Anonymous
7/9/2025, 6:58:07 PM
No.530565558
>>530562028
I was talking about early war, Barbarossa circa 1941. I'll just quote one of the inspectors for the Directorate of Mobile Troops on this:
>In my studies I had noticed that during World War I the rate of breakdowns in tanks was quite high, while personnel losses were relatively low. What we needed, then, was a large reserve of tanks. The new crews could be easily made up from crews brought back from the front after their own tanks had been knocked out or had failed mechanically. Listening to a presentation made by Colonel von Schell, it became clear to me that our tank production was completely fragmented and without any significant output. We had built a tank army, without establishing the necessary tank production lines. Our tank force was hollow. (Order in Chaos Ch.10, Hermann Balck)
Funnily enough, he talks about equestrian tournaments in the paragraph beforehand.
>To be fair, that's less of an industrial issue and more of German autism acting out
Far be it from me to downplay German autism, but the reason they had so much shit with varying logistics was exactly because they couldn't churn out enough shit in the first place. They couldn't afford the significant timesink needed to transition all production from one model to another even if it was an improvement, (eg. Pz IV to Panther) and they also had to resort to using captured stocks of weapons, especially by the late war.
Same reason why more StuGs were produced than anything else.
It's not like they set out for it to be like that, and they did make attempts to simplify things like with the planned E-series of vehicles. They didn't pan out because they were fighting a war that was taking a turn for the worse. Well, having a second separate army to supply with the Waffen-SS certainly didn't help.
Damn, does this count as spam? I think I shouldn't be writing walls of text on military history in a keiba thread of all places.
I was talking about early war, Barbarossa circa 1941. I'll just quote one of the inspectors for the Directorate of Mobile Troops on this:
>In my studies I had noticed that during World War I the rate of breakdowns in tanks was quite high, while personnel losses were relatively low. What we needed, then, was a large reserve of tanks. The new crews could be easily made up from crews brought back from the front after their own tanks had been knocked out or had failed mechanically. Listening to a presentation made by Colonel von Schell, it became clear to me that our tank production was completely fragmented and without any significant output. We had built a tank army, without establishing the necessary tank production lines. Our tank force was hollow. (Order in Chaos Ch.10, Hermann Balck)
Funnily enough, he talks about equestrian tournaments in the paragraph beforehand.
>To be fair, that's less of an industrial issue and more of German autism acting out
Far be it from me to downplay German autism, but the reason they had so much shit with varying logistics was exactly because they couldn't churn out enough shit in the first place. They couldn't afford the significant timesink needed to transition all production from one model to another even if it was an improvement, (eg. Pz IV to Panther) and they also had to resort to using captured stocks of weapons, especially by the late war.
Same reason why more StuGs were produced than anything else.
It's not like they set out for it to be like that, and they did make attempts to simplify things like with the planned E-series of vehicles. They didn't pan out because they were fighting a war that was taking a turn for the worse. Well, having a second separate army to supply with the Waffen-SS certainly didn't help.
Damn, does this count as spam? I think I shouldn't be writing walls of text on military history in a keiba thread of all places.