>>511425373So your point was that, given B is false, you can prove "A" from "not (if A then B)," and somehow this results in a paradox.
>¬(A -> B), ¬B (premises)>¬(¬A ∨ B) (Impl)>¬¬A ∧ ¬B (DeM)>¬¬A (Simp)>A (DN)Where is the paradox? You don't even need to be given that B is false to conclude A. There isn't even a contradiction in premises because you can just as validly infer ¬B from the negated conditional.
>>511425978From the top: You said logical laws cannot be framed in causal terms because you can make a true sentence using a statement form to create connections between things that, in actuality, have no tangible relation to one another.
We can start with any true sentence (e.g., "I am not a nigger") and just add more disjuncts to it (e.g., "I am not a nigger or it isn't raining today"). But this doesn't create a more powerful sentence; it weakens the statement.
I see what you mean, but the logical form is not irrelevant when determining whether a causal link exists between phenomena in the real world. If there is an interpretation of "if it's raining, then you're not a nigger" where the consequent is false but the antecedent is true, then the statement has been falsified; we can dismiss both per se and per accidens causation between the conditions of raining and being a nigger. I brought up that distinction because, as another user mentioned, logic has no conception of time. But a temporal sequence is not necessary for per se causation; only for most per accidens causation. Therefore, in principle, we can frame certain logical relationships in terms of per se causation. It's just that logic isn't the tool we use to determine the real material truth of a statement.
>>511427346>>511427508Essence precedes existence. If there is no potency, no ousia for existence to act upon, then nothing can exist. Before esse, there is to ti en einai, "that by which a thing is what it is."