Thread 213775949

Essentially the postmodernist country

>>213775949 (OP)
There's a running joke in leftist communities that Japan is the first post-modern country. In truth it's Greece, Brits and Russians waltzed in there said they knew the true history of the Romaniote people that lived there, made up some conlang out of the old Greek koine language, and then constructed a nationality around it that no one understood. At one point 'Greeks' would attack Brits speaking Greek because they thought it was Turkish (which they also didn't have a clear understanding of). It's hard to pin the US as the first post-modern country because of its attachment to the bible for narrative purposes, essentially replacing the Catholic narrative for a different universal narrative. Greece and Japan more or less destroyed the old narratives and blended it with modernism and nationalism, I'd say nationalism has a distinct post-modern quality to it because it expressly rejects universality and the narrative boils down to 'whatever state says' it's part of the reason they all make up their own special languages that go through drastic reforms as their polity shifts. Perhaps the Jacobins could be the true origin of this, but they never established a state or country for that matter.

>>213777307
A slight correction to you, nationalistic self concepts aren't as fluid as "whatever state says" because too strong a switch will heavily damage their legitimacy, given that there's a limit to rhetorical spin. Especially "foundational" myths are hard to change at will, and it must be noted that those myths are often relational to old narratives; even in places like Japan or Greece. They're usually crystalization of preexisting narratives that can be used used to justify and then pushed onto the population rather than entirely arbitrary/random, even if they were initially cherrypicked for efficiency in many cases. But mayhaps I am coping because I love Japan. I think the USA has a stronger case for postmodernism if you argue that their current spins on foundational myths constitute simulacra. Anyways look at this photo I took in Japan

>>213778074
Foundational myths are pretty easy to change especially compared to the bible since most of them are orally transmitted and some 'recent archaeological findings' can completely shift the narrative. I can't change Catholicism, insofar as I can change the catechism. I can't change the moral principles of the US insofar as I can change the bible or constitution. If everything was purely founded in myth it can be changed in a heartbeat, both Japan and Greece had something like 3 or 4 language reforms in the span of 50 years, in the case of Japan you basically need to learn an entirely different language to read Buddhist texts. Also a lot of the early national myths were part of some greater narrative that just never happened, like the Japanese/Greek founding myths have striking parallels to Babylonian mythology, so there was always this universalist Babylon/Aryan/Greater Tartaria narrative lurking in background as if someone had an idea for some mythologically based socialism. I'd even say postmodernism is a pre-requisite for any sort of mass culture, pretty much everywhere in the world had isolated local cultures that were swallowed whole by national polities. At the very least socialism abandons post-modernism, but even then you need to replace the old narratives to implement it like what Germany did with Thule/Hyperborea/Aryanism over the old Catholic system.

>>213778473
I see what you’re saying, but you’re visibly overestimating how easy it is to rapidly swap certain nationalistic myths out. Yes you can recontextualize old myths with new findings, but too sharp a change too fast bleeds legitimacy heavily. You’re also overestimating how genuinely universal myths from Catholicism are in practice; even Catholics are ready to admit that new interpretations of the text can and do emerge all the time, and part of the reason the Bible has remained a foundational myth-box for so long is that it’s esoteric enough to allow for any interpretation if you want to spin it that way. Still, it’s similar to a nationalistic self-concept insofar as you can only nudge it without experiencing narrative rupture/legitimacy bleed. Foundational nationalist myths like “we are the nation of free speech” can’t just be thrown out overnight and replaced by their polar opposite without the state suffering a total legitimacy collapse. Japanese/Greek language reforms only worked because they were within rhetorical spin’s limits to frame them as recovery/refinement of preexisting language rather than actually “new.” Mass culture cannot survive on pure arbitrariness; the narrative still has to look like it came out of what happened before, and there is a limit to what can be done there.

>>213777307
>>213778074
>>213778473
>>213779152
i read the first post
thats it

>>213775949 (OP)
No that's Canada

>>213779152
It takes way more effort to replace clearly written laws and customs with mass culture that has no basis constituting it all, it's purely arbitrary. Germany shifted from Thule to Aryan to German in the span of a decade and Greek shifted from Roma to Byzantine to Hellene then ping pongs between Byzantine and Hellene whenever Russia or Anglos decide to call in political capital. The narrative only goes as far as the political body needs it there's quite literally nothing validating it other than state. And with every change they'll say it's always been like this, even the USSR had more integrity than this. It's fine for touristy things, but even comparing Japan in Showa to Heisei feels like an entirely different country. Let's give an example. I've asked a weeb once about why Japan doesn't have garbage cans, he said that it's an ancient tradition of politeness and harmony. I look it up and it turns out they only implemented this because of Shoko Asara's sarin gas attack in the 90s. I did some more research and turns out that 90% of Japan's modern skyline was built after the 90s and most of the cities weren't hooked up to sewers until the 2000s. In fact salaryman culture didn't even exist until the late 80s most people were chain smoking blue collar workers before that. So culture changes rapidly to the point of complete unreliability, even Hegel the guy who says that a state's power is absolute thought that history was insufficient to legitimize power of state because every history event can't be understood holistically. When mass culture is too radical for even Hegel you have a problem.

>that has no basis constituting it all
Are you okay?

>the concept of essence
>post-modern

Lmao.

>>213779989
it feels as though you're reading my posts with the intent to prove them wrong reactively rather than actually reading what I'm saying lol. For starters, Germany’s rapid myth swapping was only possible in the wake of a legitimacy collapse. There was this obscure event at the time called World War One, it created a narrative vacuum that countless myths tried to fill afterwards. As for Japan, you're also seemingly ignoring the fact that similar incidents have happened in other places and they've reacted entirely differently. Japan's specific reaction was the result of their preexisting cultural narratives around order, modernity, social roles, etc. Also, you're clearly flattening Hegel. His point wasn't "the state has unlimited power and is above the narrative" but that "the state exists as the extant manifestation of all social drives," those drives being shaped by the narratives. I'm not even sure if you've read Hegel, Sittlichkeit is pretty unambiguously interpreted like this. I'll give an example. If America thought it would "benefit" from it, could it simultaneously declare war on the world, starve its population, make the entire population learn Swahili, force adoption of jellybeans as currency, and change the national anthem to Gangnam Style without suffering a legitimacy collapse? No, it couldn't. Rhetorical spin has a hard ceiling based on legitimacy and cultural boundaries. I don't understand how you don't understand this if you're referencing Hegel.

>>213781034
I've read 'End of History' the entire book was exactly about the state transcending social contracts (Rosseau's general will) and it not being an artificial construction but some manifestation of higher ethics. It's Protestant ethos through and through, a core component of Lutheranism was that state was divinely appointed and that every person is a priest. Hegel says that there's no moral lessons to be learned from history because no one learns anything from history, he thought a logical or ethical framework had more of a claim to legitimacy and was more predictable than historic narratives. Not even Marx (who was very much into Hegel) claimed that history repeats or could replicate itself, which is a materialist failure since any single science demands that you be able to replicate results for something to be a viable theory. I hate when people overcomplicate Hegel, he's not that profound unless you're reading about his philosophical work. I'm not a Hegelian, I know he was extremely pro-state in the Protestant tradition and rejected the idea of historical/mythological legitimacy. Incidentally he's the one that started a major push for constitutional monarchies to begin with for this exact reason, which virtually every country has now.

>>213782294
> > 213782294
> I've read The End of History the entire book was exactly about the state transcending social contracts (Rousseau’s general will) and it not being an artificial construction but some manifestation of higher ethics.
Ok. I don't care. Appeal to authority, and not even the right one. Fukuyama isn’t Hegel. Simultaneously a strawman. You're framing me as though I deny transcendence, which I never did.
> It’s Protestant ethos through and through, a core component of Lutheranism was that state was divinely appointed and that every person is a priest
False equivalence. Pretending Hegel's philosophy is entirely Lutheran theology ignores the very obvious fact that everyone and their mother who has read him identifies it as distinct. You can’t just force that to be true by saying it.
> Hegel says that there’s no moral lessons to be learned from history because no one learns anything from history...
Strawman again. Hegel didn’t reject historical or mythological legitimacy outright; he explicitly describes them as merely insufficient on their own without the ethical life of the people. + No moral lessons =/= history is irrelevant. Hegel very literally describes history as the unfolding of freedom.
> Not even Marx claimed that history repeats or could replicate itself, which is a materialist failure since any single science demands that you be able to replicate results for something to be a viable theory.
Category error. You’re applying hard replicability standards to historical theory, this would get you laughed at in any serious setting.
> I hate when people overcomplicate Hegel, he’s not that profound...
Thank you for your bare assertion of your opinion. I don’t care about your personal perspective on Hegel when you’re trying to frame him objectively.
> Incidentally he’s the one that started a major push for constitutional monarchies...
This wasn’t started by Hegel. Objective historical inaccuracy.

>>213775949 (OP)
Yeah.. even most of their architecture (suburbs) is postmodern.

>>213782294
Oh, and you entirely ignore actually countering my point about there being functional limits on legitimacy. You are visibly choosing to just throw logical fallacies/inaccuracies at me in order to preserve your previous schema of meaning. It was fun at first, but youve collapsed into reactionary defensiveness. And I'm being character limited. Take care! Try actually reading the traditional Hume->Kant->Hegel line before shouting literally famous inaccuracies about him on a Mongolian basket weaving forum, you clearly would like to take yourself seriously.