It's only then that humanity is revealed as an accomplice of evil. We're not guilty of the way the world is, but we are guilty of being magnetized to it.