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>Yeah it sounds to me like you’re making the same move as the Neoplatonists here. Hence the language of “something” as in concrete instantiations or particulars existing. In this way it may make sense to claim that “essence precedes existence”.
Indeed. Pic rel.

>Perhaps I could better state my position as “Being precedes essence”

>because for them, like it seems for you, “being” is conceived of not as the absolute reality underlying the ever-changing phenomenal world, but as the set containing every existing “thing”. Being to me could not be properly considered a “thing”, it is “no-thing” and it is because of this that it pervades every limited being.
I think I understand what you're saying. I'm not sure if being is really a category of metaphysics though. Maybe it's just a logical category. For Aristotle, being can be said in many different ways. It doesn't necessarily denote existence, which is what you seem to be substituting it for. To be white is not the same as to be a horse. Being, then, is nothing more than a logical connector denoting what can be predicated by substance or accident as I said above e.g. "Socrates is a man" e.g. "Picket fences are white". The real question here is if we have a univocal concept of being like Duns Scotus thought, or if our concept of being really does differ between categories