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6/27/2025, 4:05:35 PM
>>24500146
>There's plenty, in the East like buddhism and daoism and int the west, like Hume's or Heidegger's philosophy
Daoism’s concept of "no-self" is about emptying the ego to harmonize with the Dao, a functional and ethical posture, not a metaphysical denial of a substratum in the "Buddhist" sense.
You are treating fundamentally different answers to different questions as if they were interchangeable synonyms.
>...authors like Siderits or Westerhoff are much better authors on the subject
This is hiding behind the skirts of profane academia to avoid a genuine metaphysical confrontation.
>Not really, to him convfntional and ultimate, condicioned and unconditioned are two faces of the same coin, you pretty much know nothing of nagarjuna and it shows
This is a combination of pedantry and a fundamental ignorance of the two truths doctrine.
While svabhava means "own-being" or "inherent existence" more precisely than "unconditioned existence," the latter is a perfectly functional descriptor for the concept being denied. To deny svabhava is precisely to deny that anything possesses an unconditioned, independent, self-sufficient mode of being. The objection is a pointless exercise in semantics.
>Not at all, there's a personal identity(pugdala) but not a self(atman) which by it's metaphysical nature can't exist conventionally
This is a pedantic distinction that collapses under the slightest scrutiny. The Self can always only be the Witness, the pure "I" that is the ground of all experience. At the conventional level, this very Witness is what is misapprehended as the transmigrating personal identity—the pudgala that reaps karma. To insist that one exists conventionally while the other does not is a semantic sleight of hand.
>Wrong, i can think of things that doesn't exist, by your lógic every metaphysical thing i can think about must exist, so every metaphysical school must be true even when most of them contradict each other at some point, that leads to an infinite numbers of contradictions
The claim is not that every possibility must necessarily exist, but rather its inverse: that every impossibility cannot exist at any level of reality. To deny this is to abandon the very foundations of logic. A square circle, a married bachelor, the son of a barren woman—these are not merely unreal; they are metaphysical absurdities that can find no foothold in any conceivable domain of existence, whether absolute, dreamlike, illusory, or material. To argue otherwise is to embrace a logic so pliable that it can justify any contradiction, dissolving all distinctions into an undifferentiated morass of meaninglessness. The burden of proof, then, lies with you to demonstrate a single instance of a genuine impossibility that nevertheless manifests in some form.
>There's plenty, in the East like buddhism and daoism and int the west, like Hume's or Heidegger's philosophy
Daoism’s concept of "no-self" is about emptying the ego to harmonize with the Dao, a functional and ethical posture, not a metaphysical denial of a substratum in the "Buddhist" sense.
You are treating fundamentally different answers to different questions as if they were interchangeable synonyms.
>...authors like Siderits or Westerhoff are much better authors on the subject
This is hiding behind the skirts of profane academia to avoid a genuine metaphysical confrontation.
>Not really, to him convfntional and ultimate, condicioned and unconditioned are two faces of the same coin, you pretty much know nothing of nagarjuna and it shows
This is a combination of pedantry and a fundamental ignorance of the two truths doctrine.
While svabhava means "own-being" or "inherent existence" more precisely than "unconditioned existence," the latter is a perfectly functional descriptor for the concept being denied. To deny svabhava is precisely to deny that anything possesses an unconditioned, independent, self-sufficient mode of being. The objection is a pointless exercise in semantics.
>Not at all, there's a personal identity(pugdala) but not a self(atman) which by it's metaphysical nature can't exist conventionally
This is a pedantic distinction that collapses under the slightest scrutiny. The Self can always only be the Witness, the pure "I" that is the ground of all experience. At the conventional level, this very Witness is what is misapprehended as the transmigrating personal identity—the pudgala that reaps karma. To insist that one exists conventionally while the other does not is a semantic sleight of hand.
>Wrong, i can think of things that doesn't exist, by your lógic every metaphysical thing i can think about must exist, so every metaphysical school must be true even when most of them contradict each other at some point, that leads to an infinite numbers of contradictions
The claim is not that every possibility must necessarily exist, but rather its inverse: that every impossibility cannot exist at any level of reality. To deny this is to abandon the very foundations of logic. A square circle, a married bachelor, the son of a barren woman—these are not merely unreal; they are metaphysical absurdities that can find no foothold in any conceivable domain of existence, whether absolute, dreamlike, illusory, or material. To argue otherwise is to embrace a logic so pliable that it can justify any contradiction, dissolving all distinctions into an undifferentiated morass of meaninglessness. The burden of proof, then, lies with you to demonstrate a single instance of a genuine impossibility that nevertheless manifests in some form.
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