1142a:
>ὅτι δ᾽ ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν: τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται: τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον. [ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ] ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἣ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ᾽ αἴσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ᾽ οἵᾳ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον.

By my gippity translation because I am a plebe:
>That practical wisdom (phronēsis) is not scientific knowledge (epistēmē), [is] clear: for it is of the ultimate thing (eschaton), just as has been said; for the practicable (prakton) is of this sort. [Indeed it is opposed to intellect (nous)] for intellect is of definitions (horoi), of which there is no rational account (logos); but it [practical wisdom] is of the ultimate thing (eschaton), of which there is no scientific knowledge (epistēmē) but perception (aisthēsis)—not the [perception] of the particulars (idiōn), but the sort by which we perceive (aisthanometha) that the ultimate thing (eschaton) in mathematics is [for example] triangle.

Okay... so what is phronesis doing here? I used to think that phronesis dealt with practical, particular matters, and nous dealt with intellectual, universal matters. But here, phronesis is being described as a virtue which "sees" the ultimate things, which is similar to how "nous" sees the first principles. Not only this, but Aristotle both 1) takes a step to distance phronesis from another practical organ, aisthesis, which perceives the sensible particulars, and 2) compares the "seeing" of ultimate things to the way the mind "sees" the triangle in mathematics (which I imagine is with the nous). Aristotle seems to be making phronesis into the organ which sees "practical universals", in contrast to nous which sees "intelligible universals".

Also, is eschaton similar to telos? Is this another example of one of those classical Aristotelian reversible priorities, where what is first and what is last depends on what is being considered (being vs. knowledge)?

Eschaton has nothing to do with telos, it’s the “ultimate” or the concrete, which is not an object of episteme. You don’t see a triangle with your intellect but with sense or imagination; you understand it as a triangle with intellect. Phonesis doesn’t see practical universals it applies them. And practical “universals” (you should say principles/aitiai) are not grasped intellectually (except insofar as you can make ethics a science) but are states of the composite, virtues. Phronesis isn’t like pure aesthesis because it grasps things under a principle.

>>24565934
>it’s the “ultimate” or the concrete
That's a bit loose of an interpretation, isn't it? Eschaton gets interpreted as "end" just like telos across multiple parts of Aristotle. That's why I suggested maybe it's a prior/posterior thing.
>You don’t see a triangle with your intellect but with sense or imagination; you understand it as a triangle with intellect.
I was speaking analogously here. The mind's capacity to understand is the mind's "sight", and when it understands, it "sees". But obviously the mind's "sight" is not for the perceptible, and it doesn't see perceptibles. It "sees" intelligibles. That's what I meant, and that's why I brought it up. Seeing as a metaphor is quite common in Greek philosophy.

Otherwise, good stuff. Thank you for blessing my thread.

>>24565934
If phronesis is direct perception of percepts even if it's imagined, does that mean phronesis of imagined things-in-themselves must also exists in a shared presence to each other?

>>24565934
>no, that's not an intelligible universal, that's a practical universal
>no, that's not a practical universal, that's a sensible universal
you just reinvented substance modalism for no reason. imagine thinking Aristotle was the Greek Descartes, except that he thought "everything was either mind..., matter..., or JUST DO IT!!! stuff"

>>24566023
I’m telling you what it means here. It’s not an interpretation it’s objectively what the passage is saying. How could eschaton be “end” in this context? That doesn’t even make sense.

>>24566697
What the fuck are you talking about “imagined things in themselves”? Re: imagination I’m saying you see or imagine the object that “is” a triangle but sight or imagination itself don’t - you know what man?
>>24566807
I didn’t say there were two different universals. Universals are not substance. This is not substance modalism unless you think Aristotle’s distinction between perception and understanding is modalism. Again the principles of ethics are not universals, ethics is not a science. Universals are principles of sciences. See ne 2.4
-5 for example. I can’t help you really I don’t think you’re smart enough for this. Another zoomer who can’t read, can’t remember anything, etc.

>>24566830
Obv ethics is a science qua science but I mean virtues themselves. You don’t even understand this. Seriously you’re fucking retarded not to be able to understand this simple passage on the op.

>>24566830
>I didn’t say there were two different universals
You distinguished between practical universals and intelligible universals. So phronesis deals with unintelligible yet practical universals. How could there be a distinction without a difference in being?
>This is not substance modalism unless you think Aristotle’s distinction between perception and understanding is modalism.
Obviously, substance dualism isn't referring to Aristotle's definition of substance but rather Descartes's definition of substance, which isn't the same thing. A better term for it would be ontological modalism or ontological pluralism. He wasn't calling any universal a substance, most likely.

However, given your disproportionate rudeness, I will hazard this. If you couldn't sort this out and recognize the conceptual difference between Cartesian substance and Aristotelian substance because the "same" word was being used, then you have no business telling people that they aren't cut out for the work. I don't understand how somebody can study Aristotle and not be a master of disambiguating equivocal terms.

>>24567777
quads of truth

>>24567777
>>24568526
>I will also point out for the record that the situation is just as bad for Aristotle. I explained to this dumb kid why phronesis was like aisthesis and how episteme is different from arete and he accused me of making Aristotle into Descartes and being a “substance modalist”. The people who post here are illiterate. Nothing but meme replies and astounding ignorance b/w insufferable arrogance. I really think their minds are warped by tech such that they actually can’t read abstract texts.
Kek he's crashing out about you in another thread

>>24568576
>it's the anti-realist Aristotle anon again
can't say I'm surprised

>>24568576
Honestly he might be the biggest midwit on this board. Completely uncurious and unserious. .

>>24565394 (OP)
Going to take an uncertain stab at what's going on with eschaton.

So, rootwise, it's derived from "ek," "out (of)/outside," and the sense you've encountered it in as pertaining to an "end" is related to how eschaton usually means (in other Greek authors prior to and contemporary with Aristotle) something like "outermost limits," "remote," "furthest," or the "extreme." "Ultimate" as a translation seems to be a term carried over from Latin translations, where, though it's own root means "beyond," it otherwise, as a Latin word, has the same meanings as eschaton. But what does it mean to say that phronesis is of the eschaton, and why does it seem to be sometimes translated as ultimate particular or concrete particular or whatever? I suppose that if you figure what it is phronesis tries to do, to settle on what to do in a given situation, the eschaton seems to be that point at which the deliberation of phronesis comes to a halt (an "end" or "outermost limit") in deliberation, settling on something. The math example strikes me as odd, because it's not immediately clear how taking the triangle as the eschaton in math is the same or similar, but perhaps, because the triangle is the most elementary plane figure, if you're analyzing some other figure in geometry, it, as an example, shows the point at which your analysis (deliberation in phronesis) stops?

Does that make any sense at all?

>>24569577
I think you're on to something. Eschaton seems to be similar to telos, but maybe it's more like peras. In any case, it seems to be about the order of things, and it being an extreme or final thing in an order of things.

But what is the direction of the order, or what is the order itself? Well, it depends on what you are looking at. I guess you can say that the eschata of nous would be the first principles, but the eschata of phronesis would be particular situations. Both are ends in their way, being the highest universals and lowest particulars, like two opposite poles of a spectrum.

>>24569594
Here's also a passage from Metaphysics Zeta, ch. 7 around 1032b5ish and following, where eschaton is also used (albeit with respect to techne):

>And something healthy comes into being when someone thinks in this way: since health is such-and-such, it is necessary, if something is to be healthy, that such-and-such be present, for instance uniformity, and if this is to be present there must be warmth, and one goes on thinking continually in this way until one traces the series back to that which, at last (eschaton), one is oneself capable of making. From that point on, the motion is then called production, namely the motion toward being-healthy. So it turns out that in a certain way health comes into being from health, and a house from a house...

(From Sachs trans.)

>>24565934
If phronesis is grasped under a principle akin to the attributes that arise from principle, yet one doesn't know it not even as noesis nor dianoia nor even pronoia, it is like doxa orthos, in the right-opinionated manner that ironically has no direct grasp upon reality as it isn't proven, nor is it propositional since to suggest it is propositional implies it is proven/demonstrated.

Socrates's phronesis is known through knowing oneself, but the question remains, how? It ends up being analogous to recollection of memory without knowing things beforehand, but to be able to do that, it must exists independently from the knower as an object outside the knower all without knowing what it is but just that there ought to be some concept of what is perceived without even perceiving, a command prior to inquiry that commands inquiry, it is experimentation through inference with a known lack of knowing.

>>24569577
>>24569603
>>24569609
I'm glad you're appreciating this "ontological modalism of universals" problem and taking it seriously. I don't have anything more to say, except that I feel confident that "eschaton" is a placeholder for "the end of a series or the last of a series", so it's similar to peras or telos, but not exactly. The eschaton of noesis are the intelligible universals, and the eschaton of phronesis would be particular circumstances. So this thread has been useful.

However, the exact relation between intelligible universals, particular circumstances, etc., or even if phronesis grasps "practical universals" instead (and thus the exact relation between intelligible universals and practical universals), remains to be seen.

I have more reading and thinking to do. Unless you have further comments.

>>24569857
I don't think I have anything further to add at the moment, but I do wonder if looking at Heidegger's lectures on Plato's Sophist would be helpful (he spends almost the first third just looking at the intellectual virtues in the Ethics, focusing on phronesis).

Just skimming through it quickly, it looks like he devotes a section to discussing this subject, so maybe that's worth checking out. Anna's Archive has a copy if you want to dl it.

bump

>>24569973
what's Christ's opinion on ontological modalism?

>>24571295
was it the Christ spammer?

>>24572255
Kek, yep

>>24566830
Here's a good question. If ethics is not a science, then how is it possible for Aristotle to write a meaningful book about Ethics? Is it all just opinion? What is his even the point of writing such a text, then? It seems impossible to assert why anything he has written is more valuable than any other perspective, then.