Thread 17924439

Aristotle:

>P1: Matter is capable of receiving forms
>P2: Matter cannot hold contrary forms in its parts simultaneously (e.g. a square body cannot also be a circular body)
>P3: The mind is capable of receiving contrary forms into its understanding without losing either of them
>Conclusion: Therefore the mind is immaterial

Descartes:
>P1: It is conceivable that the mind is capable of existing apart from the body
>P2: Therefore it is possible the mind can exist apart from the body
>P3: Therefore the mind and the body are not identical à la the indiscernibility of identicals
>Conclusion: Therefore, my mind is not identical with my body

Which is better?

>>17924439 (OP)
Hylomorphism is much sturdier than Cartesian dualism as it at least has an answer to the problem of interaction.

>>17924587
Could you go more in-depth please? Curious.

>>17924605
There's no real "division" in hylomorphism because matter and form provide a synthesis through which objects actualize. For Aristotle, form is a property embedded into things, not a transcendental otherworldly entity.
The Cartesian "ghost in the machine" on the other hand posits the mind and the body as two distinct categories of things that exist, and the mind is basically piloting the body like a gundam. But if they're not made of the same substance and are ontologically distinct, how do they connect? You can also throw Bradley's regression to further complicate it by then asking how each side connects to the means by which they connect etc in an infinite chain. Aristotle himself had already put forth a similar issue with his "third man problem" criticism of Plato's form-matter dualism, which he patches with his new interpretation of forms.

>>17924439 (OP)
>philosophy
LOL!

>>17924439 (OP)
Seems to me that Aristotle's argument is definitely stronger. It relies on accepting controversial aspects of his philosophy, but within that framework it's solid enough. Descartes's is just
>These things don't seem the same to me therefore they're not
like come on, man. It's perfectly conceivable that water could be something other than H2O, but nevertheless it is identical with H2O.

I'm far from an expert, but Descartes’ feels more commonsensical.

>>17926178
Descartes's argument is like an even more retarded version of the ontological argument.