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7/18/2025, 12:01:30 AM
>Still no significant news or footage...
6/13/2025, 10:24:14 AM
>>211678278
advanced weaponry is not the cause of their victories
>Time and again, Egyptian tactical commanders simply failed to react to Israeli penetrations or flanking attacks. They would not counterattack, they would not refuse a flank, they would not reorient their defenses to meet the new direction of the Israeli assault, they would not even withdraw from a position that had been compromised by Israeli maneuver. As a result, all across the front, once Israeli forces had penetrated an Egyptian defensive line, it was merely a matter of rolling up the rest of the line from the flank.
>Similarly, it was the rare occasion when Egyptian reserves moved to reinforce or counterattack an Israeli assault. There were only a handful of latecoming, slow-moving counterattacks by Egyptian armored reserves, and these were clumsy frontal assaults into the teeth of the Israeli attack. In the vast majority of instances, however, the Israelis moved so fast and the Egyptians so slowly (or not at all) that Israeli mechanized forces caught the Egyptian reserves still in their staging areas, and crushed them effortlessly. The Egyptian mechanized forces performed worst of all in these fights because their junior officers seemed to have no understanding of combined arms cooperation, their formations could not maneuver, their armor acted like movable pillboxes rather than mobile tanks, their infantry did not seem to know either how to take out Israeli tanks or how to guard their own against Israeli infantry, their artillery was incapable of shifting fire to keep pace with the Israeli maneuvers, and their tank crews were dismal marksmen who rarely, if ever, moved to get flank or rear shots against the agile Israelis.
advanced weaponry is not the cause of their victories
>Time and again, Egyptian tactical commanders simply failed to react to Israeli penetrations or flanking attacks. They would not counterattack, they would not refuse a flank, they would not reorient their defenses to meet the new direction of the Israeli assault, they would not even withdraw from a position that had been compromised by Israeli maneuver. As a result, all across the front, once Israeli forces had penetrated an Egyptian defensive line, it was merely a matter of rolling up the rest of the line from the flank.
>Similarly, it was the rare occasion when Egyptian reserves moved to reinforce or counterattack an Israeli assault. There were only a handful of latecoming, slow-moving counterattacks by Egyptian armored reserves, and these were clumsy frontal assaults into the teeth of the Israeli attack. In the vast majority of instances, however, the Israelis moved so fast and the Egyptians so slowly (or not at all) that Israeli mechanized forces caught the Egyptian reserves still in their staging areas, and crushed them effortlessly. The Egyptian mechanized forces performed worst of all in these fights because their junior officers seemed to have no understanding of combined arms cooperation, their formations could not maneuver, their armor acted like movable pillboxes rather than mobile tanks, their infantry did not seem to know either how to take out Israeli tanks or how to guard their own against Israeli infantry, their artillery was incapable of shifting fire to keep pace with the Israeli maneuvers, and their tank crews were dismal marksmen who rarely, if ever, moved to get flank or rear shots against the agile Israelis.
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