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7/30/2025, 1:19:26 PM
>>24593797
The modern Russian government's both internal and external strategies are extremely predictable once you see it in its post-1991 entirety and anything unpredictable or anomalous to it can be reliably ascribed to a dismal state of Russian studies abroad, where the funding for reliable specialists who are interested in eventually adding Russia to the list of friends after the defeat of their government was cut, so the states started relying on people with anecdotal and shallow experiences with Russia instead. I don't believe that it's a good thing.
A very compact telling of how the Russian Federation operates boils down to several points.
Internally, RF is an extremely reactionary state in a literal sense: it sets up plans and all, "this time there'll be a school and a miniclinic and a neat bureaucracy center", but a lot of change is made in response to bad stimuli. It expects things to be the same until they cease to do so. When it fights limited conflicts for 25 years, it sets up a small elite army. When it cannot, it scales up massively. When there's a migrant scandal, it starts massive raids and crackdowns. When the demographic wound goes in deeper, they make more "concessions" to families with many children.
It is also flexible, but very risk averse. It had a good relationship with everyone in the Middle East because it saw no *necessity* to take a stance. It started talking with Taliban as soon as possible after their victory because it saw no necessity to start caring about women's rights in Afghanistan. It desires a lot to keep its flexibility. It may start talking to Europeans again after months of silence because it sees no need for another eternal war, but right now the stimuli is not that good for them to react accordingly.
Russia's political system is a reflection of that system. If you were to hold elections in Russia tomorrow, at least 3/4 of the candidates would already be in the parliament or in the government. The actual fault line in the State is whether Russia should be less flexible and risk averse or more malleable, with the latter being in the minority. Different positions for less flexibility arise from Russia's contested history. the Liberal Democratic Party believes that an ontological offensive on Russia is more or less inevitable so trying to be flexible is useless, the Communist Party believes that this flexibility is what caused Russia's greatest catastrophe in the first place and must be excised, the Just Russia Party believes that there should be no flexibility with regards to the existence of Russian people. The New People Party, who I vote for, believes that the State can be easily reconstructed into a leaner, less interdependent, "cleaner" entity and even they demand that Russia has a firm position on the world arena. You consciously vote for Putin if you believe that there is no good and evil but things that are effective and ineffective and if you don't, you vote otherwise. That's what it is, really.
The modern Russian government's both internal and external strategies are extremely predictable once you see it in its post-1991 entirety and anything unpredictable or anomalous to it can be reliably ascribed to a dismal state of Russian studies abroad, where the funding for reliable specialists who are interested in eventually adding Russia to the list of friends after the defeat of their government was cut, so the states started relying on people with anecdotal and shallow experiences with Russia instead. I don't believe that it's a good thing.
A very compact telling of how the Russian Federation operates boils down to several points.
Internally, RF is an extremely reactionary state in a literal sense: it sets up plans and all, "this time there'll be a school and a miniclinic and a neat bureaucracy center", but a lot of change is made in response to bad stimuli. It expects things to be the same until they cease to do so. When it fights limited conflicts for 25 years, it sets up a small elite army. When it cannot, it scales up massively. When there's a migrant scandal, it starts massive raids and crackdowns. When the demographic wound goes in deeper, they make more "concessions" to families with many children.
It is also flexible, but very risk averse. It had a good relationship with everyone in the Middle East because it saw no *necessity* to take a stance. It started talking with Taliban as soon as possible after their victory because it saw no necessity to start caring about women's rights in Afghanistan. It desires a lot to keep its flexibility. It may start talking to Europeans again after months of silence because it sees no need for another eternal war, but right now the stimuli is not that good for them to react accordingly.
Russia's political system is a reflection of that system. If you were to hold elections in Russia tomorrow, at least 3/4 of the candidates would already be in the parliament or in the government. The actual fault line in the State is whether Russia should be less flexible and risk averse or more malleable, with the latter being in the minority. Different positions for less flexibility arise from Russia's contested history. the Liberal Democratic Party believes that an ontological offensive on Russia is more or less inevitable so trying to be flexible is useless, the Communist Party believes that this flexibility is what caused Russia's greatest catastrophe in the first place and must be excised, the Just Russia Party believes that there should be no flexibility with regards to the existence of Russian people. The New People Party, who I vote for, believes that the State can be easily reconstructed into a leaner, less interdependent, "cleaner" entity and even they demand that Russia has a firm position on the world arena. You consciously vote for Putin if you believe that there is no good and evil but things that are effective and ineffective and if you don't, you vote otherwise. That's what it is, really.
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