Thread 16738193

Am I going insane, or am I onto something?:

If the lone observer's experience exhibits coherence and structure, while also resisting phenomenologically to their will, perhaps they are not so alone. Even if such structure is purely a creation of the unconscious mind, this breaks the solipsistic conception of the united self, admitting an inner otherness; a domain within the self that is not governed by the self, and thus functionally indistinct from externality. Furthermore, because this otherness cannot be fully grasped or controlled, its status as a product of the mind can no longer be proven, therefore making it epistemically unjustified to assume it is. Belief in external reality beyond the mind then becomes rational, as there is already provably internal otherness, making external otherness not only coherent but more plausible.
In regard to the existence of other minds, they exist in the only way that is necessary, as a distinct otherness, separate from the self. Whether they are independent beings or manifestations of a deeper source, they are not illusions. They resist, they relate, they matter and should be treated as real because they are. This does not mean that the other cannot conflict with you, threaten you, or oppose you. Otherness does not guarantee harmony; it guarantees reality. And because they are real, your response to them must be real, whatever form that response takes. Ethics begins not with agreement, but with recognition.

sensations derive from external stimuli
a malfunctioning hallucinating brain is still responding to external stimuli but erroneously
existence of an observer presupposes the existence of a world in which he is placed

Good argument against "self-propelled" solipsism, how about "a brain in a jar" or Matrix type of solipsism? The reality in that models is still hallucinated and fake, however uncontrolled.

>>16738334
braine spek onli

>>16738193 (OP)
You make quite a jump from "admittedly, there must be internal otherness" to "this means external otherness is also justified".
Keep in mind that to the solipsist, this distinction is not mere word-play. It's not mere abstraction. In one conception, their really is only a mind, and the other (the mainstream idea), there is mind but also an external physical universe.
As such, the "only mind exists and here only mine" is the way more parsimonious assumption.

You're going to have to play by the rules of solipsism, and that requires two rules:

1. One can only be aware of themself/their own consciousness.

And thus

2. It's superfluous to believe others are conscious/have the innate sense of being the solipsistic person does.

I think however, that the rules kinda brick themselves at the first rule, though. I mean, to be honest, if we can't know if others are conscious, how do we know we ourselves are? I mean, what would we be exactly "conscious" relative to? Every atom could be conscious; the solipsist couldn't know that, so the entire theory is based on shooting not in the dark, but in the black hole, where there isn't even a foundation to stand on because it's just guessing on unanswerable questions. What does it exactly mean to be conscious/experience something? How do we actually know what this is or if we are "experiencing" at all? A Boltzmann brain can pose this dilemma for a solipsist, so in my view, basically all of this kinda boils down to where you begin your axioms. In the end there is no "foundational" axiom to be grounded to, so I'd say to them that to suggest that they themselves are the lone consciousness is just as superfluous as saying there are infinitely many consciousnesses and that the true answers to the question, with the least amount of superfluous assumptions, are that either there are no consciousnesses at all (which requires one simple assumption: there are no consciousnesses), or that the question itself is simply unanswerable and not worth hedging any bets on.

>>16738193 (OP)
I like what you said at the end about Ethics beginning with recognition. It reminds me of the concept of "attention" that this philosopher I recently read about wrote about: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simone_Weil#Attention

>>16738193 (OP)
>If the lone observer's experience exhibits coherence and structure, while also resisting phenomenologically to their will, perhaps they are not so alone. Even if such structure is purely a creation of the unconscious mind, this breaks the solipsistic conception of the united self, admitting an inner otherness; a domain within the self that is not governed by the self, and thus functionally indistinct from externality.
Yes, that is similar to one of the arguments that Descartes gives in his meditations. Syllogistically:
D1 – My mind are the things I am aware of.
P1 – There are things in my mind whose origins I am not aware of.
P2 – Things that I am not aware of are not of my mind.
C – There are things other than my mind.
That however isn't an argument against simulation or brain in a vat.
>>16738193 (OP)
>they are not illusions
They are things you experience for sure, but you have not proven they have their own subjectivity like you do.

>>16738365
>You make quite a jump from "admittedly, there must be internal otherness" to "this means external otherness is also justified".
It seems fine on surface, you would have to elaborate on that.

>>16738193 (OP)
ever heard of a thing called "paragraphs" for sucks sake? I am not going to read this mess. Try using some spaces next time homo

>>16738524
>There are things other than my mind.
>brain in a vat
>vat
>simulation
>*thing simulation is being run on*
i mean...

>>16738948
Retard, learn to read