>>63933943
>Never quite understood why Hitler prohibited Airborne Assaults after Mercury
1. Aircraft losses, Ju-52s were already in short supply due to commitments in North Africa and the soon-to-be Eastern Front and the loss of nearly 200 of them meant that they could no longer be massed for large combat operations. For the Stalingrad airlift, they literally had to pull Lufthansa airliners out of service because not enough Luftwaffe Ju-52s were available.
2. The Fallschirmjägers' equipment shortcomings had become apparent during Crete. They could not reliably go up against even light tanks and expect to prevail, and the Red Army the Germans would soon be facing had the largest fleet of tanks in the world (even if the majority of them were obsolete shitboxes, they were still sufficient for dealing with paratroopers).
3. The Luftwaffe going forward wasn't really able to achieve consistent control of airspace over hostile territory. Even in the USSR where the Luftwaffe was racking up 100:1 kill ratios, the sheer number of planes the VKS could put into the air at any given time meant that flying a slow unarmed transport over Soviet-held territory carried enormous risk (even a single I-16 slipping past the escorts could absolutely fucking massacre a flight of Ju-52s). You saw the outcome of this during the Stalingrad airlift where 266 Ju-52s were lost despite German fighter escorts operating literally out of the pocket until very late in the battle (the last ones evacuated two weeks before the end of the battle).
Allied airborne operations like D-Day, Market Garden, and Varsity were only mounted with total air supremacy where the Luftwaffe couldn't get a plane off the ground without getting swarmed by interceptors.
4. Given how badly the Fallschirmjägers had fared compared to earlier jumps, it was safe to assume that the novelty had worn off and that even costly victories like Crete were likely not going to be repeated in the future.