Can any Platofag explain this passage?

>VISITOR: Now if that which is has the characteristic of the one in this way, will it be one and a whole? Or shall we simply deny it's a whole at all?

>THEAETETUS: That's a hard choice.

>VISITOR: You're right. If it has the characteristic of somehow being one, it won't appear to be the same as the one. Moreover, everything will then be more than one.

>THEAETETUS: Yes.

>VISITOR: Further if that which is is not a whole by possessing that as a [c] characteristic, but rather just is the whole itself, that which is will turn out to be less than itself. [!]

>THEAETETUS: Certainly.

>VISITOR: And because it's deprived of itself, that which is will be not being, according to that account.

>THEAETETUS: Yes.

>VISITOR: And everything will be more than one, since that which is and the whole will each have its own separate nature.

>THEAETETUS: Yes.

>VISITOR: But if the whole is not at all, then the very same things are true of that which is, and in addition to not being, it would not

The problem I have is with the passage marked with the exclamation mark.

What I don't understand is how being not being a whole, can be the whole itself.

I've read another translation which makes more sense:

>However, if “what is” is not a whole on account of being characterised as one, and yet the whole itself is, then “what is” turns out to be missing part of itself.

Is this the correct interpretation? It considers the whole as existing by itself and being as not being whole.

I don't know but stay vigilant against chatgp jeet trying to answer plato with llm responses

You can’t have a whole without parts, so if being simply “is” one/whole, it’s simultaneously whole and parts - there needs to be some distinction between unity and being. (Example, a distinction between the genus (unity) and species (being without unity).) On the other hand, if being and the one are different, then anything that is is plural, and then how could anything be one?

These dialectical games were permanently and irrevocably solved by Aristotle btw. Can you spot the sophism?

I never read Plato and even I understand this, maybe you're just retarded...

>>24496141
Could you explain this specific passage anon?
VISITOR: Further if that which is is not a whole by possessing that as a [c] characteristic, but rather just is the whole itself, that which is will turn out to be less than itself.
I'm just not able to wrap my head around what whole itself is and how that which is can not be a whole and still be the absolute whole.

>>24496141
Could you explain this specific passage anon?
>VISITOR: Further if that which is is not a whole by possessing that as a [c] characteristic, but rather just is the whole itself, that which is will turn out to be less than itself.
I'm just not able to wrap my head around what whole itself is and how that which is can not be a whole and still be the whole itself.

>>24495807 (OP)
See if Benardete's translation is slightly more clear to follow. Included where I think the argument per se starts. (please don't wreck the formatting 4chan)

>STRANGER: And what of this? Shall they say the whole's other than
'that which is one' or the same as this?
>THEAETETUS: Of course they'll say, and they do say, it's the same.
>S: If then, it is a whole, just as Parmenides says-
>"From all quarters like unto the bulk of well-rounded sphere,
and from its midpoint equivalent in every direction, for it must
not be
any bigger or any smaller in this direction or in this"-
>then, 'that which is' in being of this sort has a middle and extremes,
and if it has these, there's every necessity for it to have parts, or
how?
>T: That's so.
>S: And though there's nothing to prevent that which has been
partitioned to have the experience (affect) of the one over all its
parts, and injust this way to be that which is an all and one whole-
>T: Certainly.
>S: Isn't it really impossible for the one itself to be that which
has experienced it?
>T: How's that?
>S: Surely it must have been said of the truly one, according
to the correct speech, that it's completely without parts.
>T: Indeed it must.
>S: Yes, but that something of the sort is out of many parts
will not be consonant with that speech.
>T: I understand.
>S: Will 'that which is', if it has the experience (affect) of the
one in this way, be one and a whole, or are we to say altogether
that 'that which is' is not a whole?
>T: You've put forward a hard choice.
>S: That's really most true what you say. For it's no less so if
'that which is' has been affected to be one in a sense, since it will
evidently not be the same as the one, and all the things will be
strictly more than one-
>T: Yes.
>S: Than if 'that which is' is not a whole on account of the fact
of its having been made to be affected by that (i.e., the one), and
the whole itself is, since then 'that which is' turns out to fall short
of itself.

>>24496735
>(please don't wreck the formatting 4chan)
WRECKED AGAIN GODDAMNIT lmao

>>24495807 (OP)
>>24496695
>>24496735
Here's my takeaway:

Similar to your other thread, the Stranger is working out the aporiai of the Parmenidean position, with respect to the One and "that which is."

The issue: Is the Whole = "that which is *one*" = the One?

The two options are:

A) "That which is" is a One because of the many in the One experiencing the One, but then it appears that the One would have to be different from the collective *as* a One, and so this kind of One would exceed itself in some way (you have the One that sounds like it's a Whole or Totality, plus the "truly One").

B) "That which is" is a Whole, but not on account of experiencing the One, as a way out of the problem in A, but then this Whole falls short of itself in not including the One, since "that which is" is short for "that which is one," but the One by this hypothesis hasn't affected anything in the Whole.

>>24496821
>you have the One that sounds like it's a Whole or Totality, plus the "truly One"

Yeah, this is how I took it. To reason it from the lens of the Forms the hierarchy would go something like the One>>> the form of the One that is their totality> the forms> material world.

The quality of oneness is below the One.

>>24495807 (OP)
Of your quoted section

>>>And everything will be more than one, since that which is and the whole will each have its own separate nature.

This is the takeaway of the section you posted- Dualism. Each thing partakes of Being and of Not Being. The Not Being section dies away in the face of the One. Forms etc.

It is called patricide of Parmenides because he is saying there is stuff which is not though it partakes of Being.

Platostoticles....