What point is he trying to make really

>>24498983 (OP)
shitfs metaphysics to sociology and psychology

>>24498983 (OP)
your mom will bother you the most in the last minute of her life

if anything can not be, is is is is not

>>24498983 (OP)
The meaning itself Is hardbto graso because we need to give meaning "a meaning" falling into a vicious circle, while most people want to avoid this by reifing meaning into something different from itself(that Is, not being "the meaning" of things and becoming a thing itself) Heidegger thinks this circlularity Is not bad, only a circle leadvto the same place but not a spiral, if we actually turno it into a spiral, phenomenical spiral that accept meaning as meaning that can give mening to itself, in an articultion like a spiral spinning, this "movement" that you need to travel across the spiral, this inevitable becoming you need, Is what Time really Is, becoming of meaning, thus being can only exist as a form of Time and Time only purpouae is to give mening/being to things

>>24498983 (OP)
Being is . . . le bad!

Something something Dasein Sosein

It’s really just a needlessly obscure precursor to existentialist philosophy.

>>24498983 (OP)
Read this thread:
https://warosu.org/lit/thread/24457049

Goes into detail about what Heidegger was aiming for.

>>24499010
that's dumb

>>24498983 (OP)
The nothing noths

Hot take I guess but I think Heidegger was an obscurantist sophist. He actually does have a few points in his philosophy, but all of them could’ve been said in simpler more direct terms and were by other writers. He doesn’t seem to have ever had an original thought in his life. He was basically a professional academic that was always taking his friends’ ideas and making them palatable for academics and people who would only listen to academics.

>>24500619
The thread probably helps people who have virtually no understanding of Heidegger but
“He basically thinks truth is relative to time and place” is very surface level and kind of a non-starter since if that were true it would introduce epistemological problems that would necessarily make it not able to be said to be true. Basically all modern philosophy has this epistemology problem and that’s probably why it falls to obscurantist bullshit so much.

>>24498983 (OP)
Heidegger appreciated Hölderlin just as I do.

>>24498983 (OP)
Camus gave him a 2/5 Amazon review so I'm not gonna bother with him.

>>24500671
It doesn't really matter whether the position stands or falls, the answer to OP's "What point is he trying to make really" is that Heidegger was after intelligibility in the broadest way, which is why a certain relativism is a consequence and why Heidegger gets so thorny about taking truth as corresponding to beings correctly. He's trying to make room for how any given being could be intelligible as whatever, including poetic intelligibility and "falsely" by this or that frame, and his attempt to account for this leans on historicism to help solve for tendencies and big breaks in different periods. It's not really surface level, both his point about intelligibility and his account of it are relativistic.

I would say the most fundamental thing he says is:
>You are always already in the world.
Every philosophical exercise that follows is based around that.

>>24500715
You say it’s not surface level but to me that’s as surface level as it gets. It’s not even based on a roughly coherent epistemology. It’s just broad value judgement based on…functional utility? That would be kinda ironic lol. It’s not really historicism. He has the same problem as Nietzsche. Their history is literally objectively false. This is why the historian-philosopher par excellence Spengler criticized Nietzsche heavily and thought Heidegger was a navel gazer and total waste of time.

>>24500784
Ah, I thought you meant it was a surface level reading of Heidegger (which I would only dispute insofar as so many readers of him get too confused to say what's happening in his thought almost at all). As a surface level issue, perhaps. All that gives me pause is that, if I would agree that he falls prey to certain problems in defending his historicist account (and i do think it's historicist--why do the Greeks take beings as x, and we moderns take it as z? Because of different historical dispensations of Being), I think there's nonetheless serious matter to his topic where an appeal to problems with epistemology doesn't quite knock the topic out, since epistemology usually operates by already taking a frame of reference by which it determines how beings are intelligible to be know in this or that way. That very appeal itself sounds a bit like consequentialism. But that's not to also dismiss that taking the common view of the relation of truth and being as that which persists for all times and places puts Heidegger's positions in a bind.

>>24500812
But you realize the statement
>the Greeks take beings as x
Would necessarily be dependent on your beings as z…?
It might not even be accurate. This is exactly what Spengler criticized Nietzsche for and his book he dedicates an entire chapter to the Germans’ misguided idealization of the Greeks. He gave historical examples to show Nietzsche, Heidegger, et. al. were projecting. This THE issue with their account. It’s not based on anything real.

>>24498983 (OP)
he was trying to show that post kantian philosophy is self defeating by pretending to be one

>>24500819
>But you realize the statement
>>the Greeks take beings as x
>Would necessarily be dependent on your beings as z…?
I just wrote two replies that I scrapped because I want to make sure I actually understand your contention. Care to walk me through what you have in mind?

>>24498983 (OP)
1.) We have forgotten to investigate what the very meaning of Being is; and,
2.) Crucial to an investigation of what Being itself is (fundamental ontology, the deepest or most primordial basis of all possible thinking), is an investigation of our own form of being; in other words, he’s also saying that we (for the most part) have also forgotten our own being is the only means through which we have access to Being at al, and hence our own being (personhood) should be also be investigated, and this is a unique form of being different from that of, say, a rock or chair, objects we (conventionally) take as simply existing in a world external to ourselves. So, crucial to the investigation of Being, is the investigation of the being for whom Being can be an issue at all. Ontology necessarily intertwines with phenomenology, they cannot be extricated. Hence his investigations are both ontological and phenomenological.

Highly condensed form, from what little I understand. This basis also informs his investigations of concepts like time, society or our social life, as well as the history of philosophy or thought at large, what influences they still have on us today and also what parts have been as if buried or covered over, or at least their justifications and the full reasoning behind them have, even while we subconsciously carry on those conclusions, which we (for the most part) did not necessarily fully think through but simply had passed down to us:

>>24500671
>“He basically thinks truth is relative to time and place” is very surface level
If that's all you got from that thread (and that is already a woefully bad reading of the ideas expressed in that thread) then it went way over your head
>>24500784
the thread wasn't about epistemology, it was about ontology and metaontology. epistemology was hardly even a concern.

>>24498983 (OP)
hi digger

>>24498983 (OP)
The mystical, transcendental and intuitive is completely missing in the modern world. It has been rationalized and society organised along the lines of utility. But he also knows there's no going back.

>>24500661
His Jesuit training is relevant to Heidegger's sophistry. If the pope says white is black a Jesuit must successfully convince you that white is in fact black.

>>24498983 (OP)
>What point is he trying to make really
Staring with the Greeks means taking a wrong turn.

>>24502510
I started with the Lutherans and ended with the Daoists.

>>24498983 (OP)
something about a tool having a different being when you use it vs when its sitting on a shelf

>>24498983 (OP)
Metaphysicians traditionally were hung up on the concept of "beings", but never really had a coherent view of "Being" with a capital B. Human existence has a specific phenomenological structure that can be described mainly in temporal terms.

you kind of still need to hold a fork at some point, that's why he was complicit anyway