Thread 64066214

the u.s army dropped their second RWOW(russia way of war)

https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2025/07/11/f2b1e75e/how-russia-fights-a-compendium-of-troika-observations-on-russia-s-special-military-operations.pdf

man this will get spicy with the armchair generals here

>>64066214 (OP)
What does Stargate have to do with this thread?

>>64066230
spoken like a true goauld

>>64066230
There has not been the disclosure of operations as expected by our agreement.

>>64066214 (OP)
OP has made the mistake of posting a lust-provoking image more interesting that the his topic. Amanda Tapping instilled my love blondes with short hair and God bless her for it.

>>64066214 (OP)
Looking at it. Russian doctrine viewing war as a "science" rather than an "art" sounds very Soviet. The book really doesn't like their lack of NCOs. They have lost 3,000+ officers in the war because they lack NCO equivalents and the higher-ranking officers get closer to the front lines. This reminds me of Lev Rokhlin, a talented Russian general (Jewish in fact) who stepped in during the disastrous first Chechen war and reorganized the Russian forces from inside a burning building (he was later killed a few months after trying to stage a veterans' protest against the government).

There's a chapter on Russian intelligence. It reminded me of this story about how Russia had spent a couple million on these online influencers. It was a goofy amount of money for what they got out of it, and I saw people doubt whether it was even true because it didn't seem to make that much sense. This book talks about Russian recruitment of agents in Ukraine, but it makes sense now because the authors are like, Russian intelligence is actually kind of dumb and bad at its job, and also corrupt. They do recruit people who are just "in it for the money" and they don't get much out of those people, and the handlers themselves will pocket payoff money.

>>64067250
the reoccuring trend of bribed assets and double-agents is that they always do it for a weirdly small amount of cash. like that CIA head who turned on the US and got dozens of agents executed for like $5M

>>64066248
It's Burns, obviously.
>>64067324
I always thought it was kind of silly that Mayborne sold out to the trust for just $3M but now that you mention it I guess it makes sense.

>>64066214 (OP)
is it a coincidence that this thing looks EXACTLY like a miniature wargame rulebook?

>>64066974
Denise Crosby for me, embarrassingly enough. Short hair pilled at a young age, no chance.

>>64067250
>Looking at it. Russian doctrine viewing war as a "science" rather than an "art" sounds very Soviet
They love their rules. If you follow the rules, you're technically not doing anything wrong even if nothing goes right.
Army corps HQ drafts a plan based on the rules, the mission is given to the brigade, units get orders on paper signed by all the important people and everyone knows everything. The orders may be a week old and written by some drunk tards who thought the other platoon exists when it doesn't, but if you at least try to follow them you didn't do anything wrong, and you have a paper trail to prove it.

i made the mistake of reading it

mistake because its too long and i liked it
the points they make

1)russia has a fundamental view on technology and officer vs nato
their tech is simpler by design because of the way they fight
they rather lose trained (to those systems) officers that can quickly be replaced rather than having highly trained officers nato style being trained on over complicated systems that takes almost twice the manhours to teach to

2)they see russia losing 70% of their "old" officers from the field to the higher ups as a blessing for the russian army because it allowed for younger people to take the job and transform it into today's realities

3)as everybody expected the logistic system of russia hasnt changed doctrine at all since the early soviet times

4)they showed a very quick adaptability on the drone warfare to a point that they are now the ones innovating on this front

>>64067250
>Russia spent money
>through multiple proxies
>didn't do anything
I remember liberals saying that this was active treason lamo.

>>64066214 (OP)
Based Troika fans

>>64067476
The use of maps with byzantine complexity is another interesting thing. They come across like the KMT always does in Chinese war movies where it's a trope for them to have a BIG MAP while Mao and the other Chinese communists would have a hastily drawn map on the back of a napkin.

>>64066214 (OP)
dude
>Corruption is so entrenched that the guilty and the public talk about it as if it were acceptable, as long as it is not too “extravagant.” For example, in the wake of PMC Wagner Chief Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny, Rosgvardiya Director (and former Putin personal bodyguard) GEN Viktor Zolotov said in a televised interview that he gave his wife his “go-bag” of money, documents, and other items in case she needed to flee Moscow and, we presume, Russia. He added that his troops also gave their “stashes of money” to their wives, joking that his troops later regretted this.

>It is difficult to imagine a parallel situation in which a U.S. or Allied four-star commander responsible for the security of the government bragged that he had prepared his wife to flee the country.
L'MAO ZEDONG

>>64066214 (OP)
>tfw doesn't make mention to spicier buck breaking moments like that vidya of some mobnik getting spitroasted in an alley or something

>According to a pro-Ukraine military blogger, enlisted soldiers in Russia’s 4th Guards Tank Division, one of the “elite” units that marches in the Victory Day parade each year, filmed a disciplinary action and posted the clip to Russian social media. An officer had five soldiers stripped naked and beaten with truncheons, in front of a battalion-sized formation.

>The naked soldiers were then forced to pluck the grass by hand in front of what appeared to be a battalion headquarters. 27

>Russia’s enlisted have served under the threat of beatings and abuse for decades. It is so prevalent that the Russians have a special word for it: “dedovshchina,” which means “reign of the grandfathers.” The grandfathers” in this case are more senior soldiers. In the war, those beatings are often seen as “necessary” disciplinary measures by commanders.

They have to be making this shit up. There's no way they can be this comically inept and fucked up.
Why the fuck do we consider them a near peer military force again?

>>64066230
I wonder how in-universe the Russo-Ukraine war is being handled since Russia is a main member of Stargate Command and I think Ukraine has personnel on Atlantis. I don’t think the other member nations would be keen on having a Daedalus equipped Russia going full retard on Earth.

>>64066974
>>64067377
Same but for me it was Abby from Primeval, the cards were stacked against us from the beginning.

>>64069574

The Soviet Union had a lot of bodies and a lot of hardware to throw into a fight. When the wall fell, Russia snatched up the Soviet mantle and tries to act like it still has the manpower and industrial capabilities of the countries it no longer officially controls.They still have considerable amounts of hardware, are willing to scrape up anything they can get their hands on, knock together whatever they need in a cave with a box of scraps, and proved that they'll keep throwing bodies at a problem until Putin gets what he wants.

>>64069574
Some parts of it was just the immense stockpile and Russkie willingness to make people die. An inept but massive force can still kill a lot of people and be a massive fucking headache.

>>64069479
Wagner's mutiny was extremely kino, and a true revelation on what holds the entirety of the executive branch together, and this isn't law or procedure or duty or even money - it's solely Putin being alive and in control of the FSB. Take any of those two things out, and the whole structure will turn to infighting/fleeing with money/racket the very MINUTE they confirm the news.

We're looking at instant fragmentation on a level of chinese civil war, and it might last just about as long

>>64069948
that's by design, so there's not any one figure prominent enough to get ideas about taking the throne before he's dead

>>64069948
I goes deeper than simple control of the FSB
Putin is the only political institution in russia that any perceives as having legitimacy
The courts, the laws, the cops standing around on the street, everything that has authority in russia has that authority solely because they are given it by the will of Putin
When he dies there is going to be absolute chaos on fundamental, philosophical level within russia - they very concept of government may disappear for a while from the minds of the russian people
I can't even begin to imagine what that will actually look like but I am very excited to find out

can the DoD please embrace normal graphic design for once

>>64067991
>they see russia losing 70% of their "old" officers from the field to the higher ups as a blessing for the russian army because it allowed for younger people to take the job and transform it into today's realities

>they showed a very quick adaptability on the drone warfare to a point that they are now the ones innovating on this front

It kinda worked then? In their own grim and coldly calculating way they definitely have adapted at this point in the war.

>>64066214 (OP)
I’m not going to read it because everything that Russia has done has been absolutely retarded
They started Ukraine by fighting like NATO, sent the VDV into a deathtrap, then let all of their mobile SHORAD get entrenched while losing all of their operations’ kinetic energy and initiative
I will never not be mad about watching rickety, neglected Ka-52s being used like cobras in Vietnam, shot down by fucking Strelas 200 yards away
I’ll listen to Russia about combined arms the day I listen to china about naval supremacy, England about ethnocentricism, Germany about individualism, and Greece about economic strategy

>>64069981
whenever putin dies whoevers next has to pick up the pieces, and no matter how shrewd that person is it is going to take time to forge those personal connections. for that is how a dictatorship is built. and at the same time fend off others that want that same power.

>>64070085
Monke hasn't even named a successor and they have no clearly defined way to appoint a successor either. If they try voting, it'll end in infighting. If someone tries to claim the throne via force, it'll end in infighting.

>>64070091
I think monke hopes the inner circle will sort it out like the Politburo did after Stalin's death, with minimal assassinations (mark the least liked one as a new Beria, kill him, then have the rest keep things going).
Though I suspect there is a plan in place, for a regency of sorts with some spoiled vatniglet (ex. Patrushev's son) as puppet leader.

>>64069574
You have a normalization of competence which is atypical for the Global Majority and Global South. Check your privilege, Global Northerner.

>>64069479
>GEN Viktor Zolotov said in a televised interview that he gave his wife his “go-bag” of money, documents, and other items in case she needed to flee Moscow and, we presume, Russia
https://youtu.be/4r7wHMg5Yjg

>>64069574
Check out that Finn Int. officer who did a couple lectures on why and how Russia was such a fucked up country. This is a good example of the kind of culture he talks about >>64069479

>>64070274
those lecturers are from 2018, too

>>64070020
you are simply not enlightened enough

>>64070268
>Always look annoyed, never smile, never make eye contact, always rude
It's because of their fucked up culture. Making eye contact is a sign of aggression. Smiling is perceived as preceding an attempt to get ripped off. Always looking busy/being rude is intended to reduce the likelihood of scam/grift artists starting theri script/putting on their spiel.

>>64070351
They're like a more desperate and less obedient version of germans.

>>64066214 (OP)
Pdf repeats the ukrainian lie that vdv failed at hostomel airport, while by now we know it was tactical and operational success and russians held the airport until their retreat from northern ukraine, as researched by thorkill65 on x. Since they base their report on flawed data and propaganda, their whole assessment in worthless.

>>64066214 (OP)
i wonder if they still make me these 90s/2000s vests. I should pick one up

>>64066214 (OP)
>Despite drastic improvements in Russian operational and tactical fires described below and in the Fires Chapter, Russian “Fire and Maneuver” remained uncoordinated—better described as “Fire, then Maneuver.” It is a recurring characteristic of Russia’s way of war.

>>64066214 (OP)
>In some cases, even generals have had to move to the front lines to reinforce the lieutenants in their duties. This exposed them to direct fire and increased casualty rates. For example, on 5 June 2022, GEN-MAJ Roman Kutuzov, the Commander of 1st Army Corps, was killed in action at Mykolaivka. Reportedly, Kutuzov went forward in person to lead an assault, intending to rally and inspire his soldiers who were refusing to attack. His remains were recovered by Ukrainian forces when they counterattacked south. In the early days of the war, there were many such cases. 25

>Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu told an interviewer before the war that the reason Russia would not create a professional NCO Corps was because it was too expensive. It turned out that not creating an NCO Corps has been expensive too.

>It turned out that not creating an NCO Corps has been expensive too.

>>64066214 (OP)
>Russia’s reserve system was unprepared to fill the personnel vacancies. The existing system was a paper list of former conscripts and officers who had served their required military service sometime in the past. With a few exceptions, these veterans had none of the organization, periodic training, or equipment normally associated with American or Western military reserve components.

>>64066214 (OP)
>In the early stage of Russia’s Special Military Operation, there were many examples of poor direction by Russian commanders and staffs. Some Russian units famously deployed into Ukraine not knowing their destination or even that a war had started. Senior commanders were afraid of operational leaks.
>After the first days of fighting, units of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army, not receiving orders or direction, abandoned their equipment and simply walked home.

>>64067991
>they use old meatwaves strategy but dont give a shit
>SO COOL!
>>64070049
>russia isnt losing, its in fact winning then

very subtle, Ivan

>>64069574
their shit can still wreck you, which is why.

if they unfuck themselves socially, then they'd be the threat many governments would think they are.

>>64070433
>if they unfuck themselves socially
Can't happen before at least 3/4 generations, because this war's generation will be fucked up and their children will be corrupt as a result.

>>64070433
they wont though.

>>64066214 (OP)
>Avdiivka was very expensive for the Russian military. All the units that fought on the Russian side were from the Ground Forces, not from a PMC (like at Bakhmut) or any other proxies, not even from the VDV or Naval Infantry. Many of the losses were incurred by Russia’s most sparsely populated military district from Siberia, the Central Military District (CEMD), which already had challenges manning units locally. For that reason, CEMD’s newest operational unit, 25th CAA (created in 2023), was manned mostly from Russia’s Far East and its Eastern Military District. Although RF GF 2nd GCAA, 41st GCAA, and 1st Army Corps each initially used Storm-Z and Storm-V convict detachments, those formations were soon exhausted. By January 2024, the resupply of prisoners could not keep up with Russian casualty rates and troop movements.
>Convicts instead were then used as individual replacements, but even that supply could not keep up with Russian losses.

>>64066214 (OP)
>On 16 February 2024, someone, probably inside the Russian military medical system at Avdiivka, sounded the alarm through a well-known VKontakte (Russian version of Facebook) site:

>“...what is happening in Avdiivka is without limits and beyond understanding. In recent days, the losses were more than 1,300 KIA and thousands of WIA [per day], and many WIAs will not live until the next morning. They simply will not receive timely medical care.”

>>64069981
What's wrong with Medvedev? He's become a practical 1/1 for Putin in policy.

>>64070456
Medvedev was disgraced during his tenure as a puppet PM because he got too friendly (from Russian POV) with western powers. Now he's an alcoholic propaganda attack dog.

>>64068037
It is a shame they weren‘t more successfull and got fucked as they did.

>>64070564
Such is the fate of all good games/studios.
If you follow the Troika devs they're responsible for pretty much everything good from the silver age of PC RPGs.

>>64069948
I'm still salty that we didn't get to live in the kino timeline where a mercenary company took over Russia.

>>64070049
I don’t understand this logic
1. Officers dying had institutional knowledge from years of working in army, the guy who replaces them doesn’t have it and will need time to learn on the field that will cost lives
2. Officers replacing dead officers don’t magically have lower chance of dying, since they have to fill same roles those dead were fulfilling. For example famous VDV brigade went through three commanders in less than a years because they were kept dying
3. This 50 year old guy contributed more to drone development than all those Russian officers
It’s like Russian chose the worst possible way to get to finish line but because the second army in the world can get to finish line they get praised

>>64070049
Also forgot another important point. Since officers get replaced by dying it means if you have fucking retard in charge of training or high command sitting so far away they have 0% chance of dying, none of those new officers are replacing them

>>64067361
This new T2K supplement is crazy

>>64070573
Will look deeper into it. Admittedly I am a Bloodlines plebeian.

>>64070682
Russians don't have logic, they just enjoy seeing others in pain or dying, including their own.

>>64067476
>>64067250
The "science approach" was dictated by the regime's desire for the "replaceability" of cadre, i.e. the generals might need to be shot tomorrow if the regime deems them a threat, so people who get their positions need to be efficient without having experience, i.e. just follow the rules, principles, formulas, etc.

>>64069574
>Why the fuck do we consider them a near peer military force again?
Because they are okay with piling millions of bodied at the issue, while murricans get buckbroken by 60K lost in Vietnam

>>64070091
>Monke hasn't even named a successor
That's by design. The moment there is a successor, monke is couped by others. A palace coup is a typical russian shit since czarist times.

>they have no clearly defined way to appoint a successor either
There is, a sitting president appoints a replacement (who'd guarantee his personal security) and stands down, just like Yeltsin appointed monke in the first place.

>>64070682
>For example famous VDV brigade went through three commanders in less than a years because they were kept dying
>VDV

Someone post the screenshot of a pol user saying paratroopers are supposed to die in combat. They are not supposed to come back alive.

>>64070091
ah i remember how quickly the us media grabbed navanly and kept promoting him as a democratic leader

up untill the people found out he was basicly a neonazi and his views were even worse of putin

>>64070350
Same energy

>>64070113
>I think monke hopes
Monke doesn't care. Once he is gone, that is someone else's problem.
inb4 Uncle Luka

>>64070412
>>It turned out that not creating an NCO Corps has been expensive too.

The problem is not Russia lacking an NCO corps, its the general low quality of the men, the christ-communist equality myth and the disdain for academia and original thought common among christ-communist infected societies. The reason America uses an NCO corps is because the american army was patterend on the british, and the british had a two tier officer system where the commanding officers were nobility that bought their commissions (meaning that they were utterly incompetent peacocks) and the officers actually running the entire formation were non commissioned plebians that could never become officers because they weren't from the proper families.

In America this has mutated so that the officer class is recruited from politically reliable men who have been properly indoctrinated in marxism and american exceptionality, and the nco class consists of enlisted kapos tard wrangling the enlisted who are recruited from the dregs of society. The actual competence of running the formation is among the ncos, but they are not politically reliable because they are recruited from the ranks of the enlisted.

This "Russia loses because it lacks NCOs" is a popular myth stemming from a mix of taylorism and communism. The idea is that the individual quality of the soldier does not matter, only the process matter. This is a similar idea to the idea that you can insource pajeets and save money on software developement because the programmer does not matter, only the process of making a software suite.

>>64066214 (OP)
Why does the publication look like a game manual from '99?

>>64070682
>1. Officers dying had institutional knowledge from years of working in army, the guy who replaces them doesn’t have it and will need time to learn on the field that will cost lives

When you are dealing with someone who has wrong knowledge (that is, he is desinformed and therefore incompetent) it is far faster to fire him and replace him with someone who is untrained (and thus not mentally misprogrammed) and train him than to deprogram him and reprogram him. It is also generally impossible to deprogram and reprogram adults. See the fudd phenomen for a practical example.

>>64070375
they just need Ordnung.

>>64070020
But how should the MBA officers in charge and MIC stooges understand anything?

>>64069582
>I wonder how in-universe the Russo-Ukraine war is being handled
Stargate is explicitly alternative universe, clearly splitting off with, well, with the discovery of the stargate in the first place, but then obviously tons of history retcon and "the truth was hidden" shit too. But there was a period in the 90s where it's quite easily imaginable our own history could have radically diverged in a few key moments too with the election of different presidents or whatever. I don't think the path things have followed to this point has any in-universe implications or was inevitable in the slightest.

>american army report says that russia is incompetent and losing
Hello)))) I am Ivan McIvanovichnowski from Moscow state and I am very demoralized.

I mean I totally believe that the ivans are incompetent fucks, but come you guys, this is 100% biased.
I wish there were some actually objective report, but I don't think it can come from the US and not while this thing is still going on.

>>64070771
That's the other side of it. The regime gets people who are supposed to follow the doctrine predictably, and the people feel safe following the doctrine predictably, even if the results suck. They're not supposed to try any harder than that.
Well, if the results suck unusually bad, they'll find some way to make the guy into a scapegoat and send them to a camp in Siberia where they die of some combination of TB, HIV and Hep C, but anyways.

>>64070682
they were old fucks that couldnt adapt to what was coming

how much simpler we can put it
they saw drones and say more artilery
and russia was losing their artilery so much to a point that they turned their t55s into makeshit ones

>Many adaptations seem counterintuitive or incomprehensible to U.S. observers, because they are Russian solutions, and the Russians are different. Nonetheless, they are adaptations.
wow

>>64069574
I want you to picture a drunken, human-sized Poison Dart Frog. While this frog is hilariously flailing around from its inebriation and how a frog's body wasn't meant to be scaled up to 1.5 meters long, the fact is that it is still dripping in deadly poison. You shoot it, and you splatter poison blood on the walls and then it leaks that shit on the floor. You stab it, same deal, except now you're one wrong step away from being covered in poison. You try to trap it somewhere, it'll eventually sober up and now it can hop around and fight back. You do nothing to it, it'll shamble off somewhere wet and leak poison into your local water supply.

Now imagine if this drunk frog was a country. That country is Russia.

>>64067361
Can't unsee it. Character creation isn',t all in the 3.5 srd, though.

>>64070394
Can we speak with one of these escaped VDVs?

>>64070268
Has nobody told these broads that following 2000s beauty standards while wearing string bikinis designed for 2020s beauty standards just makes them look like crack whores?
Does nobody manufacture 2000s style slutty beach attire that pairs well with skinny thighs and visible ribcages?

>>64071965
Easily.

>>64070919
wat

>>64070424
Have you even read it?

>>64068037
I used to work in a woodshop that had equipment from the company where that graphic originates.

>>64071099
This whole post reads out like a frustrated ruski who cant comprehend an all-volunteer force in anything but in a Russian Bourgeoisie/Proletariat mindset

>>64071099
What a dogshit post. What the fuck are you even trying to say?

>>64071241
Russia is incompetent, and is losing, and objective reality supports this.

>>64071615
Russian young junior officers are more likely to die than old farts sitting on high chairs. Since they have no NCO those officers have to get as close to danger as possible and die.
After skimming Wikipedia for list of Russian generals. Russia appointed TWO new generals since start of the war and both of them are old farts. So clearly there’s a ceiling how far new guys can grow

>>64070919
>up untill the people found out he was basicly a neonazi and his views were even worse of putin
I never once heard any MSM outlet mention his nationalism before or after the documentary on him was released.
Even stranger to me was that russian shills never mentioned this much and stuck to calling him a western sock-puppet.

>>64071105
>>64067361
other way round
miniature wargame rulebooks were based off army field manuals
possibly because many 80s wargamers had military backgrounds and were trying to play armchair general

why do you think they're often called "field manuals"?

>>64070351
>Making eye contact is a sign of aggression
as it was for most of humanity's past and still is in many Asian countries
even today, even in the West, men stil have a tendency not to make eye contact when talking, often with the excuse of "watching the game" / fishing / drinking

>>64070412
>many such cases
jej

>>64071099
The american army was based from a guy named steuben who turned the continental army from what was essentially a militia to a professional force

>>64070433
>if they unfuck themselves socially,
considering they already had a male population crisis left over from WWII, this war has only dug it deeper and ensured it WILL explode at a certain point.

>>64072391
So basically after this war you basically can't become an incel anymore.

>>64071099
>the british had a two tier officer system where the commanding officers were nobility that bought their commissions (meaning that they were utterly incompetent peacocks) and the officers actually running the entire formation were non commissioned plebians that could never become officers because they weren't from the proper families.
>the nco class consists of enlisted kapos tard wrangling the enlisted who are recruited from the dregs of society. The actual competence of running the formation is among the ncos, but they are not politically reliable because they are recruited from the ranks of the enlisted.
these are the only nuggets of truth in this post, you can ignore everything else.
>christ-communist
LMAO

>>64072413
Sorry bro, Those girls are already going to be claimed by Chinese micro cock.
But yes there was a reason why Gen-X incels bought Russian brides.

>>64072234
His "nationalism" was a diet version of trump's current day actual policies. But that was obama years so he was ahead of his time.

>>64066214 (OP)
the formatting is hopelessly amateurish. alignment is not even justified, for fuck's sake

>The Russian Armed Forces ended 2022 with some 8,500 fewer pieces of heavy equipment
lol this is a straight copypaste from Oryx. Unattributed.

>In November 2023, the Ukrainian Information Agency UNIAN reported that at least 3,070 Russian officers were confirmed killed in action since 24 February 2022. That number includes one GEN-LT (two-stars), five GEN-MAJs (one-star), 76 COLs, 181 LTCs
holy fuck

>Contrary to popular misconceptions in the West, GRU spetsnaz are not “special operations forces, SOF.” They are specialized infantry whose missions were traditionally limited to long-range reconnaissance and sabotage. Early in the SMO, some GRU spetsnaz units were pulled from their long-range reconnaissance missions and directed instead to defend
so Spetsnaz are actually more like... Paras? Rangers?

>During their air assault into Antonov Airport, the 31st Guards apparently landed only one battalion of their organic three. That battalion was reinforced with some non-MOD SOF which had a separate direct-action mission of its own nearby
Intriguing. I wonder what that was

>Assault objectives at modern airports with just one runway normally require at least four U.S.-sized airborne or air assault battalions
Interesting

>“reflexive control"
>pg 46
NECESSARY READING

>Operation Bakhmut Meatgrinder
jej
okay gonna stop here for now

the style is appalling, but this is fascinating stuff

>>64072457
>so Spetsnaz are actually more like... Paras? Rangers?

you have that backwards. they're like LRS

>>64072467
so who are Russias actual SOF equivalent?

>>64072467
they appear much more combat-oriented than LRS and they do direct-action as well

>>64072457
>That battalion was reinforced with some non-MOD SOF
Weird not to specify after spending time saying GRU Spetznaz aren't SOF

>>64072006
>"Hello, Hasbro? I think my Ouija board is broken. We contacted a spirit and now the board only says words related to gay anal sex. Could I get a replacement?"

>>64070433
>if they unfuck themselves socially
They're completely broken and domisticated, living by their own messed up worldview.

>>64072457
>I wonder what that was
Weren't there some firefights in Kyiv during the first few nights? Was it these guys or some other Russian saboteur team?

>>64072489
perhaps they mean Alpha and Vympel?

>>64072518
Zelensky claimed there were FSB assassin squads running around Kyiv during the invasion

>>64070351
>Smiling is perceived as preceding an attempt to get ripped off.
Right. Russians do the Cheshire cat smile, which usually doesn't bode well for whatever the cat is smiling at.

>>64072234
>I never once heard any MSM outlet mention his nationalism before or after the documentary on him was released.
Yeah. The Western media that covers Russia is pretty liberal and wouldn't like to mention that because their readers in the West tend to be libs who get nervous around nationalists.

>Even stranger to me was that russian shills never mentioned this much and stuck to calling him a western sock-puppet.
That's not so surprising. They don't want to bring any attention to ethnic tensions inside Russia. And, obviously, they'd rather Navalny be a Western puppet than patriot. Navalny actually didn't give many interviews to Western media (if any). He had a lot of courage and died in a Russian prison.

I was listening to an interview with a democratic-minded Russian guy (more of an artist, not that political really) who attended some Navalny marches, and he was asked about the nationalists. Like... what's up that. And he said, well, look the thing with the nationalists is that these people know how to fight the cops and organize a perimeter.

Russia isn't a country where people demonstrate that often. Historically it wasn't something people did unless they were prepared to shed blood. Now it looks like they've gone back to the Soviet pattern where they've crushed the opposition so completely that you get someone pulling out a sign and then immediately shoved into a van by the cops. The crazy Russian avant-garde artists have gone into exile. The girl in this was once asked if they could perform in Russia while the war is going on and she said "it's impossible" in total deadpan. That's a thing Western journalists allowed to travel in (certain) parts of the USSR would hear when asking people questions like "why don't you change X?"
https://youtu.be/mWGCZnVZxGI

>>64072518
>Weren't there some firefights in Kyiv during the first few nights?
also some famous footage of non-uniformed dudes ambushing random cars on a main road. It just so happened the dudes they ambushed were CNN iirc.

>>64072457
>“reflexive control"
>pg 46
>NECESSARY READING

>>64072549
a good article on it
https://granta.com/russia-verge-nervous-breakdown/
>The Russian people suffer from a victim complex: they believe that nothing depends on them, and by them nothing can be changed.
>A 140-million-strong population exists in a somnambulistic state, on the verge of losing the last trace of their survival instinct.
>All that remains for those ashamed of the present and afraid of the future is pride in the past. When there’s no reason to love your country, hate your neighbours. If you are unable to improve your life, ruin someone else’s.

>>64070919
>up untill the people found out he was basicly a neonazi and his views were even worse of putin
any example of that?

The Guardian is probably the wokest, farthest-left news agency in the West, and it still flies the Navalny flag high and doesn't appear to ever have attacked him
https://www.theguardian.com/world/alexei-navalny

they've criticised Ukraine more often for being "Nazi" (in 2014, and in 2022 in relation to Azov)

>>64072579
this describes a lot of americans too

>>64072608
The description might fit disillusioned people in general, but those people are not a nation-defining stereotype like they are in russia.

>>64072608
yeah it's useful as a warning as well

>>64072289
GMLRS officer sniping down to popping a few generals early on was amazing. Turns out having American ISR crawling all over the front at the start of 2022 along with a few minor HIMARS provided early kino with the Ukies going ham with them.

>>64067991

>they rather lose trained (to those systems) officers that can quickly be replaced rather than having highly trained officers nato style being trained on over complicated systems that takes almost twice the manhours to teach to
>2)they see russia losing 70% of their "old" officers from the field to the higher ups as a blessing for the russian army because it allowed for younger people to take the job and transform it into today's realities

I'll have to read this, i'm interested in how it affects how they interact with their allies. The Nork system is almost literally the exact opposite of this and is fundamentally incompatible.

>>64072720
>The Nork system
we have no idea what the Nork system really is

it's probably logical that the Norks sent to Russia were a handpicked force intended to gain modern combat experience so they can come back and train the Nork army. instead the Russians used them cavalierly as they do, which rather defeats the purpose

>>64070480
He had a choice between becoming an amusingly retarded alcoholic shiposter, or falling from a window.
Of course, given the massive difference between the Medvedev of 2010, and the Medvedev of today, I'd say Putin has managed to kill him, in spirit if not in body.

continuing

>It took weeks for the Russians to clear the minefields and other UAF obstacles and to get Russian vehicles into the city from the east and southeast. Consequently, during their evacuation of Avdiivka, the UAF had an unusual advantage because Ukrainian forces were still motorized and mechanized. The Russians were frustrated by their failure to trap and defeat the UAF’s mounted 3rd Assault Brigade, 110th Mech Brigade, and other Ukrainian commands in the city, but the Russians captured and secured Avdiivka for good, their strategic immediate objective
interesting

>strategic mobility [by rail]
interesting. not even RUSI highlighted this Russian capability

>DRG
>Sabotage Reconnaissance Group
>In March 2022 in Kyiv, Ukrainians captured several GRU Spetsnaz DRGs. One small group of arrested GRU Spetsnaz were captured in a privately owned vehicle (POV) wearing what looked like older Ukrainian uniforms. They had laser rangefinders and a large bag of zip ties for securing prisoners
lol

> In early October 2023, they began collecting information about the reburial of a deceased Ukrainian soldier in Hroza. The SBU claims that the older brother provided the address and time of the funeral in Hroza to the Russian military. The result was an RF ground forces (GF) Iskander-M attack on the funeral that killed at least 59 people, all civilians
you don't hate Russians enough

>The Ukrainians had data on the Russian pilots to blackmail them and arranged for the pilots to deliver the aircraft to Ukraine. The
RF FSB learned of the operation, arrested the pilots, and then posed as the RF VKS pilots. In the end, the FSB and RF AF successfully attacked the base where the aircraft were to be delivered with missiles, resulting in UAF KIA and destruction of UAF aircraft
well that answers some questions

>>64072608
Leftists are not Americans, they are not even people.
>>64072647
Obvious samefag.

>>64072289
>even today, even in the West, men stil have a tendency not to make eye contact when talking, often with the excuse of "watching the game" / fishing / drinking
What faggots do you hang out with?

>>64070480
Maybe he could be another Khrushchev and is just acting like a clown to make himself seem like less of a threat until the time comes to seize the throne for himself?

>>64072457
Spetsnaz is a catch all term like Special Forces is used colloquially in the West.

>>64072735
>we have no idea what the Nork system really is


Actually we do, at least how Officer training and selection is done. It isn't a bad system, in theory it is better than most but it has serious flaws if they were in a sustained attritional conflict.

Basically:
>Officers receive training and education roughly equal to what a NATO officer would get
>Officer candidates are REQUIRED to be exceptional enlisted near the end of a VOLUNTARY term of service
>Typically if you become a candidate the end of your term sees you rotated through each company NCO position
>3-4 years Officer school
>You are now a 30-32 year old Lt

The obvious issue is that including Youth Guard training it takes 15 years to make a junior Officer. They have a mandatory Reserve Branch for Officers and NCOs who aren't in active service as a pool in case they need to reinforce quickly but there is no real way to get around the replacement time issue.

The system would never work in a western nation; it simply takes too long and you would never have enough Officers to fill out the ranks but it isn't necessarily a bad system. However with their way you probably know that the new Lt has a pretty good idea of what he is doing.

The age issue is almost required by their culture, no one is listening to a inexperienced guy in his early 20s.

>>64072475
>>64072457
>>64072482
Spetsnaz usually means Special Purpose, so not all Spetsnaz or Osnaz is SOF equivalent, but General Staff spetsnaz teams rate for SOF simply because they have remit to perform special operations abroad for the benefit of intelligence and on direct orders of Russian military high command. General Staff teams though are mostly limited to military-related matters, as FSB and SVR hold grasp on foreign intelligence of other types.

The MOD has a more advanced SOF unit known as SSO Kubinka.

The authors likely got themselves confused by assuming that special recon teams within certain army formations are General Staff units. These special recon teams are akin to US Marines Force Recon and act for the benefit of their immediate military formation.

Wagner PMC used to have a training camp adjacent to a General Staff unit.

>>64072579
The consistent suggestion that Ukrainian conflict has no political reasoning and only continues due to belief that a Russian's mental state is deeply altered is the biggest obstacle to truly understanding what's going down in that region.

In 10 years, we might not actually have any reliable accounts of the Russo-Ukrainian war due to this phenomena.

Even the afghanis received a more empathetic treatment, despite the fact that US troops watched their allied forces rape children and deal heroin inbetween shooting them in the back and selling them out to Taliban.

>>64072234
Tbf, it's more like it was an inconvenient side of him that cooled off the MSM for a bit, his stance on Crimea was what put western media on alert and what caused it to tone down the narrative about him a little bit

>>64072914
>>64072234
>>64070919
They just passed a law allowing Belarusians to vote and run in Russian elections, Potato Czar is a legitimate option to replace Putin at this point. He wouldn't be a bad choice given other options or the lack of other options. He seems mildly competent as ex Soviet Dictators go and isn't a war monger, the man just wants to grow spuds and get his damn promotion.

>>64072962
Didn't read.

Why is the army doing this and not the marines? They don't care about land wars anymore?

>>64072971
Yes you did.

I can feel the glavset butthurt trying to bury critique of Russia. Truly having Chinese-like face culture is an amazing societal and cultural cancer.

>>64066214 (OP)
>>64069948
The RF Southern Group of Forces in 2022 and RF Central Group of Forces in 2024 demonstrated that the RF AF could conduct maneuver warfare at the strategic and operational scale, although not uniformly and not without limitations. In the first 3 years of the Special Military Operation, the RF AF in Ukraine were never able to synchronize fire and maneuver. Even at the RF AF’s best warfighting moments it was “Fire. Then maneuver.”
>PMC Wagner, on the other hand, had demonstrated fire and maneuver at the tactical scale continuously from mid-2022 to mid-2023 in a complex urban environment. So, Russians can conduct fire and maneuver, but not the armed forces.
>The chef got purged
>Meatwaves got more retarded
Amazing

>>64066214 (OP)
>>64069948
>The RF Southern Group of Forces in 2022 and RF Central Group of Forces in 2024 demonstrated that the RF AF could conduct maneuver warfare at the strategic and operational scale, although not uniformly and not without limitations. In the first 3 years of the Special Military Operation, the RF AF in Ukraine were never able to synchronize fire and maneuver. Even at the RF AF’s best warfighting moments it was “Fire. Then maneuver.”
>PMC Wagner, on the other hand, had demonstrated fire and maneuver at the tactical scale continuously from mid-2022 to mid-2023 in a complex urban environment. So, Russians can conduct fire and maneuver, but not the armed forces.
>The chef got purged
>Meatwaves got more retarded
Amazing

>>64072577
pretty great ruse by ukraine. unfortunately not sure how applicable that play is today, at the time russia was at a severe manpower disadvantage.

>>64072962
>AI anime slop of an already good meme image in circulation
You should kill yourself.
>>64073005
He didn't and neither did I.
>>64072971
I love how any graphs about India are colored brown.

>>64073183
Naw, you read it. (You) even effort posted over a silly image.

>>64072579
>granta.com
There's another article in that magazine about drones I read the other day that mentioned some of the ones Ukraine is using can be piloted from the U.S.

>Holding up a fat cable, Patifon said: ‘This thing will allow you to operate a drone here even as far away as the USA. You have a LAN [local area network] connection and a transmitter located here. Another one we connect in the USA. We need good internet and that is it. This transforms protocols.’

>He got up and led me to another part of the room. ‘Let me show you the bomb we use for our land drone. It is seventy-eight kilograms of cumulative explosive. If it goes off at a distance of eight meters from a tank, the tank completely loses its engine.’

>‘This is something you made?’

>‘Yes. But the bomb is a separate, standard device; I just attached it to a land drone. It was originally designed to explode bridges and concrete constructions.’

>‘Suppose you stay in this house for a little while and Russians start to suspect something? You must be moving from place to place every week.’

>‘We used to move more often in Donbas. Here we do it less. If you want, I can give you my phone number and you can be the first to shoot my machine-gun drone from the USA.’
https://granta.com/drones-and-decolonization-vollmann/

>>64070433
>economy smaller than Italy
Lmao

>>64072457
>the style is appalling, but this is fascinating stuff
classic DoD presentation

>While Ukraine demonstrated excellent planning and OPSEC for its August 2024 invasion of Kursk Oblast, Russia probably suffered from similar predispositions that caused it to dismiss Ukraine’s capabilities and intent at the start of the SMO. Perhaps based on steady Russian gains in the Donbas, Russia likely did not allocate adequate collection assets elsewhere. Russia may have simply believed that it had all of Ukraine’s ground forces pinned down. Additionally, the fact that Russia had apparently lost track of a number of Ukrainian brigades probably underscores some fundamental issues with Russian HUMINT and intelligence analysis (addressed later in this chapter).6 Another issue that may have contributed to this is Russia’s apparent lack of overhead imagery capability.
Boy they sure miss those Baseduzes with cameras put inside of them they use for satellite recon don't they?

>>64066214 (OP)
>One of the key HUMINT efforts was the recruitment of informants throughout Ukraine. Russian GRU and FSB agents infiltrate Ukraine with the mission to recruit informants who will report on Ukrainian troop activity and other targets of military value (to Russia, purely civilian targets can have military value). To do this, Russian agents are provided funds to pay Ukrainian informants and spotters. While Russia did manage to recruit some informants and spotters, this effort did not have the dramatic effect that Russia hoped it would. Some of this diminished effect is due to Ukraine’s success in rooting out these informants, but most of this is probably due to systemic corrupt behavior of Russian handlers and recruiters, as well as the informants and spotters who were “just in it for the money.”
>Like attracts like

>>64074687
>During the first several months of the SMO, the Mykolaiv area of Ukraine was frequently attacked by RF missiles and artillery. To facilitate these attacks, RF forces employed Ukrainian civilians to act as “spotters” to reveal Ukrainian units and other military locations. To recruit spotters, the Russians advertised on Telegram promising potential spotters’ anonymity and payments of about 1,000 to 1,500 Ukrainian hryvnias ($27 to $40) for the information. Considering Russia’s then- generally poor intelligence and targeting performance, it appears that RF AF did not seek to verify or corroborate this targeting information. 20 This also indicates that the spotters were either just in it for the money, or simply not very good at accurately reporting locations.
>Take the money and give bullshit coordinates

>>64074687
>Even though Russian agents managed to recruit informants throughout Ukraine, Russia lacked a clear picture about the attitude of the Ukrainian people and their will to resist. This is partly due to corruption among FSB and GRU recruiters and handlers. The Russian practice of providing payoff funding to agents required the handler to report the successful recruitment of an informant and how much the agent paid to the informant. Despite the reported recruitment of several willing Ukrainian saboteurs, what was happening in many cases, was that the handler filed a false recruitment report and pocketed the payoff money. In other cases, it is likely that the quality of informants was questionable (from a Russian perspective). Some informants probably were not true supporters of Russia (in it “just for the money”). Also, there was likely difficulty recruiting enough informants capable of accurately reporting information.

>Underscoring this, in Russia’s zero-defects leadership culture, there is huge pressure to report that everything is going “according to plan.” Therefore, even if one lacks confidence in intelligence information, or doubts that collection assets are capable of accurate reporting, there is pressure to report what one’s superior wants to hear. If the boss wants the intelligence picture to be of a Ukraine likely to capitulate quickly, that is what is briefed to the boss—whether intelligence indicates it is true or not. The layers of this corrupted leadership culture produce a weak HUMINT capability that relies on a network of less than ideal, or even nonexistent, informants.

>report what one’s superior wants to hear.
Truly a member of the thirdie multipolar global south.

>>64066214 (OP)
lmao they literally project for their humint too:
>Numerous incidences of erroneous targeting are likely, at least in part, attributable to bad HUMINT. This causes RF AF to target based on templating and incorrect assumptions. Often these assumptions betray mirror imaging (assuming the enemy behaves like you). In a typical example of this, in early June 2022, Russia attacked the Darnitsky railcar repair facility in Kyiv with a cruise missile. The RF Ministry of Defense (MOD) claimed that the facility was a warehouse for T-72 tanks supplied by the West. Video later showed no tanks or other military equipment at the ruined facility. RF AF were desperately targeting any railroad warehouse facilities to interdict Western- provided military equipment as it was delivered to Ukraine. Due to mirror imaging, Russians supposed that Ukrainian forces would move military equipment almost exclusively by rail, like the RF AF would. This reliance on templating highlights poor Russian HUMINT collection.

>>64072856
First line is immediately your headcanon, fuck sake norktard groelw the fuck up

>>64066214 (OP)
>In early August 2023, when UAF SOF crossed the Dnipro River to establish a bridgehead at Kozachi Laheri, they captured MAJ Yuri Tomov, the 47-year-old Commander of the RF GF 1822nd Motorized Rifle Battalion. In an interrogation, it was clear that MAJ Tomov had never received any type of counterintelligence training in case of capture. During the interrogation, MAJ Tomov gave a candid and somewhat detailed description of his mobilized separate motorized rifle battalion.75 Training in general is often an afterthought for the RF AF. Therefore, it is not too surprising that counterintelligence training for line units would also be an afterthought.
I guess if they expect that their men are expendable there's no problem with them ever being captured if they're probably going to die anyways.

Here's one of the few points I'll give to these degen gulaghomo losers:
>As an earlier example, in January 2024, a RF GF AAG accurately tracked two HIMARS launchers to their launch points, but the only available Tornado-S ammunition was dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) rather than high explosive (HE). Ultimately, the attack damaged but did not destroy the launchers.1 That deficiency was overcome within 2 months by making a network of Iskander-Ms available as part of the AAGs’ delivery options. This solution went against the RF GF longstanding practice of reserving Iskander-Ms for targets outside the AAGs’ remit, even though the Iskander-M, surface-to-surface missile brigades are organic to RF GF armies (CAAs and 1st GTA). Previously, Iskander-M command authorities were retained at higher command levels, such as RF Joint Group of Forces or the General Staff.
I haven't seen HIMARS losses beyond the one from an earlier video but the loss floor is 1 from the one case where it was stationary and the Ukrainians reacted to it. Wonder if the damaged ones mentioned were the ones being loaded to be shipped back to refurb with those photos.

So it takes them close to 2 years to do some major reforms against their shit culture:
>For example, windy conditions on one site left Russians believing that static personnel decoys were, in fact, dynamic. The Russians also fine-tuned their ever- improving pre-attack target analysis. Russians in fact used the HIMARS decoy incident described above as a “lessons learned” event and posted footage and an explanation of the failed attack online to warn others. Earlier in the SMO, RF AF instead would have very likely deleted all mentions and videos of the decoy event and just moved on to the next target.
>xaxaxaxaxaxa 900 himars destroyed
Transitions into
>we are fighting the full force of hato nazi deception
Before they actually approach something close to a civilized country

tl;dr: Their artillery and air force actually can reform. Dunno about the rest of it (say nothing about their damned navy):
>The 12 April 2024 mission was interesting because the radar was attacked by a Kh-35U, but nearby S-300 launchers were attacked by a RF GF ballistic missile. While the exact munition used against the launchers was not discussed, it was likely a 300-mm Tornado-S missile, or possibly an Iskander-M. Two days later, on 14 April 2024, the RF MOD published UAV footage of a Kh-35U air-launched cruise missile destroying a UAF IRIS-T’s TRML-4D radar, while a RF GF Iskander-M attacked the IRIS-T’s launchers. 2

>After some debate about whether these UAF targets were decoys, the attack on the radar was ultimately assessed to be a direct hit on an actual system, because it burned in a manner that would be uncharacteristic for a decoy. The launcher, which did not receive a direct hit, did not detonate, and Russians assessed that the IRIS-T missiles themselves were shielded by their cannisters.
Can't SNEED* so they just brute force it with the ubiquitous recon UAV spam among other ISR means and dragnet in targets of opportunity.

*
>SEAD is not a Russian concept and therefore has not normally been central to their operations. In contrast to the West, the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) were designed for long-range, standoff, air-launched cruise missile fires without integrating, let alone coordinating, counter-air defense fires between the Services. When Russians discuss SEAD, they are typically referencing it in terms of its application by the United States and our Allies at strategic levels and, in turn, how to defeat it. The omission of SEAD in Russia taktika aside, this proactive, coordinated approach to hunting SA-13 Strela-10s is noteworthy, especially at tactical- operational echelons. By May 2024, Russian successes resulted in RF AF tactical UAV dominance in many frontline areas along the 1,200-km LCC.

>>64066214 (OP)
Hard kill > Soft kill
>Counter-UAS EW is never a permanent solution. Due to countermeasures and radio frequency fratricide, EW is always temporary. RF Dnipro Group of Forces learned this lesson the hard way at UAF beachheads in southern Kherson Province. Like landmines and chemical weapons, EW is indiscriminate and affects friendlies as well as the enemy. To use EW against such a wide variety of enemy UAV threats often requires forfeiting friendly use of many commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) UAVs, navigation systems, and communications, most of which use the same parts of the UHF spectrum. There are also other EW workarounds such as airborne repeaters, target acquisition technologies, and encrypted signals that provide temporary solutions. Sometimes these are very local answers, specific to a particular situation.
1/2

>>64066214 (OP)
>>64074752
>A critical component of counter-UAV TTP is kinetic. To contend with the high quantity and wide range of Russian UAV threats, UAVs which can kill other UAVs are needed. Counter-UAV UAV operators must decipher and discriminate “whose UAVs are whose,” and need access to search systems which can rapidly target the next enemy UAV nearby. The skies over Ukrainian battlefields are crowded. As the UAF 3rd Assault Brigade Commander explained, there are sometimes constellations of up to 20 UAVs operating in different roles at different altitudes over both opposing sides. He described what sounds like swarms of bees that can be heard on videos from the front lines. UAV-on-UAV dogfights are already happening very crudely over battlefields in Ukraine. FPV and FPV-like UAVs from both sides sometimes hunt and ram one another. These dangerous endeavors frequently end in fratricide and losses of key systems. In the future, whichever side can use its purpose-built counter-UAV UAVs to clear out the enemy’s higher altitude observation and communications UAVs, lower altitude FPV-like UAVs, and loitering munitions, will have the advantage. UAV supremacy is already a key to tactical success.
2/2

>>64066214 (OP)
>(NOTE: The Russian concept of “joint“ is not like ours. The RF Armed Forces are a Ground Forces-dominated military and their application of “joint“ is more about what the RF Aerospace Forces and RF Navy can do to support the RF Ground Forces’ commands’ missions.)
>Forever land army thinking

>>64066214 (OP)
>The earlier version of the ZALA Lancet was underpowered and, because of that, underarmed. The Troika had seen at least a dozen photos of ZALA Lancets stuck in camouflage nets, or in chain-link or wire fencing placed over UAF artillery and other systems. The earlier version was also susceptible to tree branches that would knock them off course in their terminal descent. The earlier understrength warhead also had little to no effect on most armored systems. Sometimes it had poor effects even in direct hits on towed howitzers. If camouflage nets or fencing was several meters above the systems, the earlier ZALA Lancet’s detonation sometimes had a minimal effect, if it detonated at all.
kek there's that tiny demo charge mentioned

>>64066214 (OP)
>An improved ZALA Lancet foolishly attacked the front of a moving Leopard-2A6 from the side and merely damaged it, although the extent of damage was unknown. The crew was unhurt. Another ZALA Lancet attacked a moving M2 Bradley and hit the right, rear corner of the infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) and damaged it, but not to the point of being non-mission capable. The M2 Bradley’s turret was unharmed. The two damaged targets (the Leo-2 and M2) were probably operator errors, despite higher- altitude observation UAVs and perfect weather and terrain conditions. Both ZALA Lancets attacked the combat vehicles sides and were not aimed at vulnerable points on either UAF vehicle. Like the first ZALA Lancet described above, UAF terminal-attack UAVs almost always attack moving vehicles from the rear or the front.

>Despite better terminal-attack UAVs, it appears that the RF AF are still slow to share better TTPs and lessons learned across their force, whether from other Russians, the UAF, or others’ (such as PMC Wagner’s) successes. Institutional training remains an overall RF GF and VDV weakness.

>repeated mentions that the cook was more competent
jesus

>>64074765
>In a counter- insurgency role in Syria, from 2015 to 2022, RF AF artillery fired on an enemy which, for the most part, could not fight back and which lacked conventional artillery or any sort of reliable counterbattery capabilities. When Russian artillery left their FOBs in Syria, they were provided overwhelming protection by the Syrian Armed Forces and the Russian military which secured main supply routes (MSRs), artillery supply points, and firing positions in deserts that offered the insurgency little cover or concealment to conduct attacks on RF AF artillery. In Syria, there was no need to disperse howitzers, ammo, and C2, and no need for hide sites out of contact or convoy escorts. In February 2022, in some ways, the Russians even seemed to reconsider their need for artillery support. On 24 February 2022, the RF VDV 31st Guards Brigade, which for more than 2 years had repeatedly demonstrated its artillery sling-load techniques at howitzer-battalion scale, failed to even bring their D-30 howitzers on their strategically critical air assault into Antonov Airport at Hostomel. For most of the SMO’s first year, RF AF artillery repeatedly suffered badly from a Troika adage that: “Russian artillery only works when Russian logistics work.” That truth did not start in June 2022 with HIMARS/GMLRS attacks but rather in late February and March 2022, northwest and north of Kyiv, when clogged and vulnerable RF AF supply lines from Belarus toward Kyiv left RF GF and RF VDV artillery disconnected from ammo and trapped way behind their maneuver elements. RF GF and RF VDV unquestionably prefer mass fires at pre-planned area targets over precision. In the Kyiv phase, February and March 2022, Russian artillery failed because their logistics failed, and the Ukrainians played a key role. RF AF howitzer and rocket battalions sometimes wound up in direct fire contact with UAF SOF and other Ukrainian forces just trying to get closer to Kyiv.

>>64066214 (OP)
>In a counter- insurgency role in Syria, from 2015 to 2022, RF AF artillery fired on an enemy which, for the most part, could not fight back and which lacked conventional artillery or any sort of reliable counterbattery capabilities. When Russian artillery left their FOBs in Syria, they were provided overwhelming protection by the Syrian Armed Forces and the Russian military which secured main supply routes (MSRs), artillery supply points, and firing positions in deserts that offered the insurgency little cover or concealment to conduct attacks on RF AF artillery. In Syria, there was no need to disperse howitzers, ammo, and C2, and no need for hide sites out of contact or convoy escorts. In February 2022, in some ways, the Russians even seemed to reconsider their need for artillery support. On 24 February 2022, the RF VDV 31st Guards Brigade, which for more than 2 years had repeatedly demonstrated its artillery sling-load techniques at howitzer-battalion scale, failed to even bring their D-30 howitzers on their strategically critical air assault into Antonov Airport at Hostomel. For most of the SMO’s first year, RF AF artillery repeatedly suffered badly from a Troika adage that: “Russian artillery only works when Russian logistics work.” That truth did not start in June 2022 with HIMARS/GMLRS attacks but rather in late February and March 2022, northwest and north of Kyiv, when clogged and vulnerable RF AF supply lines from Belarus toward Kyiv left RF GF and RF VDV artillery disconnected from ammo and trapped way behind their maneuver elements. RF GF and RF VDV unquestionably prefer mass fires at pre-planned area targets over precision. In the Kyiv phase, February and March 2022, Russian artillery failed because their logistics failed, and the Ukrainians played a key role. RF AF howitzer and rocket battalions sometimes wound up in direct fire contact with UAF SOF and other Ukrainian forces just trying to get closer to Kyiv.

>>64066214 (OP)
>The Troika saw several other such videos from elsewhere in Ukraine of Russian artillery battalions’ former positions, all torn to shreds by UAF rounds mixed with Russian shrapnel from their own exploded ammo that was often stored with their cannons. The UAF defeated several other self-propelled battalions and batteries, as well as some rocket batteries. In late February and March 2022, RF GF artillery and MRL units usually moved and set up firing positions as battalions with batteries always near one another, usually within 400 meters. The Russians’ tight proximity between their howitzers and MRLs, as well as their “very dirty” positions with rounds, charges, and other propellants laying all over positions, were vulnerabilities that forced the Russians to immediately ungroup their artillery groups, which put added stress on Russian C2 and logistics.

>>64066214 (OP)
>It appears that just as the RF AF started to solve such problems, HIMARS/GMLRS created bigger ones. In early June 2022, Russian artillery was firing more than 6,000 rounds per day at four different battles (Paseki, Severodonetsk, Toshkivka, and Lysychansk), at least 60,000 rounds per day across Ukraine. Very soon, that was no longer supportable. The Russians had built large ammunition depots along railways as far forward as possible, just outside UAF artillery range. Those became early UAF HPTs for the new long-range fire capabilities of the U.S.-supplied HIMARS/ GMLRS.

>Russian logistics were so disrupted by July 2022 attacks on ammunition depots that RF GF started what they called “working from the wheels” which meant that they delivered ammunition directly to the guns and launchers at the front instead of stockpiling it in ammunition depots (like what the UAF was doing). Meanwhile, RF GF artillery fire missions dropped to their absolute lowest levels since late March 2022. Late July 2022 fire mission totals were so low that they were near parity, with Ukrainian artillery firing slightly more.

>The Russians could not foresee the full effect of HIMARS/GMLRS and the later introductions of Storm Shadow, SCALP, and ATACMS. Initially, UAF long-range fires gravely affected RF AF artillery logistics, and then C2. Once enough of those targets had either been attacked or moved back out of range, the UAF started targeting RF AF artillery batteries. After 2022, in Russian social and mass media, as well as Ukrainian UAV footage, the Troika never again saw more than two Russian firing systems near each other. Usually, it was just a lone individual firing asset networked by radio and later digital systems back to their FDC and other C2.

>>64066214 (OP)
>The Russians do not practice “just in time logistics.” When it came to artillery positions, the RF GF artillery units typically placed their guns and missile systems close together and kept large supplies of artillery ammunition near the delivery systems. This facilitated UAF successes early on in targeting these “mountains of steel” with indirect fire systems. 21

>>64066214 (OP)
>Most Russian supplies, including ammunition, are not palletized. There are very few front-end loader and forklift operations. Most work unloading trains, loading trucks, and stockpiling material is all done by hand. After initial RF AF logistical problems in February and March 2022, the RF AF started efforts to better man logistical sites inside Russia using conscripts who, by law, cannot serve in Ukraine without a declaration of war or general mobilization.

>>64066214 (OP)
>SAM duel
>As President Putin announced at the beginning of Russia’s 2022 invasion in a televised speech, the Russian military launched a massive missile attack that struck Ukrainian cities from Lviv in the west to Odesa in the south and throughout the country. Observers expected that Russian air forces would quickly dominate the sky over Ukraine, destroying Ukrainian aviation and suppressing Ukrainian air defenses. Russia, however, failed in those two tasks. As a result, the war has taken unexpected turns in the air, on the sea, and on the ground. One of the unexpected outcomes is an historic first: battles directly between air defense units—Ukrainian S-300 anti- missile units shooting down Russian S-300/S-400 missiles launched against them in the ground mode. Ukraine is also firing S-300 and S-200 missiles at Russian ground targets.

>>64066214 (OP)
>In the system, most logistics assets are maintained at higher unit levels. It is also a “pushdown” system of sustainment, where the higher unit determines the priority of supplies and services and its delivery to the lower unit. There is no “requisition and receive” in Russian logistics, but rather algorithms are used to determine requirements, and logistics support packages are pushed down based on the outcome of those calculations. The system emphasizes repair and resupply as far forward as possible and like other Russian military structures, it is not very robust, operating on the principle of “just enough to get the job done.” The emphasis on “shooters over sustainers” results in much smaller logistics support elements than one would typically see in a Western military and an increased responsibility on the maneuver unit commander to “be creative” in supply and maintenance operations.

>>64066214 (OP)
>Russia was always a spiritual Europoor with Mongolian barbarianism combined together
>The Russian Armed Forces is also a “European Army” in the sense that unit garrisons are small, with typically only small arms ranges and a driver training course and no large maneuver or range areas. Unit garrisons are located near railheads, and Russian soldiers and their equipment are loaded onto trains and travel to larger training areas to conduct gunnery and other larger maneuver training and exercises. Because of this heavy reliance on rail, convoy operations—especially over large distances—are rarely practiced or used as a primary means of resupply. The structure is also woefully lacking in Heavy Equipment Transport Trucks (HETs) to transport tanks and other heavy equipment.
All their bitching about Nazis they sure are like them when it comes to shit logistics

>>64066214 (OP)
>Finally, like other Russian military structures and Russian society in general, corruption is prevalent throughout the Russian logistics system and affects Russia’s ability to effectively sustain its forces. Fuel is considered the number one pilfered supply. Other significant areas of logistics corruption include the provisioning of food, uniforms, and equipment for Russian soldiers, major end items. This also includes the outsourcing of many maintenance functions to private companies in the years after the “New Look” reforms were implemented.

>>64066214 (OP)
>One of the first painful lessons the RF AF learned early on about operating with forward-based logistics occurred at the Kherson Airport in Chornobaivka, where the RF AF established a forward logistics hub from Crimea. The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) repeatedly struck the logistics hub, destroying equipment and supplies to the point that the RF AF had to abandon the location.
He who holds the Piss Key controls the Choronosphere.

>>64074871
>The logistics hub was regularly shelled by Ukrainian artillery in March 2022, with a total of 22 attacks reported on the location.
Should someone have reconsidered the viability of said logistics hub after it got shelled the first time? Or maybe after the second time?

>>64074885
See:
>>64074699
>Da cumrag generalski all is ok and fine no Kamov lost.

You now remember the Alien knockoff episode where the ruski commander says
>In Russia, casualties are expected
O'Neill and the show writers knew

>>64069574
Even the dumbest chimpanzee can still bite your balls off.

>>64070394
>VDV fails to hold the airport and gets annihalated.
>tactical and operational success
The fact later ground troops took it is hardly relevant to the failure of the airborne operation. Ziggers skip tha part nor do they know the meaning of 'tactical' vs 'operational'.

>until their retreat from northern ukrain
In other words, it was a complete failure and zero objectives were achieved.

>>64075055
Even if they had held it until reinforcements arrived, it wouldn't count as a victory since the purpose of capturing the airport was to use it as an airport.

>>64066214 (OP)
>As the Russian tank inventories continued to be depleted through losses on the battlefield, Russian logisticians continued to reach back further to older models from long-term storage facilities. Apparently, the T-62 tank was not the bottom of the barrel. Vintage Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks were also pulled from the 111th Central Tank Storage Facility in Khabarovsk Krai, in Russia’s Far East. This is one of the largest armored vehicle storage facilities in Russia, including for T-62M and T-54/55 tanks.

>Published “before and after” satellite images showed dozens of missing tanks, previously seen in the open space storage grounds. The Soviet T-54 tank was first produced in 1947, with the T-55 coming a decade later. They were very formidable tanks in the Korean War era, with up to 100,000 being produced by the USSR and its allies. The T-55 uses yet another caliber of ammunition. Its armor can be penetrated by any antitank system that Ukraine has— Javelins or Next generation Light Anti-tank Weapons (NLAWs) are not required. It requires a four-man crew (no autoloader) at a time when the RF AF appears hard- pressed to find enough manpower.
I remember how much denial there was in fielding these followed by cope when they couldn't be denied any further.

>>64066214 (OP)
>In the summer of 2022, Russia started deploying the T-62 tank (itself an ancient relic, but newer than the T-55) to combat in Ukraine. There were reports of Russian plans to refurbish and upgrade 800–1,000 T-62s. In early 2023, UK intelligence reported on Russian plans to reconstitute the 1st Guards Tank Army (previously Russia’s premier armor force) with refurbished T-62s (most of their T-80s have long since been destroyed or captured in combat in Ukraine). If Russia is already dipping into T-54/55 stocks, then the T-62 refurbishment must not be going well.
>Da comraded you will get a T-62
>Get T-55 instead

>>64066214 (OP)
>Ammo as another motivation?
>The T-54/55 tank has a 100-mm cannon. It uses the same ammo as the MT-12 antitank gun, which has been deployed in Ukraine. Russian sources have unofficially acknowledged a “hunger” (a deficit) for 122-mm and 152-mm artillery ammunition over the course of the Special Military Operation. Additionally, 125-mm tank ammunition for T-72 and above tanks is also reportedly in short supply. It is possible that Russia still has large supplies of 100-mm ammunition, and they intend to use the old tanks for indirect fire. This (tanks providing indirect fire) is much more common in the RF AF than it is in Western militaries. However, given the likely age of the rounds, and the poor storage and handling procedures observed with other calibers of ammunition, the Troika wonders about serviceability of the 100-mm rounds.


>Later, T-55s were seen in some cases operating in the attack. We should also note that the BTR-50 armored personnel carrier (APC), another armored vehicle of similar vintage, has been observed on trains and in repair facilities, but has not yet appeared in large quantities on the battlefield in Ukraine (as far as the Troika knows). Next up: T-34s? 7

>da cumrag you will get t-55
>shoved into paraded T-34 sold by North Korea or Vietnam

>>64075114
There was denial of russian tank depletion even happening all the way up until a few months ago until it became undeniable, and then ziggers shifted to
>w-we don’t need tanks and armored vehicles actually
>a-actually actually putting your meatwaves on completely unprotected chinese dirtbikes and buggies that don’t go any faster is better! Glorious revolution in w-warfare!
As they always do.
I still see people coping and pretending this strategy is somehow better than having an actual armored force.

>>64075132
Imagine reading this line:
>reconstitute the 1st Guards Tank Army (previously Russia’s premier armor force) with refurbished T-62s (most of their T-80s have long since been destroyed or captured
Holy shit. Any GTA formation in fucking T-62s and T-54s? If I was any form of remotely serious military fiction writer I'd be called a fucking hack to say "yeah so trust me bro the godless commie nation has to scrape to the bottom of the barrels until splinters from 75 years ago."

>>64066214 (OP)
>The Russian facility Uralvagonzavod, which makes railroad cars as well as tanks and other equipment, has begun producing universal covered railroad cars specifically for the RF MOD to transport personnel and equipment. These cars have the ability to have berths installed inside and include ventilation and hookups for heating equipment. They also have larger door openings and a load capacity of 68 tons.
>IKARIMIR GET IN THE FUCKING CATTLE CAR

>>64066214 (OP)
>A significant portion of the funds will be “redirected” from previously allocated funds for environmental improvement projects, in particular, funds designated to eliminate landfills in Russian cities. The RF AF will continue to conduct attrition warfare to wear down Ukrainian combat power and resolve. The Russians believe this arms production surge, in combination with refitted and newly equipped RF AF units supported by ample supplies of ammunition, will facilitate Russia’s continued operations in 2024 and beyond.16
>Russian cities turn into more thirdie style, burned out husks while undergoing severe demographic implosion from committing suicide by Ukrainian 14:1.
>This is what winning looks like 2.mp4

>>64066214 (OP)
>Most of Russia’s military industrial complex consists of state-owned enterprises. Rostec and Almaz-Antey are among the largest Russian state-owned enterprises, along with Roscosmos, Tactical Missiles Corporation, United Shipbuilding Corporation, and Rosatom’s nuclear weapons division (all together about 2 million employees). This gives the state, i.e., the RF government, the ability to ramp up defense production and increase quotas, and they have done so. The threat of mobilization provides additional negative incentives for recalcitrant managers and/or workers, although as noted above, the exemption from mobilization for defense industry workers is sometimes violated.1
>We didn't need those workers
>Straight to the front with them (Norks are too costly to meatwave apparently)
>Get in the fucking Nork or Iranian vehicle (if lucky)
>Get put on a motorcycle instead

>>64066214 (OP)
>In October 2022, Putin introduced martial law in the four regions of Ukraine that Russia illegally annexed in September 2022. This latest Putin decree builds on previous measures taken related to the Russian defense industry that were introduced in July 2022, which included:
>(1) Setting the conditions for overtime and round-the-clock work at Russian production and other facilities;
>(2) Making it illegal for companies “regardless of their organization or ownership” to refuse government contracts for supplying goods and services; and
>(3) Giving the state “carte blanche” in adjusting the quantities and prices of the contracts as needed, without any reclama by the companies involved.19
Sounds awfully communist and more Jewish than how much Russia hates Jews as if they were projecting.
That and it sounds like they're running a bit low on state funds or at least cashflow.

>>64066214 (OP)
>As early as summer 2022, volunteer organizations across Russia began stepping up to fill basic supply and technology needs for Russian units and individual soldiers, in many cases overcoming significant shortfalls in RF AF official supply channels. These efforts increased after the partial mobilization in fall 2022 with the span of contributions ranging from individual equipment, optics and field medical kits to UAVs, radio systems, and even vehicles in some cases. As recently as spring 2023, the RF MOD, General Staff, and RF AF commands not only showed little appreciation, but in many cases outright refused to acknowledge private and civil society efforts to fill these logistics gaps. Russian commanders typically prefer control over all matters, large and small, even when they cannot get necessary supplies or capabilities through normal channels. There were many cases, early on, when donated items were “hung up” in RF government bureaucratic procedures or were pilfered along the way before they reached the intended units or soldiers.
>We didn't need your fucking shit
>You smeared the state and tsar monke himself by implying our boys don't have the gear they need
>Those were completely necessary deaths
>[Steals donated gears to resell to donor crowdfunding again]
>[Steals death benefits by claiming intended recipients are MIA or deserted]

>>64066214 (OP)
>Be angry patriot
>This UAV project has its origins with Maksim Fomin (aka Vladlen Tatarsky), who was killed in an improvised explosive device (IED) attack in a St. Petersburg café in April 2023. Fomin was a popular Russian milblogger and former soldier who had been an advocate of a more aggressive military approach in Ukraine, which included increasing the use of attack UAVs.
>Get assassinated by FSB

>The “Judgment Day” project included workshops for modifying commercial quadcopter UAVs and fabricating tail fins and other pieces for the ammunition, along with training centers for training UAV pilots. (A UAV workshop in Moscow was renamed after Vladlen Tatarsky.) The project initially, reportedly, both purchased the UAVs and received them as donations from Russians inside Russia, as well as from abroad. In one Telegram post, a donated UAV was shown as gifted by the Russian Cultural Center in Cyprus. Later, the quadcopters were mass-produced and standardized and carry the name VT-40 (Vladlen Tatarsky)
>Do more than RF AF ever will even in death

>>64066214 (OP)
>NOTE: MOO Veche was added to the U.S. sanctions list in November 2023 and continues to provide large quantities of equipment to RF AF forces in Ukraine. MOO Veche-raised funds were initially to purchase test radios from a Chinese supplier to equip one company-sized unit (two base stations and three individual terminals) at the cost of 2.2 million rubles (~$25,000.) The radios then underwent testing in a RF AF training area. The purchase order later expanded to outfit an artillery battalion (NFI) in the RF GF 1st Army Corps (eight base stations and 10 individual terminals) at the price of approximately 7.5 million rubles (~$83,000). In late October 2023, in a video posted from a RF GF 10th Separate Tank Battalion command post (military unit 08810) / 1st Army Corps, a RF GF officer (NFI) thanked MOO Veche for the radios and demonstrated their capabilities both in communications and UAV-corrected artillery fire via the digital screens in the CP. The radio brand, model number, and other identifying information were blurred in the video. According to Orlov, previously, the transfer of data from a UAV to an RF AF artillery crew could take up to an hour; however, the Chinese system reduced it to less than a minute. Orlov added that digitalization of one RF GF motorized rifle or tank brigade’s communications using this system would cost approximately 85 million rubles (~$944,000). To raise such funds, volunteers would require much more active business participation and additional support from government agencies.
>Volunteers get more shit done
>Monke and friends hate this because they can't embezzle 90% of the funds
What an amazing example of a nation perfect for a Multipolar Global South.

>>64066214 (OP)
>Be angry patriot
>This UAV project has its origins with Maksim Fomin (aka Vladlen Tatarsky), who was killed in an improvised explosive device (IED) attack in a St. Petersburg café in April 2023. Fomin was a popular Russian milblogger and former soldier who had been an advocate of a more aggressive military approach in Ukraine, which included increasing the use of attack UAVs.

>Prigozhin suggested that Ukrainian state actors are not responsible, and Ukrainian Mykhailo Podolyak attributed the bombing to Russia.[4] The Institute for the Study of War assessed that the bombing may act as a warning to other Russian commentators to temper their criticism of the conduct of the war, or to intimidate Wagner-aligned actors who could pose threats to Putin, and may serve the Kremlin's goal of controlling the information space.[4]
>Get assassinated by FSB

>The “Judgment Day” project included workshops for modifying commercial quadcopter UAVs and fabricating tail fins and other pieces for the ammunition, along with training centers for training UAV pilots. (A UAV workshop in Moscow was renamed after Vladlen Tatarsky.) The project initially, reportedly, both purchased the UAVs and received them as donations from Russians inside Russia, as well as from abroad. In one Telegram post, a donated UAV was shown as gifted by the Russian Cultural Center in Cyprus. Later, the quadcopters were mass-produced and standardized and carry the name VT-40 (Vladlen Tatarsky)
>Do more than RF AF ever will even in death

>>64075154
>A significant portion of the funds will be “redirected” from previously allocated funds for environmental improvement projects
Were those projects accomplishing anything to begin with? Russia still dumps like 80-90% of its waste into landfills, vs. maybe 20% in much of the EU.
Every once in a while, a big Russian corporation with ties to the government gets money to do something about the giant landfills everywhere, and the money usually disappears with minimal results.
On hot summer days, when the wind blows just right, Moscow and St. Petersburg smell like rotting garbage from those landfill mountains building up just a couple dozen clicks from the city center. They've gotten names like "Trash Everest" and "Chemical Chernobyl". There's also a lot of illegal dumping going on since it's cheaper to just dump the load into an old quarry than pay for proper waste management (what groundwater, blyat).

too long
not reading

>>64070375
>less obedient
Eastern submission is heavily ingrained in their psyche, actually.

>>64075187
>According to Orlov, MOO Veche searched extensively for possible secure digital radio solutions from Russian vendors. However, there were no private suppliers with a system proven to be analogous to U.S. Harris Falcon-3/4 radio system capabilities in a hardened battlefield design. The Chinese radio system purchased was “the little brother” export model of a Chinese digital radio system produced by the Chinese military industrial complex. Orlov also highlighted that issues remain with the current Azart family of Russian digital radios being used in RF AF units (NFI).

>>64075196
I think they'll just find more ways to embezzle more of the barely existent funding that goes to infrastructure upkeep and we'll see another winter of pipes bursting from central steam sources going cold due to no MRO (between the staff being grabbed for the VSMO or their budget being effectively zeroed). Even if they're embezzling some insane fraction, what little makes it to the actual projects is what gets shit done.
>Moscow and St. Pidorsburg looks worse than Italian trash crisis at its peak.
>Turns into those tier 3 or dude l'mao zedong tier 4 (death) Chinese cities where the entire street is just trash.

>>64066214 (OP)
>Unsecured DMR and DMR-like radios still dominate RF AF communications across the SMO. By some estimates, there are well over 60 different types of commercial radio platforms being used by RF AF units, which were often acquired through purchase or donations. According to Orlov, Chinese Baofeng radios still lead the way. However, there are also Lira, Kirisun, and other Motorola radio clones used extensively in RF AF units. Orlov admits that his current initiative is considerably more expensive than giving every RF AF soldier a Baofeng or other DMR-like radio. However, for the money, the Chinese radio system will help bring RF AF units closer to the U.S. level in terms of communication levels and speed of decision-making.
>NOTE: Russians frequently hold up the U.S. military capabilities as the standard for certain warfighting capabilities that they are trying to incorporate, such as Harris’ Falcon-3/4 mentioned above.

>Baofengs are like the equivalent of driving a 80s Benz in post-fall Russia. You're the hottest shit on the block when everyone else has Ladas and even party officials "merely" have Zaporozhets.

>>64075196
>Chemical Chernobyl
This is apparently what one section of the place looks like. Whether you're looking for contaminated waste oil, battery acid, solvents or toxic organometallics, the place probably has it.
The Baltic going to be pretty fucked if the place ever floods badly enough to drain that shit into the sea.

>>64066214 (OP)
>The latest variation is the AППИ-8 variant (aптeчкa пepвoй пoмoщи индивидyaльнaя [AППИ]). This kit is an upgrade to the AППИ-7 variant that began appearing in the RF AF in April–May 2023. The new IFAK maintains the two-tourniquet system of the previous variant, but with an improved hemostatic silicone second tourniquet to complement the primary tourniquet, similar in design to the U.S. Combat Application Tourniquet (CAT). The CAT-like tourniquet is in a separate pouch, detachable from the IFAK kit. Other upgrades include a chem light, tactical scissors located on the outside of the kit, a rescue blanket, an improved compression bandage, Meloxicam anti-inflammatory NSAID medicine, nasopharyngeal and retropharyngeal airway devices, and a medical sealant sticker with valve.

>Russian medical bloggers who advise RF AF soldiers on tactical medicine procedures are satisfied with the new IFAK, but as with the previous variant, are skeptical that the kits will be distributed to the front-line soldiers in a timely manner and in the quantities needed. This skepticism exists because of production backlogs and because it is believed that the kits will be issued to units as accountable items rather than consumable items. Because of this issuing limitation, they will likely be held back by medical officers and unit commanders.

>It is also likely, as with previous IFAK variants, that they will quickly appear for resale on Russian online sites like “Avito” (Russia’s version of eBay), with the option to buy individual IFAK items or the entire IFAK. The Troika has seen photos and video of RF AF soldiers equipped with the AППИ-7 variant, but not in large quantities, nor uniformly across the groups of forces. Overall, RF AF soldiers also continue to rely on donated medical items and other sources to create their own IFAKs.
>I'm gonna embezooooooooolllllll
Never change, Russia.

>>64075215
It's Russia; the misery is not going to be evenly distributed.
Some Storm-V units reportedly don't even get proper IFAKs. If they're lucky, they might be issued a handful of very strong painkillers.

>>64066214 (OP)
>In some cases, carrying the wounded is facilitated by light equipment such as the RF AF using the Chinese-made Desertcross-100 ATVs or even hand carts.
>In many cases, the WIA is simply left in the trenches to await further evacuation and dies of the wounds, or the death is expedited by UAV-dropped munitions, or evacuation is attempted at night to avoid being targeted.
Or sometimes they just kill them with their own hands/try to b ait a Ukrainian drone to frag their buddy but I digress. Many such vidyas.

>There is also a shortage of field ambulances to support evacuation efforts. Russian volunteer organizations continuously “pass the hat” to acquire 1960s vintage four-wheel drive vans from the UAZ-452 family commonly known as “Loaf” (бyхaнкa) because their shape resembles a loaf of bread. These mass- produced vans are also sometimes referred to by the Troika as “Scooby-Doo” vans. The volunteer organizations collect donations for the vans, which cost about 400,000 rubles (~$4,350) per van. The vans are fitted with basic counter-UAS grates/racks along with some rudimentary EW equipment and are sent to the front as field ambulances. These vans, along with the ATVs, are treated by RF AF medical units as consumables, with the understanding that they may only get one or two evacuation missions in before they are damaged or destroyed.
>The Ukrainians are getting actual pickups and work vans from donors.

>>64066214 (OP)
>Published photos in early 2024 on Russian social media showed an entire RF AF field hospital operating (literally) underground somewhere in a Russian rear area. The hospital contained multiple rooms and the walls were reinforced with thick timbers. The hospital had a waiting area with stretchers, with an assortment of crutches, which were separated from the examination and surgery areas by plastic stretched over the doorway. The photos also showed medical personnel conducting surgery in one of the rooms that was well lit and wired for powering various medical devices being used during the surgery. Overall, the surgery and treatment areas appeared adequately stocked with medical equipment and supplies.
Forgot that old early war church case but I can believe some evolution's going on when they have a manpower shortage and need to send them out in another assault but on crutches afterwards.

>The Troika has seen other underground RF AF facilities develop over time during the Special Military Operation, including multiple unit mess halls operating underground. These contained separate eating areas for soldiers and officers, a preparation area, several storage areas for food, and even a full bakery vented to the surface.
kek didn't mention the vacuum cleaner in the corner for the officer bunker tho.

>>64066214 (OP)
>This new “All-Season Field Uniform Kit (VKPO) 3.0 model 2023” in its new 7-color multicam digital pattern replaces the RF MOD’s much-vaunted, pre-SMO version of the VKPO component of the Ratnik (Warrior) Individual Equipment System.
>(Intentionally out of order)
>At a distance—or from a UAV—the VKPO 3.0 looks remarkably like the UAF’s multicam (as well as the U.S. and Belgian versions), a similarity which reportedly led to fratricide incidents on both sides in spring 2024. In the Russian case, RF GF initially attacked other Russians outfitted in their new multicam, northwest of Avdiivka, thinking they were UAF. In the Ukrainian case, UAF units north of Kreminna accidentally ambushed other UAF, mistaking them for Russians in the new RF AF multicam.
Multicamization is real and I hate it

>Not surprisingly, the procurement program of the previous uniform version was riddled with corruption and quality-control deficiencies, including having flammable components and other materials that did not wick moisture away, or insulate to the manufacturer-specified temperatures.
Explains why we see some bursting into flame after a drone drop.

>>64075220
>vintage four-wheel drive vans from the UAZ-452 family commonly known as “Loaf”
So the flame thrower drones are for grilling the sandwiches?

>>64066214 (OP)
>Despite this ongoing surge of deliveries of the new multicam uniform sets, there is still no systematic procedure to equip RF AF soldiers in the SMO. Even today, RF AF continue to use a wide variety of field uniforms and individual equipment sets, ranging from Soviet-era to modern day, all of varying qualities and patterns (from Soviet-era to digital multicam camouflage). Volunteer units continue to rely heavily on donated uniforms and equipment. For those who can afford the expense, several Russian companies offer field uniforms and other equipment items for sale online (including body armor and helmets). Russian milbloggers often advise soldiers to buy their own equipment if they want to fight “comfortably.” In a June 2024 speech, the State Duma Defense Committee member and former commander of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV), GEN-COL (Ret) Vladimir Shamanov, openly criticized the MOD and General Staff for their lackluster equipping efforts for soldiers in the SMO. He compared the Russian army to a “partisan detachment” with soldiers and their families having to purchase uniforms at their own expense, often contributing to the low quality of those issued to soldiers before deploying. He added that the generals responsible for this program have turned the fighting force into “a different army,” one which is “dressed up and embroidered.”
Real hobofor aesthetics hour.

>Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov announced in the summer of 2024 that the scheduled wear-out dates for field uniforms were cancelled in the SMO zone (Ukraine). According to the order, when a uniform becomes unusable, the soldier will be given a new set.
1/2

>>64075231
>NOTE: One of the few Deputy Defense Ministers under former Minister of Defense Shoigu to survive the recent “chistka” (purge) of corrupt senior defense officials is Deputy Defense Minister Alexei Krivoruchko, whose portfolio is the arming and equipping of the Russian Armed Forces. Notably, before he joined the ranks of the RF MOD, he was the CEO/Director General of the Kalashnikov Concern. Krivoruchko’s direct boss, First Deputy Prime Minister (and former Minister of Industry and Trade) Denis Manturov understands the value of Krivoruchko’s connections and is likely the one who has shielded him, as his “krysha” (“political cover” or “godfather”), from external (i.e., Russian Federal Security Service [FSB]) probes.28
The Woodfather protects his boys. He is unpurgable due to his joy of being a wood weeb. No matter how much embezzlement, ineptitude and incompetence strikes the Russian Armed Forces: Shoigu protects (his own corruption).

>>64075158
>Norks are too costly to meatwave apparently
Norks probably have a deal where they can only be assigned for against invasions of actual russian lands, not for offensive actions in Ukraine.

>>64066214 (OP)
Section before talks about how HIMARS fucked their logi up in 2022 but that's something everyone knows but I must paste this part if only because:
>After initial RF AF logistical problems in February and March 2022, the RF AF started efforts to better man logistical sites with conscripts who, by law, cannot serve in Ukraine without a declaration of war or general mobilization. Conscripts were used for this manpower. RF AF logistical sites, including ammunition depots, are very manpower-intensive. Most Russian supplies, including ammunition, are not palletized. There are very few front-end loader and forklift operations. Most work unloading trains, loading trucks, and stockpiling material is all done by hand. The RF AF needed to build, expand, or improve logistical facilities further south near Rostov-on-Don and Millerovo in Russia to better support RF AF operations just over the border in Luhansk and Donetsk Provinces, as the RF AF redeployed forces from Kharkiv Province back into Ukraine further south.

Also wow does Fagner get a lot of praise (repeatedly in earlier sections as well):
>Despite the Troika’s suspicion that logistics would be PMC Wagner’s undoing south and north of Bakhmut, unlike the RF AF artillery which seemed to always outrun their logistics, PMC Wagner was able to keep themselves supplied with artillery ammunition. PMC Wagner seemed to have a more realistic operational design and seemed to work out their logistical challenges before the fight. For example, logistics for PMC Wagner were not a limit to a mostly dismounted brigade(-) sized operation near Klishchiivka, which was dependent on a poor, unpaved road network bent around UAF- held south Bakhmut.
Guess they actually were vastly less incompetent than their actual military proper.

>>64066214 (OP)
>Perhaps because Russia took Crimea in 2014 in a bloodless operation, Russian leaders assumed that Ukrainians would not oppose the 2022 invasion. But Ukraine fought back ferociously and very soon, Russia began losing troops and officers faster than they could replace them. By the end of just the first 2 months of the Special Military Operation, Russia had lost over 300 officers as KIAs with a third (1/3) of them being field grade officers (majors though colonels). These numbers had increased to over 800 KIA officers by July 2022. These are confirmed losses, verified by obituaries, funeral notices, and/or official reports. The actual number is likely higher. Many more such situations existed across the force.

>Many of those officers and soldiers lost were from logistics units. Whole fuel and ammunition columns were systematically destroyed as Russia struggled to move logistics forward as fast as possible. Added to this challenge was that the logistics units are manned with an even higher percentage of conscripts than the ground forces of the VDV. (The ground forces are approximately 35 percent conscript and the VDV are 30 percent conscript, who according to Russian law, are largely exempt from service in Russia’s “Special Military Operation.”) There was a plan in 2018 to man the Russian MTO units with 90 percent contract soldiers. However, that plan was never realized. Russia recruited heavily to replace logistics personnel, especially truck drivers, who were KIA so frequently that the truck driver position was sarcastically labeled as "suicide."
>Total Logi Death

>Russia’s reserve system was completely unprepared to fill the personnel vacancies. The existing system was essentially a paper list of former conscripts and officers who had served their required duty within the past couple decades. With only a few exceptions, these veterans had none of the regular training or equipment normally associated with U.S. or other Western military reserves.

>>64075250
Also as a Wargame (support) player who brings all the FOBs to the map (and/or coalitions for FOBmaxxxing) this war speaks to me. I am the fucker who brings 5 FOBs, all the heavy trucks and supply helos and plays artillery sniping games between counterbattery and sniping high value assets like SAMs/superheavy stunning/rush denial.
>TLD is if someone could snipe my hidden FOBs and hidden+moving trucks to deny me my ability to be all the support I can be.

>Troika members all agree that, in principle, Russian officers learn and try to practice this same philosophy. We have witnessed both good and bad leadership among Russian officers as some achieve and some fail to achieve these standards. While these standards are universally understood, under the stress of combat or even everyday operations, leaders can face immense pressure to act otherwise. Obtaining adequate funding, equipment, training opportunities, repair parts, munitions, etc. are difficult tasks in any army. But, in an environment where almost every solution involves some level of corruption, leadership suffers.
>And as a result, soldiers suffer.
The natural state of being Russian

>>64066214 (OP)
>In the 29 July 2022 Observations, the Troika wrote that prior to Russia’s Special Military Operation in Ukraine, we considered the Russian officer management system to be a strength of their military. Long-tenured commanders would seemingly be more experienced and competent. Permanent, professional General Staff officers would know the defense enterprise inside and out. The reality has proven slightly different. In Ukraine, the Russian armed forces do not seem to have gained any benefit from its long-tenured commanders, especially at the senior level. In fact, many of the longest- serving commanders have now been relieved or replaced. The Troika has detailed problems with training enlisted troops. This situation seems to also be a problem training the senior officers. It is not necessarily “incompetence,” but what else could it be?

>Four officers have been in the Deputy Minister of Defense for Logistics position to date since the start of the Special Military Operation. The first was GEN Dmitri Bulgakov, who had held the position since 2010.

>It was under his tenure that many end items purchased by the Russian MOD over the years from 2010 to 2022 simply “disappeared.”
>many end items
>many end items
>from 2010 to 2022
>from 2010 to 2022
>simply “disappeared.”
>simply “disappeared.”

>He was relieved in September 2022, a move widely seen as punishment for logistics failures in the early stages of the Special Military Operation, but more specifically related to the September 2022 partial mobilization.

>At that time, it was discovered that billions of rubles worth of equipment intended to be stockpiled for a future mobilization had never been procured, even though funds had been appropriated.
>even though funds had been appropriated.

>>64067377
Jerry Hall on STTNG

>>64066214 (OP)
>For example, at least 1.5 million sets of uniforms which had been supposedly purchased and stored in case of a mobilization could not be found, and never were. On 26 July 2024, GEN Bulgakov was criminally charged with corruption relating to this non-procurement. It could have been the “perfect crime”—Russia had only conducted two mobilizations prior to 2022, in 1914 and 1941. Bulgakov likely assumed there would never be another mobilization, so he would never be caught. Bulgakov’s arrest was part of a large-scale purge of MOD officials.

>GEN Bulgakov was replaced in the position by GEN-COL Michael Mizintsev, who had previously served as the head of the National Defense Management Center in Moscow and commanded forces as part of the siege of Mariupol in 2022. His brutal actions in Mariupol, which included numerous attacks on civilians, earned him the nickname “Butcher of Mariupol” and likely his new position as the head of logistics.

>GEN-COL Mizintsev had no particular logistics background. He lasted 7 months, until April 2023, and was replaced by GEN-COL Alexei Kuzmenkov. Mizintsev was reportedly relieved because of his relationship with PMC Wagner. He was briefly seen in videos after his dismissal visiting a training camp and touring Russian positions in Bakhmut, allegedly as a PMC Wagner deputy commander. Mizintsev’s subsequent whereabouts remain unknown.
1/2

>>64075271
>GEN-COL Alexei Kuzmenkov took over the position in April 2023 and lasted 1 year, until March 2024. Kuzmenkov was previously the deputy director of Rosgvardia. Kuzmenkov was a career logistics officer and his appointment to the position at the Ministry of Defense was reportedly to be only temporary, in order to build clear logistics lines, somethin two previous officers had failed to do. Kuzmenkov then returned to his previous position as deputy director of Rosgvardia. In March 2024, GEN-COL Kuzmenkov was replaced by GEN-LT Andrei Bulyiga, who was also a career logistics officer with multiple logistics assignments at the military district level and at the MOD. He previously served as deputy commander of the Western Military District for logistics, since 2018.
2/2

>Corruption remains the lubricant that allows the Russian military to run, even during wartime. Every Russian military leader must engage in it to get things done. At best, officers tolerate it to find solutions to problems. At worst, they use it to enrich themselves. Nowhere is that more prevalent than in Russian logistics units and organizations

>>64066214 (OP)
>As mentioned previously, one of the most pilfered items in the RF AF is fuel, and opportunities abound in the Special Military Operation to make money from selling military fuel. The following case is but one example which illustrates the extent of corruptive practices that occurs, not only in garrison during peacetime, but with a critical military resource for keeping Russia’s mechanized force operating in combat conditions in Ukraine. RF AF MAJ Alexander Sungurov, whose position was Head of Fuel and Lubricants Service, was included in the “Heroes Z” column on the Russian Ministry of Defense website. In his hero description, it indicated that he ensured vehicles and equipment were fueled during the Special Military Operation, including personally leading columns delivering fuel to units, often under heavy artillery fire.
Long, you can look up the writeup in the PDF which can be summarized as:
>preserved life and hardware under fire with tactical competence

>MAJ Sungurov, along with another Head of Fuel and Lubricants Service, MAJ Oleg Kulikov, were arrested in Crimea as part of a criminal investigation that began in July 2023. They were accused of large-scale embezzlement of diesel fuel involving 17 soldiers from different military units. According to the investigation, the fuel embezzlement scheme began as early as July 2022. Many of the 17 soldiers involved in the scheme later pleaded guilty. MAJ Kulikov spent 5 months in custody and was later released. MAJ Sungurov was arrested in December 2023 as part of the criminal investigation. The fate of MAJ Sungurov remains unclear, but information about his merits were removed from the writeup about him in the “Heroes Z” column when he became a defendant in the case.
>These are their heroes

>>64066214 (OP)
>The purge began with Timur Ivanov, Russia’s then-Deputy Defense Minister, who was arrested in April 2024 after being accused of taking bribes “on a particularly large scale.” Then came GEN-LT Yuri Kuznetsov, head of the defense ministry’s personnel directorate. He was arrested after more than 100 million rubles (over $1 million), gold coins, and other valuables were seized from his residences. GEN Ivan Popov, former commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army was also arrested for fraud.4

>During this same time, several senior generals were given the chance to retire. GEN Vadim Shamarin, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, was placed in custody by a military court on 22 May 2024. According to Russian agencies, he is accused of “accepting a particularly large bribe,” charges for which he faces up to 15 years in prison. The previously mentioned GEN Dmitry Bulgakov was arrested in July 2024, officially on charges of large-scale embezzlement related to the supply of poor- quality food at an inflated cost to Russian soldiers. That was followed by the arrest of the Leningrad Military District (LEMD) Deputy Commander GEN-MAJ Valery Mindanao in September 2024, on corruption charges related to the supply of military uniforms while he was the Resource Provision Head in the MOD under Belyakov.

>>64066214 (OP)
I have no comments for this one:
>Russian commanders, like their U.S. counterparts, are required to submit various reports up the chain of command, for readiness and other purposes. Russian commanders, at all levels, are inundated with this reporting requirement. Some Russian company commanders in Ukraine report that they did not have time to do much other than submit reports, because of reporting requirements that sometimes reached 15 reports daily.
>Despite this arduous reporting requirement, Russian commanders, at multiple levels, lie in their reporting up the chain. This is especially the case in reporting logistics readiness, including equipment readiness and supply status.
>This is well-known in the system and considered acceptable.

>GEN Alexander Dvornikov, who led the Southern Military District and Southern Group of Forces at the outset of the Special Military Operation, was widely regarded as the most competent and forward-thinking of the Russian senior commanders.
>regarded as the most competent
>forward-thinking
>of the Russian senior commanders.

>Ukrainian military intelligence intercepted a mobile phone conversation from an officer likely from the 150th MRD, 8th GCAA, operating early on in Ukraine, who was complaining to his spouse about the readiness of his division prior to participating in the February 2022 full-scale invasion.
1/2 what the fuck my mind

>>64066214 (OP)
>>64075288
>He said that the division had a lot of non-operational equipment and was significantly lacking in resources and that the leadership in Moscow knew that prior to a combat readiness inspection of the unit conducted in December 2021, less than 2 months prior to the start of the Special Military Operation. GEN Dvornikov participated in the inspection, which according to the officer, was short, and division personnel were told that everything was fine.
>The inspection team then went to the hotel and sauna.
>The inspection team then went to the hotel and sauna.
>The inspection team then went to the hotel and sauna.
>The inspection team then went to the hotel and sauna.
>The inspection team then went to the hotel and sauna.

>One officer of the division told GEN Dvornikov as part of his report that the percentage of personnel in the battalions and BTGs was not sufficient. In the end, nothing was done about the personnel and equipment shortfalls, with GEN Dvornikov reporting back to Moscow that “everything was normal.”48
>nothing was done about the personnel and equipment shortfalls
>reporting back to Moscow that “everything was normal.”
>everything was normal.”
>everything was normal.”
>everything was normal.”
2/2

This is the fucking force they thought they'd kick in the rotten house of cards that they considered Ukraine as from their own projections?

>>64066214 (OP)
I thought Surovikin was one of the few cases of closer-to-competence that got purged (in a better way than some of their generals):
>Russian field commanders, of course, understand the need to protect their forces, but the casualty numbers indicate that they often choose not to. GEN Sergey Surovikin, who led the Special Military Operation in the fall of 2023, exemplifies the complicated relationship that Russian military leaders have with the protection warfighting function. On the one hand, Surovikin is credited with creating the so-called “Surovikin defensive line” in Ukraine’s Zaporozhye and Kherson regions. It is perhaps the war’s most successful example of using trenches and battlements to protect Russian troops against drones, missiles, and artillery. But Surovikin is also the general who oversaw the deadly “meat grinder” operation to take Bakhmut in 2023: a brutal battle that wasted the lives of more Russian troops than any other single operation so far.4
>The real achievement he had was withdrawing to more defensible positions/consolidating and deciding to defend instead of being defeated in detail.
>Instead he was just Standard Russian outside of those two things.

>>64066214 (OP)
>As early as 3 months into the Special Military Operation, Russia was unable to generate new, trained replacements for casualties and losses, which in turn left units struggling to protect themselves in combat. In May 2022, Russian analyst blogsite Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT Svodka) reported on a Russian volunteer who had been promised 2 weeks of training before he would be sent to the front. Even that short amount of training was not delivered.

>When he arrived at his motorized rifle unit, he had to ask his platoon mates how to use a grenade and fire the BMP-2 armored personnel carrier he was assigned to. Despite the lack of training for him and his fellow replacement troops, his unit was thrown into battle near Izyum and suffered serious casualties. He claimed that his unit had no trust in their leadership.6
>Be the WW2 meme

>>64066214 (OP)
>Besides the tens of thousands of regular soldiers killed, Troika Observations included numerous reports about Russian officer casualties during the war. A year plus into the war, military bloggers and analysts were reporting that over 2,000 Russian officers had been killed, about a quarter of which were field grade and general officers.

>This was a serious loss of command expertise, but the loss of over 1,700 junior officers had an even greater impact on combat operations and training of new recruits. With no noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps to fall back on, units in the field responded by either bringing more senior officers down to serve as small unit leaders or promoting enlisted soldiers up into the junior officer ranks—often before they were ready for such responsibility.

>Russia’s poor record protecting the lives of soldiers and leaders led to undermanned units and a lack of discipline across the force. Against a vigorous September 2022 Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Province, poorly-led Russian units broke and fled in a disorderly withdrawal, abandoning equipment and sometimes soldiers.

>>64066214 (OP)
>Some individuals were immediately dispatched to the front. Others received training ranging from a few days to a few weeks. The fact that most of the personnel who were qualified to train new recruits were deployed and fighting in the war, exacerbated the poor training back home, which led to many new losses in combat that could have otherwise been avoided.

>In one case reported by pro-Ukraine military blogger Denys Davydov, a contingent of veterans who had volunteered to fight against Ukraine tried to resign before they were deployed when they saw the poor level of training being provided. In another case, ill-prepared Russian forces abandoned many combat systems and most of their ammunition during a battle for the town of Lyman. Many soldiers were killed in action there and the rest were captured by Ukrainian forces.

>Back at a training center near Moscow, a significant portion of 3rd Army Corps’ leadership was fired for truthfully reporting the poor status of mobilization training during a visit by Deputy Defense Minister, GEN Yunis-Bek Yevkurov. Russian military analysts assessed that 3rd Army Corps had turned into a crowd of untrained military personnel, given the latest military equipment which they could not operate.

Are you going to post the entire document?

>>64075293
>sauna
I'll never understand the Russian obsession with saunas.
Did they at least have callgirls?

>>64066214 (OP)
>As TRADOC’s OE 2024–2034 Report noted,
>Mounting combat losses from UAS-directed artillery fires and precision strikes by First Person View (FPV) unmanned systems forced select Russian units to adapt their infantry TTPs from mounted armored assaults to dismounted Storm-Z “human wave” assaults against entrenched Ukrainian defenses.” (Page 29)
Human wave deniers will cry foul to this day
>B-b-b-but the Imperial Japanese weren't human waving
>B-b-b-but the Chinese weren't human waving in North Korea
>B-b-b-but the Vietcong weren't human waving
>B-b-b-but Storm-Z units weren't human waving

>>64075319
Only posting interesting highlights since some of it is stuff that any decent follower of the war already knows (HIMARS x GMLRS combo was the god of conveniently located ammo dump sniping)

>Sauna
Probably related to why Finns like them since they deal with cold weather I'm guessing.

>>64075319
If you lived in a very cold place, you would understand that saunas are wonderful things.

Also saunas in Russia are more likely to be whorehouses with either male conscripts or underaged girls.

>>64066214 (OP)
>As late as spring 2022, in the first months of the Special Military Operation, Russians still physically grouped their artillery battalions and batteries in close proximity, even hand-and-arm-signal distances, as was done by the Red Army during World War II. This close physical grouping of artillery proved dangerous in today’s environment due to Ukrainian recon drones and counterbattery fires. The introduction of longer-range HIMARS artillery in Ukrainian units completely ended the Russians’ physical grouping artillery.
>even hand-and-arm-signal distances, as was done by the Red Army during World War II
They really didn't fucking change at all. I know they overlearned insanely over WW2 but what the fuck that institutional inertia is nuts.

>They were subsequently dispersed into sections, and eventually to individual guns or launchers—something that Russian artillery was not trained for. This dispersal of guns and ammunition created logistic and communication challenges, but it improved the survivability of the units.

Few sections ahead after Black Sea Fleet, Moskava, etc:
>Shortly after the seizure of Crimea in 2014, retired Russian generals told their U.S. counterparts in a dialogue called “The Elbe Group” that to be secure, Russia demanded a return to the arrangement made at Yalta at the end of WWII: a Western recognition of Russia’s control and influence over Eastern Europe, from the Black Sea to the Baltic. Almost everything Russia has done in the intervening years can be seen as supporting that goal. But Russia’s inability to protect its main instrument of power in the south—the Black Sea Fleet—puts its plans at risk even before the shooting has stopped.
>Their national character is to be self important perfidious whiny bitches with protagonist syndrome.

>>64075330
>Girls?
Surely anon you know Russia is baZZZed and trad:

>Despite the wishes of Nicholas I, homosexuality obviously could not be legislated out of existence. Being a natural variant of human sexual relations, it could be repressed but not removed from society. It thus remained a half-hidden phenomenon, with several places where it could find expression. Among these were the public bath-houses, where male prostitution was common. The irony of the situation was that many men belonging to the upper and middle classes were homosexual or bisexual. Some would marry and live an apparently ‘normal’ family life but seek same-sex love in places like the public bath-houses.
>Similarly, as commercial bathhouses appeared for the first time in Moscow in the seventeenth century, the state decreed that the sexes should be separated for the sake of public decency. At least on the men's side of commercial baths, youths were employed to scrub clients' backs, and likely also engaged in paid and unpaid sexual relations with them.
>The bathhouses of Russia's cities were another important site in the homosexual world. In comparison to earlier eras, when sex between youthful attendants and their clients was organized according to relatively egalitarian peasant customs, by the 1890s bathhouse homosexual prostitution was a business not unlike work in heterosexual brothels.

Reading through this entire thread, I doubt Russia will exist in any meaningful capacity whether or not they win this damned war. Nor do I have any faith regarding the worthiness of any Russian who survives this war, having to endure and be a part of such cruelty and backstabbing.

>>64066214 (OP)
From selected insights:
>This is not just semantics—to fully understand the war, one must understand it in its entirety. Ignoring the period from February 2014 to February 2022 led to some ill-considered assumptions by the press and think tanks, as well as by some military analysts. Those who predicted Ukraine’s hasty collapse in 2022 were ignoring 8 years of stoic Ukrainian resistance to Russian aggression, much of it under far worse conditions than they face today (i.e., without Javelins, NLAWs, HIMARS, 155-mm howitzers, radars, secure comms, 7 years of Western training, etc.). Those who were surprised by Russia’s poor performance in the winter and spring of 2022 were ignoring the fact that after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014, Russian indirect actions in the Donbas largely failed. This was most notably in Odesa in May 2014, but also across Vladimir Putin’s “Novorossiya” (“New Russia”). They ignored the fact that Ukraine largely blunted repeated Russian conventional offensives from 2014 to 2022. They were oblivious to Ukraine building Europe’s most powerful ground force (not an exaggeration), numbering 28 maneuver brigades, manned and led by combat veterans, trained by our Western allies, and partially equipped with modern Western equipment. Acknowledging that this war has lasted nearly a decade provides some insight into the staying power and resilience of both the warring parties. The notion that Ukraine will soon tire of independence and voluntarily trade land for peace is fanciful. The notion that Russia will soon tire of war and voluntarily go home is equally ludicrous.

>>64066214 (OP)
From selected insights:
>Don’t believe the Western press or the DC-based think tanks. Today does not mark the 1-year anniversary of the war in Ukraine, or the 1-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia first invaded Ukraine in February 2014 and has occupied Ukrainian sovereign territory, as recognized by the United States and the United Nations, ever since. The two countries have been at war for 9 full years. 27 February 2023 will begin the 10th year of Russia’s war against Ukraine, not the second. That is the anniversary of overt Russian Armed Forces action in Crimea in 2014. In the days prior, Russia began preparing the environment with covert action—what the Russians refer to as ”Indirect Actions.”

>This is not just semantics—to fully understand the war, one must understand it in its entirety. Ignoring the period from February 2014 to February 2022 led to some ill-considered assumptions by the press and think tanks, as well as by some military analysts. Those who predicted Ukraine’s hasty collapse in 2022 were ignoring 8 years of stoic Ukrainian resistance to Russian aggression, much of it under far worse conditions than they face today (i.e., without Javelins, NLAWs, HIMARS, 155-mm howitzers, radars, secure comms, 7 years of Western training, etc.). Those who were surprised by Russia’s poor performance in the winter and spring of 2022 were ignoring the fact that after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014, Russian indirect actions in the Donbas largely failed. This was most notably in Odesa in May 2014, but also across Vladimir Putin’s “Novorossiya” (“New Russia”). They ignored the fact that Ukraine largely blunted repeated Russian conventional offensives from 2014 to 2022.
1/2

>>64075345
>They were oblivious to Ukraine building Europe’s most powerful ground force (not an exaggeration), numbering 28 maneuver brigades, manned and led by combat veterans, trained by our Western allies, and partially equipped with modern Western equipment. Acknowledging that this war has lasted nearly a decade provides some insight into the staying power and resilience of both the warring parties. The notion that Ukraine will soon tire of independence and voluntarily trade land for peace is fanciful. The notion that Russia will soon tire of war and voluntarily go home is equally ludicrous.
2/2
This part is a good reminder for everyone and/or especially zoomers who weren't geopolitically cognizant and millennials who barely remember that little era of WW3 type anxiety.

>Conceptually, this war is far bigger than Ukraine— at least for Russia. Russia sees itself in a global conflict with the West, of which Ukraine is but one theater (the major theater, to be sure). Neither success nor failure in Ukraine will alter Russia’s global calculus. Meanwhile, on 30 September 2022, Russia “annexed” four Ukrainian provinces and pronounced them part of Russia “now and forever.” These four provinces (oblasts) joined Crimea, which was illegally “annexed” by Russia in March 2014. From the Russian perspective, almost all blood now being spilled by Russians is for defending Russian territory. The sole exception is a tiny sliver of Kharkiv Oblast, still occupied, but not yet annexed by Russia. Russia cannot easily walk away from these territories that it has claimed and “annexed.”

>>64075334
Fuck, might as well purge the Russian "men" and leave the women to scatter the ashes.

>>64066214 (OP)
>One problem which cannot be considered a success has been the high rate of deaths/ casualties among the mobilized troops. (25 September 2023) One fifth (1/5) of mobilized soldiers did not survive their first 2 months after receiving their mobilization summons. At the 1-year anniversary of the 21 September 2022 partial mobilization, credible Russian investigative journalists and Russian military analysts (all of whom are now outside Russia) teamed to compile and analyze a list of more than 1,000 mobilized troops killed in action (mobik KIA). RF MOD or other RF authorities have never reported on the total number of mobik KIAs in the Special Military Operation. The investigative journalists and military analysts compiled their list from obituaries published all over Russia, from Moscow to Chukotka (extreme northeast Siberia)
>On average, most mobiki who died after deployment to the SMO died after 4.5 months in the SMO. At least 130 mobiki were KIA in their first month after mobilization.

>>64075353
>Women
Like two of the Russian TikTok zoomers (and the guy was a twink, obviously) doing a BDA enabling selfies with duckfaces?
>Hearts of barbed wire and rusty nails, anon.

>>64075348
>Conceptually, this war is far bigger than Ukraine— at least for Russia. Russia sees itself in a global conflict with the West, of which Ukraine is but one theater
It’s so adorable that these stupid motherfuckers think they’re still a world power that’s playing chess with the US and deserving of being a main villain in a story. They’re a regional power at best now and they STILL haven’t realized it.

>>64066214 (OP)
>In 2008, the RF MOD personnel systems were reformed as part of former Russian Minister of Defense Anatoli Serdyukov’s larger New Look Reforms. Many personnel functions previously run by the RF military were consolidated, with military billets being converted to civilian positions and/or outsourced to civilian contractors.
>In June 2021, RF Defense Minister Shoigu made a surprise visit to one of these offices near Moscow. Shoigu expressed his dissatisfaction with the organization and work of the office. He noted that while they had a microwave oven and a refrigerator, they had no computers to track personnel or to contact other military registration and enlistment offices by email.
Funny given him and his buddies are responsible for that.

>When Putin ordered a “partial mobilization” on 21 September 2022, the sad state of these military registration and enlistment offices across Russia came to a head, as they were quickly overwhelmed with the challenges of executing a military mobilization during wartime. They lacked qualified personnel, processing systems, and record-keeping required to effectively conduct a mobilization.

>>64075363
ook ook six superweapons without parallel ook ook
>Explodes in silo during test launch
>Ukraine refuses to service their older ICBMs from the 90s and 00s (and is the original servicer of them)
OOK NOOK OOK OOK OOOOOOOOOOOOOKKKK

Can't wait to see if they're genuinely retarded enough to try to start second/third fronts in the Baltics/Finland and Japan. It blew my mind that they were retarded enough to snare their dick in the bear trap that was Ukraine (I had more pessimistic outcomes in more of them getting stuck 1/3rd the way in the mud fields and the mud of resistance/insurgency rather than total front collapses like they had when the war started) so what do I know they might be truly FAS afflicted enough*.

>>64075378
*See this measure using Russian orphans as a rough indicator for the rest:
>Methods: Phenotypic screening was conducted of all 234 baby home residents in the Murmansk region of Russia (mean age 21+12.6 months). Phenotypic expression scores were devised based on facial dysmorphology and other readily observable physical findings. Growth measurements from birth, time of placement in the baby home, and at present were analyzed. In addition, the charts of 64% of the children were randomly selected for retrospective review. Information collected included maternal, medical, developmental, and social histories. Results: Thirteen percent of children had facial phenotype scores highly compatible with prenatal alcohol exposure and 45% had intermediate facial phenotype scores. These scores correlated with maternal gravidity and age. At least 40% of mothers in whom history was available ingested alcohol during pregnancy; some also used illicit drugs and tobacco. Z scores for growth measurements corresponded to phenotypic score, as did the degree of developmental delay. Children with no or mild delay had significantly lower phenotypic scores than those with moderate or severe delay (p = 0.04); more than 70% of children with high phenotypic scores were moderately or severely delayed.

>Conclusions: More than half of residents of the baby homes in Murmansk, Russia, have intermediate (45%) or high (13%) phenotypic expression scores suggesting prenatal exposure to alcohol. Despite good physical care, stable daily routine, availability of well-trained specialists, and access to medical care, these vulnerable children show significant growth and developmental delays compared with their institutionalized peers.

>According to published data, the prevalence of FASD in children from Russian orphanages is estimated to be between 30% and 66% [7]. A total of 90% of Russian women at fertile age consume alcohol and up to 20% continue to consume it during pregnancy.

>>64069981
>>64070085
I am legit thinking this is Ukraine's strategy. Waiting out until Putin dies and utilizing the chaos to re-capture territories and forcing a peace. I don't see the frontlines moving in any meaningful way until then. Putin turns 73 years old this year, already above the life expectancy of Russian males and the Ukraine war is draining his energy. Ideally he would start having health/mental issues that would either make the political/military situation for Russia worse.

>>64066214 (OP)
Also one to use on the peacenikfags:
>There are essentially three ways to be credited with having served in the Russian military: as a conscript (draftee), a kontraktnik (volunteer), or a mobik (involuntarily mobilized veteran). All three types sign oaths/contracts with the Russian MOD. Each of these is a different category of enlisted soldier in the RF AF. Western observers frequently confuse the types, or use the terms interchangeably, but the differences are important.
Mobniks aren't conscripts:

>A conscript (пpизывник or cpoчник) is an 18- to 30-year-old male Russian citizen inducted into the uniformed military. He must complete a mandatory service obligation (see NOTE 1 below) in the Armed Forces or another part of the military organization (e.g., Rosgvardia, Interior Ministry, Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Troops, Ministry of Emergency Situations, etc.). In Russian culture, a major dividing line exists between foreign wars and wars to defend the homeland. For this reason, Russian law prohibits conscripts from serving outside of Russia absent a declaration of war without having at least 4 months training (see NOTE 2 below)
1/2

>>64075390
>NOTE 2: The Troika are not lawyers, much less Russian conscription lawyers. (There is such a legal specialty in Russia.) However, our understanding is that, according to Russian law, conscripts are prohibited from combat abroad until they have had a minimum of 4 months training. In addition, President Putin has said, since the war began, that no conscripts would be sent to fight in the SMO— only those who volunteered and signed contracts would be sent. With some notable exceptions, Putin’s command has largely been followed. The annexation of Ukrainian territories in 2014 and 2022 made those regions legally and formally part of Russia (the United States does not recognize these illegal annexations). By Russian law, we believe that conscripts could legally serve in the SMO, at least in these illegally annexed territories. However, Russia has shown a great reluctance to do this.

...

>A mobik is a 19- to 70-year-old male Russian citizen who has completed mandatory military service (conscript or kontraktnik) and has been recalled to active duty (mobilized). Russian veterans are all considered “reserves” and are subject to mobilization (recall) at any time. However, the 2022 partial mobilization of 300,000+ was only the third mobilization in Russian and Soviet history (1917 and 1941 were the other two). Mobiki are often referred to by Westerners as “reservists.”

>While this is technically correct, mobiki are not “reservists” in the U.S. sense of the word. They have had no formal contact with RF AF since their discharge from service (“demobilization” in Russian terms). In Russian culture, use of mobiki in combat abroad is considered morally acceptable, even if mobilization occurs the day after the conscription period ends.
2/2

>>64066214 (OP)
Genuinely interesting one:
>The war in Ukraine, however, has demonstrated that Russian units and troops are lacking in training compared to their Ukrainian adversary. The recent mobilization of 300,000 new troops further strained the traditional training system and revealed its weaknesses. As a result, Russian military leaders have turned to using training centers as a way to improve training and relieve the strain on line units. The Russian military has had training centers for many years, some existed during Soviet times. But the relatively small number of recruits and officers who attended these training centers were generally destined for specialized duties as commanders or technicians. As such their training courses were usually 3 to 6 months long, compared to the 1-month course for most troops. During the RF AF’s drive to rid itself of hazing of junior troops, known as dedovshchina (literally, “reign of the grandfathers”), some new recruits were assigned to do their initial training period in training centers rather than line units. The thinking was that if young soldiers were all the same rank and seniority when they trained, there would be no opportunity for older troops to haze them. This arguably helped reduce the incidence of hazing in the mid 2000’s. Military leaders also recognized that, because the courses in training centers were 3 to 6 months long, soldiers who went through a training center were much better prepared when they arrived at their units.
>Get rid of power distance structure and it turns out it does make the age gap anal rape go away a bit.
Just only have the psychopathic-sociopathic society part left after that.
Also remembered hearing about Ukraine doing things on their part to end dedovshchina in their post-Soviet military but never heard the details too much.

Next part:
Q: Why didn't they do this initially for their military?
A: No funds and system not setup for it.

How does a nation even sustain a war in this fashion? Even the Nazis when they made their volksarmee were on the defensive and dug in, what I'm hearing is that they send their men out to die with little training, piss poor ammunition if any and logistics that are messier than an Indian bathhouse.

>>64066214 (OP)
>Overall, by late 2022, the RF VDV grew by 50 percent and went from 10 maneuver regiments plus 3 separate brigades in 2022, to 15 maneuver regiments plus 2 separate brigades and an artillery brigade. This was approximately 150 percent of the combat power that the RF VDV started with at the beginning of the SMO. Many of these new RF VDV “paratroopers” were really non-VDV mobiki who had never even been in a helicopter let alone fast-roped or jumped from an aircraft. (Before the SMO, RF VDV units trained to fast-rope entire battalions at a time.)
>The VDV doesn't exist anymore because they're all dead or too wounded to be fielded again.

>The September 2022 mobilization was regional and, as mentioned above, prior service experience was not a primary consideration. Therefore, if you served previously in the Ground Forces, FSB Border Guards, Rosgvardiya, or Ministry of Emergency Situations, but lived near a RF VDV home station, you might be mobilized and pressed into Russia’s airborne forces (the VDV). Similarly, it worked the other way if you lived close to Naval Infantry or Ground Forces units in need. The RF VDV’s vision seems to be that they will sort this out later but, in the meantime, they will turn the new units and mobiki into permanent RF VDV end strength.
>They got replaced by mystery meat (soon to be cubed).

>>64075406
Read the pdf (search by a few words out of a sentence to get to parts in between), I didn't post more of the RF AF positive points because the vatniks and shills would be all over it with their insufferable shitty shilling.

tl;dr answer is their airforce and artillery actually are capable of adapting and actually do a bunch of heavy lifting while their men are retards. Between them and their ISR guys and the battlefield being drone-o-clock (and not just by attack drones) those two actually get to shine because they aren't complete knuckle dragging dipshits and have some degree of doctrinal flexibility to innovate a bit.

>>64075363
Just for you:
>Both Putin and Shoigu begin their speeches by making clear that Russia is fighting the United States, the West, and NATO. This is consistent with previous statements by both leaders. Putin also evoked historic themes of defense of the motherland against invaders, and heroic, patriotic sacrifice saying, “[Russian fighters] are fighting—you know, I’m not afraid to make this comparison, it’s not an exaggeration —exactly like the heroes of the War of 1812, the First World War, or the Great Patriotic War [World War II].”

>>64075196
>landfills
It's usually not even an actual landfill, but just open dumps

>>64072912
enlighten, us, then. what does the Russian population gain from the war in Ukraine?

>>64066214 (OP)
>From a Russian military perspective, Minister Shoigu’s speech represents the triumph of Russian and Soviet military culture over reform, specifically the very ambitious 2008 New Look Reforms. The Shoigu Plan, whether it is implemented or not, is a return to a more comfortable place for Russian military leaders. The term of conscription is returned to its Soviet length.* They are returning to the larger units (i.e., divisions) of the USSR and the Great Patriotic War. Ground Forces artillery divisions have not existed in the force structure since the Soviet period, yet Shoigu plans to bring them back.

>The Russians have already reverted to Soviet form on the battlefield, favoring mass over maneuver, quantity over quality, capacity over capability, brutality over precision, and mobilization over readiness.

>The Troika looks forward to watching Russia stretch increasingly thinner personnel, leadership, talent, training, equipment and maintenance across more and more hollow units.
Unironically devolving and taking the wrong lessons from the battlefield, given the motorbike assaults*.

*Ukraine even briefly dipped their toe in (voluntarily) out of curiosity and found that those were a bad idea recently.

>>64075435
>During Minister Shoigu’s December 2022 MOD Collegium remarks, he also stated that the RF AF would establish aviation brigades in the CAAs and 1st GTA (the RF GF’s only tank army). Those are to be composed of both fixed-wing and rotary-wing attack aviation. As far as the Troika knows, there has been no recent discussion of this. However, in fall 2023, the official RF MOD website removed the air forces and air defense armies from underneath each of the military districts’ order of battle lists. The Troika is uncertain why, but earlier than expected integration of attack aviation brigades into the CAAs and 1st GTA could be a possible reason. Of course, integrating such fixed- and rotary-wing attack aviation combat aviation brigades into the Ground Forces’ CAAs and 1st GTA would be a huge military cultural challenge.
>Russian officers do not understand “joint” in the same sense that the U.S. military does, and GF officers are not trained to command and control aviation units.
>Placing attack aviation under army group commanders is unprecedented in the modern Russian Armed Forces and would be difficult to implement. Except for some RF Naval Aviation, all other RF AF fixed-wing and rotary-wing attack aviation is in the RF Aerospace Forces. None are in the Ground Forces.

>>64066214 (OP)
>RF AF military culture will play a large role in military reforms.

>The management consultant Peter Drucker famously said, “culture eats strategy for breakfast.” In the Russian context, their officer-dominated GF and VDV military culture may well eat many proposed and necessary military reforms for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. Conscription is likely to remain a primary source of manpower for the GF and VDV, even though it limits their ability to train at higher-end collective tasks up to the battalion level.

>The RF officer corps will likely resist any reforms that empower “enlisted professionals” to anything approaching the authority and stature of U.S. NCOs
>A professional, well- trained, and empowered Russian NCO corps would infringe on Russian officers’ traditional domains, and offend historical sensibilities—“Our grandfathers defeated the Germans without NCOs, why would we need them now?”

>Meanwhile, GEN Dvornikov has written and spoken frequently about the development of lieutenants. He also experimented with the roles of the senior enlisted. Under his potential leadership, we could expect more, better-educated, and better-trained lieutenants. RF academies are 5 years long and aim to prepare future platoon leaders through battalion commanders. Expect training to become more about combined arms to prepare better battalion tactical group (BTG) component commanders and better future BTG commanders. RF will also work to “professionalize” their conscript army and embrace other possible solutions to extend their training cycles beyond 6 months. (There have been several local proposals on how they might do this.) No matter what, their answers to fixing the deficiencies that Ukraine exposed will be very Russian.

Thanks for reposting the entire text ITT in a less-readable and decontextualized greentext format with no added commentary, analysis or discussion, you fucking autists

>>64066214 (OP)
>The RF AF made many “Potemkin purchases” of new tanks and IFVs over the last several years. They held ceremonies for initial deliveries and even had acquisition contracts, but ultimately few T-90Ms or BMP3s were built or fielded. Equipment that was supposedly ordered in late 2020 appears to be neither fielded nor in production.- For example, as part of the 2008 New Look Reforms, the RF AF extended their modernization goals until the end of 2020. In December 2020, a nationally televised news story showed T-90Ms (the latest model) being delivered at one of the 2nd GMRD’s motor pools. The report announced that the 2nd GMRD’s 165 T-72s would all be replaced. In reality, 2nd GMRD only received five T-90Ms. Between December 2020 and the February 2022 invasion, only 36 T-90Ms were delivered to the entire RF GF: the five already mentioned and a BN set of 31 T-90Ms to the 27th Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade.

>In May 2022, in another nationally televised new story, Uralvagonzavod delivered another 10 T-90Ms to the RF GF. They are still short at least 119 T-90Ms from the December 2020 order. This may have been due to corruption or something less nefarious. However, Western sanctions are now impacting production. Uralvagonzavod’s T-90M plant has been reported as closed.
1/2
I keep having to bring up in discussions that BMP-3s are the only new build AFV that Russia can field while T-90Ms are still T-72 hull based, even if the welded turret is a new one. UVZ no longer can produce new T-72 bulls, just like KMZ cannot produce new BMP-1/2 hulls (as they transitioned into the BMP-3 line during the late USSR). The T-90M production rate is limited by how fast they can refurb T-72s and they have already blown past most of the easily refurbed hulls and are working with the shitty ones at the bottom of the barrel.

>>64075456
>At a minimum, its production is severely impaired. Lack of high tech parts and lack of finance are among several new problems. Russia does not make computer chips. They buy them abroad. Much of their best hardware—to include the RF GF’s and VDV’s VHF tactical frequency-hopping radio, the Kalibr, Iskander-K cruise missile, and other high-end capabilities have U.S., Western European, Japanese, and/or South Korean circuitry (mostly U.S.). Much of those high-end electronics were dual-use purchases through shadow companies in Germany and the Netherlands. Those lanes are now shut down and will be hard to replace. This problem affects tank and IFV production as well. China is a potential source, but Russia seems hesitant to buy chips from China.
2/2

>BMP-3 deliveries and production were also “Potemkin” and face many of the same problems as the T90-M. Development of the 2S35 Koalitsiya, the RF GF’s next self- propelled (SP) howitzer, is also impacted. Production problems are likely much greater for replacement precision munitions.
Sanctions work for supply chain shocks

>>64066214 (OP)
>In the U.S. context, the term “airborne” conjures images of physically fit, highly trained light infantry who land on the military objective, delivered by parachute or helicopter. We also associate “airborne” soldiers with long-range patrols, raids, and ambushes. U.S. airborne units have a relatively small number of vehicles and heavier equipment. The Russian context is different. (Russians are different!)

>As the Troika has previously written, the RF AF lacks a dismounted infantry culture. This is true even in the VDV. The RF VDV is a completely mechanized force. “Desantniki” (airborne troopers) may arrive on the battlefield via parachute or helicopter, but once on the ground, they prefer to quickly mount their armored vehicles and tanks to assault their objectives. They typically land near the objective, mount up, and then attack.
Time to die around BMDs wholesale as they provide jack shit resistance to 7.62 MG fire at urban ranges.
>Muh VDV were successful
>Didn't hold the airport long enough for airlift to work
>Didn't hold out long enough for reinforcements to arrive
>Hunted down by civvie hunters in a few incidents

>>64074716
You are correct, It is far superior: 12 weeks of OCS after a few ROTC classes is a joke compared what they get.

A minimum of a decade of military experience, prior service in a leadership role and a four year dedicated Military Science program compare quite favorably to a few extra Gen Ed classes combined with three months of glorified summer camp.

>>64066214 (OP)
>>64075413
>Before this invasion, the new future of the VDV was supposed to be air assault. The 31st Guards Brigade was the VDV’s experimental force and showcased air assault operations, fast-roping, sling- loading and air-deliverable vehicle capabilities in recent strategic exercises such as ZAPAD-2021, KAVKAZ-2020, and TSENTR-2019.

>Before this offensive, the VDV Commander GEN-COL Andrey Serdyukov and his predecessor GEN-COL (Ret) Vladimir Shamanov (now Head of the Duma’s Defense Committee) had both been lobbying MOD and the Duma to buy the VDV its own organic helicopter fleet.

>However, despite the air assault contingencies before several failed assault river crossings in May 2022, the VDV has not conducted an air assault since the first week of this offensive. As mentioned above, the 31st Brigade’s combat debut air assault was a disaster. The two air assaults in the south (7th AASLT DIV and 11th ABN BDE) were initially successful, but quickly stalled when the VDV attempted to exploit its own breaches with their mechanized forces.

>At this point, consolidated and reconstituted VDV units appear to be operating as mini-Ground Forces, but with less capable equipment grinding out a few kilometers a day, trying to push north from Popasna. There were even (unconfirmed) reports 2 months ago that VDV soldiers were being asked to reconstitute the depleted 810th Guards Separate Naval Infantry Brigade.

The VDV is fucking deader than dead, they're reconstituted mobnik meat.

>>64066214 (OP)
>>64074741
>>64075421
>The Troika could be wrong, and perhaps the Russians established ad hoc targeting elements at their groups of forces/military district levels. But that would be very unusual and counter to their culture of fixing or reforming what they have and not building new tactical structures. Instead, the Troika believes that although the Russian Ground Forces’ AAGs are no longer physically grouped, they are instead dispersed in a “Network of Fires” consisting of: an AAG FDC, networked sensors, organic and “pushed down” heavy (long-range) cannon artillery and MRLs, Iskander-Ms, and RF “joint” Aerospace Forces UMPK missions. The Troika doubts that all RF GF army commands are fully proficient at this, and there is likely a great disparity of capability, experience, and effectiveness among different CAAs and 1st GTA, even within the same groups of forces. Also for now, the RF AAGs have a limit of effectiveness at about 70 km beyond the LCC. The Troika is uncertain why 70 km is their limit. Perhaps this is a technical limitation based on UAV repeater strings, or it is due to the limits of terrestrial backup UHF antennas. However, the Troika is confident that the Russians’ 70-km horizon is just temporary, because other Russian forces have reportedly already learned how to maintain Russian strategic-range UAVs over Odesa, 200 km from the nearest Russian CPs on Crimea. These Russian improvements are momentous.
For anyone wondering why they aren't utter and total failures, see point about ISR drone spam and this being one of the areas where air and artillery shine since they actually have those two in serious numbers and aren't diarrhea-attriting them like their combat line forces. Range limitation is curious, might also be a communication times limitation as well, too long to call fires in to arrive in a timely manner against possibly mobile targets?

>>64066214 (OP)
This is why we get shitty jump cut videos where they don't show things that are destroyed
>Russian pattern-of-life (pattern-of-activity) TTPs likely grew out of 2 years of Russian failures erroneously attacking UAF decoys and other false targets. To put this improvement into perspective, until November 2023, the RF AF very seldom made any efforts to conduct battle damage assessments (BDA) of the targets they attacked. Until November 2023, they seldom (if ever) observed UMPK-guided bomb attack targets afterwards and, for technical reasons, those targets were limited to 60 km beyond the Line of Combat Contact (LCC). Until November 2023, Russians might use a UAV to film the UMPK impact, but then that UAV would immediately depart the location. Now the Russians revisit the targets and conduct post-attack BDA as a regular part of their targeting cycle. Until recently, Russians’ pre-attack studies of their targets were even worse, many times based off old maps, questionable HUMINT, other old information, and templates based on Russian tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs, Russian taktika).
Because this is institutional culture (along with constantly lying) for them.

>We have asked other experts, including a graduate of the RF General Staff Academy—they are equally unaware of any similar terms used by the Russians to define command relationships.
Someone's flying outta window.

>>64075319
>I'll never understand the Russian obsession with saunas.
1. Historically it was the only way to get a warm bath in a rural setting. Still is in many bumfuck army locations, i.e. at most you get a banya (russian sauna) turned on once a week or less.
2. There was a big communal aspect of this stuff, i.e. you'd go there with others and chill there.
3. Once that happened, alcohol would materialize from out of nowhere and it would turn into an alcohol shitfest.
4. Fucking was often the next step.
(a less degenerate variant of this is also popular in Finland)

Piggybacking on this tradition, many would take business partners to sauna either to discuss work shit or after finishing up work as something to relax afterwards.

These days it's usually just an excuse to go there with "z boys" to get hammered with alcohol and either fuck some whores (requesting call girls in the norm in pretty much all saunas), boys or each other.

>>64075507
> actually have those two in serious numbers and aren't diarrhea-attriting them like their combat line forces
In 2023, we’re in 2025 we’re even seen Russian largest drones operating 10km into their own lines shot down. Russians didn’t manage to operate any ISR drones near Odesa since drone interceptors got introduced and ISR drones near front get shot down by hundreds a day

>>64075421
Putin is a confirmed historylet schizo at least starting after he spent too much time in his COVID bunker listening to Dugin:
>Understanding Putin and Russian Historical Narratives. (23 June 2023)

>22 June 2023 is the 82nd anniversary of the start of Operation BARBAROSSA, when Nazi Germany turned on its loyal Soviet allies and invaded the USSR. This is a date that every Russian child learns at an early age. It is 7 December 1941, 11 September 2001, and 4 July 1776 all wrapped together and tied up nicely with the Russian national symbol, a ribbon of St. George. On 22 June 2023, Putin, along with members of the RF MOD and veterans, commemorated this event by laying wreaths at the tomb of the unknown soldier just outside the Kremlin walls, and by observing a moment of silence. A ceremony called the “Candle of Memory” was conducted throughout Russia, where Russians lit candles at dawn in memory of those who died. As part of that ceremony in the main church of the RF Armed Forces, part of the eternal flame was used to light 1,418 commemorative candles, signifying the number of days of the Great Patriotic War. The RF MOD’s Telegram channel commemorated the event by posting several historical documents highlighting the first hours/days of the invasion and the “courage, fearlessness, and heroism” of the Red Army soldiers and commanders. These documents discussed a failed attack by German aircraft attempting to block the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) in the Sevastopol Bay by dropping mines in the inlet to the Black Sea, along with the successful retaliatory strike by BSF aircraft against the naval base of Constanta in Romania.
1/2

>>64066214 (OP)
>>64075558
>Two years before June 2023, Putin commemorated the 80th anniversary of this event by publishing an OpEd article entitled “Being Open, Despite the Past” in the German newspaper Die Zeit. It was the first of his “unholy trinity” of strategic documents published in a 20-day period in the summer of 2021, as Russia was secretly preparing for a renewed, intensified attack against Ukraine in 2022. It was followed in rapid succession by a new Russian Federation National Security Strategy (NSS), and an academic paper on European history written by Putin. All these documents were also promptly posted on the RF government’s official website. Clearly the timing, content, and sequencing of the unholy trinity documents were not by coincidence.
2/2

>>64075551
Yeah parts of this are fairly dated with how fast paced war progression has been going. There's a lack of mention of Ukraine's drone interceptor drones for dealing with ISR drones for one thing I noticed even if it shuold be a 2025Q1 development. Iran getting their shit pushed in didn't make it (given the date of it) in here either which shifts the Shahed supply as well.
>We're past T-62/T-55s and turtle tanks
>Motorcycle meat wave assault era
But glide GBUs, improved kill chains (over their atrociously awful ones at the start of 2022) and Ukraine not getting (much) more longer ranged fires from Western nations (yet?) has been a problem for reaching ammo further back to fuck Russia over. This is still an "improvement" over the hot mess that the Russians were in 2022.

>>64074684
>Baseduzes
you cannot pluralize Soyuz and still have it escape the wordfilter

>>64075330
I live in a place where I can get a nice hot bath in my own home

>>64075540
>requesting call girls in the norm in pretty much all saunas
How does that work? Where do they even fuck lol

>>64074684
Tourist

>>64066214 (OP)
>Russians are remarkably open and transparent about their worldviews and intentions. Russians tell us who they are, what they believe, why they believe it, and what they plan to do about it. We would be well-served to listen (and read, in this case)

>Victory Day celebrates Russia’s dominant narrative and national myth, in which the Great Patriotic War (their name for WWII) is central. In the current version of this narrative, Russia was attacked by Nazi Germany, valiantly fought back, and defeated the Germans at immense national cost. Russia freed Europe from the scourge of Nazism only to be rejected, shunned, contained, and later surrounded by the very people that they saved. This continues a Russian historical narrative of repeatedly defending and saving an ungrateful West—against Mongols, Turks, the French, and other interlopers. Putin reiterated this narrative, as described above, on the 80th anniversary of the start of Operation BARBAROSSA, in an OpEd for the German newspaper Die Zeit, in June 2021.
>A large mural at the entrance to the HQ of the Russian Peacekeeping Brigade in Bosnia in the 1990s simply and (not so) humbly said, “We saved the world.” The words were printed above a painting of WWII Soviet soldiers and contemporary paratroopers. Indeed, Russia suffered a great cost in order to save the world.
>When the Troika was young, the quoted number was 20 million Soviet casualties in WWII. By the time we were field grades, it was up to 27 million, and now the Russians are hawking the figure of 32 million casualties. We do not dispute that it was a very high number; but it is unclear how it continues to grow.

What a fucking chunni nation. Putin's kind of like an insufferable isekai LN protagonist in this way.

>>64075574
Zenit. Forgot the name of the Soyuz/Vostok based orb that has actual film cameras that has to return to Earth for processing after orbit.

>>64066214 (OP)
>Countries that were part of the USSR from 1941 to 1945 will point out that the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) accounted for about half of the population of the USSR at the time. Whether the real number of Soviet casualties is 20, 27, or 32 million, they were Soviet. Not all casualties were ethnic Russians, nor were they all from the RSFSR. Since 1991, Russia has claimed the Soviet narrative in its entirety and given it an ethnonational Russian component that is not entirely accurate.

...

>After teaching the Russian Way of War course to U.S. military audiences for over 3.5 years, the Troika has observed that many, perhaps even most, of our U.S. military students are familiar with the Russian Great Patriotic War narrative. Many have internalized it, either deliberately or subconsciously, and some even defend current Russian actions based on it. It is important that U.S. military personnel, especially those working in the European Theater, be aware that Russia’s narrative is one of many competing narratives and apply a measure of critical thinking and analysis to Russia’s story. We would also do well to listen more to the WWII narratives presented by our NATO allies, many of whom have intimate knowledge of Russia and Russians

>>64075595
> but it is unclear how it continues to grow.
Same way how number of Jewish holocaust survivors keep growing

>>64069574
My dude, USSR goes "Mighty Russia make big clunky just work awesome-tough point and go kill", and every smoothbrain went "Ok, I believe you. Jump in da line, rock your capitalism on time!" and in the end never connected two facts.
To us? Laughingstock since oh birth or so.

>>64069574
Because nukes. Nothing more and nothing less.

>>64067250
>millions on online influences
It's chump change and frankly, but yeah the claim that Russia is actually successful when it comes to influencing the US via the internet is retarded, its just grifters all the way down. Even if we gave them the benefit of the doubt and assumed they believed their own bullshit and that that they were having an effect. They aren't creating new political impetus and they certainly are not the cause of dissent. Ruskies and Chinks think they are clever when they stir the pot due to their own shitty experience with civil war and governmental collapse. However like everything else their experiences were shit because they were shit. A civil war in America would be completely different because it isn't a poor shithole. Here random murder and terrorism would both paradoxically result in a more destruction at least of one side's infrastructure and population but also rapid conclusion of the war by the sheer volume of death. I predict a functional victory for the forces of white nationalism in this vaguest sense within six months. At which point the removal of jews, blacks, spics, ect would make the successor state more powerful than the US going in, thus it kinda defeats the purpose. And foreign aggitation and support for whichever side is currently disadvantaged in such a conflict is almost irrelevant because as previously stated there are so many firearms, explosives, chemical weapons, and the means to create more within the US that foreign aid to the belligerents would provide a negligible increase if it could even be done given the fact that the US Navy would still exist in some fashion.

So even if they were successful all civil strife in the US would do is create a more powerful hostile actor who isn't restrained by libtard bullshit.

>>64075645
>all civil strife in the US would do is
Paralyse the US with indecision so that they can't be relied to give weapons to Ukraine that would otherwise have finished this war two years ago with TZD

That's been the most successful Russian action so far really

>>64075452
yeah, this is starting to piss me off

>>64075595
at least the insufferable isekai LN protagonists actually succeed
monke would fuck things up within 10 days of being given such an opportunity

I've been saying since day one that the ukies should have put major priority on disrupting russian rail operations.

>>64075801
Yeah but they have the hack of an author writing them. The author of our reality took a winter shit on Putin for laughs and more recently smacked the sub base in the far east with the 6th largest quake and associated tsunami.
>No plot armor edi

>>64075865
>smacked the sub base in the far east with the 6th largest quake and associated tsunami
Urgh I hate these ham-handed climate change message plotlines
What's next, drug abuse episode?
Really jumped the shark this season
(I still blame the Writers strike for cancelling the Prigozhin coup arc)

>>64075895
>Prigozhin coup arc
It was such a good buildup and let down by a wet fart

>>64075895
desu I think they were going for more "ironic" than climate change. The Soviet Union's national history has General Winter fucking the Nazis over... in Soviet Ukraine. Then there was the Poseidon weapon that Putin kept being a little chunni bitch about.

>>64075895
I think they were going for more "ironic" than climate change. The Soviet Union's national history has General Winter fucking the Nazis over... in Soviet Ukraine. Then there was the Poseidon weapon that Putin kept being a little chunni bitch about.

>>64074784
So what im getting from this is they took a while to start doing what the US arty does in terms if operating in the field and how they resupply, cuz a battery is to be emplaced laterally and in depth, the entire battallion is spread over a wide area, and resupply for ammunition is typically driver to the battery or a meeting point with the ammo humpers and a small group of soldiers to then load up all the ammo for transport back for each individual gun

>>64075936
Yeah if you look at early 2022 photos they unironically had giant piles of opened up crates right next to their artillery (and more unopened ones) which were themselves in nice close formations.

>>64075860
nah much better to clandestinely drone strike their strategic bombers

>>64075163
So they are basically a discount vader saying pray i dont alter the deal

>>64075586
>How does that work? Where do they even fuck lol
You don't want to know. You can look up an approximation of this in porn.

>>64075215
Dam, having that shit as accountable means you cant use it without punishment i suppose

>>64076029
>strike their strategic bombers

That's nice, fine, and dandy but it's not as important as affecting russsian logistics and mobility. If properly planned and executed, at the upper level. entire trainloads could subjected to concentrated attacks. Further down stretches could be put out of action and repair crews attacked.

>>64075595
>but it is unclear how it continues to grow.
It's just less hiding of reality, the amount of dead is hidden in archives because it's uber fucked up. Soviets didn't dare to show reality right after the fact, initially they bullshited everyone about just 5 million losses IIRC.

>>64075645
>the claim that Russia is actually successful when it comes to influencing the US via the internet is retarded, its just grifters all the way down
half of your retards online eat up shit from those grifters

>>64076105
I have been actually wondering about how many train locomotives russia has overall. Considering how much their shit is shipped through railways, it could pay dividends to start focusing on fucking up their locomotives

>>64074730
>Wonder if the damaged ones mentioned were the ones being loaded to be shipped back to refurb with those photos.
The dates line up: video of the DPICM attack was posted Jan 1 and pictures of the fragmentation-damaged platform being transported (picrel) on Feb 11. I remember speculation here that the damage looked like small arms fire, breddy cool to have some confirmed context on the attack.

>>64076186
Ukraine is burning down something more valuable and less numerous, substations feeding railway junctions

>>64075843
Double post Soviet on post Soviet violence option: M-55 vs Choma'ho III/IV.

>>64076277
They need to do more than that. There are switches, junction boxes, culverts, and bridges that should be hit. Either anticipate a movement on the line and stop a train or attack it, or wait for repair untis and attack those.

>>64076227
The uparmored cab and rocket pod configuration really are huge survivability factors then given as another example: >>64074741
>The launcher, which did not receive a direct hit, did not detonate, and Russians assessed that the IRIS-T missiles themselves were shielded by their cannisters.
Between insensitive munitions with less 'splodey HE, I guess there's a stark difference between munition containers/tubes (ex: S300/S400 when it comes to how well they can take frag and reduce the velocity of it. Compare and contrast to field expedient sheet metal and cages on Grads and other whacky abominations.

bro saw a pdf decided to post anything that was remotely bad for russia

jesus this is why we cant have any sort of discussion on this shithole anymore

>>64076485
Seething lol

>>64075421
>>64075558
Putin going fully Whatifalthis on Tucker's ass was great.

>>64075480
Having a military uniform on doesn't mean you have military experience nor does herding goats constitute as 'prior service in a leadership role'.

>>64075843
Old Yugoslav APC's were also donated so there's a small corner of Ukraine that feels just like Yugoslavia in the early 90's but with less accordian an songs about war crimes.

>>64076515
Ah, let me guess; another case of NATO and the Ukraine lying about Nork troop quality and their leadership based on your decades of time inside the KPA right? Somehow i trust NATO, RoK and Ukrainian military intel more than some random guy on 4chan.

>>64076798
Then you tell me why a junior seargent is herding goats?

Fucking retard lmao

>>64076798
> another case of NATO and the Ukraine lying about Nork troop quality and their leadership
What troop quality? Last time remember they were suffering about 5-10k casualties in Kursk, would walk over open fields and capture territory by having more bodies than Ukrainian soldiers there had bullets to kill them. They were lower quality than Russians

>>64075480
12 weeks of training followed by going to their unit and then learning durectly under the experienced nco's for several years while actively doing the job and after those several years they may be in charge of a company while still being surrounded by people with over a decade of experience. Its a pretty straight forward pipeline of basic training and real world learning combined with direction and leadership from more experienced people throughout

>>64076485
>noooo you can’t make fun of the comedically incompetent and cartoonishly evil army
cry about it. I still feel the latent glee of 2022 and watching decades of russia stronk get incinerated in an instant, fuck apologists of russia’s blatant degeneracy

>>64076277
I know, but seems that russia is getting through that one way or another.
Whereas I have feeling russian economy would grind into final halt if their locos started blowing up liberally

>>64075645
Have you ever heard the name Vladimir Pozner? He did Soviet influence ops in the 1980s, and he was better at it because he spoke English in an American accent and understood American culture a bit better (on account of having grown up partially in the U.S., his parents were some half-Russian Jewish communists who were in France when Germany invaded and they managed to escape to New York, and then moved to the USSR in the 1950s). He was a bit shocking on American T.V. at the time because he wasn't one of these beetle-browed Russians being like "ze party told us to say this." He could speak "American" and give their line a bit better. He comes in at the end here:
https://youtu.be/CduM6Y-6-xU

But he later said -- take it with a grain of salt -- that the KBG was not effective in the U.S., because most Americans didn't care what was going on outside of their town. The USSR did have influence ops and Radio Moscow but it was a wash. More effective in the third world. But his conclusion was that it's very hard for any foreign government to influence Americans because they're not American. Or vice-versa. And it always backfires.

Then I thought about it, and yeah, that's why they do the Texas Oblast thing. They try to pose as white Americans. But even if this was effective, and maybe it is, what influence would that have on U.S. foreign policy? There's a whole other scholarly argument that public opinion has never really had that much effect on foreign policy since at least the U.S. entrance into World War I. Now you see Trump going Mechabrandon. And there are some of his supporters who will react, like, I didn't vote for Mechabrandon. But that's because those people don't decide foreign policy. What's he going to do? Vote for Brandon? Or Jill Stein? Ha ha! The foreign policy establishment has the voters bent over a barrel.

>>64075645
Also, as to U.S. reticence to get involved in Ukraine (even though we have been involved), it's overall probably a lot less due to Russian propaganda as it is a reaction to experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, which were our own doings. It's an internal issue in America. Then there are bigger geopolitical issues at stake like China, and the U.S. government is trying to shift the burden of responsibility to the Europeans who have been free-riding on the U.S. defense umbrella so the U.S. military can focus its resources more on the Pacific. When the Trump administration would point that out, they did it in their shocking sort of way, but it's not crazy.

>>64077826
I think the biggest issue about america not being more gung ho about just throwing money and equipment at ukraine as a proxy war against russia is like you said being in afghanistan and shit for 20 years plus with the immigrant, housing, general monetary crisis for the common man and why that money isnt being spent to fix in house problems

>>64076849
>why a junior seargent is herding goats
Because he likes to?

>>64077826
>bigger geopolitical issues at stake like China
It boggles my mind how you people can't do basic bitch cause and effect.
You ignore the RU chimpout in Chechnya? You get RU chimpout in Georgia;
You ignore the RU chimpout in Georgia? You get RU chimpout in Ukraine (Crimea and Donbas);
You ignore the RU chimpout in Ukraine? You get RU chimpout in Syria;
You ignore the RU chimpout in Syria? You get RU chimpout in Belarus, Kazakhstan;
You ignore the RU chimpout in Belarus, Kazakhstan? You get RU chimpout in Ukraine (2022);
...
You ignore the RU chimpout in Ukraine? You'll get Chink chimpout in Taiwan;
The best way to neuter China is to have russia lose so badly that all the other brown faggots across the world shit their pants. Simple as.

>>64074692
rather than SWATing in ukraine you can get the russians to send a missile into their apartment.

>>64078210
Happened at least once. One ass blasted retard specified coordinates for a restaurant, as if it was a hidden military object and it was bombed by missiles.

>>64070433
And if I had a 12 foot cock I'd be a flagpole.

>>64066214 (OP)
PDF page 161/Page 320 has the interesting tale of LTC Andrei Demureko (>ko) which an interesting case of how being a vatnig is a state of mind:
>Demurenko’s tale reveals even more about Russian strategic thinking in the 1990s. In 1996, the United States still formally considered Russia to be a strategic partner, as a matter of U.S. policy. Many U.S. military members of a certain age still fondly remember the 1990s as a sort of “golden age” of U.S.-Russian military cooperation, replete with joint patrols, peacekeeping exercises, vodka shots, back-slapping, hugging, and the singing of songs. Indeed, as a matter of formal U.S. policy, the Russian Federation was a strategic partner. The United States and Russia were cooperating and working together as peacekeepers in the Balkans. Some of the Troika got their start as liaison officers (LNOs) embedded with the Russian airborne brigade in Bosnia, or on the staff of the Russian Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) at Supreme headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Yes, the Russian Federation had a GEN-LT/two-star with full staff serving as Deputy SACEUR, and the position included a U.S. Army FAO as military assistant. The PEACEKEEPER series of exercises brought Russian units to Ft. Campbell (Kentucky) and Ft. Riley (Kansas) under the auspices of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), of which Russia was (and still is) a member. In addition, a U.S. 3rd Infantry Division unit traveled to Russia for an exercise.
1/2

>>64066214 (OP)
>>64078266
>Many DC-based think tanks and other pundits blame the United States for spoiling this spirit of cooperation with misguided policies like NATO expansion. However, in 1996, in the middle of this “golden age of cooperation,” the Russian Federation was already purging its ranks of officers they considered to be “in the enemy camp,” i.e., in the American camp. In 1996, before a single former Soviet state had appealed to NATO for protection, being too close to the Americans was enough to get a promising young Russian colonel fired, even though he was only executing missions his leaders had sent him on.

>Demurenko’s tale reveals even more about Russian strategic thinking in the 1990s. In 1996, the United States still formally considered Russia to be a strategic partner, as a matter of U.S. policy. Many U.S. military members of a certain age still fondly remember the 1990s as a sort of “golden age” of U.S.-Russian military cooperation, replete with joint patrols, peacekeeping exercises, vodka shots, back-slapping, hugging, and the singing of songs. Indeed, as a matter of formal U.S. policy, the Russian Federation was a strategic partner. The United States and Russia were cooperating and working together as peacekeepers in the Balkans. Some of the Troika got their start as liaison officers (LNOs) embedded with the Russian airborne brigade in Bosnia, or on the staff of the Russian Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) at Supreme headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Yes, the Russian Federation had a GEN-LT/two-star with full staff serving as Deputy SACEUR, and the position included a U.S. Army FAO as military assistant. The PEACEKEEPER series of exercises brought Russian units to Ft. Campbell (Kentucky) and Ft. Riley (Kansas) under the auspices of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), of which Russia was (and still is) a member. In addition, a U.S. 3rd Infantry Division unit traveled to Russia for an exercise.
2/2

>>64075149
fucks sake when they meant that the nazi's were coming did the russians mean that they were loading up people to send them to droneschwitz?

>>64077801
>But even if this was effective, and maybe it is, what influence would that have on U.S. foreign policy?
Fewer and less capable troops abroad, because more troops are kept at home for internal security and more procurement dollars are wasted on dumb shit, with weaker alliances to call on or lever. The goal is no longer for the US to remain an effective developed country but with different foreign policy, it's for the US to be less effective - more like a developing country that can't generate credible and coherent force abroad for internal reasons and is isolated in its goals.

>>64078266
>>64078268
Juicy part before the conclusion: Got brought over to the US for co-training, got the full American experience, built friendships here. Went back to Russia, gets life fucked up for "fraternizing with the enemy" unofficially. Becomes a banker under Putin's presidency and pledges himself for the VSMO. Gets lumped into a dogshit quality unit after trying t o volunteer as a 60+ year old. Gets wounded by a mortar. VSMO supporter.
>You can't take the vatnig out out of the Russian - it is an ingrained mindset. It has always been there and he remained in Russia soaking in it. We are just looking at the continuation of Cold War.
Guess that within that baZZZed and trad hellhole on Earth where the pecking order and social interactions are based on being gay raped and gay raping all while embezzling to the last ruble with every lying breath only the genuinely decent ones fuck off and leave the vatnig mentality permanently behind in Russia.

>>64078266
>>64078268
Juicy part before the conclusion: Got brought over to the US for co-training, got the full American experience, built friendships here. Went back to Russia, gets life fucked up for "fraternizing with the enemy" unofficially. Becomes a banker under Putin's presidency and pledges himself for the VSMO. Gets lumped into a dogshit quality unit after trying to volunteer as a 60+ year old. Gets wounded by a mortar. VSMO supporter.
>You can't take the vatnig out out of the Russian - it is an ingrained mindset. It has always been there and he remained in Russia soaking in it. We are just looking at the continuation of Cold War.
Guess that within that baZZZed and trad hellhole on Earth where the pecking order and social interactions are based on being gay raped and gay raping all while embezzling to the last ruble with every lying breath only the genuinely decent ones fuck off and leave the vatnig mentality permanently behind in Russia.

>Because of his experience, Demurenko was assigned as Chief of Staff and 1st Deputy Commander to “the Wolf,” a Serbian national who commanded the brigade. The Wolf had previously served with PMC Wagner in Syria, according to Demurenko. The new Chief of Staff quickly took charge, attempting to establish standards and discipline. He asked about standard operating procedures, only to be told “we have none.” They also did not have maps, although they did have a tablet computer with satellite images, which Demurenko found inadequate (remember, he was 66 and first separated in 1996!). He was upset there were no operational graphics on tablet images. Despite their lack of standards, maps, or graphics, he said that the Wolves fought very bravely. He described fighting in a small village called Zaliznyanskoye (Зaлизнянcкoe) west of Soledar, defending a 2-km wide section of PMC Wagner’s northern flank during the battle of Bakhmut (he used the Russian name of Artyomovsk).

>>64070682
Anon, they CAN'T get to the finish line that's why the fumes ran out on their shit.

>>64078145
You're fucking retarded, the US has not ignored any of those russian chimp outs. Rather, it has been europeans who have completely dropped the ball on the russian issue until 2022.

>>64078370
>the US has not ignored any of those russian chimp outs
Ah yes, I remember Obama sending tomahawks to Ukraine in 2014, oh wait he actually bend his back backwards to reset the relations with russia in 2012.

>>64066230
GOOOOOOOOOOOLLLD

>>64075597
>many, perhaps even most, of our U.S. military students are familiar with the Russian Great Patriotic War narrative. Many have internalized it, either deliberately or subconsciously, and some even defend current Russian actions based on it.

Bruh

>>64078162
Add on to that Trumps little bitch behaviour where he can only bully countries he has leverage over but when China didn't back down he wasn't willing to throw hands with them.

>>64078370
Obamas foreign policy with Russia in a nutshell
>"Putin my guy, you better cut that shit out or I'm gonna be pissed"
>Monke does as Monke does
>"Aight imma pretend I didn't see that"

>>64066974
which one is amanda?

>>64075595

Russians conveniently leave out that 2 years earlier they were allied with Nazis and carved East Europe in half

>>64077590
i actually posted it to have a convo on the advancements that they have made which was the point of the pdf

but i forgot this is /k/ and its full of battle scarred generals

>>64079622
The one on the left.

>>64079699
It was barely mentioned in any Russian-written history book to begin with.
Trying to discuss stuff like this in an academic setting in Russia is how you get strange people banging your door at night, or dropping dead rats in front of the door, or whatever.
If they don't just send the cops to raid your house and plant drugs so you can be sent to a HIV-infested rape camp in Siberia.