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Thread 519321288

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Anonymous (ID: LVwmhlh1) Netherlands No.519321288 [Report] >>519321493 >>519322614 >>519322852 >>519323027 >>519328335
The prisoner's dilemma teaches us that cooperation isn't self-evident. There are humans that are filled with greed or a chaotic/evil nature that don't want us to win. Even if we could execute anyone who would be against cooperation, it would leave us with an incredibly naive society. One who would fall easily to any foreign society that would challenge them. What this thought exercise teaches us instead, is to be vigilant. To know that evil exists, and only by acknowledgement of this evil existing freely and open, are we able to stay vigilant.

This is why I am pro-Israel.
Anonymous (ID: /zKtRYnb) Portugal No.519321493 [Report] >>519322157 >>519322398
>>519321288 (OP)
>This is why I am pro-Israel.
The joke is that while talking about evil we think about jews and OP is pro-israel.
Anonymous (ID: GBiqJAks) United States No.519321848 [Report] >>519322398
The Prisoner's Dilemma is only the first inch of the rabbit hole. Now learn about the "Grim Trigger" and "Forgiving Trigger" strategies for repeated games. Society is more of a repeated game than a one-off.
Anonymous (ID: NWMFGQ19) United States No.519322157 [Report] >>519322729
>>519321493
Anonymous (ID: LVwmhlh1) Netherlands No.519322398 [Report] >>519322661
>>519321493
Would you rather have an evil you wouldn't know existed?
>>519321848
Take a look at the tournament from 1980. The winning strategy was a strategy called 'Tit for Tat'. It was more successful than 'giving up'.
https://quotulatiousness.ca/blog/2024/11/16/the-1980-iterated-prisoners-dilemma-tournament/
Anonymous (ID: Vo34B5X1) United States No.519322404 [Report] >>519322807
The image is wrong in both the location of the max sad faces and the intensity ratios which must be a golden ratio to equalize its nash equilibrium around which you can be more or less to get an edge on the game.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yMHrKSk-sIg


With a 0, 1, 20 payout, the optimal policy is no longer tit for tat, because you have to win 20 games to make up for the 19 more losses to equalizes it.

British getting everything wrong, per usual.

Tit for tat exacts a pound of flesh from the enemy for its haul, no more, and no less, and so the image is max wrong.
Anonymous (ID: wtt4yq1j) United States No.519322614 [Report] >>519326274
>>519321288 (OP)
it is evident now that isreal will go the way of rodisia
anyone associated with it will be seen as some racist circumcised weirdo
game theory suggests the prisoner confess as such I should choose be anti isreal
Anonymous (ID: GBiqJAks) United States No.519322661 [Report]
>>519322398
The forgiving trigger beats tit for tat when people can make mistakes.
Anonymous (ID: kLG48yCU) United States No.519322729 [Report] >>519324157
>>519322157

Cope, Dilate, Seethe.
In any order.
Rinse & Repeat.
Anonymous (ID: Vo34B5X1) United States No.519322807 [Report]
>>519322404
As the punishment for being defected against departs down away from the golden ratio [for a nash equilibrium balance to reward tit for tat], the optimal strategy tends toward "always defect".

The thought experiment goes like this, imagine you make the -20 cost into something outlandish like -2 million, then the optimal policy becomes "always defect", because losing once btfo's any other benefit from always cooperating vs always defecting.

Brits are not earning their dinner by teaching using that graphic, it's a total swing and a miss.
Anonymous (ID: MYFuZPHm) United States No.519322852 [Report]
>>519321288 (OP)
It can’t teach that because it is contrived.
Even if it weren’t, confessing for a plea deal IS cooperation.
You are a fucking brainlet. Your take is the worst possible take on this, and likely any, subject.
Anonymous (ID: XcmqeMFz) United States No.519323027 [Report]
>>519321288 (OP)
Confess is the right answer because the difference between 0 to 5 is not nearly as bad as 5 to 20. With confess you guarantee that you don't get 20 years. And if the other person is this rational as well then they're likely to also choose confess with increases the likelihood even more that you'd get 20 years if you stayed silent in hopes that the other did as well.
Anonymous (ID: NWMFGQ19) United States No.519324157 [Report]
>>519322729
Case in point.
Anonymous (ID: 9vdLkAV/) United States No.519326274 [Report]
>>519322614
Bartleby Montclaire Dresden is too good for this world.
Anonymous (ID: sDp91UZF) Poland No.519328335 [Report] >>519328759
>>519321288 (OP)
>The prisoner's dilemma teaches
It doesn't teach you shit, it's just an example of game theory, you can make such examples where the tables contain literally whatever number you want.
Anonymous (ID: GBiqJAks) United States No.519328759 [Report]
>>519328335
It teaches a type of pattern and related principles that can be applied to other situations