Today I read Kant's "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals." I heard it was a tough read, and holy shit. I think I understood the gist of it, although there is a particular point that either Kant failed to explain or I simply did not understand. Starting from the premise that we should rely on reason alone (i.e. not sensory experiences) to reach conclusions about ethics, he seemingly concludes that the most ethical rule is that which could be a universal law (i.e. a rule is ethical if you would have everyone follow it at all times independently of context). I don't see how that follows.

>>24582216 (OP)
If you don't rely on reason alone then utilitarianism starts to appear.

The actual process of arriving at universally recognized ethics derived at reason alone means you need to start searching through various cultures. In almost every known culture there is usually a reciprocity factor and proactive mores tend towards simplicity. The golden rule is usually how I explain it. Command of reason is the only way to know if proactive mores possess the universal.

>>24582340
This sounds absolutely nothing like anything Kant said

>>24582216 (OP)
You have to read philosophy books multiple times to understand them. The big problem with Groundwork is that his ethics rests on a radical reason/sensibility dualism, all the other problems follow from this. None of his big successors followed him on this point. The thrust of German idealism is to overcome dualisms of all sorts but Kant was too autistic to bring it all home.

>>24582348
By all means provide me with an ethical rule everyone should follow.

Here’s a typical “hot take” on the categorical imperative from the most pro-Kantian of the three, Fichte: “This proposition is purely heuristic: I can very well and very easily employ it as a test…. It is however by no means constitutive. It is by no means a principle, but only an inference from a true principle [the original principle of morality as such in human nature which we do not experience as a proposition]. Who is it that judges whether something [accords with the ci]? I myself. And according to what principles?”

Fichte, Schelling and Hegel all end up moving closer to traditional virtue ethics and away from the CI, in different ways, and that’s a vast oversimplification.

>>24582216 (OP)
The cover looks like a programming handbook

>>24582216 (OP)
>*blocks your path*

>>24582383
Don't lie. No, not even in *that* situation

>>24582216 (OP)
>I don't see how that follows.
The categorial imperative is all about rational universality -- if something cannot be universal without becoming illogical, then it is immoral, eg lying would make the entire act of expression impossible, thus it's illogical.

>>24582477
That is one of the more famous ones.

>>24582483
This sounds ultra autistic

>>24582552
Fichte’s is more autistic. He says yes OF COURSE you should tell the murderer where your friend is hiding, that part goes without saying. But then you need to engage the criminal in moral dialectics to convince him to change his mind. If he attacks you anyway, you have a duty to fight back, but only to the point of disarming him because it’s wrong to kill people. Meanwhile you have to invoke the state’s protection contract by hollering “Help! Help!” at the top of your lungs. If the murderer kills you and your friend after all that, at least you died following the dictates of Reason. I’m not even memeing this is exactly what he says. Brilliant philosopher but he had severe autism.

>>24582606
St. Augustine covers this subject and its similar, but distinct, compatriot of "what do you do if a man is trying to rape your ass and you don't know anyone who's into that" in "On Lying"