>The shrewd apprehension of relations according to the law of causality and motivation properly makes one prudent; the knowledge of the genius, however, is not oriented toward such relations; therefore, a prudent person, insofar as he is prudent, is not a genius, and a genius, insofar as he is a genius, is not prudent. — Finally, intuitive knowledge, within whose domain the idea is absolutely found, stands, in general, in direct opposition to rational or abstract knowledge conducted by the principle of sufficient reason of knowing.
>Everyone knows that it is rare to find great genius combined with prominent rationality; rather, on the contrary, geniuses are often subject to vehement emotions and irrational passions. The basis of this, however, is not weakness of reason, but lies partly in the uncommon energy of the whole manifestation of the will that constitutes the individual genius and that expresses itself through the great vehemence of all his volitional acts; and partly in the fact that, in the genius, intuitive knowledge predominates over abstract knowledge, through the senses and understanding. Hence the decisive orientation toward what is intuitive, with the impression of such knowledge being so powerful that it obscures colorless concepts, action no longer being guided by these concepts but by that impression, thereby becoming irrational: because of this, the impression of the present is quite powerful upon the genius, carrying him toward the unreflective, the emotion, the passion.
>Hence also the fact that the genius—since, as a rule, his knowledge has in part withdrawn from the service of the will—does not think, when engaging in conversation, either about the person with whom he speaks or about the topic under discussion that so vividly engages him: thus, he also judges and recounts in an extremely objective manner that which concerns his own interests, without concealing what prudence would conceal, and so forth. Finally, they tend toward monologues and can generally display many weaknesses that indeed verge on madness.
The World as Will and Representation — Book III: On the World as Representation — §36
>Everyone knows that it is rare to find great genius combined with prominent rationality; rather, on the contrary, geniuses are often subject to vehement emotions and irrational passions. The basis of this, however, is not weakness of reason, but lies partly in the uncommon energy of the whole manifestation of the will that constitutes the individual genius and that expresses itself through the great vehemence of all his volitional acts; and partly in the fact that, in the genius, intuitive knowledge predominates over abstract knowledge, through the senses and understanding. Hence the decisive orientation toward what is intuitive, with the impression of such knowledge being so powerful that it obscures colorless concepts, action no longer being guided by these concepts but by that impression, thereby becoming irrational: because of this, the impression of the present is quite powerful upon the genius, carrying him toward the unreflective, the emotion, the passion.
>Hence also the fact that the genius—since, as a rule, his knowledge has in part withdrawn from the service of the will—does not think, when engaging in conversation, either about the person with whom he speaks or about the topic under discussion that so vividly engages him: thus, he also judges and recounts in an extremely objective manner that which concerns his own interests, without concealing what prudence would conceal, and so forth. Finally, they tend toward monologues and can generally display many weaknesses that indeed verge on madness.
The World as Will and Representation — Book III: On the World as Representation — §36
