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6/17/2025, 12:12:26 AM
>>63848467
Donbass is a different thing. On top of obvious differences from crimea, its "just a piece of land", those talks about "protecting muh russian speakers" is bs. I believe that incorporating it into russia wasnt a plan from the start. That is why instead of carefully planned and quickly executed operation it got girkin and co who proceeded to larp as an epic insurgency leader at the head of mostly local rabble armed initially with looted aksus and grandpas break-action shotguns, which gave ukrainian forces opportunity to organise and respond. As the conflict escalated, russian involvement grew, culminating with significant forces rolling in when ukraine was about to crush the "rebels" in summer. A tried playbook - keep a region separate, but not completely out of reach, greatly inconveniencing and forcing target country to divert a huge chunk of resources to keep it in check; while maintaining (flimsy, but still)deniability and ability to strike again from prepared position. And in 2022 it seems it outlived its usefulness in this role, might as well grab it, while making it impossible for russia itself to go back to pre-2022 positions.
(and another angle)
Donbass is a different thing. On top of obvious differences from crimea, its "just a piece of land", those talks about "protecting muh russian speakers" is bs. I believe that incorporating it into russia wasnt a plan from the start. That is why instead of carefully planned and quickly executed operation it got girkin and co who proceeded to larp as an epic insurgency leader at the head of mostly local rabble armed initially with looted aksus and grandpas break-action shotguns, which gave ukrainian forces opportunity to organise and respond. As the conflict escalated, russian involvement grew, culminating with significant forces rolling in when ukraine was about to crush the "rebels" in summer. A tried playbook - keep a region separate, but not completely out of reach, greatly inconveniencing and forcing target country to divert a huge chunk of resources to keep it in check; while maintaining (flimsy, but still)deniability and ability to strike again from prepared position. And in 2022 it seems it outlived its usefulness in this role, might as well grab it, while making it impossible for russia itself to go back to pre-2022 positions.
(and another angle)
6/17/2025, 12:12:26 AM
>>507735166
Donbass is a different thing. On top of obvious differences from crimea, its "just a piece of land", those talks about "protecting muh russian speakers" is bs. I believe that incorporating it into russia wasnt a plan from the start. That is why instead of carefully planned and quickly executed operation it got girkin and co who proceeded to larp as an epic insurgency leader at the head of mostly local rabble armed initially with looted aksus and grandpas break-action shotguns, which gave ukrainian forces opportunity to organise and respond. As the conflict escalated, russian involvement grew, culminating with significant forces rolling in when ukraine was about to crush the "rebels" in summer. A tried playbook - keep a region separate, but not completely out of reach, greatly inconveniencing and forcing target country to divert a huge chunk of resources to keep it in check; while maintaining (flimsy, but still)deniability and ability to strike again from prepared position. And in 2022 it seems it outlived its usefulness in this role, might as well grab it, while making it impossible for russia itself to go back to pre-2022 positions.
(and another angle)
Donbass is a different thing. On top of obvious differences from crimea, its "just a piece of land", those talks about "protecting muh russian speakers" is bs. I believe that incorporating it into russia wasnt a plan from the start. That is why instead of carefully planned and quickly executed operation it got girkin and co who proceeded to larp as an epic insurgency leader at the head of mostly local rabble armed initially with looted aksus and grandpas break-action shotguns, which gave ukrainian forces opportunity to organise and respond. As the conflict escalated, russian involvement grew, culminating with significant forces rolling in when ukraine was about to crush the "rebels" in summer. A tried playbook - keep a region separate, but not completely out of reach, greatly inconveniencing and forcing target country to divert a huge chunk of resources to keep it in check; while maintaining (flimsy, but still)deniability and ability to strike again from prepared position. And in 2022 it seems it outlived its usefulness in this role, might as well grab it, while making it impossible for russia itself to go back to pre-2022 positions.
(and another angle)
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