>>24849483
>>24849483
>The question is, if you can perceive more than the appearance of an object or gain more by reflection than just the appearance with applied categories.
I've been trying to convince you guys for months that Kant's language of 'mere appearance' versus the true 'thing-in-itself' obscures what he's actually trying to say. The thing-in-itself is a limiting concept; its role is to account for the givenness of experience, though not in a dogmatic sense, and to leave a space for the practical postulates which transcend experience. Appearance is real, it is what we experience, and we can't know what the thing-in-itself is, but *even whether it exists*, as Kant says in c. 3 of the Analytic. Or consider his Refutation of Idealism - he doesn't actually demonstrate an external world, because this would be dogmatism, how can I step behind experience and know the nature of phenomena and how they're related to me? But he can prove that the appearance of an external world is necessary, that it's phenomenally independent, and that is all he does. But most casuals read him as this radical dualist. Schopenhauer is as always a terrible influence on people here, what an absolute retard he was.
So no, you can't 'perceive more than the appearance' of an object. The appearance is the truth of the thing. Kant, unlike Hegel, really is a shit writer and his imprecise metaphorical language prevents most people from understanding him.