To the Aristotleanon talking in the Meta thread earlier: thoughts on this? About sexe.
The being of the one appears multiple in abstraction, for abstraction does not partake of time in itself. The absence of time fractures the one in appearance. The one partakes of being because being partakes of time. The being of the one exists and is not identical to the one, except for the one insofar as it is one. The being of the one is in motion and at rest: being in itself, it remains immobile, it is at rest; but insofar as it is in another, it is in motion, it partakes of time. But when it becomes in motion or immobile, this occurs through change. This change is called the instant, and in this passage from one state to the other, the one is neither at rest nor in motion, and is not in time; not being in time, it is not. When the one is in motion, it is in the other; when it is immobile, it is in itself; between the two it is not, it does not change direction. Being is and becomes or is not, insofar as it partakes of time, and it does so necessarily as long as it is. The one is when it partakes of time, and the one becomes because it partakes of time.
Insofar as the one partakes in creation and becoming while it is in motion, let us see if, taken instantaneously, it can be the other. A substance is that which exists by itself. Let us admit that p is a substance, and as we have said, is one in itself and its becoming, and that the same holds for q, and that p and q are generated at the same instant by generation (γένεσις) and can generate (γεννάω) as corruptible. Lastly, let us admit that p can be q. If p is, thus becomes p, and q is thus becomes q, and p can be q, it will be necessary that p can become q and q become p, but in that case, what is p or q? For if p essentially becomes q, not only will it be necessary that p be q—and we are faced with the one, where the members of the species of p or q differ only numerically and the genus of the relation has no quiddity—but in addition p and q must not partake of time, for if we remove becoming from p or becoming from q, since they are one, all that remains is this time, but without being partaken of by being, this time is not, and if this time is not partaken, what is p or q? It follows that p and q are empty, the one, and partake of non-being in the instant. Moreover, it will be necessary to say essentially “p is q,” but does this not amount to saying “p is p”? If, on the contrary, it is not insofar as one that p can be q, then insofar as what? For we rightly say: “p is a x” and not “p is x” to speak of p, since saying that it is alone is the indefinite.
The being of the one appears multiple in abstraction, for abstraction does not partake of time in itself. The absence of time fractures the one in appearance. The one partakes of being because being partakes of time. The being of the one exists and is not identical to the one, except for the one insofar as it is one. The being of the one is in motion and at rest: being in itself, it remains immobile, it is at rest; but insofar as it is in another, it is in motion, it partakes of time. But when it becomes in motion or immobile, this occurs through change. This change is called the instant, and in this passage from one state to the other, the one is neither at rest nor in motion, and is not in time; not being in time, it is not. When the one is in motion, it is in the other; when it is immobile, it is in itself; between the two it is not, it does not change direction. Being is and becomes or is not, insofar as it partakes of time, and it does so necessarily as long as it is. The one is when it partakes of time, and the one becomes because it partakes of time.
Insofar as the one partakes in creation and becoming while it is in motion, let us see if, taken instantaneously, it can be the other. A substance is that which exists by itself. Let us admit that p is a substance, and as we have said, is one in itself and its becoming, and that the same holds for q, and that p and q are generated at the same instant by generation (γένεσις) and can generate (γεννάω) as corruptible. Lastly, let us admit that p can be q. If p is, thus becomes p, and q is thus becomes q, and p can be q, it will be necessary that p can become q and q become p, but in that case, what is p or q? For if p essentially becomes q, not only will it be necessary that p be q—and we are faced with the one, where the members of the species of p or q differ only numerically and the genus of the relation has no quiddity—but in addition p and q must not partake of time, for if we remove becoming from p or becoming from q, since they are one, all that remains is this time, but without being partaken of by being, this time is not, and if this time is not partaken, what is p or q? It follows that p and q are empty, the one, and partake of non-being in the instant. Moreover, it will be necessary to say essentially “p is q,” but does this not amount to saying “p is p”? If, on the contrary, it is not insofar as one that p can be q, then insofar as what? For we rightly say: “p is a x” and not “p is x” to speak of p, since saying that it is alone is the indefinite.