how old were you when you realized that Kant was just a typical indirect realist, and that not only the german idealists, but also all subsequent philosophers completely misunderstood him?

>>24516241 (OP)
never

>>24516241 (OP)
Because the entirety of space and time being in your head is just indirect realism.

>>24516241 (OP)
At the moment he severs the indexical, causal connection between noumena and phenomena he can't be taken as any sort of realist at all.

>>24516261
This. Kant is a solipsist by rights, whether he wants to be or not.

>>24516251
but that doesn't imply that space and time are a necessarily incorrect representation of reality.

>>24516265
Solipsism, etymologically from the latin meaning 'only oneself', is an apparently unresolvable problem in contemporary philosophy. But this, as we know, is only because the philosophers of today refuse to venture beyond the threshold of the normie standpoint. If, as esoteric Kantianism does, they would dare to speculate into the regions beyonds the confines of normie realism, into the realms of 'superipsism', then here they could actually make some progress.

The exoteric Kantians claimed Kant to have proved the existence of a supersensible world, but, their pretentions notwithstanding, all they proved was the existence of a unique idea, the idea of the non-ideal, das Ding an sich. However, as I have shown, this idea, although unique as being the highest abstraction, was nonetheless, like all other content of experience, an object of thought. And further, it did nothing to resolve the issue of the existence of intelligences beyond my own. For this reason Jacobi was right to call this exoteric Kantianism a solipsism-- but beyond the letter of this external understanding laid a deeper wisdom.

When the chasm that separated man and reality was bridged by the sublimation of the exoteric distinctions, the conditions of the transcendental unity of apperception were found not merely for the unity of the self-conscious individual man, but rather for all unity of conscious intelligence in general; and the rationality of the world was found not to be merely belonging to our preculiar mode of apprehending this world, but essential to the cosmos itself.

This cosmos, as in itself a production of universal thought-acts (called the categories by Kant), necessarily contains them in all its parts, including the finite unities of conscious intelligence within it, and which as unities of conscious intelligence must also use the categories in all their thinking.

In effect, when (you) look out into the world, you are looking at a finite portion of the infinite experience of a unity of apperception encompassing the entire cosmos in its unity. In this greater sense, solipsism is true, because the cosmos is this infinite self, not (you), not (me), but, an 'I' rather that contains (you) and contains (me), which nonetheless (and this is of great significance) is analoguous to humans in its rational essence.

>>24516261
kant constantly speaks throughout the critique of a "manifold" of sense that exists "before" the categories are applied to it. why would he think that this "manifold" just comes from nowhere? that's retarded. he never actually did what you said.

>>24516273
we can't know it's correct either--destroying any realism.

>>24516280
>why would he think that this "manifold" just comes from nowhere?
Because causality is merely a category that objective validity WITHIN phenomena and cannot legitimately be extended to a cause of sensation BEYOND phenomena. Sensation is simply given.

>>24516283
you cant PROVE its correct insofar as reason would use causality to do so and thus presuppose time, but no realist or indirect realist has ever thought that you could PROVE the validity of causality, since it's obvious that you can't prove the validity of a rule by employing that rule. All Kant did was point out that in addition to this fact, time and causality are intimately related because causality is the way we know when things happened in time.

>>24516289
*that only has

>>24516280
We can't side with Jacobi and Kant (and Kantian Kant's interpreters) at the same time. I have argued with Kantians on this board multiple times, it is a given that the subject of ''thing-in-itself'' is an agnostic stance and not a cognitively acknowledged thing. The manifold refers only to the prior state of synthesized experience, that's all. You will never find in Kant the origin of the manifold or the relation of it to noumena or how it causes the transcendental categories to synthesize them, etc.

>>24516289
Kant wanted to show that causality had objective validity with phenomena, because otherwise there is no time and hence no phenomena. But this does not imply that the validity of causality only extends to phenomena, it just implies that, because the transcendental deduction which proves that the categories are objectively valid within phenomena only works because it supposes we are in the realm of phenomena, there is no corresponding "deduction" as to the validity of causality beyond the realm of phenomena. Kant didn't prove that causality is ONLY valid within phenomena, he just proved that it is at least valid within phenomena.

>>24516301
>The manifold refers only to the prior state of synthesized experience
there is no notion of "priority" without causality, so you can't even say that about it.

>>24516301
>it is a given that the subject of ''thing-in-itself'' is an agnostic stance
True. We cannot know whether it has objective transcendent reality, but we necessarily must think it as having transcendent reality insofar as we think it all since as object of thought it is conditioned by our categories. The thing in itself is a transcendental Idea necessarily subject to transcendental illusion.

>>24516311
We cannot know if it has validity beyond phenomena. That's the point. Transcendent use of the concept of causality is not legitimate until that legitimacy is proved.

>>24516345
>Transcendent use of the concept of causality is not legitimate until that legitimacy is proved.
why? if causality actually is in the structure of the real world, it makes no difference whether we can prove that it is or not. if we assume that it is and it really is, then we're right whether it not it was proven.

>>24516348
>if causality actually is in the structure of the real world
>if
well, that's the whole point in question

>>24516351
but you're presupposing that it isn't simply because there is no proof that it is.
so why don't I appeal to practical reason? believing that causality is not in the structure of the real world is not consistent with any action. It is a precondition for acting in the world meaningfully to believe that the world is real. seems like an obvious point to make. not believing in the real world is mental illness.

>>24516356
>you're presupposing that it isn't simply because there is no proof that it is.
I'm not. I'm stating a supersensible cause of sensible reality as a fact is not knowable, not that does not exist. The external world in space is empirically real, but transcendental ideal. The transcendent real world, what exists beyond space, time, and thought, this existence is what is not determinable, not the world of sense you see around you.

>>24516369
the structure that our representations express about the world is already not sensible. there is nothing sensible about the fact that one thing occurred before another. the structure is "transcendentally ideal" because insofar as we have direct interaction with it is through our own intuitions. but that is not inconsistent with indirect realism at all, because there is no reason to think that it is impossible that the structure we think is a mirror of a structure outside the mind, which may or may not be fully accurate. absolutely nothing Kant said is changed by making this supposition, because everything that Kant said was about the mind, he only made positive claims about the nature of consciousness, which cannot themselves lead to a negative claim about the transcendent world which states that the transcendent world has no structural similarity to the world of the mind. you can say that Kant didn't think this, but even so it doesn't contradict any of Kants claims about the mind.

how old were you when you realized that Kant's observation that existence is not a real predicate directly implies the validity of the real distinction between essence (conceptual content) and existence?

>>24516415
>the validity of the real distinction between essence (conceptual content) and existence?
"essence and existence are different" isn't a new or that interesting. if you're talking about "existence precedes essence" that's a totally different thing.

>>24516241 (OP)
transcendental idealism is Kant's own terminology

>>24516301
Yes, this anon is correct. But most people are dogmatists so they actually can’t comprehend what Kant would be saying on this reading.

>>24516415
It doesn’t. This is an especially bad reading since Kant was (in Aristotelian terms) a materialist monist (in the theoretical not the practical ofc) who thought our division of reality into discrete substances was merely a subjective maxim of reflective judgment. For Kant only one thing “really” exists (phenomenally) - the permanent, ie substance, and its determinations. This permanent is primary. But you think, because he thinks you can’t logically pass from “it is x” to “it exists” (Aristotle makes the same point in de in btw), he’s affirming the Avicennan essence/existence division. Unbelievable. Aquinas is a great philosopher but the people who shill him here are universal pseuds.

>>24516397
Read chapter 3 of the Analytic right now. He makes precisely the “negative claim about the transcendent world” that you deny of him, almost in those exact fucking words.

>>24516316
A Kantian could answer that this notion of priority is a condition of internal time, of the category conditioning every experience and that therefore any explanation and experience must and will rely on it. I don’t know, would you complain that Kant is refuted because his Transcendental Aesthetic comes before the Transcendental Deduction and that he implies his notions of the former in the latter chapter?

>>24517019
He was trolling

>>24516469
Come to think of it, why not transcendental empricism?

>>24516316
>there is no notion of "priority" without causality,
But that's not true. If A is logically prior to B it does not follow that A is actually a cause of B. For example, a genus is logically prior to a species, but a genus does not cause its species. The thought of a genus is necessary for the thought of a species, but this is not the sort of "causality" that is a successive synthesis of the manifold in accordance with a rule.

>>24517364
The relevance re: Kant is that the priority of the transcendental faculties is not only not necessarily a causal one, but it's actually impossible that it be causal, for reasons that should be obvious. We speak of one idea causing another but this is only a matter of speech, they actually stand in a reciprocal relation. This is an important insight for understanding any of the post-Kantians. Not one of them thought of Kant's reproductive imagination, say, as 'coming along' and crassly 'synthesizing' a given manifold. This is a pseud, unimaginative, literalist reading of Kant, that clings to the exact words that he uses without any consideration of whether the words are saying anything sensible. If your reading of a great philosopher makes said philosopher an incoherent idiot, there is something wrong with your reading.

Indirect realism is an oxymoron. All indirect realists are really just solipsists who haven't realized it yet.