>One might wonder why we do not simply declare all individuals to be nothing more than persons, thereby sparing ourselves the repeated invocation of “man” or “woman.” And since “person” is a universal taken universally, whereas “man” (or “woman”) is strictly and specifically particular, to say “this is a person” is to define a thing by its most singular species, implying that each person differs from every other only numerically—by haecceity alone.
Shall we then assert that persons differ from one another solely in number? We might, for sure. Some people do, of course the question properly belongs to biology.They say that universals taken universally cannot serve as objects of knowledge for any subject. To know what a man or a woman is remains utterly arbitrary. Such things mark the boundary of any whole: never dissimilar, ever the same. Incapable of harboring difference, they are indifferent. And what is indifferent cannot be seized by the intellect.
It is, at the very least, arduous to define a thing while attempting to hold it simultaneously as subject and as object. This is why logic undertakes to discern the impenetrable rules that govern knowledge in general within the subject itself. About the object, nothing can be said without grave difficulty.
Consider, for instance, two individuals asked to behold a man, one of whom is his son. Logic inquires: what, in that instant, is held in common between the knowledge of these two subjects—for all subjects and for all knowledge?
Shall we then assert that persons differ from one another solely in number? We might, for sure. Some people do, of course the question properly belongs to biology.They say that universals taken universally cannot serve as objects of knowledge for any subject. To know what a man or a woman is remains utterly arbitrary. Such things mark the boundary of any whole: never dissimilar, ever the same. Incapable of harboring difference, they are indifferent. And what is indifferent cannot be seized by the intellect.
It is, at the very least, arduous to define a thing while attempting to hold it simultaneously as subject and as object. This is why logic undertakes to discern the impenetrable rules that govern knowledge in general within the subject itself. About the object, nothing can be said without grave difficulty.
Consider, for instance, two individuals asked to behold a man, one of whom is his son. Logic inquires: what, in that instant, is held in common between the knowledge of these two subjects—for all subjects and for all knowledge?