Thread 24667254

If by nominalist you mean someone who does not think that universals exist, that universals are not entities in any way shape or form, not even as 'thoughts' in a divine intellect, then yes Aristotle was a nominalist. That's an established fact, anyone who has read his works knows this.

If by 'nominalist' you mean someone who does not think nature is coherent, and that, in that sense, things can be said to 'have essences' - then no, Aristotle was definitely not a nominalist. He argues against this position in Meta 4 and Meta 10 and in other places.

What really triggers my autism is people who import a Thomist/Avicennist account of individuation into Aristotle when it isn't actually there and is, I would argue, incoherent. And a shitload of other philosophers and scholastics would agree with me. The pseuds who post here think that Aristotle believed in a sort of Fisher Price universe in which an Essence of Man (which is not a universal mind you) becomes 'limited' by 'signate matter' to become Socrates. I think that's retarded. It annoys me that kids like you who have not read Aristotle, or were too dense to follow the arguments, preach this as Aristotelianism. Yes I know about that one line about Socrates and Callias. Aristotle did believe the universe was coherent, that there was such a thing as 'human nature' - and so did Occam. Aristotle did not believe in an Essence as a metaphysical entity. Essences, as universal essences, only exist in your mind, and we acquire them by experience, not by a spooky process of "abstracting essences" with our trusty rusty "agent intellect".

It triggers me even more like pseuds like you claim that a "nominalist" reading of Aristotle is what caused the modern world and explains your inceldom. The actual contours of this debate are likely too subtle for the likes of you. Fuck off and go read the Metaphysics five times in a row.

>>24667254 (OP)
If you were trying to make a point through bait, mission accomplished lol

>>24667315
So in other words the issue is that some people can't accept Aristotle's rejection of universals as existent, they think there must be some "explanation" for a thing's being what it is, and this thing is an essence, which is supposed to be neither universal nor particular. In the Aristotelian tradition, nominalists and conceptualists say this is retarded and not necessary. My dog Sancho is a dog because he is Sancho, not because Dogness has been limited by a certain sort of matter. Objects like Sancho which we call "dogs" exist because the universe is coherent because of the unmoved movers, not because God or nature says "hmm let me take this dogness essence... mix it up with a bit of matter here... there we are, a Sancho!" This is what you call representational thought, or hypostatization, making a concept into some sort of Being.

Now just wait some pseud is going to throw us some quote from Meta 7-9, or maybe from Post An, in which Aristotle speaks of a thing's essence, not knowing that the words translated as "essence" are homonymous - even the people on the other side of this debate realize this.

>>24667351
>inb4 "but similarity and likeness are universals checkmate"
Holy shit you guys are rearde REEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE

>>24667315
>If by nominalist you mean someone who does not think that universals exist, that universals are not entities in any way shape or form, not even as 'thoughts' in a divine intellect,
Where does he say this?

>>24667373
It's more of a question of where does he not say this, this is one of his main points. Whenever he rejects Plato's Forms, he's rejecting that universals are entities - rightly or wrongly that's how he understood the Forms. A big chunk of Meta 7 is devoted to attacking specifically the thesis that universals exist in any way. And all of Meta 13 for mathematical objects. And also all over Meta 3. And also in Post An he talks about substantive universals as "the twittering of birds". And all over the natural works he'll randomly attack this. And in De Gen An he rejects the idea that the generation of animals involves some sort of universal or essence-like entity, it's the genetic material of the particular parents. ALL FUCKING OVER THE CORPUS. Read the shit yourself you tradcath pseud, you zoomer swine.

>>24667315
Everyone knows Aristotle was an immanent realist. This is pseud nonsense.

>>24667389
Hey retard have you ever considered what it means to say an "essence" is "in" a natural being? Aristotelian nominalists would agree that the thought "dogness", the nature of "being a dog" is in a way "in" the particular dog, that's a legitimate use of the word "in" which Aristotle actually disambiguates. The question is what exactly it means for an essence to be "in" something. Does it mean there's an actual entity called an Essence? That's the question. Aristotle's answer is no but because of the influence of Plato via Augustine on Catholic thought it took a couple of hundred years for the correct reading to take off. Then in the 19th century the Church decided to circle the wagons around Thomism and now we have people claiming Aristotle was basically a Thomist about the problem of universals when he definitely was not. And really this is one of the biggest barriers to Aristotelianism today, the Fisher Price universe which he supposedly held to, which modern people instinctively recognize as retarded. But instead of saying "yeah, that's not what Aristotle thought, the evolution of species and the differences between particulars isn't actually a problem for him, in fact particulars have absolute ontological priority you see this in the Categories and the Metaphysics" you have these tradcath pseuds insisting "no no there's definitely a Human Nature In Itself and if you reject that you get trans people." Fuck all of you.

>>24667410
Yes, the politicization of medieval metaphysics by Milbank et al is ridiculous. You might like this blog.

https://lyfaber.blogspot.com/

>>24667315
>If by nominalist you mean someone who does not think that universals exist... then yes Aristotle was a nominalist.
Sounds like you're conflating substance with primary substance.
Universals existed for Aristotle as they are indispensable for knowledge and predication, although he rejected Plato's theory that they exist separately from their instantiations.

>the universal is valuable because it makes clear the explanation; hence universal demonstration is more valuable than perception and comprehension.
Can something that doesn't exist be valuable?

>>24667480
>Sounds like you're conflating substance with primary substance.
Right, the word 'substance' is homonymous in Aristotle, just like the terms translated as 'essence'. And 'being'. And 'one'. And 'is'. This is what makes Aristotle such a difficult author to understand. But no I am not conflating them, I understand the distinction just fine. You say 'universals existed for Aristotle as they are indispensable for knowledge and predication' - yes, I agree with you, and so would Occam. The question is how exactly universals can be said to 'exist'. Of course redness or threeness 'exists' and is 'real'. But if you think there is some sort of Thing, of any kind, corresponding to it, besides the thought which stands in potency to particulars, then you're wrong. So you're another guy who doesn't really know Aristotle at all and doesn't even understand the distinctions at issue. You hear 'nominalist' and you think I'm saying Aristotle thought the world was incoherent, that we could not truly say "x is y" because "y" is "just" a thought. You don't know what you're talking about.

>>24667493
So you do think universals exists, thanks for reneging.
>b-but they only exist in the mind
That's completely fine. God's thoughts are prior to anything empirical.
Do you think God was surprised when any substance came into being?

>>24667488
As I predicted, anons who are too retarded to read Aristotle are posting out of context quotes which they do not understand. The universal does exist - it's a thought; and it's a thought that is realized in the world, that's how we acquire this thought in the first place, by experience in the world. So the doctor who knows that disease x should be treated with drug y is employing a universal, and it does indeed exist, in his mind, and also in the world insofar as the world is represented by this thought. That's not the issue. You don't understand what the issue here even is. Please read the Metaphysics five times in a row.

"It is plain that no universal attribute is a substance, and this is plain also from the fact that no common predicate indicates a 'this', but rather a 'such'. If not, many difficulties follow and especially the 'third man'." Meta 7.13

And now, because you're a retard, you'll say "hmmm he says substance... perhaps it exists in some OTHER way?" Why the fuck am I arguing with someone who has not read the books?

"But.. but... YOU said that the universal is realized in the world.... therefore... it clearly exists!"

Again you actually don't know what the debate is about and you don't know what any of these technical terms mean. That's the long and the short of it.

>>24667515
>The universal does exist
t. (you)

>>24667515
>The universal does exist - it's a thought; and it's a thought that is realized in the world, that's how we acquire this thought in the first place, by experience in the world.
You can call me a retard all you want I still don't understand what you've been sperging out about all these years.

>>24667524
Because there are different accounts of how the universal can "exist". On the far left the universal is only a thought in the mind; the things in the world aren't somehow "composed of" an essence, only particulars are substances in the fullest sense of the word. The universal, or the essence, does not play a metaphysical role in making the particular what it is, rather we learn the universal by interacting with particulars. But someone like Aquinas would think that the essence (not the same as a universal) metaphysically constitutes the object in some mysterious way. So there is a debate here, it's just so autistic it flies past your radar. And it is nominalism, this is exactly what medieval nominalism is, and Aristotle was a nominalist.

>>24667521
Right, but not as a substance, and not as the principle of a real substance, though it is the principle of knowing a substance. As Aristotle puts it in De Int it's an "affection of the soul". "But how can it be a principle of knowing a substance if it doesn't exist and make the substance what it is hurr durrr" Right so if you see three tooth-picks there must be a mysterious Triad that is somehow "in" the three toothpicks.

>>24667493
>"I understand the distinction just fine"
>doesn't understand the distinction at all

>>24667538
will you deal with this?>>24667503

>>24667328
Thanks, I'm doing my part.

>>24667315
If universals were not entities in ANY sense in the word and do not even exist, then we couldn't even talk about them, and it would be impossible to say that there is a common property shared by many, a common essence shared by many, etc. There would be nothing for the mind to "lock on" and become identical to. So, universals could not be knowledge, and they could not be even referents.

And before you take a slanted interpretative of a contentious excerpt from Metaphysics, may I present to you an excerpt from Book 5, Chapter 3 of De Anima?
>Actual knowledge is identical with its object.
If universals are not objects in any sense of the word, then they are nothing and as a corollary cannot be known or even thought about. They could not even exist in the mind. There would be nothing for the mind to grasp and no identity to be had!

I'm all for deflating metaphysics as much as possible and not letting culture war nonsense get in the way of good philosophy... but you are going so far as to make abstract thinking a technical impossibility. And that's why nominalism is not satisfying. Philosophy in general makes no sense and cannot even justify itself if nominalism is not true.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rfn0D-rkhsw

>>24667493
>it is... le real... it le exists... but it is also nothing
So nothing exists? Retard moment. Read your Eleatics niggerfaggot.

>>24667315
If universals were not entities in ANY sense in the word and do not even exist, then we couldn't even talk about them, and it would be impossible to say that there is a common property shared by many, a common essence shared by many, etc. There would be nothing for the mind to "lock on" and become identical to. So, universals could not be knowledge, and they could not be even referents.

And before you take a slanted interpretative of a contentious excerpt from Metaphysics, may I present to you an excerpt from Book 5, Chapter 3 of De Anima?
>Actual knowledge is identical with its object.
If universals are not objects in any sense of the word, then they are nothing and as a corollary cannot be known or even thought about. They could not even exist in the mind. There would be nothing for the mind to grasp and no identity to be had!

I'm all for deflating metaphysics as much as possible and not letting culture war nonsense get in the way of good philosophy... but you are going so far as to make abstract thinking a technical impossibility. And that's why nominalism is not satisfying. Philosophy in general makes no sense and cannot even justify itself if nominalism is true.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rfn0D-rkhsw [Embed]

>>24667548
I've been watching this guy as a lurker for a while, and I noticed that he very rarely deals with this kind of response, and if he does, it's more hand-waving and calling anons pseuds. This is disappointing for me, since I've been waiting for a good answer from him for a while on this.

>>24669161
The object of the intellect is a universal and the intellect is indeed identical with this universal - this thought you’ve formed from experience with particulars. Aristotle speaks in de anima of particulars as being “potentially” thoughts, or universals - in other words the concept is not in itself constitutive of the object, a knower knows it as a universal by experience, as he describes in post an 2.19. Similarly he describes percepts as in potency to a perceiver. And note that you’re ignoring all the passages where he denies that universals exist except as thoughts. So you’re ripping passages out of context and misunderstanding them. Even Thomists realize this, they just want a middle term between the particular and the universal, when no such middle is needed, and when any such middle turns out to be a universal - which they RECOGNIZE as nonexistent, as “only” a thought, because Thomists do read Aristotle.
>but I don’t get it… surely red is real!
I explained all of this above. You still don’t understand what the debate is about, I can’t help you.

The main point here is that medieval nominalism explodes the essence existence distinction, so Thomism goes kapoot. (Catholicism does not). Seriously please read the metaphysics carefully and repeatedly, you guys are making Platonist arguments and it’s really heckin’ triggering.

And this will go round and round in a great big retarded circle because you will keep saying some variation of “but surely, our thoughts are real!” Of course they’re real do you think Occam and Abelard were schizophrenic nihilists or what? The question is how they are real, do particulars have genuine ontological priority or not REEEEEEEE

>>24670043
>the mind grasps the universal
>but the universal just gets created out of thin air by the mind from particulars because creation out of nothing and destruction into nothing is something that Aristotle loved doing
>yet somehow I hate the agent intellect explanation is le bad

>>24670043
> do particulars have genuine ontological priority or not REEEEEEEE

>The word prior is used in more sense than one. For there is a difference between the end or final cause and that which exists for the sake of it;
>The latter is prior in order of development, the former is prior in essence.
He uses the example of building a house. In some ways the foundation and materials must be prior to the form of the house being actualized, but the form exists prior to the foundation being laid or the materials gathered.

>>24670043
>>24670056
This is probably your best posting on the matter in months. I have a few questions then.
>The object of the intellect is a universal and the intellect is indeed identical with this universal - this thought you’ve formed from experience with particulars.
If the ontological priority of knowledge is: sensible particulars outside --> universals from experience --> knowledge of universals, then what is the mind actually corresponding to? Is it corresponding to the things "outside", or is it corresponding to merely its own mental product? It seems like you are introducing a representationalism problem with your interpretation of Aristotle.
>Even Thomists realize this, they just want a middle term between the particular and the universal, when no such middle is needed, and when any such middle turns out to be a universal - which they RECOGNIZE as nonexistent, as “only” a thought, because Thomists do read Aristotle.
The representationalism problem goes away if the universal "abstracted away" corresponds with something fundamental in the particular. You may loathe the agent intellect "cracking open" sensible particulars to enjoy the abstracted universal inside account of knowledge, but the Thomists made it up for a reason. You otherwise have a solipsism problem in the account of cognition, and you would need a deeper account of ties between universals and particulars.
>because you will keep saying some variation of “but surely, our thoughts are real!” Of course they’re real do you think Occam and Abelard were schizophrenic nihilists or what? The question is how they are real, do particulars have genuine ontological priority or not REEEEEEEE
Then let's break the circle by making this more about the mechanisms that allows for nominalism to remain grounded in reality, aka, what ties universals to particulars in a way that's more sound than they just spontaneously emerge in the mind without any logical or metaphysical connection or rules whatsoever.

>>24667315
lmao, he posted it again.

Bump

>>24667315
>>24669161
>>24670043
>>24671118
*eats popcorn*

bump

>>24669983
I guess he doesn't have an answer yet, maybe we'll hear back in a few months.

>>24674636
probably crashing out in another thread lol about culture war bs lol

bampu

bumperino