2024 stolen: smoking gun pdf
Here is why 2024 was actually stolen:
https://files.catbox.moe/9bu8jr.pdf
>The Pro V&V analysis treats this as a simple fix: "The file is unique, so the hash check fails. Let's move it so the hash check passes. Problem solved." No need for deep auditing (kek)
>Why is the file unique in the first place? lmfao
>A configuration file for a critical election system should not be unique upon delivery. It should be standardized, minimal, and secure by default. Its uniqueness should only come from the official, witnessed configuration process that occurs immediately before an election
>By making this file "dynamic" (i.e., exempt from verification), ES&S and Pro V&V are accepting a significant risk:
>Tampering During Transport/Storage: A "dynamic" file is not checked for integrity. If a bad actor gains physical access to a machine before it's configured (e.g., during shipping or in a warehouse), they could replace or modify the configuration.ini file with a malicious one. This poisoned file could:
>Enable Hidden Features: As, it could >activate debug modes,
>enable unauthorized network access, or >change logging levels to hide malicious activity, options that are never presented in the GUI.
>Introduce Subtle Logic Flaws: A malformed line or a specific parameter could exploit a bug in the file-parsing code (a very common vulnerability class) to trigger a buffer overflow or other exploit, potentially compromising the entire machine.
>Pre-Configure Evil Settings: It could pre-load specific settings that seem benign but are designed to be exploited later.
>Loss of Integrity Assurance: The entire point of hash verification is to create a trusted baseline. By exempting this file, you are creating a "blind spot" in your security apparatus. You are no longer able to cryptographically prove that the system, as delivered, matches the certified system. You have to trust that the file hasn't been altered since it left the trusted build environment
https://files.catbox.moe/9bu8jr.pdf
>The Pro V&V analysis treats this as a simple fix: "The file is unique, so the hash check fails. Let's move it so the hash check passes. Problem solved." No need for deep auditing (kek)
>Why is the file unique in the first place? lmfao
>A configuration file for a critical election system should not be unique upon delivery. It should be standardized, minimal, and secure by default. Its uniqueness should only come from the official, witnessed configuration process that occurs immediately before an election
>By making this file "dynamic" (i.e., exempt from verification), ES&S and Pro V&V are accepting a significant risk:
>Tampering During Transport/Storage: A "dynamic" file is not checked for integrity. If a bad actor gains physical access to a machine before it's configured (e.g., during shipping or in a warehouse), they could replace or modify the configuration.ini file with a malicious one. This poisoned file could:
>Enable Hidden Features: As, it could >activate debug modes,
>enable unauthorized network access, or >change logging levels to hide malicious activity, options that are never presented in the GUI.
>Introduce Subtle Logic Flaws: A malformed line or a specific parameter could exploit a bug in the file-parsing code (a very common vulnerability class) to trigger a buffer overflow or other exploit, potentially compromising the entire machine.
>Pre-Configure Evil Settings: It could pre-load specific settings that seem benign but are designed to be exploited later.
>Loss of Integrity Assurance: The entire point of hash verification is to create a trusted baseline. By exempting this file, you are creating a "blind spot" in your security apparatus. You are no longer able to cryptographically prove that the system, as delivered, matches the certified system. You have to trust that the file hasn't been altered since it left the trusted build environment
