Posting stuff from across africa feel free to add on
Somaliland warriors if the Issa Clan

>>17852289 (OP)

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Afar

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Somebody saw the Romans chimp out exactly like that.

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Oromo

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Afar & Beja

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>t. Cushcel samefag

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cool thread OP. any particulars you think are cool?
>>17852468
these guys seem neat

All this and you niggers still couldn't conquer your masters.

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>>17852781
I think groups like Kikuyu and Masai looked cool

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West Africa

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Azande

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Done for now if the thread still up will post ethiopian stuff later

>>17853592

Fascinating stuff.

>>17853595

>>17853292
great photo

why did they not really have much armor?
i believe other pre-european africans had armor right? did they not have the resources or feel the need?

>>17854619
Nah it was mostly because 1 its extremely hot and humid, and 2 most of this was taken during the age of gunpowder so anyone not on a horse had no need for armor 3 theres photos of them in armor its just much of this is for anthropology rather than military

>>17855810
>>17854619
Heres an example of a guy in a steel curiass and coat

>>17855820
Most armor still in use were worn by cavalry as part of display of tradtions

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Common misconception was that they only wore coats when in actuality theyd wear said coats over chain mail and breast plates

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From what I know across the sahel region they wore fabric armor gambesons like those of Meso America, amongst the Malians, Songhai and Adalites theyd wear mail armor and steel breast plates for infantry armor based off accounts

>>17855855
Songhai in particular had foot soldiers adorn in cuirasses made of steel, and or hippo hide

>>17855863
The quilted often cotton armor seems to have originated from the Kushites it was noted the Ptolemaic Greeks adopted it from them while skirmishing on their borders

>>17855810
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>>17855855
interesting, thank you.

>>17856133
No probs

>>17856133
There was also strangely enough wicker armor in the mandara region similar to what certain Chinese tribes used

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>>17855863
I could be wrong but I believe the cuirasses are from Kanem-Bornu, not Songhai, and that the person in that image is mixing items from various non-related African cultures.

wasn't there a thread the other day asking why linguistic extinction is a bad thing? This is why. The real humanity speaks a million different languages and knows little about other cultures, only living life its own way.

>>17856892
Nah theres direct accounts

>>17857223
Those are masquerades

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Accounts of warfare
>Jean Boulègue's analysis of the sizes of Sudanese armies is interesting. We can deduce that the Askias could in theory mobilize 40,000 combatants. Songhai had in fact three permanent army corps of nearly 4,600 men each, one in Tendirma under the command of the Balma'a, another in Gao under the command of Askia, and another in Dendi, the region downstream from Kukiya, the religious and historical capital of Songhai. This army corps located on the south-eastern border of the Empire being the least powerful of the three. The rest of the Songhai army was made up of the fluvial flotilla of 2,000 canoes commanded by the Hi-Koi, admiral and Minister of the Interior, one of the main dignitaries of the Empire. Contingents from vassalized kingdoms made up the bulk of the troops: Mossis, Dendis and Macinas provided the infantry. However, the arrival of the Moroccans cut the Empire in two, depriving the Askia Ishaq II of the Kurmina army corps and part of its flotilla, while the unrest at the borders prevented the Dendi army corps from coming in time.

>The civil war, which had divided the Empire, had also divided the army in two, Askia Ishaq II could not mobilize the forces of the West whose headquarters were in Timbuktu and Djenné, that is to say, behind the lines of Judar. In theory, he only had the two professional army corps of Gao and Dendi, part of his fluvial flotilla and Tuareg and Gourma allies difficult to estimate. The Tarikh al-fattash which offers 18,000 cavalry and 9,700 infantry also gives a more accurate picture of a Songhai army cut off from its professional contingents and more than essentially made up of a noble knighthood.

>>17859445
>The Songhai armies are very unequally armed and equipped. Unlike the armies of the Mali Empire (1230-1468) which were made up of aggregate contingents of warriors free from their vassals, mobilized in the off-season on the same pattern as the medieval host, the Songhai armies since Sonni Ali Ber are made up of a nucleus of professional soldiers mobilized full time and for the most part from servile caste, owned by the Askias. It is these contingents of infantry that form the three army corps permanently stationed along the Niger River.

>In addition to the establishment of a standing army, the Songhai profoundly modified the armament and equipment of the permanent troops: the copper iron javelins replace the old spears, the armor equip the cavalrymen, the infantrymen are protected by breastplates in hippopotamus leather. Moroccan and Sudanese authors speak readily of "armor", implying iron armor, Songhai infantry and horsemen, which they wear under their tunics. Under the term armor, the Sudanese armies classify two types of protection: on the one hand solid gambesons, on the other hand coats made either of iron mail (worn in particular by the warriors of Kanem-Bornou on the model of cataphracts) or light iron plates. The uncertainty arises from the fact that we will speak in Sudan of armor, including for cavaliers equipped with gambesons, as the officers of the Voulet and Chanoine column and of the Joalland-Meynier mission will realize when they face the knighthood of the Sultan of Zinder (1899).

>>17859447
>The expenses occasioned by such equipment gradually excluded free men of modest means from the ranks of the army. Now the war opposes a warrior aristocracy solidly and costly equipped, supported by well-armed professional fighters against the traditional free men, warriors and hunters. The Songhai army imposes itself on these traditional fighters by the superiority of its training and its equipment. Judar Pasha does not therefore face an undisciplined horde of valiant but almost naked warriors; he has in front of him a structured and solidly equipped army, trained and with a strong bellicose ideology."

>Now there are a few minor things here that aren't exactly correct like the part about "Dendis" and "Macinas" who of course aren't ethnic groups(The author probably meant Fulanis for the Macinas. Also the western headquarters of the army would've been in Tendirma, where the Kurmina-Fari/Kanfari(Just realized we technically have the same :)) was stationed.

>The Tarikh al-Fattash mentions one Askia (Muhammad Bani) raising an army of 30,000 men against rebels led by the balama. Not sure how reliable that number is.

Jean Boulègue, The Wolof kingdoms in the Senegambian space ( 13th century - 18th century) ,Paris, Karthala, 2013 (posthumous), 504 pages

Jean Boulègue, Les royaumes wolof dans l'espace sénégambien (xiiie siècle-xviiie siècle), Paris, Karthala, 2013 (posthume), 504 pages

John Hunwick's "Timbuktu & the Songhai Empire”

>>17859380
First off, absolutely love this thread. Thanks for the awesome content. Secondly, am I wrong, or is the severe scaring on the man on the left in this picture a result of having smallpox?

>>17859451
Mande Army

>battle during the second half of the XVIth century between the Mane (Mande speaking people coming from Mali) and the Susu in Sierra Leone. Again from Alvares de Almada. According to him, the tactics and weapons of most people in Senegambia and the Guinea coast were similar (he describes the same type of formation for the Wolof as can be read in post 538, and also for the Mande subjects of Mali along the Gambia river), so a description of a battle in some detail like this one might be useful to understand warfare amongst those peoples during the XVI century and probably earlier:

>Although the Manes were very confident because of the many victories they had won in these parts, and although they vere accustomed to seek out the enemy on his own ground, they had lost some of their great self-assurance, and showed some hesitation. Precisely why I do not know, unless it was because the people they led were soldiers made out of Sapes whom they had captured in their own homeland and were not all (true) Manes, or else because they saw some sign which they took as a bad omen. Whatever it was, when they had passed over a river after entering the land of the Souzos, and were warned that the Souzos were marching against them, the captains and governors called a halt, and the Manes threw up strong entrenchments and stayed there, using the river as a wall.

>>17859468
>They sent out scouts, and found that the enemy had done the same. But when the Souzos learnt that the Manes were not advancing, they went forward in very good order to meet them, until they camped near them, and fortified the camp. The next day, at sumrise, the Souso and Fulo captains began to deploy their men and arrange them in order of battle. When they were all in position and ready, the king a addressed the whole army, through many heralds. [...] The king spoke these words with much courage and force, bearing his weapons and leaning on a bow which he held like a stick. When he had finished his speech, and all had assured him that they would not return home as conquered men, unless (they were carried there) dead, he ordered the musical-instruments of the army to be played, and at the sound of these they began to march towards the enemy camp. Seeing them coming, the Manes remained behind their fortifications, as if they feared the outcome of what was to follow. They did not care to sally out or place themselves in order of battle, as they saw the Souzos doing. They sent out only some small detachments, which advanced to attack the Souzos on the flank. But the Souzos were not at all disordered by these attacks, and continued to march in step, all together.

>>17859474
>At the head of the army came seven men mounted on horses which were small as ponies, but were saddled and bridled. These horses had hairy manes and must certainly have been Fulo horses, and carried great bells on their breast-bands. All together in step, this well-ordered army advanced, shield-bearers in front and on the flanks, archers in the centre. When they were near (the enemy) they simultaneously threw themselves into the attack and assaulted (the camp). Those on horseback placed their hands on the atabanca - as they called the entrenchments in this language - and broke them down. It must be said that on the Mane side they did not fail to fight back very strongly, for there were many of them; but their opponents were very brave. They were not an army of mixed nations (as the Mane army was); they had only the Fulos, who are a very bold people. And the Souzos knew that it was vital to exert all their strength in this battle, since if they were once conquered they would never regain their security. Their whole land would be destroyed, and their wives and children killed, and on this victory depended their security. (In contrast,) the Manes , if defeated, would remain masters of all the lands they had previously gained; they kept men in these lands and waged war on the same people they brought with them. But if they had the victory, they would not stop util they had conquered all of the Souzos, as they had done with the Sapes; and therefore the Souzos put forward all their strength in this battle.

>>17859475
>The Manes, after coming to these parts and to the Malagueta Coast had conquered the coastal lands and were (therefore) experienced in a travelling by sea; hence, they were good sailors and swimmers. When they were defeated (in this battle) they retreated across the river by swimming, particularly the Bolons and Temenes whom they had brought in their army, but many were killed and made captive. The Souzos, since they had been in the habit of crossing this river frequently on their trading excursions, and knew the fords, went over in military order and pursued the enemy, killing and capturing many of them, so that, according to the blacks who took part in this war, only the bravest and speediest of the men escaped. For as soon as they stopped at one place and tried to draw breath, the Souzos were on them, killing and capturing them

>>17859479
According to Almada, there was a shared military tradition amongst most peoples he talks about, with some exceptions. There were four types of units: archers, shieldbearers, cavalry with javelins/short spears and horse archers. Access to horses was very unequal in the region, so while the Great Fulo have in his words "many horsemen, and in his lands there are many horses, and from these are supplied all (the horses required by) the Jalofos, Barbacins and Mandingas, those of the interior as well as those of the coast.", other peoples like those in Sierra Leone are described as having no cavalry at all. This must have been true for Mali as well, with northern regions under the Faran-sura having more cavalry available than southern regions under the Sanquara-zuma'a. This has some support from the sources, since the Mane, who were Mande who departed from southern imperial Mali circa 1500 and conquered most of the Malagueta Coast and Sierra Leona from 1550, did not have any cavalry but fought otherwise the same as other Mande more to the north or even as the Wolof.

Swords and knives were common, as were spears and bows. Metal armours are not mentioned anywhere for Mali, although metal helmets are possible since they appear later in Songhay sources. The Djenne terracotta riders have helmets, but it can't be known if they depict metal or leather. Almada mentions cotton armor for the Wolof "They have long strips of cotton, that they roll and wear from the groin to the chest very compressed, and armed in this manner no arrows or assegais can go through". I don't know how far back these go and their use by imperial Mali forces, if they used them at all. Most soldiers would be unarmored, in any case, especially the archers. Both large shields of leather and of poles and woven rattan are described for Mande peoples, and they are stated to have been very strong. The Djenne terracottas provide visual evidence of these things

>>17859479
>According to Almada, there was a shared military tradition amongst most peoples he talks about, with some exceptions. There were four types of units: archers, shieldbearers, cavalry with javelins/short spears and horse archers. Access to horses was very unequal in the region, so while the Great Fulo have in his words "many horsemen, and in his lands there are many horses, and from these are supplied all (the horses required by) the Jalofos, Barbacins and Mandingas, those of the interior as well as those of the coast.", other peoples like those in Sierra Leone are described as having no cavalry at all. This must have been true for Mali as well, with northern regions under the Faran-sura having more cavalry available than southern regions under the Sanquara-zuma'a. This has some support from the sources, since the Mane, who were Mande who departed from southern imperial Mali circa 1500 and conquered most of the Malagueta Coast and Sierra Leona from 1550, did not have any cavalry but fought otherwise the same as other Mande more to the north or even as the Wolof.

>Swords and knives were common, as were spears and bows. Metal armours are not mentioned anywhere for Mali, although metal helmets are possible since they appear later in Songhay sources. The Djenne terracotta riders have helmets, but it can't be known if they depict metal or leather. Almada mentions cotton armor for the Wolof "They have long strips of cotton, that they roll and wear from the groin to the chest very compressed, and armed in this manner no arrows or assegais can go through". I don't know how far back these go and their use by imperial Mali forces, if they used them at all. Most soldiers would be unarmored, in any case, especially the archers. Both large shields of leather and of poles and woven rattan are described for Mande peoples, and they are stated to have been very strong. The Djenne terracottas provide visual evidence of these things

>>17859484
>However, note that Djenne was never fully submitted to Mali at most it paid tribute on occasion, and that they probably represent local traditions of the Niger Bend. For example, these terracottas depict individuals with a naked chest, while Ibn Battuta's, al-Umari's and the Portuguese descriptions state that the Mande they met (infantry and cavalry) wore tunics and smocks, and caps and turbans. Thus, the likeness of a typical Mali soldier can't be directly drawn from the Djenne terracottas, although they give information on things on a regional macro scale, like those described in the previous paragraph.


>The cavalry (Wolof, Fulani and Mande of various kinds) are described by Almada as:

>"The weapons they use in war and (carry) in peace are those stated (swords and knives), and also six short barbed spears and one large one. In battle, fighting on horseback, they throw (the short spears) to strike down the enemy. (bat) always keep the large one to attack with, never allowing it out of their hand. They do not use javelins or long lances as we do, because the land is covered with trees among which they must fight their wars."

>>17859488
>This aligns with contemporary Songhay cavalry, as described in the Tarikhs or by external accounts, which also carried spears for throwing and thrusting with them. However, some Songhay riders are described as carrying small lances by the Anonimous Spaniard and al-Ifrani when they are talking about Tondibi and the Moroccan invasion of Songhay, although not as forming separate units of lancers. We don't have evidence for lancers in Mali, but given the similarity in fighting styles between them and Songhay riders, and long-standing contacts with Sanhaja berbers and Tuareg, who used lances as well, it might be possible that they appeared in Mali interior northern provinces. In any cases, lances would at most have been part of the panoply of a few warriors, integrated with the rest of the cavalry.

>The infantry are described routinely as both shielbearers with assegais and archers (in 1453 by Zurara, describing events 5 years earlier, by Almada, etc.). That they are present in all areas ruled once by the Empire of Mali, even in 1448 when the Jolof Empire was just breaking off from Mali, means that that shared tradition had been created and spread earlier. The most likely option is that the Mande peoples created it at some point and spread it through their expansion, especially Malian expansion, from the 14th century onwards. This explains why the greatest deviations from the model witnessed by the Portuguese occurred in peoples far from Malian imperial autorithy and from the expanding Mande, like the Bijagos islanders and the Sapes in Serra Leone.

>>17859489
>The infantry were apparently the primary force of Mande forces relied on to win battles, at least in the south and southeast were horses were more scarce. Almada describes Wolof tactical disposition (and Mane, Susu, and most in the region, again reinforcing the notion of a shared tradition propagated by Mali) as follows: "Their infantry use the same weapons as the cavalry. In battle they are drawn up in formations of squadrons and lines, the shield-bearers in the front and on the flanks, the archers in the middle so that the shield-bearers guard them." The archers, however, were probably expected to fight in melee too after weakening the enemy with a shower of poison arrows, and large scale battles are described as being decided in hand-to-hand fighting.

>They appear to have discipline and maneuver in good order, and not as a mob of warriors, marching to the sound of instruments. They also used scouts and patrols to gather intelligence on their enemy:

>>17859493
>"Those who are practiced in military matters are well disciplined and accustomed to suffer hardships in military service." "[...] he ordered the musical-instruments of the army to be played, and at the sound of these they began to march towards the enemy camp". "They formed a large force jointly with the Fulos who neighbour them, and when the army seemed large enough to defend them from the enemy and to launch an attack, they marched out with scouts and sentinels. Knowing that the enemy was a few days march away, they sent patrols ahead". "They sent out scouts, and found that the enemy had done the same. But when the Souzos learnt that the Manes were not advancing, they went forward in very good order to meet them, until they camped near them, and fortified the camp."

>>17859500
>Mande forces seemed to routinely establish fortified camps when their army stopped marching, to defend against possible enemy attacks. Regular fortifications were made of rammed earth and wooden stakes, with towers and bastions along the walls. They also had incendiary mixtures of pitch tar to defend against siege attempts. These regular forticications were called sãosans by the Mande subjects of Mali along the Guinea river. Field fortifications for army camps are described in the context of the Mane invasion of Serra Leone, and they are called atabancas, and consisted of mounds with woodwork, and ditches. Since they are the only Mali-linked force described extensively in the context of maneuvers and campaigns, it's only for them that we have evidence in this period. However, the appearance of field fortifications in a battle between Bainuk people and Mande from Casamance (subjects of Mali at the time) in the Bainuk side points at the practice being widely used by well organized forces in the region, amongst which we can count Mali. Taking into account the possible earlier spread of military traditions mentioned before, it is probable that these practices were, at the very least, originated at some point during medieval Mali.

>There are few battles between local forces described with some tactical detail. Almada describes two of them. The first one is between the King of Casamance, which is stated to be subject to a Farim (a corruption of the Mali title Faran) under the rule of the Mandimansa (the emperor of Mali), and a kingdom of the Bainuk:

>>17859503
>The King of Casamanga had this cacis summoned because he was about to give battle to King Bambara, his enemy, who lived on the other side of the river and belonged to the Banhun nation, and he wished to learn from the caciz what day he should give battle and whether he would win. To discover (the answers), the caciz carried out many ceremonies, such as that involving the boy and the water, at which he asked (the spirits) what the enemy was doing and many other questions. And he told the king that he would gain the victory. Having been given this reply, the king made preparations, and after assembling many armed men he crossed to the other side of the river in a large number of canoes and in some of our ships. When these touched land, and all the force had assembled, he began to march towards the enemy, who were in fortified positions nearby. The caciz marched happily along in front of the army, holding batons in his hands as if he was directing it; and he passed the word on to all (following) that they should attack the enemy in their fortifications when he gave a certain signal. The enemy did not wait for him to give the signal. As the Casangas drew near them, they sounded to arms very rapidly, and threw themselves upon them with such force that they overwhelmed them. The Casangas were routed and put to flight. As they boarded their boats, many were drowned, for the numbers were so great that those of our men who were assisting the king (to escape) had to kill many Casangas, cutting their hands off as they clung to the boats, since with so many aboard the boats would have gone to the bottom. In this way the king was saved from the fiasco. The enemy did not pursue, or keep within range, with the same enthusiasm that they had shown at the beginning of the action.

>>17859505
The second one is between the invading Mande speaking Mane and the also Mande speaking Susu people, in Serra Leone:

Although the Manes were very confident because of the many victories they had won in these parts, and although they were accustomed to seek out the enemy on his own ground, they had lost some of their great self-assurance, and showed some hesitation. Precisely why I do not know, unless it was because the people they led were soldiers made out of Sapes whom they had captured in their own homeland and were not all (true) Manes, or else because they saw some sign which they took as a bad omen. Whatever it was, when they had passed over a river after entering the land of the Souzos, and were warned that the Souzos were marching against them, the captains and governors called a halt, and the Manes threw up strong entrenchments and stayed there, using the river as a wall.

>>17859505
>The second one is between the invading Mande speaking Mane and the also Mande speaking Susu people, in Serra Leone:

>Although the Manes were very confident because of the many victories they had won in these parts, and although they were accustomed to seek out the enemy on his own ground, they had lost some of their great self-assurance, and showed some hesitation. Precisely why I do not know, unless it was because the people they led were soldiers made out of Sapes whom they had captured in their own homeland and were not all (true) Manes, or else because they saw some sign which they took as a bad omen. Whatever it was, when they had passed over a river after entering the land of the Souzos, and were warned that the Souzos were marching against them, the captains and governors called a halt, and the Manes threw up strong entrenchments and stayed there, using the river as a wall.

>>17859514
>They sent out scouts, and found that the enemy had done the same. But when the Souzos learnt that the Manes were not advancing, they went forward in very good order to meet them, until they camped near them, and fortified the camp. The next day, at sunrise, the Souso and Fulo captains began to deploy their men and arrange them in order of battle. When they were all in position and ready, the king a addressed the whole army, through many heralds. [...] The king spoke these words with much courage and force, bearing his weapons and leaning on a bow which he held like a stick. When he had finished his speech, and all had assured him that they would not return home as conquered men, unless (they were carried there) dead, he ordered the musical-instruments of the army to be played, and at the sound of these they began to march towards the enemy camp. Seeing them coming, the Manes remained behind their fortifications, as if they feared the outcome of what was to follow. They did not care to sally out or place themselves in order of battle, as they saw the Souzos doing. They sent out only some small detachments, which advanced to attack the Souzos on the flank. But the Souzos were not at all disordered by these attacks, and continued to march in step, all together.

>>17859517
>At the head of the army came seven men mounted on horses which were small as ponies, but were saddled and bridled. These horses had hairy manes and must certainly have been Fulo horses, and carried great bells on their breast-bands. All together in step, this well-ordered army advanced, shield-bearers in front and on the flanks, archers in the centre. When they were near (the enemy) they simultaneously threw themselves into the attack and assaulted (the camp). Those on horseback placed their hands on the atabanca - as they called the entrenchments in this language - and broke them down. It must be said that on the Mane side they did not fail to fight back very strongly, for there were many of them; but their opponents were very brave. They were not an army of mixed nations (as the Mane army was); they had only the Fulos, who are a very bold people. And the Souzos knew that it was vital to exert all their strength in this battle, since if they were once conquered they would never regain their security. Their whole land would be destroyed, and their wives and children killed, and on this victory depended on their security. (In contrast,) the Manes , if defeated, would remain masters of all the lands they had previously gained; they kept men in these lands and waged war on the same people they brought with them. But if they had the victory, they would not stop util they had conquered all of the Souzos, as they had done with the Sapes; and therefore the Souzos put forward all their strength in this battle.

>>17859520
>The Manes, after coming to these parts and to the Malagueta Coast had conquered the coastal lands and were (therefore) experienced in a travelling by sea; hence, they were good sailors and swimmers. When they were defeated (in this battle) they retreated across the river by swimming, particularly the Bolons and Temenes whom they had brought in their army, but many were killed and made captive. The Souzos, since they had been in the habit of crossing this river frequently on their trading excursions, and knew the fords, went over in military order and pursued the enemy, killing and capturing many of them, so that, according to the blacks who took part in this war, only the bravest and speediest of the men escaped. For as soon as they stopped at one place and tried to draw breath, the Souzos were on them, killing and capturing them

>>17859559
Some descriptions of infantry from Mali or Mali-affiliated entities. One refers to infantrymen of the "King of Casamance", actually a subject of the Kaabu-fari (Farim Cabo for the Portuguese). The second refers to Mandinka non-Muslim guards (the source calls the caravan leaders Moors, but also states they were Mandinka. In this case, and given that they also apparently wore clothes like the Casamance Mandinka or the Wolof, the Moor probably denotes that they are Muslim, in juxtaposition to the guards who might not be. This is supported by the fact that there is a parallelism of these guards with the Manes, and that referring to any Muslims anywhere as Moors was typical between the Spanish and Portuguese of the period) of a Malian caravan trading in gold with people probably in modern Ghana in the Gold Coast. The third refers to the Manes in Sierra Leone. All are from the XVIth century, but note that the Manes left Malian territory following their queen Maçarico c.1500 and their infantry is identical to the caravan guards, so the descriptions can be safely projected into the XVth century and maybe before. Arm daggers are mentioned, and they are present in the Djenne terracottas (like the archer in the first post), so some regional continuity is present. The bolded text is mine.

>>17859559
>Some descriptions of infantry from Mali or Mali-affiliated entities. One refers to infantrymen of the "King of Casamance", actually a subject of the Kaabu-fari (Farim Cabo for the Portuguese). The second refers to Mandinka non-Muslim guards (the source calls the caravan leaders Moors, but also states they were Mandinka. In this case, and given that they also apparently wore clothes like the Casamance Mandinka or the Wolof, the Moor probably denotes that they are Muslim, in juxtaposition to the guards who might not be. This is supported by the fact that there is a parallelism of these guards with the Manes, and that referring to any Muslims anywhere as Moors was typical between the Spanish and Portuguese of the period) of a Malian caravan trading in gold with people probably in modern Ghana in the Gold Coast. The third refers to the Manes in Sierra Leone. All are from the XVIth century, but note that the Manes left Malian territory following their queen Maçarico c.1500 and their infantry is identical to the caravan guards, so the descriptions can be safely projected into the XVth century and maybe before. Arm daggers are mentioned, and they are present in the Djenne terracottas (like the archer in the first post), so some regional continuity is present. The bolded text is mine.

>>17859573
>In war they use spears, arrows, shields, knives and short swords, like the Jalofos [Wolof], and they wear the same clothes. [black or white smocks, cut away at the neck, sleeves reaching the elbows, reaching a hand-span above the knees. They also wore wide breeches that tightened towards the bottom and reached just below the knee. On their feet they had leather slippers. Their cotton caps were in the shape of a crown] They carry another weapon, a thick club of up to three hand-spans long, with knobs on it, which they throw at the legs (of enemies), or use to strike them on the head, to knock their brains out.

>They use swords, arrows, and shields made of very strong thatch, which when wet are a protection against a spear or an arrow. Although made of thatch, - | they are effective and handsome, since what is called 'thatch' (here) is not really thatch: in fact, the shields consist of a framework of really very thick wooden staves, with reeds woven across the outside. They are very strong, and have fixed in the middle a diamond-shaped piece a hand-span across,

>[...] the clothes of these merchants are the same kind as those of the Mandingas; the clothes of the guards who come with them are different, being large tunics and baggy trousers whose width continues to more than a hand-span below the knees, then they narrow like boots and cover the whole leg. They fix many feathers on their tunics, and in the caps they wear. They carry short swords like the other blacks, and two knives, one in the belt and the other attached to the upper left arm. The arrows they carry are short and the bows small. They say that they prefer these because (the arrows) are of no use to their enemies who have large bows, while the arrows of their enemies are of use to them. Although their bows are small, they shoot arrows accurately. They also carry spears and very strong shields made of poles and reeds.

>>17859578
>The weapons of the Sumbas and of the people of Mandi Mansa are short bows and small arrows. They make them this way, they say, because their arrows being small and the bows of their enemies large, their weapons can be of no service to the enemy, since they cannot shoot (short arrows on long bows) or hurl them forcefully. But they themselves can make use of the arrows of their enemies in their (short) bows, since these arrows are long. The shields they carry are made from switches of wood and rattan, very well woven together, and strong, and of a size to cover a whole man completely. They also carry short swords, and a knife in place of a dagger, and another knife tied to the thick of their left arm, and spears made out of long iron bars, with each end made the same shape in order to wound either way. In war they carry two containers, or quivers, containing many arrows. [...] They dress in smocks of cotton cloth which they commonly call shirts; these stop above the knees, and the wide sleeves go to the elbows. Their trousers almost reach the ground, with the bottoms more than a span below the knees; the trousers are wide and the smocks large. They wear many plumes of birds feathers in their shirts and caps.

>A brief treatise on the rivers of Guinea (1594) by André Álvares de Almada. P. 12

>From chapter 1 "Which discusses the Jalofo blacks, who are the first (to be met in Guinea) and the nearest to us; and their customs and laws".

The Horn

>There was a proliferation of armour in the Horn for centuries, from chainmail, breastplates, and helmets, including those that covered the entire face, as well as armour for the horses of the cavalries and special units. An increase in archaeology in the region, including excavation of cemeteries and old battlefields would most likely retrieve the aforementioned armour types. [1]

>The early adoption of gunpowder weapons made the need for armour also more and more obsolete over time, but it was the switch from clear battle lines and conventional warfare of the preceding centuries to asymmetric warfare driven by the Oromo migrations that contributed to why armour fell out of use in the Horn by the 18th century.

>Adal's cities built fortifications and walls, while in Abyssinia, the Emperors constructed a capital of castles at Gondar, yet the Oromo style of ambush raids did not get reversed until Emperor Susenyos I took a page out of their own book and adopted their tactics;

>"What makes the Gallas much feared is that they go to war and into battle determined and firmly resolved to conquer or die. The Emperor Seltan Çagued recognised this quality in them and in most of the Abyssinians the exact opposite. To this he used to ascribe the victories of the Gallas and the defeats and routs of the Abyssinians, though the latter are usually much more numerous and have better horses, muskets, helmets, and coats of mail in plenty. The Gallas do not usually come in bands of more than six or seven to eight thousand, but these are mostly picked young men.

>>17859587
>The same Emperor used to therefore say that the Abyssinians could not possibly withstand their first onslaught. So he used to let them invade the country and steal the cattle and whatever else they found. He used to then wait in the way for them on their return. Their first fury was then broken and they were thinking of reaching their country and securing and preserving the booty with which they were loaded. In this way he often defeated them." - G.W.B. Huntingford's Some Records of Ethiopia, 1593-1646 Being Extracts from The History of High Ethiopia Or Abassia by Manuel de Almeida Book IV Chapter 20

>As you can see, despite facing superior numbers and technology, the Oromo tactic of asymmetric warfare could still overcome bigger armies wearing armour, while they wore only cloth and other textiles and moved with a lean force of handpicked young men and excellent horses.

>>17859588
1. A few of the references to armour in the Conquest of Abyssinia;

>"So the imam asked him: 'And these soldiers of theirs, tell us about them - who are they? How many of them are there?' He said: They are from the people of Tegre, of Angot and of Fatagar. The imam then asked him, 'How many horses have they?' He replied:'Five-hundred horses from Rif with riders from Tegre - all of whom wear armour of iron and steel'."- Page 148

>"The Muslims mounted their horses, put on their armour and their breastplates, proclaiming the unicity and the mightiness of God, and praying for [Muhammad] the unique Herald." - Page 134

>"When morning came, the imam summoned the captives, the horses and the weapons of war. They presented the horses to him, five-hundred of them with their protective armour draped with red broad-cloth and velvet, with silk, and gold brocade of silk shimmering like fiery flames; with Davidic iron armour, helmets from Sabur, swords from Egypt, and shields made of hide from Abyssinia that resembled white baskets. He gave glory to the most high God, and took the fifth part of these and of the mules, and then divided the remaining horses and the mules amongst the mujahidun." - Page 78

"Army fused with army, swords were unsheathed, spear tips were aimed, emblems and banners were unfurled, flags fluttered, bridles clanked, horses whinnied, vast clouds of dust billowed up, and sweat poured from the breasts of the soldiers on account of the weight of the armour. Nothing could be heard from armies but the battle-cries of soldiers and the neighing of horses at the blows of the swords hitting the hide-covered shields and the iron helmets shaped like ostrich eggs." - Page 81

>>17859588
1. A few of the references to armour in the Conquest of Abyssinia;

>"So the imam asked him: 'And these soldiers of theirs, tell us about them - who are they? How many of them are there?' He said: They are from the people of Tegre, of Angot and of Fatagar. The imam then asked him, 'How many horses have they?' He replied:'Five-hundred horses from Rif with riders from Tegre - all of whom wear armour of iron and steel'."- Page 148

>"The Muslims mounted their horses, put on their armour and their breastplates, proclaiming the unicity and the mightiness of God, and praying for [Muhammad] the unique Herald." - Page 134

>"When morning came, the imam summoned the captives, the horses and the weapons of war. They presented the horses to him, five-hundred of them with their protective armour draped with red broad-cloth and velvet, with silk, and gold brocade of silk shimmering like fiery flames; with Davidic iron armour, helmets from Sabur, swords from Egypt, and shields made of hide from Abyssinia that resembled white baskets. He gave glory to the most high God, and took the fifth part of these and of the mules, and then divided the remaining horses and the mules amongst the mujahidun." - Page 78

>"Army fused with army, swords were unsheathed, spear tips were aimed, emblems and banners were unfurled, flags fluttered, bridles clanked, horses whinnied, vast clouds of dust billowed up, and sweat poured from the breasts of the soldiers on account of the weight of the armour. Nothing could be heard from armies but the battle-cries of soldiers and the neighing of horses at the blows of the swords hitting the hide-covered shields and the iron helmets shaped like ostrich eggs." - Page 81

>>17859594
>"The ignoble Abyssinians withstood the charge of the noble believers momentarily. But then the right wing of the infidels broke ranks, while the soldiers on their left wing held firm - the patrician Robel, the patrician Aser, the patrician Feqra lyasus and the patrician Wasu 'Utman. They and their standards stood firm like mountain crags wearing protective armor of helmets and coats of mail." - Ibid

>"Two of the messengers returned from their journey bearing good news about the arrival of the Somali tribes. 'No one heard your letter read out,' the two of them said, 'without responding obediently to the Most High God. They have responded to your plea. Great numbers of them have equipped themselves with armour made from chain rings with overlapping tiers. The tribes have followed one another, kinsfolk in the footsteps of kinsfolk, tribe in the footsteps of tribe."

>"They showed off their weaponry and armour, paraded their horses and had their bows slung sash-like over their shoulders as they met the imam face to face. He commanded them then to go ahead to a place called Sim. Their chieftain had brought with him his wife, Fardusa, the sister of the imam Ahmad. And he set out ahead, he and his army." - Page 43

>"They made up an army that was like a plague of locusts whose number the Most High God alone knows. All the Christians, and the infidel army, with their soldiers assembled in Bet Amhara in untold numbers, wearing armor composed of chain rings set in neatly tiered rows, and with awesome weaponry." - Page 48

>>17859596
>On Susenyos I and the Oromo chiffra system he adopted, it also had a part related to pitched battle, although Susenyos didn't adopt it wholesale and instead relied in great part in countering the Oromo system, fighting in broken ground that hindered their cavalry and furious charge and where his more armored and numerous spearmen formations could shine. Oromo liked to offer battle in big plains where their light cavalry could comfortably maneuver, and formed their infantry in deep shock formations (6 to 12 ranks) who relied on impact to break the enemy.

>A battle of Za-Dengel against Oromo, from Pedro Páez's chronicle:

>Splitting into three squadrons, they advanced to where the emperor was, and when he saw this he commanded his men to form three squadrons as well and, taking his place in the middle one, he went forth to encounter them. On coming close, one squadron of [Oromo] charged so furiously that it soon put the [emperor's] left-hand squadron to flight; they then did the same to the right-hand squadron, so that the emperor remained alone with his squadron facing the [Oromo] battle corps. When the captains saw that they decided to turn … , but when he heard this he dismounted from his horse, … saying 'I shall die here fighting. The rest of you can run away to the mountain…, but … people will say that the emperor whom you made yesterday was abandoned by you today at the start of battle'. At this, they all resolved to die without turning tail, and they attacked and fought so valiantly that they put the [Oromo] to flight

>>17859600
>This does not mean that the Oromo foot formations were a massed rabble, because there are sources that tell us about how they maneuvered maintaining good order. This is a description by a Portuguese in 1548:

>We were ready sometime, awaiting the [Oromos], when one day they appeared. They were innumerable, and did not come on without order like barbarians, but advanced collected in bodies, like squadrons. When they saw us they halted, some waiting for the rest, and then marched in one mass and camped near us, at a distance where our shots could do them no harm. As they were many and we were few, we did not go out to attack them, but waited in our camp. At the most there were one hundred and fifty of us, as the rest were already dead, nearly all in war, some few of sickness … Our camp was pitched on rising ground, whence we commanded the rest of the country, and stood over those that fought against us. We defended ourselves here for ten or twelve days, awaiting the king. During this time we killed many of them by shot, and by our artifices of fire, because they approached so fearlessly that we could aim every cast and shot. Meanwhile our powder failed, and as the king did not come, we had to leave the position in search of him. The [Oromos] did not pursue us: perchance because they also did not desire our company

Futuh al-Habesha

>>17859603
Mossi tactics:

>"In bigger raids or expeditions, the Mossi continued to place their faith in cavalry. Should the expedition take as much as a week or ten days, soldiers would bring their own provisions, usually beans and water, and would supplement this by living off the land. Surprise was not a factor when a large force marched. When the enemy was sighted, the army moved into battle formation. The infantry formed a single skirmishing line and made first contact. The Mossi did not employ their cavalry as shock troops; horses and nobles were not so easily expendable as that. Next, the cavalry charged, organized in three units: right, centre and left. Provincial commanders remained in the rear to supervise the action. If the initial infantry attack was unsuccessful, the cavalry reserved the right to beat a hasty retreat, helping the infantry if possible, or applying the rule of sauve qui peut if necessary."

Echenberg, M. J. (1971). Late Nineteenth-Century Military Technology in Upper Volta. The Journal of African History, 12(2), 241–254

>>17859610
>"Scouts preceded each district contingent as the army marched off to battle. Within the contingent, the younger warriors marched in front, followed by older men. It was the duty of the more experienced warriors to make sure that the younger men did not break ranks and run under the stress of battle. Behind the foot soldiers came the cavalry, composed of nobles and of the few commoners who possessed horses. Behind these came the district chief, surrounded by his own palace guard. Several heralds known as yumba (sing, yuma) accompanied the district forces to exhort them to fight. As the men marched to battle the yumba shouted:

>Men! Your ancestors were not slaves. They were men. They were stronger than anyone else. They did not bathe with water; they bathed with blood. Do you wish to return home to drink millet water and eat bread? Never! A man does not eat bread or drink millet water; a man fights. Your ancestors were not afraid of anyone; you must not be afraid of anyone. Even if you are killed today, you must march ahead, beat your enemies, and take their villages. You must not be afraid!

>>17859613
>Mossi armies on the march used scouts to keep a sharp lookout for the enemy or for any evidence that he was aware of impending attack. The tactics these scouts used to avoid detection, such as camouflaging themselves with leaves and branches and crawling upon the ground, can be witnessed even today at Mossi funerals where men re-enact warfare practices. Whenever possible, the Mossi preferred to take the enemy by surprise, but this was seldom possible when large-scale fighting and massive preparations were involved. When two Mossi armies drew up to each other, the heralds from both sides issued such challenges and epithets as: "If you men do not wish to die,you should run or you will never eat again. We will have your blood towash with." In the meantime, the Tansobadamba on both sides deployed their forces in accordance with the number of men available, the spirit of the enemy, and the nature of the terrain. From the description of warfare given to me by an old Tansoba in Nobere district, it appears that the strategy most commonly used was to split the infantry in two while attacking, thus making room for the cavalry to charge through. If the initial charge was successful, the attack was maintained, but if it failed, the army usually turned about and fled. Despite their braggadocio, Mossi commanders seldom insisted that their troops fight against overwhelming odds. However, shame over impending defeat often induced such officers as theTansoba and the Gounga Naba to fight to the death."

Izard, M. (1966). The Mossi of the Upper Volta. The Political Development of a Sudanese People.

>>17859618
On Mossi panoply in the 19th century

>"Mossi warriors cut rather awesome figures. To protect against the arrows of his adversary, the Mossi horseman covered himself with as much clothing as he could manage. He wore four or five tunics on top of each other, the outer garment covered with leather amulets and charms; he covered his head with a turban coiffed with a huge straw hat, and he wrapped several bou-bous around his waist. Similarly, he protected his mount with a large piece of leather under the saddle, that covered the croupe and flanks, and with a large frontal piece of copper for the horse's head"
Echenberg, M. J. (1971). Late Nineteenth-Century Military Technology in Upper Volta. The Journal of African History, 12(2), 241–254

>"The village chiefs, in turn, beat their war drums to summon their noble cavalrymen and commoner foot soldiers, who came armed with bows and arrows, spears, swords, and clubs, with or without iron tips. The tips of the sharp weapons were often covered with a vegetable poison derived from a shrub of the Strophanthus species. Some of the men also carried guns after firearms were introduced among the Mossi from the desert region and from the coast. Many carried rawhide shields."

Izard, M. (1966). The Mossi of the Upper Volta. The Political Development of a Sudanese People.

>>17859621
Zande Warrior

>More about the Zande. True Zande warriors (that is, Avungara or completely assimilated conquered peoples) didn't use bows, but fought exclusively as spearmen, with throwing knives and swords as auxiliary weapons. Sometimes, auxiliaries from submitted peoples fought as bowmen in Zande armies, however. Petherick in 1858 writes:

>"Their arms consist of smooth and barbed lances, and a large oblong shield, formed of closely- woven matting, composed of several patterns, and dyed with many colours. In the centre of the interior is a wooden handle, to which are attached two or three
singularly-formed iron projectiles, resembling a boomerang of rather a circular form, bearing on their peripheries several sharp projections. Attached to the girdle, a strong leather sheath containing a knife, hilt downwards, is worn by every 'Neam Neam'"

Schweinfurth, in 1870, writes:

>"The principal weapons of the Niam-niam are their lances and their trumbashes. . . . The trumbash of the Niam-niam consists ordinarily of several limbs of iron, with pointed prongs and sharp edges. Iron missiles very similar in their shape are found among
the tribes of the Tsad basin. . . The trumbashes are always attached to the inside of the shields, which are woven from the Spanish reed, and are of a long oval form, covering two-thirds of the body ; they are ornamented with black and white crosses or other devices ; and are so light that they do not in the least impede the combatants in their wild leaps. An expert Niam-niam, by jumping up for a moment, can protect his feet from the flying missiles of his adversary. Bows and arrows, which, as handled by the Bongo, give them a certain advantage, are not in common use among the Niam-niam, who possess a peculiar weapon of attack in their singular knives, that have blades like sickles."

They still live in huts btw

>>17859624
>Here Schweinfurth argues that bows and arrows were advantageous in warfare in that region, but other sources claim the opposite. From Evans-Pritchard in Zande Warfare:

>"I have already quoted Schweinfurth's admiration of the Zande's skill in the use of his weapons. Another writer, Col. C. Chaillé Long, has described how in a fight with the Yanbari (? Nyangbara) he let loose his Azande (Adio or Makaraka Azande) on them : "I confess that I never saw a more perfect ideal of the warrior, not alone in muscular display, but in the bounding élan with which he flew rather than ran - the right hand grasping the huge knife, while with bouclier pressed closely to his side, he met the enemy. Covering his body with it with wonderful quickness from the deadly arrows, that his adversary in vain expended upon the broad shield, he threw himself upon him and cut and stabbed the defenceless 'Yanbari' to death." They burnt at least twenty villages and then ate enemy dead. The huge knife referred to is doubtless the scimitar the Azande of this region fought."

>>17859628
>It seems that the large shields allowed the Zande (in small scale engagements at least) to close range with the archers and effectively use their focus on melee combat.

>The most common type of engagement in Zande warfare during the 19th century were raids. Raids were organized by the governors of border provinces to gain loot, captives and prestige. According to Evans-Pritchard, who talked to old warriors who had personally taken part in these raids before the Europeans ended their independence, they were somewhat formalised, following a stable structure (they were not ritual though, the violence was real). The raiders attacked at dawn and killed the men that they caught, taking the women and children prisoner. They also took weapons, drums and gongs, and other goods as loot. They had to be fast in this, as the people who escaped from the initial carnage alerted the local forces (the alert spread from village to village with gongs and drums), who immediately sent warriors to counter-attack. Generally, the princes of neighboring provinces to the one attacked also started mobilising, as at this stage they could not know if it was just a raid or the start of an enemy campaign.

>>17859630
>The attacking party prepared before the raid three ambush sites to cover their retreat with the loot, and a rearguard. The rearguard made contact with the enemy first, but they didn't attempt to hold the enemy. A few spears were thrown for honor's sake, and then they withdrew, from this point stopping at no moment until they reached the prince located far back after the ambush sites. Once the enemy arrived at the first ambush site, they saw the leader of the ambushers alone in the road, who sprung the ambush from the densely covered with long grass sides with one yell. The ambushers threw spears, but they did not attempt to fight in melee. Evans-Pritchard mentions here that the throwing knives (and the sickle swords) would not have been used in this action, and I have seen some people on the Internet misinterpreting this and then saying that the throwing knives were ceremonial. Obviously, it was not the case (as described in my previous post), but they didn't use the throwing knives in raids because they were very valuable and there was a very high chance of not recovering them, for basically no gain.

>If the ambushers gained the upper hand, the counterattacking party retreated, and the former went back to the prince. If they were forced to withdraw, they retreated to the second ambush site, where once again the leader stood alone in the road. Again, they fought here. Independently of the outcome, the pursuers didn't go further, as they were not numerous or prepared enough to risk a large engagement. All the raiders withdrew as well, and returned to the village with loot and captives

Seer

>The king is lord of a great kingdom. People of three nations are subject to him, that is, Barbacins, Jalofos and Mandingas [Serer, Wolof and Mandinka respectively]; and he governs them very strictly through two governor-generals called by the blacks jagarefes. One of them governs the Barbacins during peace and war, and the other the Jalofos and Mandingas. [The concept of having two main territorial-military subordinates seems to be inspired by Mali, with its Faran-sura and Sanqara-zuma'a, as well as the idea of linking these with specific peoples. In fact, Faran-sura means more or less "governor over the dwellers of the desert"] These men have under then many governors who are appointed to districts all over the kingdom, where they reside in very beautiful towns; they are called jasodins and act as military commanders and governors of such places. The governors report to their superiors anything that occurs in their district, and the superiors pass it on to the king; and in this way, through this chain of command, the king learns about anything that happens in his kingdom and how many men are available for war. [Here there is a deviation from the Malian model, as all governors are under the twin military figures, while in Mali they had some under their authority and most outside of It. Scale is a factor, as Mali was much bigger and was built in various compromises with local elites, which most likely was not a factor in the same way in Saloum].

>>17859638
>In order to assemble these men, he has only to tell the governors-general what must be done, and they immediately pass it on post-haste to the governors. (Thus) there can be no mistake about the day on which each has to assemble with his men, or about the place of assembly. In this way, with very little trouble the
king assembles a large army, (made up) of cavalry as well as of infantry, for there are many horses in the land which come there by way of the Fulos and Moors [Interesting bit, and the Tarikh al-Sudan passage about the 1599 Battle of Djenne between Mali and Djenne and the Pashalik of Timbouktu suggests this was how it worked in Mali as well, although in a more complicated way due to its more complex political apparatus].
[...]
>All these kings [he is generalising here and this refers to all polities of Senegambia, either Wolof, Serer or Mandinka], have alcaides or governors, and these are the officers who collect gifts from our people and who purchase the goods the kings require. They also have governor-generals, as has been stated, who are called jagarefes; governors of districts called jagodis; officers of the treasury called farbas; masters of the horse called bigeos; and chamberlains called buguinegues.

A brief treatise on the rivers of Guinea (1594) by André Álvares de Almada. P. 12

>>17859644
From chapter 1 "Which discusses the Jalofo blacks, who are the first (to be met in Guinea) and the nearest to us; and their customs and laws".

Yoruba

>In Yorubaland, war expeditions were sent out once per year by the king of Oyo normally against the Gbe peoples. Normally to acquire spoils rather than captives or conquest. The winners rarely pursued the losers and those who ran off or hid were normally safe. After conquest, the shade trees of the main market were chopped down to signal victory. In the age of Oyo, slave raiding was virtually unknown. Sieges did not occur either. Standing armies didn't exist except in Ibadan where the rulers created a class of trained slave-soldiers. Young boys were often brought along to war campaigns, not for combat but as attendants to the warriors. And to teach them the horror of war. All men of fighting age were expected to participate in wars, but it was not enforceable except among men of status. At the end of battle, all men simply went back home to their farms.

>Prior to the introduction of firearms, the main yoruba weapons were poisoned arrows, short cutlass-like swords called "Jomo", and heavy cutlass-like swords called "Ogbo".

>Post Oyo supremacy, sieges were conducted during the dry season. Dry season was the more common time to engage in warfare in west africa. Rations were composed of parched beans and a hard chunk of cornbread called Akara-kuru. Foraging for food was allowed during military campaigns, however. Ibadan being more concerned with bellicose matters had the tendency to start farming the area around their military camps during long sieges.

>>17859652
>There were two grades in the military: Junior and Senior. The senior "Balogun" was the commander-in-chief supported by his lieutenants "Otun" of the right and "Osi" of the left. Ranked below them in order were the Ekerin, Ekarun and Ekefa i.e. the fourth, fifth and sixth.
These men commanded the veterans.

>The commander of the junior grades was called the Seriki. And under him were a lesser degree version of the Otun, Osi, Ekerin, Ekarun, and Ekefa. These men commanded the younger warriors.

>They also commanded any men not attached to a senior warchief. A Sarumi was the cavalry chief and they formed their own separate branch of the military. Below him was a Balogun and so forth. The chief of a city state and the council members allowed to speak & vote would confer these titles on their soldiers.

>In battle, the Asanju was the leader of the vanguard who provokes skirmishes with the enemy. He was supported by the "Badas" who were something like medieval knights. They were expected to own 2 war steeds and followers in battle. Badas fought on horseback using lances and swords. Seriki comes after the Badas along with his lieutenants and their soldiers while the Balogun with his veterans kept the rear. Cavalry attempted to break the ranks of the enemy when they could, and a favorite tactic to demoralize the enemy was to dash into their midst and kidnap a lieutenant right in front of everyone and take him away in shame.

>>17859656
>War became a profession after the Fulani sacked Ilorin during the great jihad and sent the rest of the Yoruba tribes into a panic. It was because of this that Ibadan gained it's reputation for glory in war. Adventurers, mercenaries, and others from different tribes seeking combat traveled to join the people of Ibadan.

>War was often declared in the name of the Alaafin of Oyo and his permission was required before a campaign. The leader of a town and his council assembled with the warchiefs and discussed the nature of the campaign. When it was decided, the Balogun would stand outside before the army and finish his speech by proclaiming "X town is at your mercy!". The assembled force would cheer and march out. The Balogun would take the war staff with him. The war staff was a 4 foot bamboo pole covered in charms and amulets with a round head about the size of a coconut. They were created in the holy city of Ile-Ife and given with the blessing of the Ooni (basically the yoruba pope). They were sacred to the god of war

>>17859660
Very nice

>>17859660
>There were two types of walls, claims Smith: those either broad in width and tall in height, or breastworks. Both Old Ọyọ́ and Owu had the former type, while at New Ọyọ́ and another such place as Ijaye, their walls were of the latter variety. At Ìjẹ̀bú, the outer walls were of the first kind while the inner walls were of the second. The gates which determined entry through the wall were also engineered with meticulous care. Ketu’s gates featured inner and outer doors at oblique angles within deep porches and courtyards, and verandahs covered within walls two to five feet thick. The thatched roofing could be quite easily removed so as to prevent them being set ablaze. “At Iperu, missionary accounts describe gates flanked by timber watchtowers, their elevated platforms manned by archers—or later, gunmen—scanning the horizon for dust clouds raised by approaching forces.”

>Siege camps, such as that of the Egba at Ado Ekiti in 1824, replicated the city defense features on a smaller scale: thorn-studded bushes in ditches four feet deep on either side of a mud wall five feet high, constructed in a mere matter of days through cooperative labour, were modus operandi. Substantial labour was required of Yorùbá armies in wartime. This labour was in the form of the construction of new defenses before going out to engage with a foe. These camps were usually about an hour’s march from the location to be attacked and were enclosed with ditches and watch-towers, much like the permanent defenses to be found in the cities. These camps, being composed in makeup by Houses and farmlands as the wars dragged on for longer, took on the appearance of settled towns.

>>17861536
>Smith, using yet again Johnson’s work, reconstructs the Yorùbá theory of operations, stating that the army, “after sacrificing to the war standard, would move off in the order determined by the commands of the chiefs. In the front rode the Asaju, supported in his skirmishing by mounted ‘knights.’ Next came the Seriki commanding the young warriors who would begin the real battle. The Balogun, accompanied by the senior chiefs and warriors, would observe, and in theory direct, the battle until the time came for him to intervene, while the horsemen would use their mobility to reconnoitre, cover retreats, cut off stragglers, and try to demoralize the enemy by occasional sorties for prisoners.” Samuel Johnson writes:

>The usual method of a pitched battle is for all the war chiefs to be disposed, each in his right place, according to their rank and title, or as the commander-in-chief disposes, and then each in turn to march forward, company by company to the middle line of battle to discharge their arms, trying each time to gain more ground. This method they call tawus. But when later on the Balogun himself rises to fight, that denotes a general charge throughout the whole host; every man must be engaged in fight; and wherever he fixes his war standard, everyone is bound to dispose himself about it in due order. His going forward means that the whole army must push forward at whatever cost, for no one whose right place is in front dares fall to the rear of the Balogun except when hors de combat.

>>17861537
Now Smith goes on to counter the claims made by Jones, saying: “Jones’s account was based on limited observation at a time when, as he admits, the Egba army had declined far from its standard of ten years before. Although objective and factual, it must not be accepted as giving the whole picture.” Ground observers of battle, being obviously not in the minds of the commanders, will no doubt be struck with confusion as localized conflicts will seem to be dominant. Seeming to and being are two very different things. His comments on the casualties of battle may however be explained as a precursor to the introduction of the Sniders in the 1870s. The dane guns in use before then were an older, less effective at killing variety, and although they led to a lessening of hand-to-hand fighting as the armies adopted them, no doubt this itself offshot into a decrease in fatalities. In 1830, during the Gbanamu (“grasping fire”) war which Ibadan waged against the Ijẹbú, Ibadan swordsmen were able to overcome their enemies by such tactics as closing in, grasping and lifting their guns by the barrels, and as such, rendering them null. Jones’s somewhat scornful view of the low number of fatalities can also be critiqued because although he writes “tho’ thousands of rounds be fired, the killed may be counted by units and the wounded by tens.

>>17861541
>Seventeen thousand men engaged in mortal combat on May 23rd. [1861], the killed on both sides, as ascertained by spies, were 5 and the wounded under 50!,” his account is at odds with that of missionaries, who would have had primary interest in succouring the wounded and occasionally helping with operations. One such missionary, Townsend, writes that an attack on Abeokuta in 1851 left 1,200 Dahomey dead along the walls, and that the total casualties amongst the [enemy] were 3,000 (while Bowen estimates 2,000), with 1,000 captured. Another missionary, Mann, is evidenced to have been at times dealing with 40 to 60 wounded soldiers daily, and that he was in some demand for his talents. Another one, Stone, talks of the casualties at Ijaye being of a considerable number, and that wounds inflicted by copper bullets often became gangrenous. Johnson recounted that between April 1860 and March 1862 during the Ijaye war, a named commander, Ogunmola, alone lost 1,800 of his slave soldiers, not counting casualties from his free soldiers. It would be inaccurate, to say the least, that the determination with which this war was fought by combatants be minimized with no strong evidence, and even still, the civilian loss of life, whether from famine or just general slaughter by those unlucky enough to be caught in the crossfire, seems likely to have been as high as that of the combatants.

>>17861543
>There is also one other factor which complicates the dismissiveness with which some onlookers, though certainly not all, viewed the war as a result of the poorly evidenced accounts of low casualties. Soldiers were greatly incentivized by the taking of prisoners for sale. Captives from the wars at this time likely provided the bulk of [those] exported at markets in Lagos and Dahomey. The appetite for taking captives whom one could profitably dispose of no doubt prolonged certain campaigns, and likely prolonged the general course of war. In any circumstance, not all slaves were for exports, and likely a majority was retained for use as porters for wares other than slaves to those same coastal markets. Even still, not all captives were enslaved. Imprisonment, execution, and even just being released in return for payment or out of goodwill were all documented acts which occurred: first with an interpreter named Thomas captured at Ijaye and kept in chains for three years; then with Dahomey prisoners being put to death by the Egba in 1851 for slaughtering retreating farmers of Egba descent; to large numbers of other Dahomey who were ransomed in Ketu and the many Ijaye freed by Ibadan after having been taken captive in the fall of their city.

>>17861547
>The wars were devastating for the country, and depopulation was a widespread occurrence. Marches and counter-marches by armies crisscrossed the landscape; sieges which lasted for months at a time were endured; soldiers lived off what they could from local farms, disregarding the ownership of those who occupied it at the threat of death. Lander, journeying through the country in 1830, wrote of towns abandoned en masse, towns which he had, up until a few years ago, seen prosperous with his own eyes with Clapperton. Accounts of missionaries during the period only sustain the awful picture painted.

>Much remains to be said of the Yorùbá and their history of armed conflict; not only those wars of the 19th century, but those in the distant past we know little to nothing about. Even in those wars, comparative accounts of the individual Kingdoms and newly minted republics involved, as well as the Fulani and Dahomey who were at one point or the other involved, need to be written; and although I have tried my best with what I have available to me, I should state that I am not a historian—my information just comes from the works of historians. The Yorùbá armies had, throughout numerous centuries, evolved complex means of adaptation to the swift winds on which the tides of war violently turn.

>>17861549
Ogundiran, A. (2020a). The yorùbá: A new history. Indiana University Press.

Law, R. (1991a). The ọyọ empire, c.1600-c.1836: A West African imperialism in the era of the Atlantic Slave Trade. Gregg Revivals; Distributed in the U.S. by Ashgate Pub. Co.

Ajayi, J. F. A., & Smith, R. S. (1971). Yoruba warfare in the nineteenth century, by J.F. Ade Ajayi and Robert Smith. Cambridge University Press, in association with the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan.

thanks OP

>a haplogroup thread died for this

>>17852766
>fuzzy wuzzy
cruel

I like Zulu clothing, it's a shame the vast majority of photos only show their civilian attire, with small shields and ornaments instead of the large, almost classic shields.
Does anyone know what those things on their heads are made of? Cow's tail?
>Image limit reached.
mmm
https://files.catbox.moe/4wbie8.jpeg

Today, many from the Issa clan participate in local politics, security forces, and business, balancing tradition with the realities of modern Somaliland.