lul

>>17868534 (OP)
Based. Most free will opponents just apriori refuse the concept of a "self" that could have that will. That's why an organism choosing things based on that organism's own genetic code and that organism's own experiences isn't seen as free - because the organism is seen as just an amalgamation of external factors with no intrinsic selfhood.

You can have free will WRT petty things and no free will WRT important matters

>>17868534 (OP)
I can do what I want
But I can't choose what I want

>>17868934
>if I change the meaning of free will enough then it makes sense to me!

>>17868534 (OP)
Notice they both said the same "random" word

>>17868534 (OP)
How was 'banana' chosen at random and how can they prove that it was?

>>17869058
It was not coerced and it was unprompted. Which is the primary meaning of the word free in free will. From there-on it's up to the determinist to provide an argument why my brain (my body) processing ways in a certain way (my mind) should be considered coercive upon me. As though the real me is an aetherical "soul" that my body and mind contrain.

>>17869071
>It was not coerced
When talking about free will in the philosophical sense we typically don't go by the "as long as no one is holding a gun to your head" definition of 'free', but rather the "did you have the capacity to choose otherwise" definition.
>and it was unprompted
Were you not prompted by your desire to prove your free will?

>>17869083
They are the same. It is a fairly recent development that "capacity to choose otherwise" is supposed to contain not only foreign agents but for some reason even your own circuitry. If this novel discussion is the one you want to be having, then I will leave you to it, but I would be happy to know that you understand that this is a degenrated form of the free will debate, where people are essentially playing chess with where the goalpost of "self" and "free" is.
>Were you not prompted by your desire to prove your free will?
This is exactly what I mean. If "I" has any meaning at all, it includes my mind and most (if not all) of its contents. That I decided to do something is free will per excellence regardless of how you slice up the self into constituent parts. Unless you're playing chess with the concept goalposts.

I want to be clear, I'm not accusing you of dishonesty here. I'm just showing you that this very important concept was deconstructed and reconstructed to the point and if a medieval monk was teleported here, he would have no idea why you think this is relevant even if he understood neurology to the T.

>>17869071
>It was not coerced and it was unprompted
So it was free in a way that has absolutely nothing to do with determinism.
Good job anon, you disproved yourself.

>>17869095
See >>17869093
It's determinism that was falsely imported into the free will and free choice debate to begin with.

>>17869093
I'm only concerned with determinism, for me the discussion is completely boring if it's defined by lack of coercion because then the only question becomes "are you currently being coerced or not" which is completely uninteresting compared to the other questions raised by determinism.

>>17869093
>It is a fairly recent development that "capacity to choose otherwise" is supposed to contain not only foreign agents but for some reason even your own circuitry.
>If this novel discussion is the one you want to be having, then I will leave you to it
Considering your pic EXPLICITELY refers to this exact argument, this post is 100% dishonest.
You're bait and switching here, and it's completely obvious.

>>17869106
That is fine. There is a lot to be said about determinism (and why physics are no longer deterministic) itself. But I encourage you to try to define "I" and (at least the goalpost for) "free" within these theories when you evaluate them.
You will see that in many cases the theory isn't really addressing the state of will. It denies the person who could be having any will at all. Because all constituent parts of a person (brain, individual firings, body, DNA, past experiences, perceptions...) are framed as input factors and there is ultimately no place the factors form anything like a "will" at all - free or bound.

In short: if we reduce the person away, there is no person and hence no free will.

>>17869112
I'm not OP. I just stalk free will threads where I'm being a smartass about how free choice and free will discussion degenerated from their theological-philosophical application into Harris charging $15 for a book where he says "presuming everything is matter, do humans work as matter?".

Peace out, homies.

>>17869130
>I
The self, my concept of 'me', the person/creature that I am
>free
In this context I define it as having the capacity of making different choices.
>Because all constituent parts of a person (brain, individual firings, body, DNA, past experiences, perceptions...) are framed as input factors and there is ultimately no place the factors form anything like a "will" at all - free or bound.
>In short: if we reduce the person away, there is no person and hence no free will.
I'd still say there is a person but there is no free will. I'm a determinist and I do think it's just a (potentially incredibly complex) series of input factors that lead us to making the choices that we do. We make choices, but it was inevitable that we would make those specific choices and so in a sense we were never truly free to act otherwise.

>>17868863
You're braindead.