>>24578691>>24580423>>24581084>>24583079You're right, although it should be noted that Russell's interpretation can lend itself into making Hegel a schellingian, in the sense that all differences are sublated in the absolute identity, and we all know how critical Hegel was of that idea. You mentioned infinity, and for Hegel, infinity is not a mere separation of finitude since that would limit infinity and infinity is precisely the unlimited. Infinity, insofar as it's the absolute affirmation, is the negation of negation that includes the negated content. It negates the finite (since to be finite is to negate the other) but also absorbs it, not by diluting its finitude but by preserving it as an other. This leads to a retrieval of the separatedness Russell talks about, since the Whole cannot be the Whole if it remains in absolute opposition to its parts. If the truth of immediacy is mediation then the truth of mediation must be a return to immediacy, an immediacy that contains mediation. That's the passage from essence to concept. The singular is self-sufficient if and only if it immediatly references both the negation and the negation of negation. Each perspective is equally unconditioned for all of them equally contain each other.
>>24579257>Then you read the section in the foreword of Logik that explicitly said Philosophy can now only be done in GermanHe only says that german lends itself to speculative thought due to the existence of composite words, allowing them to transcend their self-identity or to self-differentiate. It would be quite inconsistent with his philosophy to hold that position. Thought would be reduced to the juxtaposition between signs that bear a contingent relation to one another. There would be no identification between Logos and actuality.
>That is a way to childish and insufficient way to describe what he is doing.That's how he starts his logic, with the most simple thing there is. If he didn't start that way, he would start with something previously mediated. Thus, he would need to presuppose the arbitrary unity of a multiplicity of elements, without even elaborating on the in-itself of each of those elements. They would only appear as being-for-other. One of the purposes of the Phenomenology is to go from the apparition of truth as an other, to truth in-itself. It is true that this immediate in-itself shows itself to pass unto an other, but it is necessary for the passage into essence, which ultimately reabsorbs the truth of immediacy. Hegel is a thinker of how simplicity transitions into complexity and how complexity transitions into simplicity.