>>17912799>Maintain focus on RAF Fighter Command (no early switch to bombing cities)The reason they switched to bombing cities was because they were losing the battle.
RAF only grew as the battle progressed, and the Luftwaffe bombers failed to destroy any of their targets. Not a single airfield was put out of action.
>Commit to winning the air war before invasionWhich was impossible beause RAF shot down more planes than Luftwaffe, had fewer casualties, recovered more pilots, produced more aircrafts, trained more pilots, and maintained greater morale.
All while having greater access to raw material for a sustained war, whereas Germany did not.
>Choose a single clear objective (destroy RAF '''or''' force negotiation)Why coninue on a failed strategy?
>Sustain attacks on radar stations to blind RAF>Target aircraft factories and repair depots alongside airfieldsThere was a major problem with this, and that is that precision bombing was a meme. Not just for Germany but also for Britain. The technology simply did not exist.
This is what actually happened:
1. The Luftwaffe bombers couldnt locate their targets
2. When the Luftwaffe bombers located their targets they couldnt identify their targets.
3. When the Luftwaffe bombers identified their targets they couldnt hit their targets
4. When the Luftwaffe bombers hit their targets they couldnt destroy their targets.
Again, not isolated to Luftwaffe. The RAF bomber command suffered from the same problem. Their raids on German cities early in the war had almost zero impact.
After the David Bensusan-Butt Report; (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Butt_Report) the British realized that area bombing, i.e bombing an entire city with its civilian population, was the only way to actuallly produce any meaningful damage to any strategic target.
>Ensure strict bomber escort discipline with fightersThey did this. It's a reasons why Luftwaffe lost the battle. Tying fighters to the bombers stripped them of their tactical ability