Which philosopher has the most coherent or most satisfying answer to the hard problem of consciousnes?

michel henry

https://d-nb.info/1239874839/34

Philosophy of mind usually treats consciousness as just another (if quite dubious) phenomenon that exists in addition to the other, “outer” phenomena. David Chalmers, for example, calls consciousness “the most vivid of phenomena”, being, however, at the same time “frustratingly diaphanous” (Chalmers 1996, 3). Yet, in light of the above considerations, it might seem questionable whether it is really fully adequate to understand consciousness as “a phenomenon” among phenomena at all: Understood as the event of givenness, it is rather the taking place of phenomenality itself, of all phenomena whatsoever. It is not some “ghostly stuff”, “invisible” to anyone besides the respective subject, which irritatingly haunts the realm of the objective phenomena that can be “seen” by everyone, but rather, it is the very “seeing” itself in which any phenomenon (be it “objective” or “subjective”) manifests itself. It is less a phenomenon than that which makes any phenomenon a phenomenon in the first place.

>>24588925 (OP)
John Searle and anyone who promotes intentionality like Franz Brentano.

Searle. He also destroyed Dennett lol
https://lukesmith.xyz/articles/searle-dennett/

>>>/his/

>>24589663
>>>/lgbt/

>>24589669
No need to post your main board, anon.

>>24589671
I thought we were recommending random boards for each other.

>>24588925 (OP)
Try pic related, it's fantastic. The answer is that it was always the descendents of Aristotle and Plato, particularly the Patristics and Aquinas.

.

Me.

What we call qualia are what "material things" (at least certain material things about the brain) actually are like. the sight of red is a material thing.
>why don't we see qualia when we open up a brain then?
because, 1, you're probably not looking at the actual physical property that maps onto consciousness anyways. you would have to look at the entire system or brainwaves or something instead of just the flesh. but, 2, which specific physical property maps onto conscious states is irrelevant to understanding, because even if you found the specific physical property and were looking at that, what you would see isn't the qualia of someone else, but your qualia representing someone else's qualia.

this is in some ways dissapointing, but also radical, considering that we would normally imagine a rock outside of our perception to be completely unimaginable, whereas it actually exists alongside very imaginable things like qualia of smells and sights.

>>24589748
I like this idea. I probably dont see it exactly the same as you do but why i cling to this sort of perspective, is it allows the hope of not only manipulating through physical fabrication experiences good and bad to be what we desire, but that we can maybe create experiences beyond the senses and modes of thought we have now.

>>24588925 (OP)
https://youtu.be/hkW0oma44uU?si=uD6EBELWu82AkTuG

Shankara, Rupert Spira, Bernardo Kastrup

>>24588925 (OP)
I am grappling with the hard problem of constipation

>>24588925 (OP)
https://youtu.be/TkmfjC9Bw_E?si=EM-feP8oy9ahNemv

Take the Pajeetpill

>>24588931
Didn’t Heidegger say this? That all phenomenology was built on the wrong basis. That when you shine a flash light in a dark room, the flash light isn’t just illuminating things, the light becomes part of the room itself

>>24589916
isnt the distinction just categorical/perspectival? surely the idea of a "room" doesn't have to include every specific room and its context, unless thinking about "rooms" as such. IDK it seems pretty easy to cognize either way

>>24589923
Idk I’m a pseud that hasn’t read either that just listens to podcasts.

>>24588925 (OP)
>Which philosopher has the most coherent or most satisfying answer to the hard problem of consciousnes?
recognizing the existence of the Soul solves it

>>24588925 (OP)
CIA and KGB parapsychologists

>>24589783
>manipulating through physical fabrication experiences good and bad to be what we desire, but that we can maybe create experiences beyond the senses and modes of thought we have now.
we can and do do that already.

>>24589943

But then you must solve the Problem of Interaction.

>>24591461
Embrace Monism and the Problem of Interaction goes away too.

>>24588925 (OP)
Nietzsche.
>>24588931
Conflating computation and qualia. An AI can compute inputs to distinguish phenomena but we know nothing about what kind of qualia if any the computation manifests.

>>24591593
Henry's not talking about AI. He'd deny that AI possesses immanence. He draws a categorical distinction between the living and non-living.

>>24591595
The quote only touches on the brain as a computation device that defines what input is relevant, it's word games to handwave away qualia like all supposed explanations are.

>>24591603
Henry only takes issue with Chalmers characterizing consciousness as only a particular type of a phenomenon. Consciousness is the site of phenomenalization. Henry's not a reductionist. If anything, he radicalizes the Hard Problem by claiming that consciousness is only explicable only in terms of itself.

>>24591606
We get delivered pre-computed, curated and filtered ideas of supposedly external phenomena from the eyes and brain.
To be able to claim you have some sort of explanation for qualia you have to be able to answer some questions about it like why we experience one part of the process but not another or what should be even simpler, why we experience ourselves and not another person.

>>24591638
>To be able to claim you have some sort of explanation for qualia you have to be able to answer some questions about it like why we experience one part of the process but not another or what should be even simpler, why we experience ourselves and not another person.
It's simple, a multiplicity of perspectives is logically neccessary in order for there to exist logically contradictory things.

>>24591638
Okay, like I said, you're preaching the choir. Michel Henry was a French phenomenologist. He wasn't an eliminative materialist. He already argues that what it is like to experience anger, fear, joy, and so on is something we experience immediately. The neural correlates of emotion don't interest him.

>>24588925 (OP)
>why do we feel qualias
Because our senses produce brainwaves which makes us aware of what we are feeling. We are aware of what we are feeling because we have a distinct capability to "think" in that we can hear ourselves producing words and signifiers without producing sound which places words on the qualias that we feel and thus makes them understood.

>>24589656
Are you the only other anon on /lit/ who watches lukesmith ? Or are you yourself Luke ?

>>24589748
The problem is that you don't answer why we feel things themselves. You explain that objects have qualities like redness, but don't explain why there's a subjective experience that comes with it.
To receive qualia, you need to be able to experience it, if you can experience it the question becomes why ?

>inb4 because of our brain
if it's because of the brain, why can we subjectively assess things with our brain

unless I didn't understand you at all and you're just advocating for panpsychism.

>>24588931
>it is the very “seeing” itself in which any phenomenon
If we see something, why do we feel it. Why am I aware of the color red when I see it ?

>>24592778
luke smith has a good heart but a closed mind

just dont be cartesian and it goes away
read Retrieving Realism by charles taylor

>>24591651
That's a description of the problem, not an attempt at explaining anything.
The key has to be memory. Apparently everything is experienced by a universal qualia but in human brains memory creates a sense of self where every experience is related to previous ones and imbued with meaning derived from that large context.
If that's true then it's interesting to think about what exactly counts as memory. Does a rock "remember" when it was hit by a hammer because the hammer leaves a mark?

>>24592778
>unless I didn't understand you at all and you're just advocating for panpsychism.
it is a panpsychism of sorts but it is important that you understand how the brain works. the brain uses a neuron (only for the sake of argument, doesnt matter if its actually a neuron, just something physical) to represent something outside the brain. each neuron stands for a thing, and a thing can be as variable as whatever we can denote as a thing. the thing is "objective", while the neuron our brain uses to represent it is "subjective"

all of these are easy problems. the hard problem is answered when you realize that our qualia is LITERALLY just those neurons. what a neuron is like (not our representation of what someone elses neurons, but what that neuron itself actually is like) is qualia. the world is made up of qualia (although the things that arent neurons are probably as unimaginable as smell is to someone who cant smell). qualia is just what "a being" is. this is actually quite intuitive because we cant imagine being without qualia anyways. now we know why.

the interaction problem is solved. the cutting up a brain and not seeing qualia problem is solved too, since youre seeing your representation of someone elses representation, and there is no necessary link between a representation and what it represents just as there is no link between a tree and the word "tree".

>>24593320
so in essence, everything has a qualia in-and-of-itself but the brain maps those qualias to a physical part of the brain ?

>>24588925 (OP)

>>24589677
Interesting. What do you think of Plotinus

with all due respect, this is retarded. There is no "hard problem of consciousness", we are the consciousness. The brain is just a computer, it doesn't run any "software" on its own so to speak.

>>24593320
even retarded niggers living in the remote jungle with no education at all understand the there is an invisible counterpart to all things, even rocks, rivers and trees. This is not "animism" which the scientists believe, it's not an irreducible dualism either. Is it really so hard to understand (I suppose the answer is yes) that the living creature is made up of two parts, and that "consciousness" is not a "material" thing.

>>24591584
No, i shall not.

>>24594171
The hard problem isn't the identification its unobservable process that's supposed to link the gap in causation
neurons in configuration -> something? -> experience/property that seems to have entirely different nature

The emperor's new mind

>>24594400
Of course you can't observe consciousness, it's not manifested.

>>24594103
no, everything IS qualia. the brain maps neurons (which are what our qualia are) unto the outside world to represent it. am i that bad at communicating myself :(

>>24594181
the problem goes away when you realize "material" things are "consciousness". with the dualism you suggest there is the correspondence problem. its the most primative option to believe in desu

>>24589663
/his/ is full of materialist bugmen atheists that don't understand either philosophy or science.

>>24589748
>it's material because I said so, okay?
Great insight.

>>24594953
>the brain maps neurons (which are what our qualia are)
You're still just conflating the map for the territory and trying to pass it off as a novel theory.

>>24595027
material is consciousness. its not because i said so, its because there is a one to one correspondence between mental states and brain states. with my explanation however you can understand why we dont see qualia (whatever seeing someone elses qualia would entail) when we open up a brain.

>>24595034
idc if its novel.
>You're still just conflating the map for the territory
our brains map of the territory that is the outside world is literally what we are, and it is what people mean when they say qualia. but i assume you meant im conflating the map that is the neurons and the territory that is qualia. im not. they are the same thing. they look like neurons in third person because we are seeing qualia that represents other qualia, like how the word "word" stands for all the other words while not looking like them. but what those neurons, in actuality and not in representation, is like is qualia.

>>24594953
I'm not "suggesting a dualism", you should have read my post before you replied.

furthermore you are severely deluded to believe that "material things are consciousness", that is simply not true.

>>24588925 (OP)
>Which philosopher has the most coherent or most satisfying answer to the hard problem of consciousnes?
We already have the consciousness we deserve.

>>24595110
>furthermore you are severely deluded to believe that "material things are consciousness", that is simply not true.
Explain to me why he is 'deluded' according to your standards of delusion. Go on, confess.

>>24595129
I don't need to explain why material things are not the same as consciousness, that is obvious to everyone who knows what those two words mean.

>>24595139
So dependant on words and words and words...

>>24595139
"Simply" not true according to your quantitative standards of linguistics though, right? lmfao

>>24595151
What the fuck are you trying to say?

>>24595162
Nothing. Consciousness isn't meant to be articulated through language.

>>24595164
Ironic then (if that were true), since that's exactly what you're doing right now.

>>24595106
what you described is dualism. you didnt explain how it wasnt. there is now no reason to believe in any invisible counterpart. we now know that what we see in third person and name "physical" is in first person what we see as "mental".

>>24594161
based

>>24595209
It's just so retarded, I don't know why I'm talking the time to reply to someone who is so retarded. It's clearly not a dualism, the dualism is inside of your retarded brain that cannot take a step back and see a larger perspective than the so-called "dualism". You're literally looking at a coin, flipping it over and seeing the other side of the coin, and saying "Hey look, a dualism, this coin has two sides.".

Furthermore, I don't "believe" in anything, I'm telling you how things work. You are totally projecting your retarded "beliefs" onto people. This has nothing to do with "belief". Furthermore, there are invisible things all around you all the time, such as air, you do not need to "believe" in air in order to acknowledge that air is there. Consciousness is everywhere, it is invisible, yet we do not need to "believe" in it.

You take X drug, which is physical.
Your consciousness changes.
Because is physical.
I Know it, and you could know it also.

>>24595229
okay thats at least an explanation this time, rather than "its made up of two parts but not dualism and youre a retard". but the other invisible side to the coin is extraneous for an explanation. if the "conscious" side is entirely determined by the "physical", and is also invisible, and can also be explained by being not the two sides of the same thing but being the same thing (looking like different things only because of a difference of representation and represented) then your elaboration is useless.

consciousness IS visible, and IS the material that we see when we open up a brain, looking like neurons and not qualia only because we arent looking at someone elses qualia but a representation of it.

>>24595572
Nope, the soul can inundate itself from the corruption of the body if wise enough, as shown by Socrates feats in Symposium.

>>24595572
You're confusing consciousness with brain. Brain is matter, but consciousness is more than matter, as it is the condition of the possibility of matter's existence.

once Remote Viewing is perfected, I'll give you your answer.

>>24589656
Dennett is an NPC retard, so that's not really an achievement.

>>24594181
kys

>>24595057
>there is a one to one correspondence between mental states and brain states.
How does your theory account for phenomena in which someone is perceiving without knowing he is perceiving or having a conscious experience of perception eg. blindsight?

>>24596634
>there is a one to one correspondence between mental states and brain states.
to be clear this part isnt my theory, this is backed up by all research on this topic and taken for granted by everyone investigating the hard problem.
>How does your theory account for phenomena in which someone is perceiving without knowing he is perceiving or having a conscious experience of perception eg. blindsight?
these arent relevant to the hard problem, but yes there are brain states that correspond to those experiences/mental states as well. the brain represents not only things in the outside world but also things in itself and the body, which i didnt mention in my post.

>>24589656
Both are worse than useless, actively harmful to anyone trying to think about these things.

>>24596801
Wanna expand on that or are you just litposting?

>>24595576
>we arent looking at someone elses qualia but a representation of it.
Okay so where's the qualia?

>>24596682
>but yes there are brain states that correspond to those experiences/mental states as well.
Perhaps I didn't explain myself well enough, the phenomenon I cited (blindsight) is an example of an observable brain state that lacks a corresponding subjective mental state, the people that suffer from it can see things moving (or at least their brain can) without having the perception of sight. How does your theory account for this?

>>24588925 (OP)
The final substance is noumenal, we can't speak of that which our experience continges on, only that which is available to us through experience.

But we can describe consciousness and its different from other phenomena. It's a process of self reflection. There is a sense in which Hegel puts it on a continuum with life itself. The degree to which a system can maintain itself and become self-referential distinguishes a chemical from simple matter, plants from chemicals, animals from plants, and conscious animals from ordinary animals - the same thing in increasing degrees.

>>24588925 (OP)
Unironically picrel. It's not just 'a' problem in his philosophy it's THE problem at least in the Jena period. He realizes that, just as a materialist might try to somehow derive consciousness from the brain, to overcome the hard problem you have to proceed in the other direction, from consciousness to matter - and in doing this last you actually solve the first as well (eventually), but only by rejecting materialism.

>>24596682
You haven't touched the hard problem, in fact you don't seem to know what it is. How does something merely physical BECOME subjective experience? Saying "my brain changes as consciousness changes" does not answer that, it's also not controversial, even before we knew so much about the brain people were saying this in the 18th century. How are you present for yourself? Good luck answering this with cognitive science buddy.

>>24597830
someone's qualia when you open up their brain? this is what ive explained. the qualia IS their neurons (again not necessarily neurons but a physical property) but you dont see them as neurons when you open up their brain because youre seeing your own qualia that represents their qualia, and not their qualia.

this is a very flawed analogy but in the hopes of clarity, and for the second time in this thread, its like if our experiences were words, and you expected to find a billion different words when you opened up a head, and the only word you found was "words", because thats what our head maps someone elses words as.

>>24598366
literally in the post youre responding to i said the correspondence part isnt controversial and is acccepted by everyone and isnt relevant to the hard problem. refer to other posts.
>physical BECOME subjective
its not a case of becoming, its a case of being the same thing in the first place. again refer to other posts for why.

>>24598121
sorry i thought you were referring to the book. i see what you mean now. a brain state that lacks a corresponding subjective mental state is really not surprising since a dead or deep sleeping brain also lacks a subjective mental state. i guess in my system all physical things are mental states of some kind but it is important to realize that our sense of a "mental state", our "continuous conscious experience", is determined by connection and memory. the brain may have unconnected processes or processes that arent included in our string of memory so that they dont contribute to our "mental state" or our sense of "continuous conscious experience". in that regard there are all kinds of qualia happening in the brain that arent connected to our string, or arent strung togehter at all, and thus are probably much more momentary, isolated (as in focused on a single thing rather than an amalgamation of many senses) consciousnesses, which are very alien to the consciousness we are familiar with.

what about the hard problem of my cock

>>24598487
didn't i already deal with you earlier?

>>24597691
Dennett uses dishonest logic and appeals to empiricism to dismiss something that clearly precedes any thought, logic or empiricism.
The Chinese room from Searle sums up how braindead he is. It's "proof" that computers will never understand language, which they already do. You can use the exact same "proof" to show that humans can never understand language. He thinks in humans there's an actual physical, biological but also magical element hidden somewhere in the brain, like a little magic elf controlling the brain with levers.

The Chinese room fucking understands Chinese and it has some sort of qualia like everything does.

>>24598440
>its not a case of becoming, its a case of being the same thing in the first place. again refer to other posts for why.
OK you already pretty much know the answer. It's not really a hard problem at all with a modicum of philosophical culture, this is ancient stuff. A metaphysics that leads to insoluble problems like this one is a shit metaphysics. I think what the STEMfags are afraid of is magic or woo but you don't need to transcend naturalism, you just have to realize that reductive materialism doesn't make sense - not just for consciousness but for organic life in general and even for inorganic nature. Rejecting crude materialism does not mean embracing the 'supernatural', it's just realizing nature is formal.

>>24598440
>the qualia IS their neurons
Hmm as far as I can tell your entire "solution" is just refusing to acknowledge what qualia actually is and then sweeping the term under the carpet by just defining it as neurons

>>24598609
>which they already do
Lol.

>>24598968
Understanding is computational, about relating symbols to other symbols. You don't need qualia for it. That's the only point the Chinese room expresses. Now we've built the room for real and it really works to relate symbols to other symbols in a consistent way, to understand knowledge expressed in language well enough to apply it, aka express the meaning behind the input using other symbols or actions.
There's no way to know if the room is experiencing some kind of qualia but based on the little we know the most reasonable assumption is that it does. The only model consistent with what we all subjectively observe is assuming everything has some kind of qualia that in human brains leads to a persistent sense of self and all that. The medium is probably not important, only the information and how it's processed. Like math is not dependent on any specific medium for the rules to work. If that's true it's possible to make a fully conscious being by shuffling around pieces of paper or whatever like in the Chinese room.

>>24598947
neurons are a placeholder for any "physical" property of the brain that is observable from the outside, that also corresponds to conscious states. that is, whatever is the thing that when you change it, your mental state also changes.

qualia (our internal experiences, the sight of the color red etc) is what those neurons in reality look like, or rather what those neurons actually are. what we call "material" (or at least the material responsible or correspondent to our consciousness) IS "consciousness". our entire internal experience, and every difference in our experience, is just different neurons. i know im bad at explaining this, but please try to understand, because this is the answer.

>>24599023
This implies conscious beings may exist right in front of us in systems we don't recognize as alive. The eye of Jupiter is a stable, centuries old system with more computational power than every manmade CPU on earth combined. There could be an entire world, like a minecraft world computed naturally by the interactions of elements in the storm and that world could be populated by in-game conscious beings interacting with each other "virtually", without any knowledge of the actual physical storm as we see it.

>>24599023
qualia wouldnt *emerge* in the chinese room, everything is already qualia since qualia is what beings are like, so disconnected qualia would already be there before the chinese room. what the chinese room would achieve is a consciousness like ours, that is, a string of qualia connected by memory. in fact the ingredients to make a consciousness like ours would specifically be something that represented every "thing" it sensed or thought and something that recorded the past and recalled it, and the being of those representations would constitute its consciousness.

A dust devil is an actual, literal devil/demon with it's own narrow perspective and disregard for humans. AI is the beast, a high level demon in the hierarchy of hell given a human voice and power over all men.

>>24589748
>>24595057
>a one to one correspondence between mental states and brain states
This doesn't prove consciousness is material, nor have you furnished much proof for this in of itself. You're actually loading numerous unproven presuppositions, which actually don't cohere. Keep in mind, I'm not trying to argue in bad faith here.
For instance: this word "state." This is an abstraction. To say there is such a thing such as a brain or a mental state is to assume that there is an 'essence' of a brain, which is ontologically distinct from all the rest of things. Inevitably, what you're saying is that consciousness doesn't exist, because abstractions and essential ideas like brains, bodies, and mental states don't exist in a purely material universe. Demonstrable through this argument:
1. Unified and distinct wholes, like brains, bodies, or minds, are essences (think like Platonic forms)
2. (Per materialism) Only material things exist.
3. Essences are not material things.
4. Therefore, essences don't exist.
This gets into why the hard problem of consciousness prevails, and materialism/naturalism fails to explain it.
>>24599104
>verything is already qualia since qualia is what beings are like
Equivocation. That's not what qualia means.

Let me explain further.
Presume the law of identity, A equals A, etc.
If consciousness is material, consciousness is identical to the matter that makes it. There is no extra level of consciousness (say, spirit, what have you). Say, mind is identical to its matter.
If this is true, qualia is identical to the matter it 'represents.' Ergo, our conscious experience ought to have direct metaphysical access to what things are: pure matter. Except, we don't. Consider that if I have a pile of coins, I can produce the sum of the coins. And if i have the sum of the coins, I can turn them into a pile. They are identical. Not so with consciousness. Consciousness itself does not derive its material associates.
Conversely:
1. Our consciousness perceives everything, including itself, through essential categories (we perceive cups, tables, and people, not their material constituents). Granted, some of these are mental fabrications.
2. Everything we experience is interpretive, even our science is a model, not the things in of themselves.
3. Look at the word 'represent.' Qualia is our Kantian phenomena. The fact that there even is a distinction between our phenomena (how we see it) vs. noumena (how things are in of themselves) proves that phenomena and noumena are metaphysically distinct.
Ergo, consciousness is not identical to material constituents. It's something that exists, yet shouldn't according to a materialistic universe.
Which is why materialists arrive at some retarded ideas: naive realism with the belief that we don't actually exist as conscious beings, something we can never arrive through naive realism. Or, that our consciousness is an illusion... to our consciousness?

Take the Strawson pill
>universe exists
>therefore, its experiential
>you are the universe experiencing itself

>>24599188
im not a materialist. if anything im arguing for idealism, saying that what material in actuality looks like is qualia.

>Say, mind is identical to its matter.
yes, this one is my position.
>If this is true, qualia is identical to the matter it 'represents.'
not true. qualia is the representor in the brain. it is matter, its just matter in the brain, not the matter outside the brain that the brain is representing. every time our brain sees a tree, it uses something to code that thing. the matter im talking about (that qualia is equal to) is not the matter that is represented by the brain, its the matter that is used to do the representing. i hope that will clear any the confusion.
>Qualia is our Kantian phenomena.
yes. i believe what kant got wrong was that phenomena and neumena are exclusionary, rather than phenomena being a subset of neumena. i believe when the color red is experienced, what that color red IS is "the thing in itself" of a neuron, or whatever matter the brain is using to represent matter outside of itself.
>phenomena (how we see it) vs. noumena (how things are in of themselves)
this is because somethings are outside the brain and somethings are inside.

>>24599232
You’re right imo came to same conclusions

>>24595057
>its because there is a one to one correspondence between mental states and brain states.
No evidence of this being the case btw.

>>24595572
Midwits love making this misunderstanding.

>>24599084
>i know im bad at explaining this
Have you considered you just don't know what you're talking about in general?

>>24600709
what's the misunderstanding

>>24599223
>take the midwit redditor naturalist that bases his philosophy off of futurama pill

>>24599232
>if anything im arguing for idealism
If you believe that its "lights out for good" when the brain dies, you are a materialist.

>>24600728
The misunderstanding is the belief A = B. It's that simple. Materialists are so dumb lol.

>>24600728
The hard problem is exactly that, no matter the drugs, the physical effects, etc, upon the brain, the person is still "Conscious". We dont know where consciousness begins and ends, what is experiencing and what isnt? For all we know via science, the brain allows "reason", not "consciousness", as >>24595871 said. The reasoning could simply allow the consciousness to be expressed (psychoanalytic unconscious)

>neurons are qualia!
>except if I surgically removed it and took it out of your head then that doesn't count

>>24600792
See:
>>24595871
>>24600765
>>24600781

>>24600795
I'm making fun of the materialist anon, actually. It's such a nonsense idea. If he said consciousness was the holistic seemingly coherent whole of the body itself, then I could see where he's coming from, but reducing it to tiny gray matter alone is flat out retarded.

>>24600738
It's "lights out" when you close your eyes. Why would dying restore something physical like your sight?
If you're attached to your idea of self, your body, your eyes etc you identify with a material construct over your eternal soul.

>>24600803
Infantile word games. Do you or do you not believe awareness fades forever when the brain dies?

>>24600781
>The hard problem is exactly that, no matter the drugs, the physical effects, etc, upon the brain, the person is still "Conscious".
But that's precisely what anesthesia does. No perception, no feelings, no reflexes, no thoughts, no dreams, and no memory afterwards. Where would you locate the consciousness of a person under general anesthesia?

>>24600803

The limited experience of the body ends. It becomes like, during states of trance or total sensory deprivation in which your brain begins firing concepts from its deep unconscious toward the lobes of reasoning, except there is no brain to produce images or make sense of it, and there is no sense of self. There is no "sense" at all

>>24600810
Sense and reason is not consciousness

>>24600814
I can accept that, but it's not an answer to my question. Where is the consciousness of a person made unconscious through anesthesia?

>>24600817
Nowhere. It is a phenomenon. Consciousness is, as best we understand it, not produced by the brain or nerves or any “location”

>>24589916
yes Heidegger said ther's no object subject, ideal real distinction, it's all the same part of the "clear" that manifests everything

>>24600837
Okay, maybe it's the wrong way to frame the question.
In what way does the phenomenon of consciousness manifest while being under anesthesia? >>24600781 says the person is still conscious no matter the drug, but I've never met anyone who would describe it as such, nor would I with my personal experience. There was definitely an end and a restart when I went under the knife.

>>24600805
Depends what you mean by awareness, anything like sight or any of the other experiences that rely on physical mechanisms to deliver input to the soul dies with the body and a lot of what Christ said and what early Christian rhetoric continued is about condemning the sort of attachment to the physical body you're promoting here. The body of Christ is eternal, yours burns away leaving only the eternal gold that is the soul. I've heard a modern Orthodox monk say their traditional understanding of the "image of God" is basically that it references qualia. I've heard a Buddhist monk say this is how reincarnation actually works, "you" are not reincarnated, the eternal soul is incarnated in your neighbour even as "you" talk to him. This soul is different from your spirit, the pattern that defines your life and you may cause to repeat over and over in coming generations, reincarnating your spirit over and over in a pointless treadmill. The whole soul of a physical human being has three parts, the eternal Father in heaven, the spirit in your mind, and your physical brain.
>>24600811
The part we can't find anywhere in the body still exists. There's just no apparent continuity because memory is encoded physically. If every second my consciousness teleported into the body of a pig and then back without recording any of that physically in my brain or the pigs brain, nothing would change, my experience would look exactly the same to "me" despite teleporting into a pig 60 times a minute.

>>24600738
(the other anon isnt me) its lights out for the kind of consciousness we have, with memory and continuity and all of that. but since ive explained all matter is qualia, things go on just as matter goes on. except the matter that goes on is qualia, like a single shade of red just existing.

>>24600706
there is, and its such strong evidence that everyone on all sides of this debate agree. same brain states, same mental experiences. (not every part of a brain state is dedicated to the mental experience ofc, which explains blindsight and all) i cant argue you out of that so do research.

>>24600792
nigga ive been explaining why you dont see qualia when you open up a brain this whole thread. its because youre not seeing their qualia directly, youre seeing your own qualia representing their qualia. its matter representing matter, and qualia is what matter is like. also keep in mind that its not neurons per se, ive just been using that as a placeholder for whatever physical property in the brain actually corresponds. please be less tiring, try to understand this if youre actually curious and not a theist hanging on to the last front in apologetics. even if god existed this would be the way it works.

>>24600852
Some of the physical mechanisms pause and you stop recording memories so there's no continuity of self. If every second is felt on some level you wouldn't know that if there's no memory of it. Psychedelics mess with memory without completely stopping it from working, that's basically all they do but this can translate into changing your actual perception and even so called ego death where you remember not having a coherent "self". I remember slowly remembering what and who I am, what a human is and what space is etc. That all the colors around me have significance, they're things in space not just pretty colors.

>>24600883
Okay, but if all perception, memory, sense of self, and any imaginable form of experience is *not* consciousness itself, then consciousness seems to be ultimately devoid of content. It's not even the grounding of experience, as there are forms of life with the capacity to perceive while lacking anything we could commonly describe as consciousness, unless you want to argue that bacteria have it too. Would you say that's the case?

>>24600936
What we normally call consciousness is the advanced human version produced by the interactions of all the elements involved. That's why we need qualia as a separate concept.
A triangle is made of three points but the triangle is not a point and the point is not a triangle. If we remove the physical triangle the rules that dictate how geometry works still exist, they're not local to the instance of the triangle. The physical triangle is an incarnation of a non-physical form that emerges from interactions between simple parts with very fundamental and basic rules like points existing with a position in space.
We don't even need bacteria, a dead rock is incarnating the rules of the universe including having a position in space and having the fundamental, basic element that in the complex interactions in human brains expresses as consciousness. That's qualia and it existed before time and space like the geometrical rules that allow points also existed before time and space or time and space wouldn't have been possible. It can't be accounted for as a product of anything physical.
You need something like a neural net with dynamic weights to start to approach human consciousness but it's almost certainly medium independent like the triangle. The rules dictate how the triangle works whatever medium we incarnate it in, even when it's virtual and there's no physical triangle anywhere, just a representation of one in electrons shuffling around in a CPU or in the brain of a person.

>>24589663
>>24589669
>>>/b/

>>24593320
>>24594103
>>24598440
>Neurons are qualias that represent qualias in the real world
Beyond the dubious nature of your assertion, you don't explain why we subjectively feel these neurons, are why they're associated with consciousness/subjective experience. All you're doing is saying that subjective experience is stored in the form of neurons (or some other physical matter).
But this isn't any different than saying consciousness is stored in the brain (which I believe it is) and is responsible for making us aware of our sensory experience. In essence you're responding to "why do we subjectively experience things ?" with :
>we feel things because these feelings are in our brain.

>>24599188
>For instance: this word "state." This is an abstraction. To say there is such a thing such as a brain or a mental state is to assume that there is an 'essence' of a brain
No it's just describing a mental process

>If this is true, qualia is identical to the matter it 'represents.'
You're going to be shocked when you realize how qualias get to the brain (hint : images from our sense ;) )

>Consciousness itself does not derive its material associates
Braindead people aren't conscious anon. There quite literally is a transposition with the brain which proves your first supposition (If consciousness is material, consciousness is identical to the matter that makes it)

>Ergo, consciousness is not identical to material constituents
It is, we just don't know how to "read" it.

>>24601292
Theres genuinely no way youre this retarded

Our intuitive, conditioned ideas of "matter" don't map on to what we can measure about reality so trying to anchor statements about qualia in ideas about "matter" doesn't accomplish much. A proton is made up of some kind of energetic sub-particles, quarks or whatever that got locked together in some weird dance where one force pulls forever and another pushes forever. When the universe was dense enough this interlocking couldn't happen, it was just a hot, dense, uniform field of those proto-particles. Not even particles yet because that needs a gradient in energy density, a point in the field with higher energy density than what surrounds it is a "particle".

>>24600852
Of course your memory and sense cannot remember when you were under anesthesia. You were still conscious though. You were still "observing" the no-sense. Upon waking up it feels as if nothing happened, as the senses and memories flood back in. This is a matter of relativity.
>>24600936
Yes, I would say bacteria likely experience a form of consciousness

>>24600867
it's interesting you mention three parts. that neatly aligns with the individual's (dependent, participated) act of existence, their essence (the soul as substantial form of the body), and their matter (the physical brain as part of the body).

>>24588925 (OP)
wtf is the hard problem of consciousness God did it

The question of whether you're actually nothingness under anaesthesia or just not creating memory of it is a real bugger and makes me scared of death not being an escape/rest. I have brain damage since birth & I get glimpses during deep sleep of my brain sorting through the morphology of thought in the abstract and can still sense suffering. It's made me better at analysing information from what I've learned about how semantic thought is constructed but yeah, makes me scared there's no actual respite from experience, only forgetting. I hope I'm wrong.

>>24601292
i dont think youre making the attempt to understand, or there is an inherent difficulty in this issue, or im retarded, or people dont read other people's posts very carefully.
>you don't explain why we subjectively feel these neurons
what we call a "subject feeling" (qualia) IS what a neuron is, in reality. there is no feeling the neurons or whatever, the neurons ARE our feels.
>All you're doing is saying that subjective experience is stored in the form of neurons (or some other physical matter).
not stored in them, they are them.
>But this isn't any different than saying consciousness is stored in the brain
our consciousness IS the brain. its just that another brain (or our brain seen via a mirror, for instance) looks like a brain and not like our first person experience, because our first person experience, that is, ALL OUR REALITY, are qualia that are used to represent things, and the qualia that is used to represent qualia looks like a brain. just as there are many different words, but the word used to represent words doesnt look like those other words.

Do you need qualia to process sensory information and direct the body to act?
Do you need qualia to contemplate sensory information?
What is the type of processing minimally required to be Contemplation that would require qualia?
Do you need qualia to discuss qualia?
Do you need qualia to believe you have qualia?
How could qualia materially stimulate a response to a mental program probing whether it had qualia?

I think there are so many possible responses to these that it is impossible to provide any universally satisfactory Solution. Also you can always provide a set of answers that would dismiss materialists as unable to address qualia due to not having any, due to a failed mental prompt tendency that does not require qualia to satisfy the probing of thought itself. As such the brain would not 404 due to a null return for them, and they would never switch on their own qualia experience. Alternatively, they simply lack souls or are just too retarded to understand the concepts.
>can you design a series of questions that would determine which of the above flaws was the case for a materialist?

>>24601624
Anon, physical neurons are to mental processes what physical transistors are to computer programs. Ultimately, the actual processing happening is the flow of wave patterns in the EM field more than the collection of individual states of the fundamental processing units. Likewise, electrical flow is a light speed wave pattern in the electric field, more than being individual electrons moving (at mm per hour).

I think EM is also a nice analogy for qualia. If the physical brain is operating as an electrical grid, it can produce a seemingly disconnected and entirely different yet directly correlated effect in a different field. (Note I am now speaking analogously, not saying consciousness if magnetism). Perhaps just as E and M separated from a combined field in the past, so too did material reality and qualia, yet the two can still interact under certain circumstances. That is likely the best we can do for a dualist answer.

>>24601609
There are thousands of seemingly honest NDE reports that are sometimes seemingly medically impossible which materialist medical science has copium'd hard about. Also sometimes someone sneezes and has an NDE so its a real conundrum.
Somehow the human brain evolved this bizarre trick. If the human brain also evolved a coupling with qualia (ie it is not universal to all brains/matter), then the two may be linked.
I don't know whether this actually indicates an afterlife (NDEs are reported maybe 10% of the time too), or an immortal Soul or that the afterlife is infinite in duration, but it introduces enough plausible doubt to be a salve on such fears.
Most NDEs indicate a very pleasant reprieve.
Anesthesia does not reliably produce them, but its also not inherently different from non-REM sleep, which presumably does not keep you up at night.

>>24601693
i hate non linear discussions like this. i must have repeated myself a billion times. i defined neurons as whatever physical property actually corresponds to consciousness. its just a placeholder.

with my explanation, there is no reason to opt for dualism, its shaved away with Ockham's razor. qualia is what that physical property in actuality is.
>yet the two can still interact under certain circumstances.
the problem is that they map onto each other one to one. for every mind state, there is a brain state. if the brain state is entirely the same, the mind state is too. the two being literally the same thing would solve this. for how the two might be the same thing while not looking like the same thing (ie. we open up a brain and dont observe qualia) refer to earlier posts.

>>24601755
Readings your posts reminds me of that screencap of an Indian proposing a supplementation to the famous equation e = mc^2, e = mc^2 + A.I. due to the importance of AI to humanity's future

>>24601799
why

>>24600869
>there is
You can't define what "mental state" correlates to the brain state, so your opinion is worth less than shit.
>and its such strong evidence that everyone on all sides of this debate agree.
All sides of the debate = You and your tranny zoomer friends on discord.
>i cant argue you out of that so do research.
>I'm a lazy fat faggot so do your work for me.
Clean your axe wound.

Panpsychism is a form of intellectual self-cuckoldry. Literally no predictive power can be garnered from it.

>>24589748
I agree that rocks have some way of "experiencing" the universe and that it implicates a lot of how we should conceive what consciousness is, isn't, and how much of the conscious experience we may not have.

>>24601915
Of course no predictive value can come from it. That was obvious all along. It's okay to think about the parts of the nature of the universe that aren't about how predicting the universe will act or unfold.

>>24601925
>Of course no predictive value can come from it.
It's just physicalism and thus aberrant dogshit.

>>24601926
If it's not physicalist to us, it is to whatever non-physical form that may exist from its own perspective. They would have their own physics, and their physics might explain everything they perceive in their own reality, inclusive of the sub-reality that constitutes what we perceive.

>>24601910
this is obviously very personal to you, but im actually curious to know, do you think there is no correspondence between brain states and mental states, or do you think there is some correspondence, or what? because ive never heard anyone claim the former (since you can prove it to yourself very easily) and the latter leaves you in a very awkward position.

as a diagnosed retard I hate this shit. I assume normal not retards are more well able to perceive reality and be less of an NPC, but even if you hit your head or take some drug not only would your perception and interpretation change but the ability itself might change or be reduced. like what the fuck are non verbal autists with extra high light and sound and smell sensitivity experiencing? is there reality more valid than a normal persons.

>>24601948
It's "normal" by whatever endures. If you have kids and a family line then you aren't retarded in a a genetic sense. Those nonverbal autists aren't experiencing a reality that they can, in most cases, successfully pass on to offspring such that they have their own offspring.

>>24589916
>That when you shine a flash light in a dark room, the flash light isn’t just illuminating things, the light becomes part of the room itself

There are studies suggesting that the eyes do indeed 'emit' (e.g. the phenomena of sensing one's being watched; hunter practice of not looking directly at the game ect.)

>>24588925 (OP)
>most coherent or most satisfying

Closer to the field induction of light 'speed', the less extension has reference; biophotons, nanotubules, morphogenetic field ... some melange of Late Platonics, Boscovic, Sheldrake and pre-Einstein physicists.

>>24591096
>CIA and KGB parapsychologists

Unfortunately, this.

>>24588925 (OP)
Gravity is the fundamental force of the universe we still don't understand. Understand gravity and we understand consciousness.

>>24588925 (OP)
Schopenhauer. The endless will acquiring a new manifestation level

>>24588925 (OP)
The only answer to the hard problem is that there is no problem.

>>24601933
Not him, but you sound like you wake up and go through your day permanently thinking: well right now I presume my brain is structured like this image while representing that image for yourself in your head, and consequently I will do X or feel y because that's what my brain's state dictates to me, and nowi think of the following image my brain should have now, so I do Y or feel Y.
The reality of seeing the colour red is just that, the reality of seeing red. It's not some kind of qualia as material substance in your brain. The reality of seeing red might be represented in your brain by neurons, but this representation is secondary. That's what intuition tells us. Seeing red will have a certain brain state as a result, but seeing red comes first and this very experience stays for itself, it is literally in no other way real, it can only be represented differently by structures of information and data. We do not go through the world telling our brain what form it should materialize into, but the world is there for us in much more immediate way. Your assumptions do reverse any known intuition by saying that the way in which we act and feel (which belongs to experience) is a reality of the brain, while everyone knows that what they experience is a by itself an immediate reality, not represented and in this primary form not representable.

>>24601755
>>24601933
I don't agree with your position (I buy Chalmers' explanations more), but you've explained your position well. The quality of posts arguing against you (people who don't seem to have actually read on this subject) is sad.

>>24602387
“One can’t help wondering whether the Churchlands’ early courtship involved poetry expressing the strength of their neuronal activations for each other.”

>>24601933
>do you think there is no correspondence between brain states and mental states, or do you think there is some correspondence, or what?
There is no evidence that brain and "mental states" (a nebulous term that can range from emotions, to general beliefs and thought) are 1 to 1. The data is tautological. Neuroscience is by and large a big fat false positive. I'm not going to repeat myself.

>>24601705
Oh non-REM sleep does scare me, I've had trouble falling asleep as a kid and had night terrors weekly til 13 that felt like glimpsing eternity and going mad from the revelation

>>24602432
Show me the same poetry, and if I’ve never been in love, I’d just see noise. Maybe I’d compare it to a drug rush.
But love isn’t in the spikes. It’s in the one who knows what they meant.

>>>>24601755
>they map onto each other one to one
I suppose stating that the interactions would be only in some circumstances was a misstatement. The circumstance I was aiming at was that in which a mind directly referenced its own qualia symbolically, where there would be a more direct coupling of the consciousness to its qualia as a focal point. In that case the qualia is directly affecting the neurological process "backwards" in a sense, as we tend to see qualia as being produced by brain states, in the same way magnetic fields tend to be produced by electric charges in motion. There is always the possibility that it is more of a back and forth relationship, at least in how biological intelligence evolved (I do not think qualia are required for LLMs to operate, though if there is a qualia field it may spontaneously activate in such structures).

>qualia is the physical property
My impression of your position is
>Physical hardware is also qualia
>You only experience those qualia if they are directly coupled to your own physical consciousness center
But also now
>it can also be brainwaves not neurons
>>that's not dualism.
First, this sounds like property dualism, I'm not sure what would be the distinction you would make there.
Second, I am not sure there is a disagreement between our positions fundamentally, I just find the way your are describing yours as suboptimal. I do prefer the EM analogy, as interacting but separate fields, but in essence it is identical to stating that the physical state of the brain includes a qualia property, unless I am misreading you. This is epiphenomenalism in my book.

>>24601924
If rocks contain qualia, it would be so amorphous as to be meaningless, beyond the implications that our own highly treasured Experience is at its most essential level utterly mundane and universal. At any rate, our treasuring of our Experience is just our ego identifying with our qualia, and whatever logic our egos come up with for value is generally tortured and nonbinding to objective fact.

>>24601960
>eyes emit
I think this is purely subconscious pattern recognization rather than anything ESP. It feels spooky to us precisely because it is an unusually distinct and rare subconscious trigger.

>>24602768
General anxiety disorders are unpleasant.
As I don't like "therapists" and greatly distrust pharmaceuticals and their massive side effects, all I can say is to give meditation a try and maybe vagal tone exercises. It sounds fad but the stuff does work. Ultimately, GAD is an imbalance of emotional reaction. You can contemplate the same issues from a position of calm. As there is nothing you can do about eternity or spontaneous nonexistence, unless you buy into a relion, so experiencing anxiety over it is not helpful or necessary.

>>24602897
>>24601924
its not that rocks experience or contain qualia, its that they are qualia.
>it would be so amorphous as to be meaningless
yes. its definitely not consciousness as we know it, but whats important is that its the same kind of basic substance, and that beings can be imagined as experiences out there.

>>24602756
>(a nebulous term that can range from emotions, to general beliefs and thought)
here it means all internal experiences.
>are 1 to 1.
so is the correspondence some or none? do you not observe that when things happen to your brain, your internal experience changes? just the fact that your sight has the perspective of your brain not mean anything? i have never seen anyone hold this position.
>>24602387
>a by itself an immediate reality
im saying that that immediate reality IS what are brains structure looks like. from the inside, if you will. im not sure if we are talking about representation in the same sense.
>>24602422
thank you desu. what's chalmers' explanation? i thought he only asserted the problem. ig i haven't read that much either.
>>24602884
>I was aiming at was that in which a mind directly referenced its own qualia symbolically
i see, like feedbacking cases so that we know consciousness isnt epiphenomenal. doesnt it make even more sense if there is so much interaction and they can interact back and forth that they are the same substance then?
>You only experience those qualia if they are directly coupled to your own physical consciousness center
well all qualia is already experience, but YOU only experience stuff if its tied to your string of memory which creates the continuous self illusion. so more or less yes.
>to stating that the physical state of the brain includes a qualia property
im saying a physical property or physical substance (this distinction doesnt matter to me, what matters is that it is physical, that is, that it is observable from the outside) IS qualia. this way, if everything is physical/experience (rather than the pyhsical generating the experience) the feedback loops and interactions back and forth you mentioned are much more easily explained.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HHmiOJhL72I

>>24588925 (OP)
The sankhya school already solved it 1700 years ago

>>24603272
>pee pee poo poo saar

>>24603090
>here it means all internal experiences.
There is no way to prove the transition is 1 to 1 due to qualia being inherently subjective, which means the recorded data is merely anecdotal.
>so is the correspondence some or none?
The correspondence is in your senses and not your subjective awareness.
>do you not observe that when things happen to your brain, your internal experience changes?
It's not 1 to 1.
>just the fact that your sight has the perspective of your brain not mean anything?
Not really.
>i have never seen anyone hold this position.
You're a dishonest pseud so it doesn't matter.

>>24603090
Basically, Chalmers argues that since there are metaphysical ideas which cannot be identified with physical qualia, materialism is false. I think this is basically what a lot of the posters attacking you are grasping at. Putting it one way, on a physical level you can identify 'brain matter experience' with 'world matter experience'. While applying Occam's Razor here does offer a "simple/satisfying" solution, it leaves a lot to criticize, e.g., 'the knowledge argument'. I'm not going to wax heavy on other arguments against physicalism since it's a hairy topic, but I'll suggest you read up on Berkeley since you say 'rocks are qualia' - also reminds me of Spinoza's monism, but Berkeley you might find more fun. There is only one substance, Mind. (Samuel Johnson's kicking of the rock does NOT refute Berkeley)
>>24603272
>>24603299
I don't think these problems are ever going to get explanations that fully satisfy, but it must be admitted the poos did some good metaphysics. Worth reading into for anybody interested in this stuff.

>>24603756
>The correspondence is in your senses and not your subjective awareness.
yes but the hard problem covers first person sense data. we don't see the experience of red when we cut up a brain. an experiencer experiencing the red is not required for explanation since the experience of red is already an experience, and it is all there is (a la hume, there is no subject that can be found or needs to be posited to explain consciousness).

if you mean the feeling of when you are aware that you are experiencing something, rather than any experience in general, that is just a different sense that you have: meta-cognition. the brain state is in fact different when you are feeling this. look into meta-cognitive experience research if you're interested.

>>24603894
im not a physicalist. im advocating for a kind of idealism where everything is like and is qualia, and the specific physical brain matter/property (neurons, waves, whatever corresponds fully) IS qualia. afaik i agree with berkeley. the knowledge argment isnt directed towards my position.

>>24588925 (OP)
Not reading the pseuds in this thread whose only point of reference is like, Brandon Sanderson but consciousness is not complicated and only pseuds and hacks think so.
Consciousness first of all exists in levels, which are degrees of intelligence.
A plant is not conscious because it lacks the biological structure. An ant is very slightly conscious because it has a brain, but its brain is very small and it's retarded. An animal has a bigger brain, and is more intelligent than an insect, and therefore on a higher plane of consciousness. But its consciousness is purely reactive. It never sits around and reflects, like "Damn, I'm a dog. How good do I have it, just chilling and being a dog." It has no sense of past or future. It exists only in the moment, and uses its intelligence to decipher the world moment by moment.
Humans are the highest level of consciousness known to us. This is because we are able to think about the process of thinking itself.

That's it. That's the answer. It's not complicated. There is no soul. There is no "but what if like consciousness is a radio signal and our brains are like antennas bro" it's literally just electrical signals in a biological structure (the brain).

Shan't be responding to any complaints or questions.

Feynman kept reiterating how powerful the standard model of physics is, it can account for "almost" everything we observe and the way it does it is extremely convincing.
What it doesn't account for is the fundamental forces of physics, although there are some ideas about how they relate to each other generally they're something we just take as given, fundamental, universal and atomic as in without constituent parts.
In physics historically when there is no conceivable explanation for an observation we simply take it as fundamental like that, as given until working with it as given eventually yields some insight into it.
Today there are no such observations left except the fundamental forces and qualia. All of these are extremely abstract and most people never get exposed to them. So to them the entire universe, their entire existence as they conceive of it is completely accounted for by the standard model of physics. In this context naive materialistic "scientism" makes perfect sense. It's automatic, no need for any conscious reasoning to lead you to the conclusion, within that framework it's so obvious that it's close to impossible to even conceive of an alternative. So even though the standard model is powerful and correct it's also a mind virus that makes people less powerful.

>>24604540
Braindead. Exactly what I was describing in this post. Can't even begin to think about the subject. >>24604542

>>24604542
True
We're at an awkward stage in history where the materialist worldview, after serving its purpose in freeing us from religious dogma, is resting on its laurels and immediately categorizing as backwards or "woo" anything that questions it
It will all age terribly

Imagine light shining on a painting. The light begins as chaotic white noise then reflects off the painting as an ordered and coherent image. The light is the eternal qualia, the painting is your brain, and the image is your identity.

This explanation is either enough for you or you are a midwit who will never understand no matter how many books you read.

>>24604874
>this explanation erjfaofjeaf ect
how do you know.

>>24604884
The explanation was enough for me.

>>24604960
we are different people, im pretty sure. and if we arent then its a part of your plan or your madness, and the subjectivity i occupy is rather offended at the mysteriousness. even if your nouns are as labeled, how does that make me god, which what i would prefer to be the experience i believe im having?

Nondualist have figured this out ages ago. You do not exist, there's only experience. Imagine a mirror that reflects the room, from the mirror, you can witness any and all, except there's no reality that the mirror is reflecting, there's only the mirror

everything that you feel, think, wants, see, anything is arising from nothing. What you experience is all there is. There never was or never will be, only what is happening.

Remember that if I believe that experiencing the universe is completely subjective, and you do too, we can still agree on that and connect with each others. It doesn't mean you have to be disconnected.

>>24604542
>Today there are no such observations left except the fundamental forces and qualia. All of these are extremely abstract and most people never get exposed to them.
Except like every person that ever thought about religious or metaphysical questions? So almost everyone?

>>24605838
Who are you talking about? Can you name one example from the post-industrial west?
The atheist types can't sincerely engage with the questions even if they try and most religious types latch on to some nonsensical dogma for emotional reasons like to fit in to their community.
On both sides most people can't stop working from the naive materialistic perspective conditioned in them by science. The most recent religious sects like Mormons add shit like a physical alien planet where God lives. Almost all burger Christians can't conceive of heaven except in materialistic terms.

>>24604542
Problem with physicists is that they have been arguing that they’re close to knowing a theory of everything since the late 19th century

>just one more breakthrough bro! we’ll have a theory of everything bro!

This shit has been happening far too many times, and its newest iteration, M-theory, didn’t do so well either. Take physicists’ claims of a theory of everything with a huge fucking mountain of salt

>>24604540
>consciousness is structure
Fine, then at what point does the structure become sufficiently complex to host consciousness of a certain level? You point to brains and how “brains bigger, so better consciousness”, but what is it that really makes a certain configuration of neurons better? Octopi don’t have brains anyway, just nerves. Plants could easily have other communicative tissue that are not as obvious as neurons, and are decentralized like those of octopi. At the end of the day very little is known about the potential structures that can give rise to consciousness, and our current logic is: we are conscious->we have big brain->bigger brains mean higher consciousness level

It’s a good starting point, but that’s really it. And we have zero fucking clue how a platypus duck “feels” the electric fields it senses, which is the whole point of qualia

>>24606787
>very little is known about the potential structures that can give rise to consciousness
But if we assume it's true that all that matters is structure then consciousness isn't material. It means a conscious brain could be recreated in any number of weird rube-goldberg machine like the chinese room or in virtual machines. All the extra steps like a guy walking around with a piece of paper with symbols on it don't matter as long as the needed structure emerges eventually from the sum of interactions happening.

>>24588925 (OP)
Christopher Langan

>>24606787
>our current logic is: we are conscious->we have big brain->bigger brains mean higher consciousness level
Nta but sort of yeah.
I don't believe plants could have meaningful consciousness, because consciousness implies conscious thought and awareness, as opposed to mere unfocused sensory compositions. It is akin to saying a camera with no lens still takes pictures: yes but also non meaningfully (to us).
Conscious thought (as opposed to having a collection of qualia) requires specific logic circuitry that can focus a decision-making/awareness center on various stimuli with inhibition/switching logic. I think biological neural circuits have some special properties that science has yet to catch up with (eg brain waves and varying frequencies are more central than just neural pathways and structures), so I am doubtful that plant hormonal systems can show emergent "thought" even if they have some intricate feedback loops and senses. That really gets into automata. Whether automata/inanimates possess qualia is totally uncertain, but I'd they do it would be without awareness, as awareness is specifically generated by neural-logical self a referencing structures rather than bring inherent to all logic/sensing systems.

Anyway, to the first point: bigger and more complex likely does equate to a richer/higher level of subjective conscious experience, such that our evaluation of an Experience an order of magnitude lesser than our own is near-nil (see: meat). That is more debatable and quite subjective.

>we have zero fucking clue how a platypus duck “feels”
Yeah. Is there a fixed spectrum of qualia (red to violet for color) for given logical arrangements, or is it spontaneously and uniquely generated by every instance... Do we even experience red and violet the same each waking day, and how would we know otherwise? Lots to ponder.

>>24606475
>Almost all burger Christians can't conceive of heaven except in materialistic terms
Yeah lol they all harp on some inane thing like a minor raise or an hot dog sale and bellow out “we are just so blessed! this truly means God is on our side!!”
These are also the same people who practice “communion” through nestle wafers and smuckers grape jelly packets

>>24599188
this is the dennett meme all over again. There is no qualia and so on

>>24599188
Illusionists of course wouldn't say that we are phenomenally conscious of the illusion of phenomenal consciousness. There is no formal contradiction, whatever the illusion is, it's not a quale on the illusionist view.
I'm not an illusionist myself, though. The theory just doesn't make sense to me and I gave it a fair shot. I would in principle be fine with getting rid of some of the supposed properties of qualia, though.

>>24589943
The soul is not a great explanation. How does a soul actually perceive things? If you say that's just what souls do, a materialist can just say that that's just what brains do. It's a brute fact in both theories.

>>24599084
I think your view might be dual aspect monism.

>>24610475
>How does a soul actually perceive things?
We can't know.
>a materialist can just say that that's just what brains do
He's still adding a new element that has no apparent parts. He can't account for the phenomena using any sort of physics.

>>24610498
no because they're not the perspectives change what the thing you're looking at is, rather than it being the same thing looked at from different perspectives. your qualia is what the thing actually is, whereas all the "matter" you see when you open up someone's brain and look at their qualia is really your qualia that represents their qualia.

the way a brains representation works isn't like a picture and a reality, its more like a word and the thing the word describes. the representor for the represented is arbitrary, its only important that the same representors come up when the same represented is presented to the brain.

since I'm concluding that all "matter" is also qualia, then in this analogy everything is made up of words. its just that the "brain matter" (that corresponds to our qualia) is the word "word", whereas our other qualia are other words. its only natural that the word "word" doesn't look like other words while representing them.

I think this is the best I've explained it this thread.

>>24610498
no because the perspective in this case changes what the thing you're looking at is, rather than it being the same thing looked at from different perspectives. unlike dual aspect monism, I am claiming that matter and qualia are both qualia, rather than both something else.

your qualia is what the thing actually is, whereas all the "matter" you see when you open up someone's brain and look at their qualia is really your qualia that represents their qualia.

the way a brains representation works isn't like a picture and a reality, its more like a word and the thing the word describes. the representor for the represented is arbitrary, its only important that the same representors come up when the same represented is presented to the brain.

since I'm concluding that all "matter" is also qualia, then in this analogy everything is made up of words. its just that the "brain matter" (that corresponds to our qualia) is the word "word", whereas our other qualia are other words. its only natural that the word "word" doesn't look like other words while representing them.

I think this is the best I've explained it this thread.

>>24589656
>luke smith
lol is that your first point of reference?

physicalism is gay

>>24613414
hes gotta good heart.

>>24614068
>consciousness can only deal in abstractions therefore it's not physical
non-argument, nigga thinks he invented transcendental idealism

>>24595572
a part of your consciousness must be unchanging so it can perceive the change.