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ID: 5aMP5Dpb/pol/508638430#508650429
6/25/2025, 4:33:18 AM
>>508650231
>>508650291
>As of May 17, Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent HEU in the form of uranium hexafluoride was 408.6 kg (as measured in U mass) or 604.4 kg (hex mass).
>Iran can convert its current stock of 60 percent enriched uranium into 233 kg of WGU [Weapons Grade Uranium] in three weeks at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), enough for 9 nuclear weapons, taken as 25 kg of weapon-grade uranium (WGU) per weapon.
>Iran could produce its first quantity of 25 kg of WGU in Fordow in as little as two to three days.
Mathematically, from the moment Israel attacked on June 13th to the US struck Iran on the 22nd, Iran could have enriched enough uranium to weapons grade to build 3-4 nuclear bombs. Now that material is unaccounted for, at least publicly, on top of the strikes not having taking Fordow's centrifuges out.
If Iran hadn't made the final decision to actually build the bomb prior to the US strikes, it absolutely will now. The lessons of Libya and North Korea, when pressed against the last 3 weeks of developments, all but guarantees it.
For all we know, the next major update we all hear on Iran's nuclear program might come in the form of a mushroom cloud.
https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/analysis-of-iaea-iran-verification-and-monitoring-report-may-2025#
>>508650291
>As of May 17, Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent HEU in the form of uranium hexafluoride was 408.6 kg (as measured in U mass) or 604.4 kg (hex mass).
>Iran can convert its current stock of 60 percent enriched uranium into 233 kg of WGU [Weapons Grade Uranium] in three weeks at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), enough for 9 nuclear weapons, taken as 25 kg of weapon-grade uranium (WGU) per weapon.
>Iran could produce its first quantity of 25 kg of WGU in Fordow in as little as two to three days.
Mathematically, from the moment Israel attacked on June 13th to the US struck Iran on the 22nd, Iran could have enriched enough uranium to weapons grade to build 3-4 nuclear bombs. Now that material is unaccounted for, at least publicly, on top of the strikes not having taking Fordow's centrifuges out.
If Iran hadn't made the final decision to actually build the bomb prior to the US strikes, it absolutely will now. The lessons of Libya and North Korea, when pressed against the last 3 weeks of developments, all but guarantees it.
For all we know, the next major update we all hear on Iran's nuclear program might come in the form of a mushroom cloud.
https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/analysis-of-iaea-iran-verification-and-monitoring-report-may-2025#
ID: 5aMP5Dpb/pol/508638430#508650231
6/25/2025, 4:30:35 AM
>As of May 17, Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent HEU in the form of uranium hexafluoride was
408.6 kg (as measured in U mass) or 604.4 kg (hex mass).
>Iran can convert its current stock of 60 percent enriched uranium into 233 kg of WGU [Weapons Grade Uranium] in three weeks at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), enough for 9 nuclear weapons,
taken as 25 kg of weapon-grade uranium (WGU) per weapon.
>Iran could produce its first quantity of 25 kg of WGU in Fordow in as little as two to three
days.
Mathematically, from the moment Israel attacked on June 13th to the US struck Iran on the 22nd, Iran could have enriched enough uranium to weapons grade to build 3-4 nuclear bombs. Now that material is unaccounted for, at least publicly, on top of the strikes not having taking Fordow's centrifuges out.
If Iran hadn't made the final decision to actually build the bomb prior to the US strikes, it absolutely will now. The lessons of Libya and North Korea, when pressed against the last 3 weeks of developments, all but guarantees it.
For all we know, the next major update we all hear on Iran's nuclear program might come in the form of a mushroom cloud.
https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/analysis-of-iaea-iran-verification-and-monitoring-report-may-2025#
408.6 kg (as measured in U mass) or 604.4 kg (hex mass).
>Iran can convert its current stock of 60 percent enriched uranium into 233 kg of WGU [Weapons Grade Uranium] in three weeks at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), enough for 9 nuclear weapons,
taken as 25 kg of weapon-grade uranium (WGU) per weapon.
>Iran could produce its first quantity of 25 kg of WGU in Fordow in as little as two to three
days.
Mathematically, from the moment Israel attacked on June 13th to the US struck Iran on the 22nd, Iran could have enriched enough uranium to weapons grade to build 3-4 nuclear bombs. Now that material is unaccounted for, at least publicly, on top of the strikes not having taking Fordow's centrifuges out.
If Iran hadn't made the final decision to actually build the bomb prior to the US strikes, it absolutely will now. The lessons of Libya and North Korea, when pressed against the last 3 weeks of developments, all but guarantees it.
For all we know, the next major update we all hear on Iran's nuclear program might come in the form of a mushroom cloud.
https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/analysis-of-iaea-iran-verification-and-monitoring-report-may-2025#
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