Thread 24856709

Is sex gender? It could not be, for that would mean saying that gender is sex, and then we would say nothing more than one or the other. But gender is not nothing; it exists within several individuals. What is gender? It is the discourse between the sexes in general and the singular sex. Let us set aside the question of discourse, for in any case, for there to be discourse, the singular sex must, instantaneously and as a whole, be one as substance. Otherwise, it could not be used to define gender, which would then have to be defined by itself or aesthetically, and we would go round in circles. If sex is one, can it, consequently, be the other while remaining one?

The being of the one appears multiple in abstraction, for abstraction does not partake of time in itself. The absence of time fragments the one in appearance. The being that, while partaking of becoming, is one, is one at the moment it begins to become. Let us see whether sex is one, instantaneously and as a whole—that is, whether it partakes of the instant and of becoming. If it partakes of the instant, it does not partake of becoming as one. In partaking of time, the one becomes older than itself, and since that which becomes older becomes so relative to the one that becomes younger, in becoming older than itself, it becomes at once older and younger than itself. When, in becoming older, it reaches the present, it no longer becomes but is older and younger than itself. But since becoming is as long as being for the one that is itself, it is the same age as itself and neither becomes younger nor older but one with itself and what it was. However, from the fact that a thing partakes of the one, can we also say that it is, and thus be able to say: “It is a thing”?

The one partakes of being, for being partakes of time. The being of the one exists and is not identical to the one, except for the one insofar as it is one. The being of the one is in motion and at rest: being in itself, it remains motionless, it is at rest; but insofar as it is in another, it is in motion, it partakes of time. But when it becomes in motion or at rest, this happens through change. This change is called the instant, and in this passage from one state to the other, the one is neither at rest nor in motion, and is not in time; not being in time, it is not. When the one is in motion, it is in the other; when it is at rest, it is in itself; between the two it is not, it does not change direction. Being is and becomes, or is not, insofar as it partakes of time, and it necessarily does so as long as it is. The one is when it partakes of time, and the one becomes because it partakes of time.

Insofar as it partakes of the one in creation and becoming while in motion, let us see whether, taken instantaneously, it can be the other. Let us assume that p is a substance, and as we have said, is one in itself and its becoming, and that the same holds for q, and that p and q are generated at the same instant by generation (γένεσις) and can generate (γεννάω) as corruptible things that necessarily partake of motion. Let us finally assume that p can be q. If p is, therefore becomes p, and q is, therefore becomes q, and p can be q, then p must be able to become q and q become p, but in that case, what is p or q? For if p essentially becomes q, not only must p be q—and we are faced with the one, where the members of the species of p or q differ only numerically and the genus of the relation has no quiddity—but in addition p and q must not partake of time, for if we remove becoming from p or from q, since they are one, only this time remains, but without being partaken of by being, this time is not, and if this time is not partaken of, what is p or q?

It follows that p and q are empty, one, and partake of non-Being in the instant insofar as they are other. Moreover, it would be necessary to say essentially “p is q,” but does this not amount to saying “p is p”? If, on the contrary, it is not as one that p can be q, then as what? For we do say: “p is a x” and not “p is x” to speak of p, since saying that it is only is the indefinite.

This is precisely the essentialist doctrine. Essence is prior to existence, and according to this hypothesis, sex is one instantaneously and as a whole, for the category of becoming is that of being, and one sex cannot become the other without being itself and not the other; otherwise it would be the other and not itself and would become the other, but it is only itself and can only become itself. But since experience shows us that we can speak without saying anything, is it possible that we say nothing when we say that the one does not partake of the instant, since how is it that it partakes of generation? Generation is the opposite of corruption, and together they are one, but they are not so before being. For it is indeed in the instant that the non-being of the one becomes being, not being before the instant, it is with the instant. To explain this contradiction, we would have to resort to the ultimate sophism and say that non-being is. But if it is not, it is wrong to say that it is, and if it is, it is wrong to say that it is not. If the one is, everything is one, for the other is not the one. We must further say that everything is one and is not.

And the other.

Any tranny counters ?