Can the Aegis system shoot down nukes launched at us by Russia? Do we have anything else to protect us from nukes?

>>64062900 (OP)
yes
yes
google anti-ballistic missiles

>>64062900 (OP)
Russian incompetence.

>>64062900 (OP)
Russia's vulnerability to nukes.

>>64062900 (OP)
SM-3 IIA has a solid shot of intercepting ICBMs in-orbit, but it requires an Aegis BMD ship (not just regular Aegis) to be in the right place at the right time.

Also they only deploy ~8 SM-3's per boat, and not all of them will be the IIA variant, so you're only really going to have a shot of intercepting a rogue ICBM or two, not a full salvo from china/russia.

There is also the GMD system, though we only have 44 interceptors and they only have a probability of intercept of 97% when using 4 interceptors per target, so that can only cover ~11 ICBMs.

>>64062900 (OP)
SM3s have a 25%/50% success rate in field tests. Against live targets those numbers drop to about a tenth though.

>>64062927
>SM3s have a 25%/50% success rate in field tests
source: vatnigger cope delusions

>>64062927
Lol

>>64062919
I wonder if the golden dome funding means we are gonna purchase a lot more of these interceptor missiles

>>64063993
Maybe, but realistically the money would need to go into expanding production capabilities first.

Right now for example the US has only bought 30 SM-3 IIA and both orders were placed in 2018/2019, and the final missile was delivered in June of 2025.

The most recent budget documents I can find say the US decided to purchase 12 SM-3 IIA's in FY25, so not exactly the production pace needed for a continental ICBM shield.

Beyond that, the GMD interceptors (GBI) are even more expensive and has even more limited production capability. And the new interceptor for GMD (NGI) is going to be even more expensive with some estimates putting them at over $200m per interceptor.

>>64063993
Based on the lockheed martin website, these are the missiles and technologies that will be part of the Golden Dome

https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/capabilities/missile-defense/golden-dome-missile-defense.html

As for funding
>A significant portion of the funding is included in the 2025 budget reconciliation legislation, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (P.L. 119-21), which provides $24.4 billion in mandatory funding for the Department of Defense until September 30, 2029. This funding is allocated for enhancing integrated air and missile defense and supports the Golden Dome initiative. Specific allocations include $18.8 billion for next-generation missile defense technologies and $5.9 billion for layered homeland defense

Reminder that like ten years ago when the US suddenly declassified everything to do with orbital kill vehicles, several replacement devices were openly mentioned.

>>64062900 (OP)
US has anti-nooks but doesn't flaunt it because the US doesn't want to dare rogue shitholes into launching their arsenal.

>>64062900 (OP)
Hi /pol/, I see you aren't taking the news Trump has turned on Russia well.

>>64064090
The first part of GD will be the sensors. We've discussed in other threads the possibility that we're really close to having accurate, reliable MTI from space, which means StarShield and its follow-ons could theoretically handle all of the tracking and targeting and data relay between the HQs and the various ground and sea launchers, which would make intercepts *far* easier to pull off. If SpaceX's existing high-volume satellite assembly line could be used, then theoretically a rudimentary level of 24/7 coverage could be available within 2-3 years of authorization being given. The limiting factor would be the ability of subcontractors to manufacture the military-grade AESAs (I don't know who builds StarLink's TRMs).

That just leaves the interceptors, which ain't cheap. GBI is the best, but there are <50 of them. SM-3 is unproven against ICBMs in testing, and its performance may be marginal; however, the aforementioned orbital MTI could dramatically reduce the rocket performance requirements to conduct a successful intercept. THAAD is less capable, and would mostly be used for terminal defense, along with PAC-3s which would be last-ditch rolls of the dice. Spaceborne weapons would most likely be something akin to Brilliant Pebbles, taking advantage again of SpaceX's launch cadence, but that would probably be several years away even if prioritized tomorrow.

no. ever since topol, russia uses marvs for their warhead buses that are designed to defeat mid-course interceptors.

>>64065283
getting them in their boost phase is the only way, which golden dome is designed for. but russia is deploying ipbvs in the near future, which will defeat that. and terminal interceptors don't work against icbms, since they have no need to slow down to acquire the target. they impact at mach 13.

china will be most effected by golden dome.

>>64065189
>SM-3 is unproven against ICBMs in testing
Not fully accurate, it successfully completed an intercept of a simulated ICBM target in late 2020. Specifically the ICBM-T2 threat-representative target.

>>64065914
sm-3 can hit stuff that doesn't maneuver during mid-course just fine. satellites to icbms all moving at orbital velocities.

it just can't when there's an appreciable velocity change of the object, as the kkv doesn't have much delta-v of its own.

>>64065299
>>64065283
The only solution would be a preemptive strike against silo, ssbn bases, tel bases. I’ll say that’s pretty doable with the b21 being available in a far larger number is compare to b2.
If the f-47 range without refueling can be increased to 3000-4000km, they can coordinate a huge swarm of ultra long range version of x-47 carrying these, loitering above russian or Chinese airspace at any given moment
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_Centric_Airborne_Defense_Element
A b21 can easily carry at least a dozen if not more of those

>>64065925
I mean you're speculating, the ICBM-T2 target is designed to be "threat-representative," meaning it emulates the speed, trajectory, and other flight characteristics of a long range ballistic missile. It's a multistage rocket that uses components from decommissioned U.S. missiles like the Trident I C4 and Peacekeeper ICBM, modified to simulate the flight profile of a modern ICBM. The target is specifically designed to be a "complex separating" ballistic missile, which means it can release decoys or other countermeasures to challenge the interceptor's ability to identify and hit the actual warhead.

It might not have a high delta-v for drastic in atmosphere maneuvering, but it can clearly manage complex target discrimination in a cluttered environment.

The 2020 test wasn't the equivalent of hitting a satellite as you imply.

>>64065940
not really speculating, rather just how it works. the rocket stages get it up to space and then the kkv releases and heads towards to intercept point. if the threat changes velocity that exceeds the delta-v of the kkv, it won't be able to hit. for something with a maneuverable bus, there's an appreciable change in velocity during bus separation from the second stage because its rocket motor can give it more delta-v than the sm-3's kkv; this is assuming the sm-3 platform waits until after the 1st stage separation change in course of the icbm (this was one of the earlier methods to defeat mid-course interceptors).

to have a chance at something like this, you need a ground-based interceptor, since that has quite a bit more delta-v than a sm-3.

>>64065953
Yes what you're doing is literally speculating

>well if the warhead happens to change velocity after the interceptor separates it'll miss
With no actual knowledge if Russian/Chinese ICBMs even CAN do that, let alone actually do it at the right time to dodge an SM-3.

What you're essentially saying is the SM-3 needs to be fired at the right time, which, no shit, is obvious.

You acting like it CAN'T hit any ICBMs because of this is just braindead retard tier thinking.

Is it a 100% guarantee that it'll intercept? Of course not. But that's far from what you're saying which is essentially it WILL miss.

>>64064124
boaner inducing

Is Aegis Ashore more effective than THAAD?
I'm wondering why the Koreans and Japanese don't want both now that Kimmy is being stupid. Fuck the Chinese and what they think, if they cant reign in their dog.

>>64065967
Japan didn't want AEGIS Ashore because they couldn't agree where it should go

Like 70-80% of Japanese people approve of getting AEGIS ashore, but when asked if they wanted it in their prefecture it dropped to like 10-20% approval.

So they're doing ASEV (Aegis system equipped vessels) instead using the AEGIS ashore radars they already purchased (SPY-7(V)1)

Japan likely hasn't considered THAAD for similar reasons.

South Korea already has a THAAD battery deployed, though owned and operated by the US. And AEGIS Ashore is politically dead in the water for South Korea due to China.

Though Guam's AEGIS ashore installation is supposedly operational now, with enhanced capability slated for 2029.

>>64065990
they should put it up in the mountains at a holy site or something

>>64063993
Golden Dome is economically impossible, we will never have the ability to intercept a true salvo of modern ICBMs because it would be so horrendously expensive that we would bankrupt the country. It would cost trillions of dollars to buy the missiles, buy the actual X band radars needed and buy the land and develop it for missile launches. The orbital interceptor idea is even worse arguably. The physics for this problem simply do not work.

>>64066615
>this nigga doesn't believe in Brilliant Pebbles
kill yourself

>>64062919
>There is also the GMD system, though we only have 44 interceptors and they only have a probability of intercept of 97% when using 4 interceptors per target, so that can only cover ~11 ICBMs.

Isnt GMD terminal point defense? Then it would be 4 interceptors per warhead, meaning that all of them would be able to take down 1 multi warhead icbm launch.

>>64066735
>Is <Ground-based Midcourse Defense> Terminal Point Defense?

>>64066746
>>Is <Ground-based Midcourse Defense> Terminal Point Defense?

Yeah but what is the official range on this thing? You have to be able to get the bus before it starts to drop warheads and decoys meaning that you have to launch within minutes of the ICBM being launched.

>>64066766
m8, do you know what "midcourse" means?

>>64066714
Satellites in LEO are a shitty ass way of intercepting ICBMs because of how many you need to put into orbit for good coverage

>>64066775
the math is simple and easy and already done in a big paper
serial satellite production isn't as expensive as they thought it was and Low earth orbit launch is orders of magnitude cheaper than they thought it was

>>64066843
and ? China and Russia also has asat missile
so what you gonna do to stop them from swatting those out of the sky preemptively ?

>>64065967
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_anti-ballistic_missile_systems
SM-3 IIA has a 21" motor and a max altitude of ~600 miles (all the way into the bottom end of MEO).
THAAD has a 13" motor and a max altitude of 90 miles (just below LEO).

That's a pretty big difference in delta-v. Think of IIA as exo-atmospheric, and THAAD as endo-atmospheric. That means SM-3 can hit mid-course targets, while THAAD can only hit terminal targets within a much smaller radius.

So, why not replace the THAAD with IIA? Well, look at the estimated prices: $12M for THAAD, vs. $28M for IIA (or $70M for GBI). You need more fuel to reach longer ranges. You need more thrust (and hence more fuel) to reach the greater speeds needed to get to those longer ranges before the inbounds can pass by. You need more structure and better materials to handle the extra speed and acceleration. It all snowballs.

And >>64065990 is correct; there was so much NIMBY that Japan gave up and decided to put all their eggs in the naval basket; this has the advantage of being mobile, but of course the disadvantage of being far easier for the enemy to suppress or destroy. It does also have a bit of an advantage in that the ships can probably be deployed off Japan's east coast and still defend the west coast from ballistic missiles, making attempts to find or kill them more difficult for the PLA.

>>64067185
That's a *lot* of satellites that they have to shoot down before they can "safely" launch their ICBMs... and we'd kinda notice if they started doing that.

>>64066775
Damn good thing the US can crank and launch LEOs then

Russian nukes are more dangerous for Russians themselves

>>64068087
>almost hit the pedestrian on crossing instead of yielding
typical third world behavior