>>510207746does not follow.
>>510207437next we turn to agent-causal libertarianism, which holds that agents possess irreducible causal powers. in this view, God's design includes being with genuine control over their actions, free acts are not caused by prior states but originate from the agent themselves.
a perfect designer may allow moral evil as a necessary condition for meaningful freedom. crucially, God's foreknowledge doesn't constrain our choices, it encompasses them, much like a mathematician knows the truth of an equation without causing it to be true.
lastly, we have divine simplicity and non-competitive agency.
within classical theism, God's act of creation is simple (as in non-composite) and non-competitive with creaturely causation. God's causality operates at a metaphysically distinct level, he sustain the universe secundum naturam (according to the nature of things), including free agents.
within reformed epistemology, belief in free will is properly basic and not defeated by divine foreknowledge, as the latter is inscrutable to finite minds. the logical incompatibility of free will and foreknowledge is unproven.
so, a perfect designer's foreknowledge doesn't entail determinism if:
a: God's knowledge is atemporal (eternalism)
b: free acts are agent-caused (libertarianism)
c: divine and creaturely causation are non-competitive (classical theism)
thus, the argument that "perfect design eliminates free will" commits a category error (confusing knowledge with causation) or a modal scope fallacy (equating certainty with necessity)
scientia Dei non est causa rerum