Thread 16815920

(1/2)

Let's suppose Dennett et al were right to claim P-zombies are incoherent. But the P-zombie is basically a strawman. What stops me from inventing a better zombie that conforms to materialist assumptions while undermining them? For the sake of argument, I'll adopt these criteria:

1. Subjective experience necessarily reflects brain processes
2. External behavior necessarily reflects brain processes
3. Altering or removing any aspect of experience implies relevant and observable changes in brain structure and external behavior

Fair? Fair. Now forget about P-zombies. What about N-zombies? The N-zombie "mind" operates in purely abstract, relational terms. To it, "red" is defined entirely by how it relates to other abstract ideas: it's the label for a certain stimulus, the opposite of blue, "the color of passion" (which, in turn, is the emotion of red) etc - it's whatever can be analyzed and communicated, but not an aspect of direct experience. Same goes for any other concept normally relating to experience.

By definition (which I made up, as I have the right to do) the N-zombie lack a "subjective experience" in any meaningful sense; there's nothing analogous in his "mind". If the notion of qualia is a misunderstanding, it lacks the necessary ingredients to form such misunderstandings.

The N-zombie is artificial. It doesn't have a brain identical to a human's. Instead, it has precisely the kind of brain needed for the aforementioned mode of cognition, abiding criterion #1 by definition. Externally, the N-zombie is (almost) indistinguishable from a normal human. Its behaviors (including "subjective" reports) are driven by some abstract model of the world/the self, which is (almost) structurally idential to a normal human's. Anything of a purely relational nature can be faithfully captured and reproduced by the N-zombie's cognition.

>>16815920 (OP)
(2/2)
However, there ARE some things humans do, that the N-zombie won't do. It will never independently come up with the idea of qualia. It will never claim to have a soul. It will never spontaneously form metaphysical beliefs. The N-zombie is an innate materialist who can't trick himself with nonsense like consciousness and P-zombies. Therefore he conforms to the 2nd and 3rd criteria: granted, individual humans can be like that, but it's not uniformly characteristic of humanity, the way it is with N-zombies.

Since a N-zombie is mostly indistinguishable from a human, you'd expect its neural architecture to be analogous on some level of abstraction; particularly, the level where materialists start throwing around terms like "substate independence" and "functionalist equivalence". Now here's the thing: neuroscientists can't just look at a biological brain and take it in wholly, with every physical detail figured in on every level. Finite minds have to rely on abstractions and create models to deal with complexity. But models are all about structure and relationships. Since the N-zombie retains all the proper relational aspects of cognition, and they're the only ones a subject can communicate and the experimenter can confirm, one can start with a normal human brain and happily abstract things away, accidentally arriving at the N-zombie. If that happens, how would materialists know it? The only observable difference would be that if one were to manufacture such a brain from scratch, according to the model, they'd sometimes get a synthetic Dennett but never a synthetic Chalmers.

>>16815921
>However, there ARE some things humans do, that the N-zombie won't do. It will never independently come up with the idea of qualia. It will never claim to have a soul. It will never spontaneously form metaphysical beliefs.
So what's the point then? What are you trying to prove here?
>one can start with a normal human brain and happily abstract things away, accidentally arriving at the N-zombie. If that happens, how would materialists know it?
I don't see how this is a problem for materialism. You are changing both the subjective experience and material reality at the same time, by your own admission. It would only be problematic for materialism if you changed one but not the other.

>>16815934
>People who aren't neurotic narcissists are le zombies

science?

>>16815934
>I don't see how this is a problem for materialism
A materialist model is unlikely to be able to distinguish an N-zombie from a conscious human. Moreover, it's unclear how you would test if a given model suffers from this flaw. If you implemented it and got a horde of materialists instead of a normal human population, would that indicate to you a deficiency in the model?

>>16815945
>A materialist model is unlikely to be able to distinguish an N-zombie from a conscious human.
Yes it is:
>there ARE some things humans do, that the N-zombie won't do.

>>16815946
If you implemented it and got a horde of materialists instead of a normal human population, would that indicate to you a deficiency in the model? Yes or no?

>>16815946
>>16815948
I'll answer it for you: a honest materialist (which you aren't) would simply say 'yes'. That's not really the crux of the issue. Here's the real question: under what conditions would you attribute this flaw in the model specifically to a lack of consciousness?

>>16815951
Nigga the whole point of p-zombies is that they are exactly the same yet lack consciousness. If you posit n-zomies to lack consciousness, and also have the requisite physical changes to make them non-conscious, you're not able to prove anything. I would even say that if you admit that change a conscious being into a non-conscious requires physical changes, you are yourself a materialist.

>>16815920 (OP)
Can you make a PN junction that the propagation of stabbing only goes one way?

>>16815956
it's almost like brain is material

>>16815956
>If you posit n-zomies to lack consciousness, and also have the requisite physical changes to make them non-conscious, you're not able to prove anything.
As it currently stands, I've been able to prove (unless you find some major flaw in my reasoning) that materialist attempts to explain consciousness can fail to distinguish between a conscious human from the hypothetical N-zombie I described (which IS coherent) and you wouldn't know it, capturing the basic intuitions of the (arguably) flawed P-zombie idea.

>>16815973
Sure, but you proved it only in terms of practical limitations, because we don't have good enough neuroscience yet. Any materialist will admit that.

>>16815973
I can hit you in the head once and you will go anywhere from dead to the so called zombie you speak of, why does material world affect your consciousness? Are you a zombie?

>>16815920 (OP)
>>16815921
This is your daily reminder that philosophy is for faggots.

>>16815978
>you proved it only in terms of practical limitations
No. It's an inherent limitation that stems precisely from denying that direct experience involves any kind of ineffable knowledge. Once you reduce it into things materialist models can deal with (structures and relationships) you inherently open yourself to the N-zombie problem.

>>16815987
sweaty? you don't understand. science having to use abstract models is just a practical limitation. the AI singularity is going to make us all into gods (i mean that in the good, materialist way) with infinite mental capacities. then our new turbo-brains would be able to directly simulate their own matter, giving us a perfect intuitive understanding of how turbo-brains generate techno-divine turbo-consciousnesses. your ideas of science is too narrow and limited because you're not a real materialist science visionary

>>16815987
>you inherently open yourself to the N-zombie problem
But who cares? If you change the structure of the brain you can accidentally remove the part that makes consciousness. Big whoop. That is exactly as expected by materialism.
If you think you have some new amazing argument you should try to state it more rigorously.

>>16816018
He's just mentally ill, let him be.

>>16815920 (OP)
Now let us assume NP-zombies. Are all NP-zombies also P-zombies?

This is all just pseud shit:
Even "standard" P-zombies need not by physically identical in brain structure. That was never part of the thought experiment in te first place. It's just that you wouldn't be able to make the link between any structural differences and consciousness due to the problem of other minds and the hard problem of consciousness.

Your N-zombies do nothing to explore any territory not explored by p-zombies except for the fact that you absolutely could establish a link between difference in brain structure and a persistent denial of one's own consciousness because there's a measurable difference in behavior there.
So you only made the quandary weaker.

>>16816095
I can tell if you're a P-zombie just from your brain scans.

>>16816096
>I can tell if you're a P-zombie just from your brain scans
No you wouldn't because there's no way for you to verify whether I'm conscious.

>>16816097
I can tell you aren't conscious because your poverty ridden ass cannot afford a MRI scan.

>>16816098
Lack of consciousness does not confer a noticeably different set of behaviors.
Kekmate.

>>16816101
Yes it does, inability to procure resources for your bloodline in a heavy surplus is a common sign that consciousness isn't present.

>>16816018
>But who cares?
Anyone who thinks materialist theories can explain consciousness and also smart enough to understand the argument (shouldn't be that high a bar).

>>16816095
>t. N-zombie

>>16816107
The whole point of the thought experiment (at least with P-zombies) is that it's just a regular himan being minus consciousness.
For all we know, the rich and powerful are all P-zombies and consciousness is reserved for low IQ nigger monkeys. Failure to understand this is failure to grasp the breakfast quandary.

>>16816179
Ah yes, those who herd the cattle are the cattle.

>>16816181
Lack of consciousness != cattle. You are imposing your own values on a system that need not necessarily care about them.

>>16816183
Ok cattle. Keep telling yourself that you're conscious while you perform actions chosen for you by someone who actually has a consciousness.

>>16816179
>The whole point of the thought experiment (at least with P-zombies) is that it's just a regular himan being minus consciousness.
Which is arguably an incoherent proposition. This entire thread went completely over your head.

>>16816185
Well I know for a fact I'm conscious by virtue of the fact that I'm experiencing it right now. I can't say the same about you, though I can only assume as much.
In either case, you're missing the point due to low IQ.

A P-zombie would act exactly the same way as a conscious person. They would even be able to communicate novel concepts. The whole argument around P-zombies revolves around the fact that consciousness is an inherently subjective phenomenon and there's no way to prove its existence without having to refer back to your own conscious experience.

>>16816197
Nope, a conscious person would seclude himself from society and start recruiting others for a rebellion.

>>16816193
>Which is arguably an incoherent proposition
I'm not familiar with Dennett's argument but if you think this "N-zombie" idea is a valid rebuttal then it must be pretty fucking stupid.

>>16816201
Once again you are imposing your values on a system that need not care.

>>16816197
>if i assert/imagine something it must true

>>16816205
>I'm not familiar with Dennett's argument
Then why do you keep posting in a thread, every aspect of which simply goes over your head?

>>16816205
The system does not care, yet you participate in it, P-zombie.

It just seems intractable and people continue to debate it for non-truth related reasons. People debating on both sides have professional incentives to continue publishing academically, it’s a popular academic area. They also have incentives to write popphilosophy books on this subject despite the public not knowing what concepts like “token identity,” “qualia”, “modal possibility ” or “Leibniz Law” mean. Frankly people like Dennett overstated their cases that qualia are definitely theoretical constructs with people like Chalmers on the other side pretending there is a modal logic semantics that allows lossless reasoning from epistemic possibility to modal possibility.

I’m going to get into the weeds for a second.
Dennett doesn’t take seriously the possibility of this: causal structures that allow for one-way direct observation for agents in a specific context but agents outside of that context only have reliable inferential knowledge of the causal structures associated with that observation. this isn’t that different from how our knowledge of super distant galaxies would be interpreted by alien archaeologists in a billion years. Qualia really could be this type of causal structure.

Or perhaps the archaeologist wouldn’t have knowledge? But this knowledge gap and the room for imagination it allows shouldn’t be comforting to p-zombie anti-physicalists. Because in what world does a system of logic allow us to have lossless sub-conclusions from an initially weak premise? A logic allowing epistemic possibility to entail modal possibility, really Chalmers? Honestly that should be a sign that the modal logic semantics today are inadequate. The modal logic needed to talk about physicalism, Leibniz Law, modal possibility, just isn’t developed enough to handle p-zombies and refutations of physicalism.

Maybe I’d care about p-zombies or debates about physicalism if teleporters existed. But they don’t. So why care?

>>16816206
It's true by definition.

>>16816209
Why do you keep demonstrating a lack of understanding of the P-zombie thought experiment?

>>16816211
Low IQ moment.

>>16816243
>hey alexa, generate the most intentionally pseudointellectual string of words possible while maintaining plausible deniability

>>16815920 (OP)
I know I'm not an N-Zombie and am a biological human. It stands to reason that other humans that operate on identical principles would function similarly. Everyone can deduce that for themselves. The burden of proof would be on the person who claims N-Zombies exist and since it's impossible to prove, the existence of N-Zombies is not provable so we are back to square one - N-Zombies don't exist.
If you are talking about a hypothetical N-Zombie then yes this would stand but what exactly would you mean to say by that? That a hypothetical entity such and such has such and such properties? You are essentially saying nothing by it.

>>16816248
>brownoid gets filtered by the entire thread
>admits to thinking babby's first thought experiment is hard

>>16816250
>mechanistically spouts a bunch of generic and completely irrelevant "points"
At this point I'm convinced there are no actual humans on this board besides me.

>>16816253
I don't think P-zombies are a hard to grasp idea. I find it harder to understand how you can be so stupid as to misunderstand it in this way.

>>16816262
>I don't think P-zombies are a hard to grasp idea.
You clearly do. It's extremely typical for people who just barely grasp some trivial thing (which they erroneously associate with intellectualism) to claim that anything disputing whatever trivial concept their deficient mind worked so hard to grasp, must come from a misunderstanding of the concept.

>>16816267
The moment you assert that a P-zombie would act any differently from a conscious being, you are failing to grasp the definition of the term.
Now, if you'd like to defend the notion that this thought experiment is "incoherent" then feel free to do so. Otherwise you're just a moron spouting nonsense.

>>16816273
>The moment you assert that a P-zombie would act any differently from a conscious being
Quote the specific post where I asserted this. If you can't consider once again that your IQ is 80 and you're getting filtered by the thread.

>if you'd like to defend the notion that this thought experiment is "incoherent"
Why would I need to defend this notion? Did you read the OP?

>>16816279
>Quote the specific post where I asserted this
There's no ID's on this board. I was using "you" in the collective sense to refer to everyone ITT asserting such.

>Why would I need to defend this notion?
Assuming you're this guy:
>>16816193
>Which is arguably an incoherent proposition
Now you're using the arguable incoherence as a defense for inventing this notion of an N-zombie which, as I demonstrated, is horrifically weak.
See: >>16816095
This whole thread is really quite silly.

>>16816283
>When I claimed that you, specifically, don't understand babby's first thought experiment, I actually meant some abstract collective that I am intellectually superior to
See >>16816267. You're displaying that symptom even more clearly now.

>Now you're using the arguable incoherence as a defense
No, I'm not. I'm explaining to you that you got filtered by the thread. Please re-read the OP. I don't need to "defend" anything.

>>16815921
>Since the N-zombie retains all the proper relational aspects of cognition, and they're the only ones a subject can communicate and the experimenter can confirm, one can start with a normal human brain and happily abstract things away, accidentally arriving at the N-zombie. If that happens, how would materialists know it? The only observable difference would be that if one were to manufacture such a brain from scratch, according to the model, they'd sometimes get a synthetic Dennett but never a synthetic Chalmers.
by literally just noooooticing this pattern?

>>16816464
But such a model fully accounts for the materialist's consciousness, if you go by the materialist's own logic, even though it actually only models the N-zombie cognition. At most, they could say the model is imperfect because it doesn't fully capture human intellectual variation, failing to diagnose the deeper problem that it doesn't account for consciousness at all.

>>16816494
>But such a model fully accounts for the materialist's consciousness, if you go by the materialist's own logic
in their book it does. it successfully models everything you could (meaningfully) say about their mind. so they can claim "see, science has figured out consciousness" and it'd be justified under their own framework. they win. you lose

>>16816494
Well yes. The hard problem of consciousness precludes any empirical measurement of consciousness.
This is no more a "problem" with physicalism than it is a problem for any other framework. You're left just kinda making shit up and assuming things that apply to you also apply to others.

If all synthetic brains trended towards a particular mindset, the physicalist would have to conclude there's some physical phenomenon which is not being replicated during synthesis. And a non-physicalist attempting to use this to justify their viewpoint would be committing a god-of-the-gaps fallacy.

>>16816516
>in their book it does. it successfully models everything you could (meaningfully) say about their mind
In their book, they ARE N-zombies themselves and it's meaningless to claim otherwise. But more generally, there actually is a meaningful difference which I have formulated without invoking anything Dennett fanboys would call "incoherent". That's a flaw in their framework.

>>16816530
> the physicalist would have to conclude there's some physical phenomenon which is not being replicated during synthesis.
See >>16816494:
>At most, they could say the model is imperfect because it doesn't fully capture human intellectual variation, failing to diagnose the deeper problem that it doesn't account for consciousness at all.
And also see above.

>>16816545
>>At most, they could say the model is imperfect because it doesn't fully capture human intellectual variation, failing to diagnose the deeper problem that it doesn't account for consciousness at all.
Sure. In this hypothetical scenario, the non-physicalist would be more correct than the physicalist. However, the physicalist's reasoning is more sound than the non-physicalist.

Physicalist says:
>[thing] doesn't show up in experiment. Therefore there is something missing. Let's look towards the things we know exist for answers.
Non-physicalist says:
>[thing] doesn't show up in experiment. Therefore there is something missing. Let's assert that it has something to do with this thing that fundamentally cannot be measured.

The only reason we're expected to side with the non-physicalist here is because you made us omniscient observers in a contrived situation where the non-physicalist is correct. But nobody would know it in this scenario and the physicalist has more sound reasoning behind his stance. Any non-omniscient rational actor should side with the physicalist.

>>16816594
You just invented some "non-physicalist" strawman out of thin air, as a counterbalance to the demonstrably bogus claim that materialist models can fully account for consciousness.

>you made us omniscient observers in a contrived situation
You are a normal observer in the non-contrived situation of materialist modeling not being able to distinguish between consciousness and non-consciousness, unless you redefine 'consciousness' to coincide with the N-zombie cognition.

>>16816607
>the demonstrably bogus claim that materialist models can fully account for consciousness.
As I said: hard problem of consciousness renders the notion of objectively observing consciousness impossible regardless of what model you use.
It does not follow that consciousness cannot exist in a fully materialist universe.

>>16816607
>You are a normal observer in the non-contrived situation of materialist modeling not being able to distinguish between consciousness and non-consciousness
And this remains true regardless of the model you use.

>>16816628
>As I said: hard problem of consciousness renders the notion of objectively observing consciousness impossible regardless of what model you use.
Materialist philosophers (Dennett being one prominent example) have argued that the "Hard Problem" is meaningless if materialism is true. If his argument is sound and yet the Hard Problem IS meaningful (e.g. if my argument is also sound), it follows that materialism is not true.

>>16816636
>Materialist philosophers (Dennett being one prominent example) have argued that the "Hard Problem" is meaningless if materialism is true
Some do. Others don't. You're attacking one particular guy's argument which is fine I guess, but not a rock solid refutation of physicalism.

The relevant issue at hand is that there is no way of observing consciousness outside the frame of one's own consciousness, since "observation" only makes sense from a conscious frame of reference in this particular context. Even if we found a physical source for consciousness, there'd be no way to verify. Ditto if that source were somehow "non-physical."
Thete does not exist any framework which can rigorously explain consciousness without being inherently self referential.

>>16815920 (OP)
the idea is interesting but it is just "circular" given what you actually believe:
Given your words, I would sum up your reasoning like this:
>an N-zombie is an individual which presents consciences, but it is uncapable to experience it directly ie subjectively. It can only experience it through a certian level of abstraction.
>in any physical or behavioural way, it is identical to a human except on its incapability to "subjectively" experience
>thus it cannot come up indipendently with the idea of qualia etc, as those require subjective experience
>we cannot distinguish it from an human empirically, ie materialism has no tools to explain their existance
>if such an individual exists as it is concivable, metaphysical consicence must exist
There is here a contradiction:
>thus it cannot come up indipendently with the idea of qualia etc, as those require subjective experience
>we cannot distinguish it from an human empirically, ie materialism has no tools to explain their existance
we can distinguish from humans given statement 1, but actually we cannot do it by statement 2: this is possible only if we suppose a priori what we want to prove - the existence of metaphysical consciousness - as we state that our "physical" ways to explore the real cannot tell a differnce that is there; this is only possible if we assume that there is something else than the physical.

>>16816640
>You're attacking one particular guy's argument which is fine I guess, but not a rock solid refutation of physicalism.
It IS a refutation of materialism, unless you can refute either Dennett's argument or mine. I've literally just provided you with the logical reason for this. Maybe both wrong, so the refutation is not "rock solid", but so long as you're not refuting the refutation, the refutation stands.

>The relevant issue at hand is that there is no way of observing consciousness outside the frame of one's own consciousness, since "observation" only makes sense from a conscious frame of reference in this particular conte
Why are you explaining this to me? This is just the basic-ass, infinitely disputed standard fare for this discussion.

>>16816652
>Why are you explaining this to me? This is just the basic-ass, infinitely disputed standard fare for this discussion.
NTA but because you don't to acknownledge this:
>Thete does not exist any framework which can rigorously explain consciousness without being inherently self referential.
These N-zombie discussion makes sense only if we assume a priori that consciousness exists - see my reply >>16816644
It's a circular reasoning: you are just making explicit the metaphysical commitment you are willing to start with.

>>16816652
>unless you can refute either Dennett's argument or mine
1. Define "meaningless" in this context.
2. Explain how your contrived hypothetical makes the problem "meaningful."

>Why are you explaining this to me? This is just the basic-ass, infinitely disputed standard fare for this discussion.
Because any alternative viewpoint to the materialist view hits the same wall that materialist views do (if we exclude this one guy who apparently painted himself into a contradiction).

>>16816659
I saw your reply but there are too many things wrong with it to list. Your attempt at a summary is a bunch of things I didn't write. I can sorta see how you ended up seeing a "contradiction", but read the exchange starting from >>16816464 and it should be clarified.

>NTA but because you don't to acknownledge this:
>>Thete does not exist any framework which can rigorously explain consciousness without being inherently self referential.
I believe no EMPIRICAL framework can do it, but again, this has been the subject of infinite unproductive debates which I intentionally circumvent.

>>16816665
>this has been the subject of infinite unproductive debates which I intentionally circumvent.
That's the point. It's a glaring flaw in your whole argument that you refuse to address.

>>16816660
>1. Define "meaningless" in this context.
If you want to know what materialists mean when they claim the Hard Problem is meaningless, there's a ton of material they have written about it. I don't see why I should be the one making their case. For what it's worth >>16816516 strongly hints at it.

>2. Explain how your contrived hypothetical makes the problem "meaningful."
Because unless you believe that (e.g.) your experience of red is purely abstract and relational, I have formulated a way in which the very act of scientific modeling can accidentally strip it down without the loss being externally detectable, in a way that you can easily grasp the difference and without invoking anything "incoherent".

>>16816673
>It's a glaring flaw in your whole argument
No, it isn't. I embraced the objections raised by one side of the debate to stifle the other, and then integrated them into a thought experiment that undermines that side. But I know you don't understand this point. It suffices to show that you can't actually quote any "glaring flaw", but only go on a boring tangent about how the Hard Problem IS hard.

>>16816673
You know what? If (unlike many materialists), you do accept the Hard Problem, there's no need for the N-zombie stuff. The case against materialism is straightforward: there are a directly observable aspects of reality that are completely impenetrable to materialist reasoning, cannot be logically connected to materialist premises and cannot be formulated in terms of matter. That means materialism is incomplete at best.

>>16816683
>I don't see why I should be the one making their case.
Because it's on you to define the terms of the discussion you are opening.

>I have formulated a way in which the very act of scientific modeling can accidentally strip it down without the loss being externally detectable, in a way that you can easily grasp the difference and without invoking anything "incoherent".
But the consciousness, or lack thereof, is not externally detectable even in your hypothetical. You basically tell us to imagine a universe where synthetic minds consistently hold to a materialist viewpoint and say "materialists wouldn't be able to explain why." We'd still not be able to externally verify their lack of consciousness.

>>16816694
>The case against materialism is straightforward: there are a directly observable aspects of reality that are completely impenetrable to materialist reasoning, cannot be logically connected to materialist premises and cannot be formulated in terms of matter. That means materialism is incomplete at best.
Yeah. Some things are fundamentally unknowable. That is not an excuse to presuppose some other shit to shoehorn in its place.
Non-materialist frameworks run into the exact same problem.

>>16816697
>Because it's on you to define the terms of the discussion you are opening.
They are defined. You just can't accept this discussion has prerequisites you're ignorant about.

>the consciousness, or lack thereof, is not externally detectable even in your hypothetical
Yep. Now I'm thinking maybe you should go and read the OP again?

>>16816698
>Yeah. Some things are fundamentally unknowable.
That's not what that quote says.

> That is not an excuse to presuppose some other shit to shoehorn in its place.
That's not what anything in the thread says.

>>16816665
>Your attempt at a summary is a bunch of things I didn't write
there are five sentences. Try correcting them.
>I can sorta see how you ended up seeing a "contradiction", but read the exchange starting from >>16816464 and it should be clarified.
I think this would lead to just another contradiction.
Can N-zombies think and discuss about qualia even if they never experince it directly?
If no, then yeah there is metaphysical consience - empiricism cannot explain this difference - but I would argue that this is not the case in real life. An N zombie maybe has not the intellectual tools to discuss about them - ie never heard them in their life what a qualia is - but with enough study it can talk about them plenty. It can tell you that seeing red has a je ne se pas which is unique to who sees it without never experiencing it. Which leads to the problem that we cannot prove whether somebody is a N zombie empirically since we cannot "see" how it experiences the world - ie subjectively or not.
You equate this limit of empiricism as its defeat - not understanding that for their point of view there is absolutely no loss. As >>16816516 pointed out for them their model is complete. You say it is incomplete, because you believe that metaphysical consciousness exists. You and empiricism exists in two realities that can understand one another but cannot coexist as you have a "cognitive dogma" that the other does not have.
We could go on like this until the Sun wipes us out.

>>16816707
>They are defined. You just can't accept this discussion has prerequisites you're ignorant about.
If only people who knew or cared what one particular philosopher thought about p-zombies replied to this thread, you wouldn't get any responses.
It's on you to define the term, not on me to fuck off and read some guy's apparently shit argument.

>>16816710
>That's not what that quote says.
It's what I and anyone who's not retarded has been saying since the dawn of philosophy.

>That's not what anything in the thread says.
Materialism is to believe only in empirically verifiable phenomena. If you're advocating for an alternative, you're necessarily making shit up which cannot be observed.
Your argument is god of the gaps.

>>16816715
It actually is on (You) to fuck off. Or at least ask nicely for me to spoonfeed you. Then maybe I will.

>>16816721
>it's my opinion and everyone who disagrees with it is heckin' retarded!!!
Ok. Just don't quote me, then say "yeah" and attempt to associate your unsubstantiated opinion with my substantiated statement. Make your own case.

>Materialism is to believe only in empirically verifiable phenomena
No, that's not what materialism is. Should I spoonfeed you that definition also?

>>16816723
I already asked nicely and you responded by being a cunt.
>>16816727
>Make your own case.
Some yhongs being fundamentally unknowable includes things like solipsism. Any experiment you could perform could be explained equally well by a solipsist vs a non-solipsist model. Therefore solipsism is fundamentally unknowable.
There: proof by example. Which is, funny enough, also an example of how a non materialist framework couldn't prove consciousness in other minds.

>that's not what materialism is. Should I spoonfeed you that definition also?
Go ahead. I guarantee it will only be different from my description in a very pedantic sense.

>>16815920 (OP)
But I did have breakfast this morning.

>>16816738
>I already asked nicely
No, you're acting like your ignorance about a prominent materialist criticism of the Hard Problem is a fault in my argument. Ask nicely.

>Any experiment you could perform could be explained equally well by a solipsist vs a non-solipsist model. Therefore solipsism is fundamentally unknowable.
That "therefore" is a lie. The second statement doesn't logically follow from the first. I guess you're trying to say that if you can't rule solipsism out empirically, then the truth on that matter is "unknowable", but you never established that empirical inquiry is the only source of knowledge.

>spoonfeed me the bare basics of my own stated position
Ok. Materialism is the belief that matter is the fundamental substance of reality, which everything else stems from. 99.9% of the time materialists are also reductionists and claim that all phenomena are reducible to matter.

>>16816754
But Bubbha... what if-

>>16816763
>Ask nicely.
>>16816660
>Define "meaningless" in this context.

>you never established that empirical inquiry is the only source of knowledge.
Even a sensation of divine revelation via noetic faculty or whatever could be explained by a solipsist model.

>Materialism is the belief that matter is the fundamental substance of reality
Most materialists support Einstein's Relativity which indicates energy is more fundamental than matter.

>>16816772
>Even a sensation of divine revelation via noetic faculty or whatever could be explained by a solipsist model.
Explained how? In a way that makes the true source of that sensation known, I assume? What experiments do you propose to establish that? :^)

>Relativity indicates energy is more fundamental than matter
LOL. Ok, I am definitely arguing with a retard.

>>16815920 (OP)
Q zombies by definition are the minimal substance that can have subjective experiences. It's the Barkleyian idealist's P zombie. H zombies are the same as us except they can't do hypotheticals. What happens if you get lost while you're trying to understand what it's like to be one? Sometimes I can't get up and label myself a couch potato or C zombie in an attempt to shame myself into action.

>>16816851
>H zombies are the same as us except they can't do hypotheticals.
How would you feel if you could do hypotheticals?

>>16816858
I'd be gratified and terrified. It's already a powerful technique in itself, but skill in hypotheticals is a prerequisite for things like shooting lightning bolts emdash that is comma, things that people have to see to have a small chance of believing ellipsis...

A broken question. Or the hypothetical faculty is being probed. A hypothetical test of hypothetical ability. If the probe is an Agatha Christie lookalike novel the score is the number of words left after the whodunit inference settles down to the consensus. The psychometricians can't count the hypothetical faculty dancing in the pinhead owing to a lack of breakfast. Results vary after permuting the names. Rawls' new clothes unveil an ethical dilemma.

>>16816887
Anon, you just sound like you're assblasted about something and trying too hard to transmute it into smugness. I'm guessing it has to do with unironically believing neuroscience studies consciousness but not being able pinpoint anything wrong in arguments that refute this.

>>16816095
>Even "standard" P-zombies need not by physically identical in brain structure. That was never part of the thought experiment in te first place.
This is dead wrong. The whole point of zombies is to pose a problem for physicalism. If you admit physical changes it defeats the entire purpose.
Do you have any sources?

>>16816243
>Dennett doesn’t take seriously the possibility of this: causal structures that allow for one-way direct observation
Isn't this just epiphenomenalism? If so, Dennett is certainly aware and surely considers it an invalid position.

>>16816715
p-zombies is a common term in philosophy of mind, read chalmers 1996 or the plato.stanford.edu entry on zombies

>>16817213
>This is dead wrong.
Of course it's dead wrong. Does the lowest-hanging fruit taste good?

>If you admit physical changes it defeats the entire purpose.
Depends on what you take the purpose to be. If you're an empiricist materialist, you have to admit that some physical changes are possible without altering consciousness, or else you end up with an unfalsifiable theory.

>>16817226
>Does the lowest-hanging fruit taste good?
Only thing available here I'm afraid
>If you're an empiricist materialist, you have to admit that some physical changes are possible without altering consciousness
Of course, substrate independence and all that. What's more important is that consciousness changes are impossible without physical changes.

>>16817234
> What's more important is that consciousness changes are impossible without physical changes.
How do you know?

>>16817243
Low quality post. Please try to look at the context when replying. Gosh what a shit thread.

>>16817244
So you don't know?

>>16817244
>look at the context
The context is an argument showing that materialists can and would make that statement in a situation where physical changes ARE occurring and consciousness goes away without their knowing. The alternative is that "consciousness changes are impossible without physical changes" reduces into a meaningless and untestable belief.

>>16817248
>materialists can and would make that statement in a situation where physical changes ARE occurring
Why would they directly contradict themselves? Sounds like a strawman

>>16817256
Because they make broad assertions lacking nuance to score points against dumb opponents, but then introduce "reasonable" provisos when challenged. For instance, they will assert consciousness is inherently tied to physical processes in the brain to dismiss P-zombies, then turn around and also assert "no, that physical change doesn't count" if their favored theory of consciousness is agnostic to certain physical factors. They won't admit changing them can change experience unless they can corroborate that change externally.

>>16817274
Look here:
> a change in consciousness must necessarily be accompanied by a change in physical processes
vs
> a change in physical processes must necessarily be accompanied by a change in consciousness
These are two different cases yet you keep mixing them up.

>>16817283
>These are two different cases yet you keep mixing them up.
You only think so because you are getting filtered by the actual subject of the thread.

>>16817243
>>16817246
>>16817248
>>16817274
>>16817285
dude I'd rather spend my time arguing with an LLM than you, at least they can keep more than 1 post of context in mind, I know you're just trying to get bumps but come on, put in a little effort. Every new reply it's like you've forgotten everything directly preceding.

>>16817292
I don't consider you to be human at this point, but just for the sake of preempting more such spam from your likes, let me spoonfeed you:

There's a popular notion among materialists that a subjective experience, and all external observations that correlate with it, are inherently tied, simply virtue of being different perspective on the same phenomenon. The same structure is reflected through both views. If you figure out this structure and how it relates to physics, you can answer every "meaningful" (by their philosophy) question about consciousness, therefore know all there is to know about it. They'll say asking how the brain "causes" consciousness is nonsense: it's like asking how/why the equation for a circle "causes" a circle - it's not a causal relationship but a logical one.

Under this framework, any change in experience should imply a change in external observations AND vice versa.

>>16817297
>Under this framework, any change in experience should imply a change in external observations AND vice versa.
I would agree with the first but I don't see how the framework implies the second. For example imagine replacing a 1m long nerve with a negligibly short device that delays whatever signal comes over the nerve for exactly as long as it would have travelled through the 1m nerve. Most materialists would say that the subjective experiences are the same in both cases, even though the external observations are different.

>>16817321
>Most materialists would say that the subjective experiences are the same in both cases, even though the external observations are different.
That's exactly the fucking point. They WOULD say this, even though superficially, it contradicts their philosophical framework. When they have to translate that philosophy into scientific practice, they start discarding some external observations (e.g. by abstracting over "irrelevant" details of the biological substrate) and say this is justified so long as the omission doesn't propagate back to the external stand-ins for subjective experience (e.g. subjective reports). This move is based exactly on their philosophical notion that the relationship between the internal and external perspective is bidirectional, such that one is direct evidence of the other: if something doesn't change the "experience" (i.e. subjective reports), it's not a "real" change to the neural architecture and its physical processes, even if it's technically a physical change.

>>16817329
>and say this is justified so long as the omission doesn't propagate back to the external stand-ins for subjective experience (e.g. subjective reports).
I don't think this is a fair characterization of materialism. Obviously you could do some fuckery whereby the test subject would start lying that they are conscious when they're not, instead of telling the truth that they are when they are. You have then broken the causal chain from an actual conscious experience to the report. No materialist would deny that this is (in theory) possible.
But obviously it is a very different kind of change from changing some implementation details of the computational substrate.

>>16817339
>You have then broken the causal chain from an actual conscious experience to the report.
Again and again you're you're getting filtered by the fact that a useful model isn't about "the" causal chain (it being endlessly complex) but some abstraction thereof. Preferably one that finite minds can grasp, and which generalizes to any entity deemed similarly conscious. How do you know you haven't abstracted over something important, without circling back to subjective reports?

>I don't think this is a fair characterization of materialism.
It's not a characterization of materialism. It's an explanation of a (reasonably intelligent) cope from some materialists philosophers who know better than to assert that the brain "causes" consciousness, only to fall prey to the problem of there being no irrefutable external confirmation of anything being caused beyond the body's "outputs". You do that - you open yourself to attacks like the P-zombies or the Hard Problem, which you can do nothing about except to reiterate your dogma.

>>16817360
>Again and again you're you're getting filtered by the fact that a useful model isn't about "the" causal chain (it being endlessly complex) but some abstraction thereof. Preferably one that finite minds can grasp, and which generalizes to any entity deemed similarly conscious. How do you know you haven't abstracted over something important, without circling back to subjective reports?
You are demanding a simplification of the model and then saying that because the simplification can be wrong, materialism is wrong. It's a stupid move.

>>16817383
You are getting filtered by a simple argument and then saying that because you are getting filtered, the argument is wrong. How much chewing your food for you and spoonfeeding am I supposed to do before it's justified to note that you're a fucking retard not worth talking to?

>>16817384
>You are getting filtered by a simple argument and then saying that because you are getting filtered, the argument is wrong.
Bazinga!

>>16817386
Call me back when you can explain how you determine whether or not the "simplification I demand" (AKA scientific modeling) is wrong in the particular way I've described.

I guess the problem here is that most materialists are 80 IQ monkeys with inherently unfalsifiable worldviews, so when you challenge materialist attempts at doing science, they think the situation can be salvaged by appeals to their version of Russell's Teapot which you "can't refute".

holy shit materialist N-zombies BTFO forever

>>16815920 (OP)
>The N-zombie is artificial. It doesn't have a brain identical to a human's.
Can we see some of these brain images/scans with some highlights of the structural differences and the reasons?

>>16818718
Come see me on /med/. Be sure to bring scans of your own brain to help diagnose what caused your nonsensical post.

>>16818725
>nonsensical
Its only nonsensical if the idea of a human like being with an artificial brain that is not identical to human brains is nonsensical.

>>16818737
You can barely form coherent sentences, never mind understanding what you're reading and responding with anything relevant.

>>16818744
Sure, you aren't coping with the lack of any evidence for a human like being that doesn't have a brain identical to a human's, its all just the text pointing out the various flaws in your argument that are barely coherent.
I better not close this thread since you clearly have a lot of important extremely intelligence things to say about zombies.

>>16818750
>coping with the lack of any evidence for a human like being that doesn't have a brain identical to a human's
Maybe if you can explain what I need this evidence for, I'll start coping with it, but for now it's clear you just don't understand what you're reading.

>>16818753
You obviously need the evidence to justify your claim that you have discovered a human like being that has a brain that is distinct from human brains.

>>16819056
>justify your claim that you have discovered a human like being that has a brain that is distinct from human brains
You're hallucinating like a broken bot.

>>16819102
No, its literally in OP's text as the opening of the last paragraph that I directly quoted it, retard.
>The N-zombie is artificial. It doesn't have a brain identical to a human's.

>>16819109
Unironically just take your meds.

>>16819111
Are you on some sort of meds that adversely affect your eyesight and make you illiterate or something? Is this retarded outburst of your just a malding thing related to shitty meds that barely address your shitty genetics?

>>16819133
Nowhere in the OP does it say anything about:
>discovering a human like being that has a brain that is distinct from human brains
So please, take your prescribed medicine and stop posting.

>>16819134
>the N-zombie is (almost) indistinguishable from a normal human.
Which means the N-zombie is human like because it is almost indistinguishable from a human.

>It doesn't have a brain identical to a human's.
ie it has a brain that is distinct from human brains

So feel free to present the evidence that you have found some kind of human like creature that measurably has a brain that is distinct from humans.

>OP describes a concept for a hypothetical situation
>explores logical implications
>retards who didn't learn how to read but DID have breakfast start sperging out and muh evidence

>OP describes a concept for a hypothetical situation
>explores logical implications that apply in a real situation
>retards who didn't learn how to read but DID have breakfast start sperging out and muh evidence

>>16819137
>>16819139
>>explores logical implications that apply in a real situation
No, the logical implications are that if there is actually a real situation where human like beings exist as physically described by OP, then OP would be able to present physical brain imaging that shows the differences he is describing. But thanks for confirming that you are illiterate and all the stuff you kept denying does actually appear in OP's post.

>>16819141
You have a literal mental illness, no joke.

>>16815921
>Since a N-zombie is mostly indistinguishable from a human, you'd expect its neural architecture to be analogous on some level of abstraction; particularly, the level where materialists start throwing around terms like "substate independence" and "functionalist equivalence".
That's only a problem for people who actually throw around those terms or believe something in that spirit.

>>16819153
If they don't believe anything like that, they can't claim their preferred model does anything beyond modeling "neural correlates". You can't say "this model explains consciousness" then question the consciousness of some construct that also happens to be modeled by it.

>>16819144
I don't accept diagnoses for mentally retarded dipshits larping as psychiatrists on free websites and neither do any of the other people you try to diagnose out of your own retardation and functional illiteracy, trying going back if you need a pool of retards who not only believe in psychiatry, but believe that there are well trained psychiatrists benevolently working for free on free internet forums.

>>16819167
>You can't say "this model explains consciousness" then question the consciousness of some construct that also happens to be modeled by it.
Ok, but you can say it explains the features of human consciousness but lacks the exact criteria to confirm its applicability in a different context. Your robowaifu may or may not be truly conscious. They don't care, it's a theory about humans.

>>16819181
Then it establishes necessary but not sufficient conditions and potentially conflates structure with substance. In fact the core of the argument is against this conflation, especially with materialists claiming the structure IS the substance, or even that experience has no substance at all. If you're not doing that, I don't care.