I'm currently reading the Sutta Pitaka, and some of the suttas around parinibbana, rebirth etc have made me realize this shit is 100% annihilationism, and the only reason its rejected as such is because of semantics.

Parinibbana is the end of rebirth, suffering, consciousness and ALL experiences. There is no awareness, identity, or experiencer left, its total cessation as quoted by the Buddha. This matches the definition of annihilation, however when pointing out that if nothing remains, and nothing can be experienced, you're annihilated, they come back with "its just the unconditioned, you can't understand it with dualistic thinking". But the Buddha's own words are describing actual annihilation, even if he rejected annihilation.

I've read that this is really a language issue, and that in the original language Buddhism was taught in, it was called "deconfiguration" which was literally a more positive Indian spiritual version of the Western understanding of annihilation.
Buddhists, Theravadin ones at least, are attempting to commit quantum suicide.

There are other hilarious aspects in the Suttas as well, like the one about allowing yourself to be butchered.

>inb4 hylic cope

>>24497899 (OP)
I thought nibbana was a state of bliss.

>>24497908
I'm not sure what you're implying.
Are you calling Buddhism a hylic cope that arose out of a shithole country where people obviously yearned for a final death due to belief they'd be reborn there indefinitely unless they did something about it and thus agreeing with me?
Or otherwise?

>>24497915
A state of bliss, which appears to be likened to the state you existed in prior to birth, if you can call that a state, sure.

Guenon considered Buddhism as Buddha taught it to be a heterodox deviation, yet I see how the Infinite, what Guenon thought lies at the centre of every tradition is present there too.

The Infinite is that which admits no limitation, and I see Buddha as saying the goal is to reach the Infinite: his goal is so limitless even words can't grasp it (it would indeed be a limitation for a thing if it could be captured in words).

However, it's also interesting how Shakyamuni's doctrine is the most averse to metaphysics and absolute truth claims. He did say to not take him on faith and that all his teaching is meant to be discarded when the goal is reached, so everything he said has a provisional character...

>>24497938
Unfortunately you do have to take certain aspects on faith. Buddhism is a supposedly "come and see" religion, however, certain MAJOR elements like Nibbana are not able to be confirmed directly by us until we become Arahants, which takes multiple lifetimes, or possibly just this one if you're an incredibly advanced monastic.
Its unreachable by laity in this life (supposedly) which contradicts a lot of the friendlier nature in which faith is de-emphasized and personal experience is encouraged in a lot of the discourses.

Most Buddhists cope this away with "well you practice for a few years and confirm some of it as true, then you you take the rest on faith/confidence that he was right about everything else, too" which is incredibly convenient.

>>24497899 (OP)
write annihilation one more time could you for me - I must've skipped over that part

By no means a Buddhist or Buddhist scholar but the concept of anatta always interested me. The idea that the self is also illusion and there is no real-you. If most of what you see is attachment and that attachment also produces suffering than complete removal of attachment would mean destruction of the self. I don’t know how one experiences phenomena without the utility of a self. Maybe some animals live in this state but that wouldn’t seem to be an enlightened life. I agree that Buddhism is largely life denying

>>24498026
*most of what you are

>>24498045
Anatta is usually their next crutch in the argument, that there isn't a you to permanently die in the first place, its all a cognition error basically. Which means they recognize that there is no experience in parinibbana, "you're" just gone.

crazy to see westerners care about shitty indian and swamp asian people talking about how being indian sucks so much they deny the reality of the bodies.
if i was indian i'd also want my self to be an illusion

>>24497938
t.Guénonfag here
Not really. For Guénon, the later schools were not the true representatives of the Buddha's teachings; he was influenced by Coomaraswamy in this regard. He was not entirely against Theravadin Buddhism (as his account of the milinda panha shows), but he was (like Sankara) hostile to the nihilistic schools that reified the concept (which was more of a strategy) of anatta for purely polemical purposes. In the Aṭṭhakavagga and Pārāyanavagga, the oldest part of the Pali canon, there is never any question of a non-self as an ontological concept.

>For the benefit of readers who may have been aware of the first edition of this book, we consider it appropriate to briefly indicate the reasons which led us to modify the present chapter: when this first edition appeared, we had no reason to doubt that, as is usually claimed, the most restricted and most clearly antimetaphysical forms of the Hînayâna represented the very teaching of Shâkya-Muni; we did not have the time to undertake the lengthy research which would have been necessary to explore this question further, and moreover, what we knew then of Buddhism was in no way of a nature to lead us to it. But, since then, things have taken on a completely different aspect as a result of the work of A. K. Coomaraswamy (who himself was not a Buddhist, but a Hindu, which sufficiently guarantees his impartiality) and his reinterpretation of original Buddhism, from which it is so difficult to extract the true meaning of all the heresies that have been grafted onto it subsequently and which we naturally had especially in mind during our first writing; it goes without saying that, as far as these deviated forms are concerned, what we had written at first remains entirely valid. Let us add on this occasion that we are always ready to recognize the traditional value of any doctrine, wherever it may be found, as soon as we have sufficient proof of it; but unfortunately, if the new information that we have had has been entirely to the advantage of the doctrine of Shakya-Muni (which does not mean all Buddhist schools indiscriminately), it is quite different for all the other things whose anti-traditional character we have denounced.

>>24498052
In the Pali canon (Aggi-Vacchagotta Sutta) the Buddha is neither annihilated nor actually present, he is compared to the extinguished flame (=nibbana), according to the Brahmin the fire is Agni, and when this fire was extinguished Agni did not disappear but rather permeated the cosmos as Brahman. The difference being that Agni eventually re-arises and the Buddha does not.
As >>24498077 said such confusions arise only due to later nihilist polemical schools of Buddhism

Okay where do I even start with buddhism and all this? what book

>>24497899 (OP)
According to Buddhist cosmology, your soul which endlessly cycles through births, living, and deaths, upon entering parinibbana (pari, the prefix, denotes completion, extremity, finality), your soul escapes the endless cycle and is transported into another dimension where you no longer have to swim in the samsara and where you exist for ever in a state of ataraxia so to speak. Therefore, technically, it isn't annihilationism where you are reduced to nothing (nihil).

>>24498158
> Okay where do I even start with buddhism and all this? what book

1) Moralizing Proselytism for Dummies - Nigel Biggelsworth
2) The Absence of a Soul: Reflections on Being an NPC - Jonah Goldberg
3) The Isvara Delusion: Why Religion Ruins Everything - Shlomo Cohen
4) A Sourcebook of Sophistic Relativism - Thaksinawatra Sukhdeep
5) The Permanent Extinction of One's Aggregate of Consciousness is not Annihilationism Because it Never Existed to Begin With: Parsing Mahayana Dialectics - Chen Wang
6) On Compassion for Non-existent Persons - James Davies

>>24498077
Where's that quote from?

The real question is Mahayana or Theravada

I don't know why but when I see Theravadins online, theres a mass amount of non-sectarian infighting between them. I see much less with Mahayana practitioners. Seems like theres a huge beef in Theravada circles between EBT purists (theres not even enough material to adhere to lmao) and run of the mill Theravadins.

>>24497899 (OP)
>even if he rejected annihilation.

The religion rejects it for practical reasons (it never would have become a religion if it was canonically annihilationist), but I doubt the Buddha ever would have rejected it personally. Even in the suttas, they typically have him sidestepping the question.

A clue for you is the two truths doctrrine. There is a secret truth that is available only to the select Bhikku who are capable of dealing with annihilation. For the lay people and other people who cannot handle it, you let them believe what they want about the afterlife, because it is inconsequentia. As the Buddha says in the scriptures, it's just a thicket that does not lead to enlightenment. All you need are the 4 Noble Truths.

>>24498045
Every image of a Buddha shows him smiling and in a state of bliss. Compare that to your Jesus imagery. I wouldn't say that solving the problem of pain/suffering is life denying, especially if it allows you to live with contentment and happiness.

>>24498483
is self-sacrifice for others life denying?

You AREN'T HERE
>b-but I'm here
NO YOU AREN'T
>I'm pretty sure tha-
YOU JUST AREN'T
NOTHING IS HERE

>>24497899 (OP)
Realization of no “I” is not annihilation
Emptiness (sunyata) is not just nothingness
The Mahayana update is worth looking into. But the real Mahayana Buddhists deeply respect the Theravada Buddhists, and in fact they share the same core basis in many respects.

>>24497899 (OP)
but anon, there already is no identity or experiencer. there is no self and nothing to achieve. there is nothing to annihilate. you just have to recognize that.

>>24497899 (OP)
The only thing annihilated are lies. Cope more midwit.

>>24498483
>No two ideals could be more opposite than a Christian saint in a Gothic cathedral and a Buddhist saint in a Chinese temple. The opposition exists at every point; but perhaps the shortest statement of it is that the Buddhist saint always has his eyes shut, while the Christian saint always has them very wide open. The Buddhist saint always has a very sleek and harmonious body, but his eyes are heavy and sealed with sleep. The medieval saint's body is wasted to its crazy bones, but his eyes are frightfully alive. There cannot be any real community of spirit between forces that produced symbols so different as that.

>>24498652
Chesterton's style of promoting Christianity and subtly or not-so-subtly putting down all alternatives is remarkably recognizable. I've read almost nothing from him outside of quotes shared by others, but, reading this, I instantly knew it was from him.

>>24498663
Kek, I was wondering if anyone will recognize where is it from.

>>24497899 (OP)
>Buddha's own words are describing actual annihilation,
Only if you believe in a substance that must exist as base of your experience, but buddhism Is not an ontology of substance but an ontology of process, nibbana Is total freedom from every condicioned thing, even substances or fundaments, Is not the purification of a substance ir a conciousness, but the radical transformation of the human conditions into something else beyond being and non-being, beyond duality, you're not perfecting yourself, or saving yourself, you're going beyond the category of self altogether and freeing the process of existence that younthinknits the self from it's vicious circle into true becoming, not becoming another idea of a self but becoming something else outside of the categoríes the mind creates

>>24498045
>I don’t know how one experiences phenomena without the utility of a self
You never experience phenomena with the utility of a self, but with what Kant called thenunity of aperception, what buddhist call pugdala, that is you experience phenomena from a subjective standpoint, the self Is created when you use yourind to reflect on what that pugdala Is and abstract it from it's natural state, specially when you think it's eternal, partless and unchanging

>>24498077
>who himself was not a Buddhist, but a Hindu, which sufficiently guarantees his impartiality)
Lol

>>24498077
>>24498077
>there is never any question of a non-self as an ontological concept.
Because those text don't touch on that specific aspect of the dhamma, The concept of Anattā appears in numerous Sutras of the ancient Buddhist Nikāya texts. It appears, for example, as a noun in Samyutta Nikaya III.141, IV.49, V.345, in Sutta II.37 of Anguttara Nikaya, II.37–45 and II.80 of Patisambhidamagga, III.406 of Dhammapada. It also appears as an adjective, for example, in Samyutta Nikaya III.114, III.133, IV.28 and IV.130–166, in Sutta III.66 and V.86 of Vinaya

>>24498952
>nibbana Is total freedom from every condicioned thing
if nothing about you that is present right now also remains after this, then its completely indistinguishable from total annihilation, both logically and empirically

>>24498553
>there already is no identity or experiencer
the experiencer is self-evident, you can debate whether this experiencer is the self or not or whether something even more subtle underlying the experiencer is the self or not, but denying the presence of any experiencer is just foolish and absurd

>>24499382
>>24499382
>experiencer is self-evident
No Is not, the experience Is self-evident, but there's nothing besides the experience that's added to the experience like an experiencer that's self-evident, any experiencer Is reflected upon the experience, thus Belongs to a second order observatión, Is rational not empirical, and can't be explained as empirically self-evident, only rationally or categorically necessary(pugdala un buddhism), but not self-evidently existent

>>24499378
No, total annihilation implies a complete turn into nothingess(annihilation,in latín:ad nihilo ad:to nihilo:nothing), changing completly isn't the same as becoming a complete nothing, nothingess is part of the duality being/non-being, your lógic implies that beyond the aggregates and duality there's nothingess, but that's a non-sequitur, nothingess Is not the base of the aggregtes, freeing yourself from them don't imply a "retiran to nothingess" nothingess in itself Is a contradiction in terms, since in order to exist it needs to be an absence of existence

>>24499423
>changing completly isn't the same as becoming a complete nothing,
Changing into Parinirvana (after bodily death) where there are no skandhas, no awareness, no conciousness, no being etc and where nothing of one's former existence remains is totally indistinguishable from becoming nothing, both logically and empirically. You are just not being honest with yourself or anyone else about this.

>>24499409
>but there's nothing besides the experience that's added to the experience
Setting aside the question of whether the cognitive faculty or mind that experiences is the same thing as conciousness or something separate but linked in some way, both this cognitive faculty that grasps and conciousness are present in a self-evident manner. The grasping or cognitive faculty is not another experience that is presented like sense-perceptions or thoughts but it is itself the experincer or what receives them. Denying this is foolish and absurd, its no different whatsoever from saying "sounds are heard but there is no ear".

>>24499482
>indistinguishable from becoming nothing
Already explained how that's just question begging based on a non-sequitur and how the concept of "becoming nothingess" Is contradictory and ilogical
>You are just not being honest
And this Is an ad hominem
All you did was fall into fallacies without adressing or elaborating any arguments, so there's no logical or empirical argument on your part, only fallacies and logical errors

>>24499488
>are present in a self-evident manner
Not really, and you can't explain or elborate your point beyond saying that is "self-evident" the fact that opposing theories and arguments can be Made already prove that Is not self-evident, so you can't rely on that
>The grasping
There's no self-evident grasping, only experience, the experience Is not grasping to anything and Is not being grasped by anything, Is just experience, you can't randomly establish a form of "grasping" as self-evident
>itself the experincer
You can't know that since that's in itself an experience, and the experience of that experincer Is as Said before a second order observatión, you have the experience of an experincer, but that experincer Is an object of the experience, contradicting the idea of an experience as a subject,so "feeling" that the experience Is grasped by an experincer Is already faulty, there's no need for an experincer beyond the experience

>Denying this is foolish and absurd,
For you maybe, but you're only showing that you can't defend your argument or understand and opposite argument and can only rely on ad hominems, the moment your "experiencer" Is not self-evident you lost all your arguments and you need to rely on ad hominems, that shows how weak and dogmátic your ontology is, and should invite you to rethink your position ir at least your rethoric

>>24497899 (OP)
>is Annihilationism

The joke's in the name. Buddha extremely rarely names his doctrine as a whole in the Pali Canon-- but when he does, it's "Path to the Absolute (Brahman)". The metaphysical questions are ab extra along with much else. Theravadans are is that ' religion's ' literalists. Picrel will have the answers to your questions.

>>24499556
>the fact that opposing theories and arguments can be Made already prove that Is not self-evident, so you can't rely on that

This is completely false; there is no argument in favor of anatta as absolute reality. Richard H. Robinson, in his article "Did Nagarjuna Really Refute All Philosophical Views?", clearly demonstrated the extent to which Nagarjuna was a sophist, using strawman arguments, and that he started from fallacious presuppositions that his opponents did not believe. For example, Nagarjuna denied the possibility of svabhava, i.e., unconditioned existence, but he assumed that all of this existence necessarily belongs to the conditioned phenomenal world.

Furthermore, based on the principle of double truth, there are two doctrines:

- there is no Self, neither conventional nor absolute: this is Tsongkhapa's doctrine (see Gorampa's critique on this subject), which is clearly absurd and not even taught by the Buddha. -there exists a Self from the conventional point of view, but not an absolute one:
This doctrine is also absurd because it assumes that something can be the illusion of a metaphysical impossibility, but this is not the case; no one says, "John seems to be the son of a barren woman." If the Self were truly a metaphysical impossibility, whose existence entailed insoluble contradictions, then there would not even be a Self. Since this doctrine violates all the principles of logic, it can only be irrational faith.

>>24499987
>If the Self were truly a metaphysical impossibility, whose existence entailed insoluble contradictions, then there would not even be a Self
If the Self were truly a metaphysical impossibility, whose existence entailed insoluble contradictions, then there would not even be the illusion of a Self*

>>24499987
>there is no argument in favor of anatta as absolute reality.
There's plenty, in the East like buddhism and daoism and int the west, like Hume's or Heidegger's philosophy


>Richard H. Robinson,
His critique of nagarjuna was mediocre and ill informed, he even confused the chapters of the book and the notion of space in madhyamaka, studies un Madhyamaka have advances a Lot since Robinson, which ay this point Belongs to the prehistory of buddhist studies, authors like Siderits or Westerhoff are much better authors on the subject

>Nagarjuna denied the possibility of svabhava, i.e., unconditioned existence,
Svabhava and unconditioned existence are two different things
>but he assumed that all of this existence necessarily belongs to the conditioned phenomenal world.
Not really, to him convfntional and ultimate, condicioned and unconditioned are two faces of the same coin, you pretty much know nothing of nagarjuna and it shows

>there exists a Self from the conventional point of view
Not at all, there's a personal identity(pugdala) but not a self(atman) which by it's metaphysical nature can't exist conventionally
>>24499996
>would not even be the illusion of a Self
Wrong, i can think of things that doesn't exist, by your lógic every metaphysical thing i can think about must exist, so every metaphysical school must be true even when most of them contradict each other at some point, that leads to an infinite numbers of contradictions


But i think you got triggered because no one was talking about Nagarjuna here, but of the basic notionof atman, which you can't still defend, you're trying to change the subject, how curious

>>24497899 (OP)
Annihilationism is the default "doctrine" of man, though. Both rebirth and nirvana supplant it.

>>24499556
> Not really, and you can't explain or elborate your point beyond saying that is "self-evident"
Yes I can, our mental attention is immediately known to us, and whenever it shifts from one object to another this is also immediately known to is. Our awareness is also immediately known to us in the same way.
>the fact that opposing theories and arguments can be Made already prove that Is not self-evident
You can try but they are unserious and they have already been refuted beyond any possibility of redemption.

> There's no self-evident grasping, only experience
Mental attention by nature grasps onto whatever it comes into contact with, I dont mean this in any sort of bad way as in ‘desire’ or ‘false conceptualization’ but merely in the sense of ‘grabs hold of’.

> You can't know that since that's in itself an experience
Wrong, the cognitive faculty is not another experience, it is what has experiences. It can think about itself, but this is simply having a specific thought be the content of that experience, the faculty qua faculty is not a direct object of that experience, only indirectly as mediated through the thought-image that the cognitive faculty forms about itself.

> there's no need for an experincer beyond the experience
Completely wrong, because isolated thoughts and sense perceptions are completely unable to form a unity of experience absent anything standing over and above them. The awareness of the succession of these phenomena in order cannot inhere in those phenomena themselves because it would arise and perish with their arising and perishing, which would form constant ruptures in our attention span which does not actually happen during our experience. I can stand there and watch my attention shift from one phenomena to another without any rupture occurring, this would be impossible if that attention inheres in the things which were arising and dissipating, thus the necessity of something beyond them.

>>24499516
> Already explained how that's just question begging based on a non-sequitur
No you didn’t, you simply falsely accused me of making a claim that I never made (that nothingness is the base of the skandhas) and used that false accusation as an excuse to not engage with the point that I made, because you are evidently incapable or afraid of addressing it. I never made any claim about what their base is, but I pointed out the obvious fact that if you are transformed into something after death that lacks all sensation, awareness, sentience etc and also retains nothing about you that is present right now, then that is both logically and empirically indistinguishable from being turned into nothingness, into annihilation. Pointing out this fact does not require me to take any stance about what the basis of the skandhas is, Im just pointing out the logical implications of your own stance.

You wrote:
>changing completly isn't the same as becoming a complete nothing

I agree completely, but the thing though is that if what you are “changed completely” into after Parinirvana lacks any sort of live, awareness, being, conciousness, sentience, even a non-dual one, then being changed into that is empirically indistinguishable from being changed into nothingness, since both are characterized by a total absence of anything that would allow them to be distinguished from nothingness. You have not even really clearly defined what it is that you are ‘changed into’, but right now it seems to be logical indistinguishable from nothingness, in addition to being empirically indistinguishable.

>>24500282
>our mental attention is immediately known to us,
But you can't prove that this "us" exist,you're already estsblishing a metaphysical "us" that you're not explaining, you're question begging,you're saying "the self exist because the self Is aware of experience" already talking for garantes that the self exist, that's a petitio principii fallacy

>can try but they are unserious
Ad hominem fallacy
>and they have already been refuted
Not even close, they established the fundamental for most modern forms of philosophy,Hume's theorybof non-self inspired Kant's critiques which in turn started both continental and analitical schools of philosophy, hell you can't even refute the buddhist one, if they were refuted then show us those refutations
>Mental attention
Not really, this mental argentino should be different than the experience un order to graso ir, and you still didn't show how this different thing could exist, to heidegger for example there's no grasping, but openess of the experience itself, effortless without any cognitive action needed, so then again this grasping Is not self-evident
>>24500282
>cognitive faculty is not another experienc
If it's not, then you can't have an experience of it, so you can't know if it really exist, since you can by deffinition only know what you experience in some way ir another, once again you're talking for granted the existence of something without having any empirical or rational proof of its existence, youre just believing it "must" exist
>>24500282
>unable to form a unity of experience
Wrong, as Kant already proven, you only need the "trascendental unity of aperception" to establish the cohesión of experience, no metaphysical atman needed, no experiencer beyond experience, experience itself have the categoríes needed to link moments of experience together, or in Madhyamaka terms, experience Is empty thus relational, there's no essence making every moment an atomic moment that needs to be linked with another once other by something else, our apparatus of conceptualisation Is what abstract them and make them look like different things, but experience Is a flow, no need for a metaphysical unity at all, you're trying to impose a substantialist ontology así self-evident criteria and un doingrso falling into question begging, youre saying "a metaphysical substance must exist because things are Made of metaphysical substances and thus they must work as metaphysical substances" but you never showed ud a single proof of the need or logic necessity of a metaphysical substance, and that's because there's no es, metaphysical substances like the self, a first cause or atomic experiences are noumenic presuposition not self-evident aspects of phenomena, all your arguments rely on vedic dogmas, you can't refute buddhism with those, since buddhadharma reject those axioms

>>24500333
>that nothingness is the base of the skandhas
How can freeing yourself from the skhandas lead to nothingess then?
>then that is both logically and empirically indistinguishable from being turned into nothingness
Again, how? >>24500333
>then being changed into that is empirically indistinguishable from being changed into nothingness
Once again, how?
If nothingess Is not the base, whats prior to the skhandas then getting rid of them can't turno you into that, that's pretty simple lógic right there

>You have not even really clearly defined what it is that you are ‘changed into
Of courses not, if i could that would be a skhandas

>>24500146
>There's plenty, in the East like buddhism and daoism and int the west, like Hume's or Heidegger's philosophy
Daoism’s concept of "no-self" is about emptying the ego to harmonize with the Dao, a functional and ethical posture, not a metaphysical denial of a substratum in the "Buddhist" sense.

You are treating fundamentally different answers to different questions as if they were interchangeable synonyms.


>...authors like Siderits or Westerhoff are much better authors on the subject

This is hiding behind the skirts of profane academia to avoid a genuine metaphysical confrontation.

>Not really, to him convfntional and ultimate, condicioned and unconditioned are two faces of the same coin, you pretty much know nothing of nagarjuna and it shows

This is a combination of pedantry and a fundamental ignorance of the two truths doctrine.
While svabhava means "own-being" or "inherent existence" more precisely than "unconditioned existence," the latter is a perfectly functional descriptor for the concept being denied. To deny svabhava is precisely to deny that anything possesses an unconditioned, independent, self-sufficient mode of being. The objection is a pointless exercise in semantics.

>Not at all, there's a personal identity(pugdala) but not a self(atman) which by it's metaphysical nature can't exist conventionally

This is a pedantic distinction that collapses under the slightest scrutiny. The Self can always only be the Witness, the pure "I" that is the ground of all experience. At the conventional level, this very Witness is what is misapprehended as the transmigrating personal identity—the pudgala that reaps karma. To insist that one exists conventionally while the other does not is a semantic sleight of hand.

>Wrong, i can think of things that doesn't exist, by your lógic every metaphysical thing i can think about must exist, so every metaphysical school must be true even when most of them contradict each other at some point, that leads to an infinite numbers of contradictions

The claim is not that every possibility must necessarily exist, but rather its inverse: that every impossibility cannot exist at any level of reality. To deny this is to abandon the very foundations of logic. A square circle, a married bachelor, the son of a barren woman—these are not merely unreal; they are metaphysical absurdities that can find no foothold in any conceivable domain of existence, whether absolute, dreamlike, illusory, or material. To argue otherwise is to embrace a logic so pliable that it can justify any contradiction, dissolving all distinctions into an undifferentiated morass of meaninglessness. The burden of proof, then, lies with you to demonstrate a single instance of a genuine impossibility that nevertheless manifests in some form.

>>24500344
>But you can't prove that this "us" exist,you're already estsblishing a metaphysical "us" that you're not explaining,
Wrong, that's just a strawman. I'm talking about an empirical analysis of experience, I wasnt making any ontological claims. The empirical presence of the cognitive faculty is self-evident due to it being immediately known in experience. This fact is separate from any ontological claim made about said experiencer.
>this mental argentino should be different than the experience un order to graso ir, and you still didn't show how this different thing could exist
It can exist (or be empirically present) as distinct from the contents of the experience in the same way that ears exist as distinct from the sounds that they hear, or that tongue exists as distinct from the flavors that it tastes, this is not hard at all to understand and doesn't need any sort of justification.
>o heidegger for example there's no grasping, but openess of the experience itself, effortless without any cognitive action needed, so then again this grasping Is not self-evident
If this openesss is something that makes it possible for experiences to be known and through which they are known then this is just a kind of awareness/conciousness/knowing function being referred to under another name.
>then you can't have an experience of it, so you can't know if it really exist
We have direct experiences of its acts, we know it through its acts/modifications. When you know a thought, you are just knowing the cognitive faculty under one of its respective modifications as thought A, thought B etc. It's absurd to suppose that thoughts just arise randomly in a void without any cognitive faculty that produces them.

> you only need the "trascendental unity of aperception" to establish the cohesión of experience, no metaphysical atman needed
I wasn't talking about Atman, the cognitive function or faculty is different from Atman and isn't identified with Atman except in Shaiva Siddhanta. Kant's unity of aperception actually proves my point that something is required over and above the disparate experiences in order for them to be united in experience. For Kant, the thing that is over and above the disparate experiences is the transcental apperception.

"Now no cognitions can occur in us, no connection and unity among them, without that unity of consciousness that precedes all data of the intuitions, and in relation to which all representation of objects is alone possible. This pure, original, unchanging consciousness I will now name transcendental apperception." - Kant

Just as I am saying, the knowing function precedes the changing phenomena and is different from them, and just as Kant says, its presence is required for them to be known and united in our experience. The transcendental apperception is not another object of experience but is what makes experiences knowable.

>>24500344
>experience itself have the categoríes needed to link moments of experience together, or in Madhyamaka terms, experience Is empty thus relational, there's no essence making every moment an atomic moment that needs to be linked with another once other by something else,
This is wrong, because experience involves mental attention registering phenomena in succession, and the phenomena like individual thoughts and sense-perceptions themselves are insentient and incapable of performing this function themselves, they have no mental attention and are not self-aware. Something beyond them like a mind, intellect or transcendental apperception is necessary, as even Kant admits.
>our apparatus of conceptualisation Is what abstract them and make them look like different things, but experience Is a flow,
Even if you call experience a flow, the same issue still applies that requires something over and above the individual sensations. The perception of the green of a tree and the perception of the sound of car are not self-aware and have no mental attention, in order that they be combined into the same flow of experience alongside changing thoughts etc requires something over and above these disparate phenomena.

>no need for a metaphysical unity at all, you're trying to impose a substantialist ontology
Wrong retard, I'm making purely an empirical or phenomenological analysis here and have made zero ontological claims. This is just a weak cop-out attempt by you.

>>24500357
>How can freeing yourself from the skhandas lead to nothingess then?
If you actually read my post you would see that I didn't say it does, I said that it leads to something which is indistinguishable from nothingness. Saying that A is indistinguishable from B is not making the positive claim that A is B.

>Again, how?
If you actually read my post you would see that I already answered this when I wrote 'that is empirically indistinguishable from being changed into nothingness, since both are characterized by a total absence of anything that would allow them to be distinguished from nothingness.'

>If nothingess Is not the base, whats prior to the skhandas
Thats irrelevant to the point I was making, which does not require me to take any stance on that question.

>>You have not even really clearly defined what it is that you are ‘changed into
>, if i could that would be a skhandas
There are no skhandas present in Parinirvana after bodily death though so that's just factually wrong evne according to basic Buddhist doctrine.

>>24498652
>Buddhist saint always has his eyes shut

>>24497899 (OP)
>But the Buddha's own words are describing actual annihilation, even if he rejected annihilation.
>Am I misunderstanding the Buddha or the suttas?
>No. The Awakened One must be wrong
Do you faggots hear yourselves talk lmao

>>24500536
>Saying that A is indistinguishable from B is not making the positive claim that A is B.
Nope, that's logically not true at all
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_of_indiscernibles

>>24500614
Was gonna said, what about Dzogchenpas, their whole meditative practice is staring with their eyes open at a fixed point (Trekcho), or staring at the sky (Thogal)

>>24500633
Could it....some people.....don't assume.....the buddha.....is an awakened one?

>>24500639
The law of identity of indiscernibles refers to things which are already established as having all their properties in common, which is not the case here. It has not been established (yet?) that nothingness and parinirvana have all their properties in common (which almost all Buddhists would deny anyways), so the law of identity of indiscernibles would not apply here.

I was simply pointing out that, as currently taught and explained, there is nothing that really distinguishes parnirvana from nothingness and which distinguishes attaining parinirvana from being annihilated or dissolved into nothingness, so that however much Buddhists want to deny annihilation as the end-goal, it still seems to be for all intents and purposes.

It may be hypothetically true that parinirvana has some additional property that distinguishes it from nothingness, but I have yet to see it explained what that property is.

>>24500498
>Daoism’s concept of "no-self" is about emptying the ego to harmonize with the Dao, a functional and ethical posture, not a metaphysical denial of a substratum in the "Buddhist" sense.
And the dao is emptiness, there's no substratum of self there

>hiding behind the skirts of profane academia
You're the one doing tht with Robinson, i'm just citingnmore relevante and contemporary authors

>the latter is a perfectly functional descriptor for the concept being denied
No Is not, nibbana Is the unconditioned ir can't be svabhava,but be my guest, post a quote of the Madhyamaka where nagarjuna Said that
>>24500498
>This is a combination of pedantry
Saya the guy trying to argue Madhyamaka terms without reading the book
>>24500498
>To insist that one exists conventionally while the other does not is a semantic sleight of hand.
Ok the contrary, saying that something that exist un phenomena could exist as noumena, a completly different form of quality Is the sleight of hand, you never show us any proof of how this by the way
>. A square circle
A thing that can exist as phenome and noumena Is the square circle, so you're the one with the burden of proof, i don't need to prove that our apperception exist as something else than our apperception
>>24500504
>I'm talking about an empirical analysis of experience
You can't derive metaphysical noumenical conclusions from empirical experiences, so you're still not proving that the apperception can be an atman, you can only establish that the categoríes of phenomenical existence works under the unity of apperception, there's no experiencer, only relative experience
>>24500504
>The empirical presence of the cognitive faculty is self-evident due to it being immediately known in experience
Yes, and estasblishing a metaphysical experiencer from that Is a non-sequitur
>distinct from the contents of the experience in the same way that ears exist as distinct from the sounds that they hear
Both share the same qualities, both are Made of parts, impermanent and relational, so your example Is still a non-sequitur or you're just admiting that this "experiencer" Is just a pugdala, any está there's no way to the atman there
>direct experiences of its acts
Nope, you have an experience of múltiple activity, but none of those experiences lead us to something beyond the quality of those experiences

>>24500504
>We have direct experiences of its acts
Not really, you yave an experience of a process of unity, there's no experience of some thing or o ject making thstnprocess, just like there's no particular object or thing controlling the process of a tree growing

>wasn't talking about Atman
Then you're just accepting The buddhas point that there's no trascendent thing regulating and estsblishing perception
>Kant's unity of aperception actually proves my point
On the contrary it destroys it, Kant show that the apperception Is trascendental(in every experience/phenomena) and not trascendent(beyond experience/noumena)
>the knowing function precedes the changing phenomena
It logically "precedes" phenomena, as an apriori of phenomena itself, Is not trascendent to phenomena
>>24500524
>and the phenomena like individual thoughts and sense-perceptions themselves are insentient and incapable of performing this function themselves
What proof do you have of that? You can only derive that conclusión if you already see the experience as a metaphysicsl dichotomy between an object and a subject, but we arrive at the same problem, if they're mataphysically different how can they interact? You're once again falling into a petitio principii fallacy, using your own cosmological terms to justify your cosmology
>the same issue still applies that requires something over and above the individual sensations.
Again petitio principii, there's no individual sensatión in madhyamaka
>retard
To be honest inthink you're the only retarde here, you're using dogma and think it's empirical thinking all this Time you did nothing but question begging and circular reasoning, i would be very caregul to call anyone retarde if i were hoy, you're most probably projecting your own shortcoming at someone else

>>24500702
>You can't derive metaphysical noumenical conclusions from empirical experiences
I never claimed to be doing that you retard (I instead claimed the opposite by stating I was making a purely empirical analysis), this is just a strawman which has absolutely nothing to do with what I wrote. I don't even know what the point of these retarded strawmen are unless you are trying to show off your lack of reading comprehension.
>so you're still not proving that the apperception can be an atman
I never claimed that either, that's another stupid strawman.
>you can only establish that the categoríes of phenomenical existence works under the unity of apperception
The unity of apperception is something different from the individual perceptions and thoughts, so this still proves my point, that our experience requries the presence of something over and above the individual sensations and thoughts. This refutes what you wrote earlier about there just being individual thoughts/sensations and nothing above them.

I'm not talking about Atman or anything metaphysical, I was just pointing our that your explanation of empirical experience is simply wrong and was already refuted by Kant, among others.

>Yes, and estasblishing a metaphysical experiencer from that Is a non-sequitur
Another gay strawman which nothing to do with what I wrote
>Both share the same qualities, both are Made of parts, impermanent and relational, so your example Is still a non-sequitur
No, it's not a non-sequitur but its an empirical example of how there can be the empirical presence of something over and above the individual sensations, just as ears are over and above the changing sounds that are heard through the ears.
>but none of those experiences lead us to something beyond the quality of those experiences
The knowing function is known simultaneously with the known contents. The mental attention which jumps from object to object while itself remaining is this knowing function.

>>24500738
>there's no experience of some thing or o ject making thstnprocess
The thing making that unity is the intellect/mind or the transcendental apperception, whatever you call it doesn't really matter, the unity requires that thing performing this function either way, the phenomena themselves are incapable of performing this.
>Then you're just accepting The buddhas point that there's no trascendent thing regulating and estsblishing perception
False, in the Atmavadin view the intellect/mind or transcendental apperception still requires the presence of the Atman in order to function, I have not written anything that would contradict or reject this premise of the Atmavadins.
>Kant show that the apperception Is trascendental(in every experience/phenomena) and not trascendent(beyond experience/noumena)
That doesn't contradict anything I have said, I have not made any claims whatsoever about noumena in this thread.
>It logically "precedes" phenomena, as an apriori of phenomena itself, Is not trascendent to phenomena
That still proves my point, that the phenomena are incapable of producing the unity themselves and require something more than themselves.

>What proof do you have of that?
Read Kant, he explains why. I have also already given you reasons why in this thread, namely that experience involves attention jumping from one thing to another, and if the attention inhered in the changing transient phenomena instead of above them then there would be consant ruptures in our attention, but there are no such ruptures, ergo the attention resides above the transient phenomena. Moreover if every phenomena had its own center of attention we would experience ourselves as many different centers of attention but this is not the case.
>Again petitio principii,
False, sound is clearly different from sight which is clearly different from taste which is clearly different from e.g. memory or emotion, these are all individual in the sense of being marked by distinguishing characteristis that make them separate from each other.

>>24500742
>individual perceptions and thoughts
Ni, the unity of apperception Is presente in every perception and thought, since each one of them has múltiple categories
>This refutes what you wrote earlier about there just being individual thoughts/sensations and nothing above them.
No it doesn't, that's why Is a trascendental unity and not a trascendent unity, you didn't read the critique of puré reason didnt you?
>>24500742
>already refuted by Kant
You already did More than enough to show us you don't know anything about Kant
>>24500742
>just as ears are over and above the changing sounds
No they're not, both exist at the same level of qualities and categoríes
>knowing function is known simultaneously with the known contents
There's no need for a differentiated knowing function beyond the act of knowing, you're not estasblishing any new, different or prior knowledge besides the particular knowing act in question, the act and content of knowing Is gnoseologically self suficient, and you still didn't presente any proof of the contrary, any form of reflecivity of the knowing Is rlative to the particular moment and content of the at of know, so Is not self suficient and Is not essentialy different
>>24500760
>the phenomena themselves are incapable of performing this
The unity of apperception Is phenomena, that's the whole point of kants psychology on the critique of puré reason
>claims whatsoever about noumena in this thread.
Then you're just talking about the pugdala andbyoure accepting the buddhist creed
>>24500760
>the phenomena are incapable of producing the unity
That would make the aperception tradcendent and norntrascenental, you really should read knat if you wanna engage with his system
>Read Kant
I did, you on the other hand.....
>namely that experience involves attention jumping from one thing to another,
Still petitio, experience grasping things Is talking for granted a metaphysical divide between object and subject, what proof do you have ofnthat and how can they interact if their qualities are different? Kant doesn't have thatnproblem because everything happens in phenomena, it's in a way a non-dualist

>>24500702
You haven't presented an argument; you've just proven that you don't understand the words you're using.

>be me, a philosophical genius
>want to win argument on anime imageboard
>my masterstroke: "a square circle can be a phenomenon"
>a phenomenon is an object of experience
>a square circle is a logical contradiction that cannot be an object of experience
>mfw I just argued that a thing that cannot be perceived is a type of perception
>mfw I just rejected basic logic to "win" my debate

Parinibbāna refers to a mode of consciousness that has been decoupled from its elemental ground. Think of it as a dimension of consciousness outside all relation, non-dependently arisen, non-intentional, neither objectified nor objectifying. The Buddha compares it to a beam of light that does not land on anything, is not traversed or impeded by an outside. The Zen insistence on realizing a "flavorless" consciousness (a mind that isn't labeled, reified, "colored", designated, etc. as anything other than itself by its relation with the world or its own desires), as well as Ajaan Mun's formula that the principle of suffering is a mind that seeks to go outside itself, proves it. Thanissaro Bhikkhu describes it as a mind that does not feed. Nibbāna is not some zero-point, but the mind of permanent, harmless satiation, which means a mind that is no longer compelled to appropriate its outside. I don't think this is crypto-eternalism because such a mind is inconceivable, and it isn't annihilationism because this state is endowed with qualities that we associate with the character of a Buddha. The mind is enriched, not diminished, by cessation. The Buddha did not make a full circle back to materialist death, because unconsciousness can't be identified with the deathless.

The kantposter is not wrong but he's not right either. His argument is that since knowing and the knower presuppose one another, there are no grounds to assume the noumenal existence of the latter. The point of Buddhist practice is precisely to cultivate the conditions by which the knower is eventually released from this relation of mutual positing.

>>24500942
>square circle can be a phenomenon"
That's not what i Said, i Said that a squats circle us just as stupid as a phenomena that's also a noumena, since both are things with two opposite qualities in them, so you saying that an experincer can exist has something with different qualities than experience but still having that experience i just as dumb as saying a squats circle can exist, an atman Is a square circle, any other form experience Is non-self since exist in the impermanence of phenomena

>>24498203
It was revealed to me in a dream

>>24497899 (OP)
Watch a guy called Ken wheeler, he explains it.

>>24500760
>in the Atmavadin view the intellect/mind or transcendental apperception still requires the presence of the Atman in order to function,
If the knower Is the trascendental apperception and not the atman, then there's no need for the atman whatsoever

It is interesting to note that among Buddhist school, the yogic schools, and particularly in the Thai forest tradition, the notion of an Atman ("eternal citta," "pure citta"...) is often encountered. Ajahn Mun, who was, according to the most serious accounts, an arahant and teacher of the devas, spoke of a luminous and primordial citta, beyond all constraints. How can we not see this as the Upanishidic Atman?
Conversely, scholastic Buddhist schools (Buddhaghosa, traditional Theravada, etc.) deny this notion of a supreme citta, but in doing so, are unable to explain the higher states of being experienced by the yogi. Thus, in these schools, it is rare (if not impossible) to encounter an arahant; as Thanissaro Bhikkhu explained, this idea of absolute non-self can be harmful to the practitioner.
Moreover, it is obvious that from an experiential point of view, nothingness can never truly be realized (neither release if it were pure nothingness), so the yogi who has traversed all the higher states always has a positive experience in every aspect, and can only describe it in positive terms (luminous, spacious, boundless etc...) or eliminate misconceptions about it.

See :
https://www.forestdhammatalks.org/en/ajahn_martin/dhamma/Ajahn%20Martin_Is%20the%20citta%20atman%20or%20anatta.pdf

>>24501233
>spoke of a luminous and primordial citta
Tons of schools talk about that, all tibetans and most chinese buddhist also have That notion of the luminous mind, but it's never an eternal partless thing outside of experience, but the flow of experience/impermanence itself, you have to embrace impermanence and non-self to get there

>Thanissaro Bhikkhu
A Lot of people missundwrstood thanissaro there, he's not saying that a self could exist in some form, he's saying that if you replace the notion of self with a notion of non-self you're still trapped in that category, you're still clinging to that form of identity, now negating it instead of creating it, when the anatq doctrine imply letting go of that category altogether

>>24501233
>according to the most serious accounts, an arahant and teacher of the devas,
lmao

>>24501362
This is an absolute retarded take, did you even read the suttas ? The Buddha never says that you should "embrace the flow", he says that every conditioned phenomena is dukkha, anatta, anicca, and as such one doesn't identify nor become entangled with such phenomenas, let alone "embrace the flow". This flow isn't even a thing it is a characteristic of phenomenas, this obviously isn't the luminous Primordial citta have you even read the link ?
You and all nihilists are not interested in the dhamma at all you just want to spam shit such as "u don exist xDDD" instead of practicing the Noble Path : that is the active conquest of the higher states, and ultimately of Nibbana.

>>24501407
>you should "embrace the flow",
I never Said that either, i said that if you wanna reach that state of luminoasity you have to embrace the flow of impermanenece and no -self, so there's no link between the luminous mind and the self on the contrary, now so you need to reach that state to achieve nibbana? well that's another question, different schools have different answers
The Buddha did talk about "leting go of grasping" which it's, as a concept, almost identical to embracing the flow

>>24501407
What "flow" are you guys talking about?

>>24501227
> If the knower Is the trascendental apperception and not the atman, then there's no need for the atman whatsoever
The cognitive capacity, intellect or knowing function can only carry out its function when it’s illuminated by and imbued with the light of the Atman according to Atmavadins, so it’s just factually incorrect to claim that if the intellect is what knows then no Atman is needed.

>>24501606
>when it’s illuminated by and imbued with the light of the Atman
That's a second order ontology, if there's a cognitive capacity already present, there's no need for an extra "light", it doesn't execute any proper function, cognition Is already present, that's why apperception refutes the atman, such a thing becomes irrelevant with a trascendental apperception

>>24500828
>Ni, the unity of apperception Is presente in every perception and thought, since each one of them has múltiple categories
As Kant says, the pure consciousness is original, unchanging and its prior to each and every sensation. It remains as unchanging while they come and go. This means that something beyond the sensations (sense perceptions and individual thoughts) is required, since they by themselves cannot produce our experience.
>No it doesn't, that's why Is a trascendental unity and not a trascendent unity
Regardless of whether you call it transcendent or transcendental, the point remains that he affirms that an unchanging pure conciousness that is different from individual thoughts and sense perceptions is required for them to be cognized such as we cognize them, this refutes what you claimed about nothing being required besides the individual sensations.
>No they're not, both exist at the same level of qualities and categoríes
Regardless, sounds depend on the presence of ears to be heard and they come and go while the ear remains, the same is true of sensations in relation to the mind/intellect.
>There's no need for a differentiated knowing function beyond the act of knowing
There is, because otherwise there is no connection between knowing tree versus knowing rock a moment later and they would be unable to be united in the same unity of experience. This one reason why Yogachara says a storehouse consciousness is necessary. Moreover we have direct firsthand proof of its presence as separate from the sensations when we find our mental attention to remains throughout time without interruption or division even as the objects of that attention change, this would be impossible if that attention was not separate from the changing objects because something cannot observe its own absence.
>The unity of apperception Is phenomena
I understand that, I was using phenomena there not in a Kantian sense but in the more general empirical sense.
>Then you're just talking about the pugdala andbyoure accepting the buddhist creed
False, everything I saying about the intellect and its relation to experience is fully accepted in the Darshanas of Samkhya, Yoga and Advaita, all of which reject Anatta and also say that a Purusha or Atman is required for experience to happen and is required for the intellect to function.
> Is talking for granted a metaphysical divide between object and subject,
Nothing I have written has said that

I love jhana and have done it for about 4 years. Have any of you read the Vigyana Bhairava Tantra? I read Ranjit Chaudri's translation and I'm chewing on Osho's massive commentary.

>>24501662
>That's a second order ontology
Wrong, its making a point about epistemology and nothing more, its just saying that the knowing function of the intellect depends on the enabling presence of a self-illuminating or reflexive partless pure awareness that is Atman. Since this is discussing knowledge and what makes knowledge in experience possible, its talking about epistemology. There are many ontological things that can be said about Atman, but talking about how it relates to the intellect knowing things is a matter of epistemology.

>if there's a cognitive capacity already present, there's no need for an extra "light"
Again, this is simply incorrect in the Atmavadin model that is generally shared by Yoga, Samkhya and Advaita. The intellect is not really even a “knowing function” but is more a “lifeless insentient mirror that can perform the knowing function if and only when its imbued with the light of Purusha/Atman”. The intellect is just as insentient as a rock is, and its not able to inherently know things by itself any more than a rock is.

It is therefore a strawman fallacy for you to argue that the natural implication of said stance is that the Atman is unnecessary, because if you are evaluating said position honestly and not leaving out something that is inseparable from it then there is zero justification for saying that its unnecessary, since the basic tenets of said position lay out explicitly why its necessary.

I could equally for example say that various things in Buddhism are irrational and unnecessary if I selectively ignore the reasons Buddhism provides for those things, but that would be fallacious just as what you are saying is fallacious.

>it doesn't execute any proper function, cognition Is already present,
No, it’s not. Maybe in the Buddhist analysis (which they consider wrong and we are not even talking about at present) but not in their analysis.

>that's why apperception refutes the atman, such a thing becomes irrelevant with a trascendental apperception
Apperception does absolutely nothing to refute the Atman you moron. Apperception is a function that is essentially performed by the mind/intellect in the Atmavadin model. Simply admitting that this function is performed by the mind/intellect by itself does nothing to refute the existence of the Atman. There is zero logical connection there, its a total non-sequitur. Apperception being performed by the mind/intellect provides no logical reason why the Atman would not exist, both can be true at the same time with zero contradiction.

>>24501701
>Regardless, sounds depends on the presence of ears to be heard

That presupposition is a major implication on your part. You're still in confirmation bias.

>>24501767
>That presupposition is a major implication on your part
Okay, then by all means, explain how sounds can be heard in the absence of any ears
>thats not what I meant, I meant about the knowing function and the known sensations
I already explained why:

1) The individual sensations, being multiple, disparate, insentient and different in nature from each other, are inherently incapable of producing a unity of experience, where all thoughts and sense-perception are united in the same stream of mental activity occurring for the same center of awareness/attention.

2) We have direct firsthand proof of the knowing function being different from the known sensations when we experience our attention remaining present without interruption even as the known contents change. Even the very act of witnessing one thought being replaced by another thought about something else is firsthand proof of this, since the thought that has vanished cannot be the witness of this transition, and nor can the thought that has not yet arisen be the witness. Witnessing the transition such as occurs thousands of times every single day necessitates an abiding cognitive capacity which is not reducible to either thought and which does not inhere in them.

>>24501785
To hear yes, you seem to be implying this is needed for existence. Sound can be felt as well. Sound occurs without you needing to hear or feel anything. You need to keep in mind that you haven't acknowledged the external world yet and you seem to be retreating from it, I also don't care how you make sense of anything.

>>24501751
>epistemology
You call me a Morón and proceed to confused epistemology with gnoseology,
>that the knowing function of the intellect depends on the enabling presence of a self-illuminating or reflexive partless pure awareness that is Atman.
And that's a second order ontology because ir creates two different things doing the same function
>>24501751
>talking about epistemology.
Again gnoseology, epistemology Is how humans create conceptual knowledge like thebtrue and false dichotomy, gnoseology Is how the mind and sensory apparatus work and create immediate knwoledge
>>24501751
>The intellect is not really even a “knowing function” but is more a “lifeless insentient mirror that can perform the knowing function if and only when its imbued with the light of Purusha/Atman”.
Then Is not an apperception and all your bizarre attempts to link Kant with your notion of thwnkniwer were a waste of time

>because if you are evaluating said position honestly a
If i don't honestly, still Is a second order aspect of knowing, it's not doing nothing relevantbto cognition besides being "a light"

>Apperception does absolutely nothing to refute the Atman you moron
Yes it does it Made it obsoletw

>>24501751
>The intellect is not really even a “knowing function
Then Is not an apperception

>>24501796
They can't help you. If you want to turn Kant into a Buddhist he won't fit into any particular group, and by default this is Mahayana. The Theravada are mostly concerned with self-enlightenment, this isn't meant as a pejorative statement. Kant's ethics can be morphed towards rational compassion but they have to initiate the contact.

>>24501885
>you want to turn Kant into a Buddhist
I don't to be honest, Kant's apperception kits works really well to refute a trascendent conciousness, you can see on this very thread how every attempt to put Kant into a vedant frame fails spectaculary to the point we're the conversatión went from Kant proves vedanta here>>24500504
>Kant's unity of aperception actually proves my point
To negate Kant's system altogether here>>24501751
>The intellect is just as insentient as a rock

>>24501785
>our attention remaining present
You don't know that attention exist as a metaphysical apriori, only as an analitical apriori, that Is particular moments of attention generates a set, an abstraction of attention itself, but there's no proof that such an abstraction could actually exist as a different thing, only that different moments of attention have enough things in common to develop a Sense of general attention, but there's no possible experience of attention in itself, attention without content, in that Sense attention Is relational, not substantial, attention así and activity needs and object of attention,and your idea of a knower falls apart, a knower can be a knower ir it doesn't "know" something
For example form remains present even when particular forms change, but form as a conditions of possibility Is eternal, Is always presenr, just like "atentrion",by your lógic then form exist as something different than any particular form or object in the world, and that would create a metaphysical dichotomy in which conciousness exist as it's own thing, form exist as it's own thing, feeling, sensatión and so on and so on, the process of abstraction you use to establish awareness as a different thing from experience ends up creating a multiplicity of sets of eternity and the world doesn't make Sense anymore, which one Is my"true self" my puré awareness or my puré form, or my puré sensatión etc? By establishing puré awareness as different you're just picking and choosing, ignoring all forms or logical rigor and consitency

>>24501955
The Theravada settled on realism. The ancient Mahayana were scattered on this and that entails a range of complete denial of the external world, to realism, to a sort of instant thought wisdom for lack of better words. The modern Mahayana include recognition of the external world by agreement but you should be aware there is also an internal agreement that there is no stable core to reality, this entails there are no fixed results for experimentation. There isn't a consensus on whether the era of darkness is over or not. There are a number of Mahayana epistemological works but they are scattered, and heavily guarded by constant affirmation of delusion. I'm not familiar enough with vedanta to comment on that, but a number of Mahayana contributors have made deontological arguments.